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Introduction  
 
“There are few nations in the world with which the 
United States has less reason to quarrel or more 
compatible interests than Iran.” (Kissinger [2001]: 
p. 196. also quoted in Balogh-Láng [2007b]: p. 37.) 
 
 
  Henry Kissinger’s words describe well the contradictory and ambivalent nature 
of relations between the United States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The conflict 
between Iran and the US has been high on the international political agenda ever since 
the rupture in the relations of the two entities due to the 1979 revolution in Iran. Many 
theories and many suggestions have seen light on how Washington should handle the 
conflict with Tehran. Despite the large number of excellent experts dealing with the 
issue and the enormous number of works and analysis on the subject, the US has not 
found a way to tackle the challenge posed by the Islamic Republic of Iran. When one 
immerses oneself in the tactical details of a given topic, he or she risks losing the overall 
picture, the “strategic focus” that helps an analyst formulate the most important 
questions.  Thus, a large number of works seem to forget asking the most important 
question: why? What are the causes of two such powers unable to come to terms with 
each other when there had been plenty of opportunities for a “grand bargain” during 
the history of their enmity? Broadly speaking, there were four significant and real 
opportunities for a grand bargain between Iran and the US since the end of the Cold 
War. 
  The first opportunity following the Cold War was the period after the Gulf War 
of 1991. Iran declared “positive neutrality” during the war and thought it would receive 
rewards for being relatively constructive during the military campaign to oust Saddam 
Hussein from power and pushing for the release of US hostages in Lebanon. Instead of 
using the opportunity for rapprochement, the US left a large military force in the Gulf 
after the conflict with Iraq, which Iran viewed as a hostile measure.    
  The second opportunity after the end of the bipolar world order came under the 
Clinton presidency (1993-2001) and the Khatami (1997-2005) administration. It is 
important to look at the wider context here. The Clinton administration tried to apply a 
new approach to the Middle East in general. It initiated the Oslo Process, which seemed 
to be successful at the beginning, but it began stalling by 1997-1998. The Clinton 
government also introduced the policy of “dual containment”, the aim of which was to 
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contain both Iraq and Iran at the same time. However, “keeping Iraq in the box” did not 
stop Saddam Hussein from breaching the terms agreed upon at the end of the Gulf War 
and under subsequent UN Security Council resolutions.1 In Iran’s case, sanctions were 
introduced against the Middle Eastern country in order to implement the policy of dual 
containment. Engagement toward the Khatami administration was a success initially, 
but hard liners in Tehran as well as hawkish political forces in the US seemed to have 
isolated the Iranian president and the Clinton administration, respectively. Still, 
President Clinton got quite far in trying to bring about a change in the stalemate that has 
characterized US-Iran relations since 1979. Despite those limited results, the initiative 
failed. Even though the constellation of international factors was relatively ideal for 
rapprochement, domestic factors proved to be obstacles on the way towards the 
normalization of relations. Thus, the second opportunity was missed and most of 
President Clinton’s policies in the Middle East could not reach their objectives. Events 
seem to suggest that containment and aggressive policies do not seem to work – 
engagement on the other hand, almost brought substantial results. The dissertation 
wishes to shed light on why engagement did not work in the end and why the 
opportunity was missed after all. 
  The third opportunity presented itself under the tenure of George W. Bush. The 
Bush administration’s foreign policy strategy was defined by the “Global War on 
Terror” (GWOT) and extensive reliance on military force. It was not surprising at all 
that the excessive use of US military power could not remedy the problems of the 
Middle East, much less realize the strategic interests of the United States. Afghanistan 
was a success initially, but the US administration already had its eye on Iraq by then. In 
fact, the issue of regime change in Iraq had been debated in Washington’s intellectual 
and policy circles since the Gulf War. The US gave special emphasis to the doctrine of 
preemption and confronting state sponsors of terrorism, thus, Iran was labeled as a 
member of the “axis of evil” in the beginning of 2002. Clearly, the Bush administration 
wished to send a strong psychological message that states sponsoring terror will share 
the destiny of Saddam Hussein’s regime. The “psychological spillover effect” caused by 
the fear of further US military interventions after the toppling of the Iraqi regime may 
have initially contributed to creating the necessary conditions for another grand bargain 
                                                 
1 This was at least the perception of US officials. For an excellent account of how the US and the world 
was deceived by Saddam Hussein concerning Iraqi WMD programs, see: Daalder, Lindsay [2005]: p. 
152. 
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between Tehran and Washington. This is suggested by the May 2003 Iranian offer, 
which touched upon most of the sensitive issues between the two parties. No doubt, fear 
of US intervention played a role in Iran’s offer. (Ross-Makovsky [2009]: p. 190.) As a 
result, Iran was convinced that the United States really had the power to change regimes 
in the Middle East. Nonetheless, the author argues that Iran’s offer was a direct 
consequence of the Iraqi invasion to a very limited extent. In fact, Iranian willingness to 
cooperate emerged in the lead up to the Afghanistan intervention. Thus, Iran was 
already willing to engage the US even before the invasion of Iraq, meaning that it was 
not necessarily the invasion itself, which motivated Iran to pursue engagement with the 
US. Thus, aggressive US policies may not have had the effect ascribed to them by 
many.  
  Regardless of what spurred Iran to engage the US, instead of making the most of 
the opportunity, Washington rejected Tehran’s offer and kept pursuing the Bush doctrine 
– clearly, another opportunity missed. The aggressive policies did not seem to be paying 
off – Iran took a confrontational course and did all it can to roll back US influence in the 
Middle East, significantly weakening Washington’s position in the region. Washington 
rejected the opportunity that could have led to the normalization of relations between 
the two entities.  This was a result of pure miscalculation and an ideological mindset 
that reflected confidence in the US ability to change regimes in the region and engineer 
new states and societies.  
  The fourth opportunity came in the form of the P5+1 negotiations under the 
Obama administration. Both rounds failed in Geneva and Vienna in the fall of 2009. 
This time it was Iran who rejected the offer – again. This instance was quite similar to 
how the engagement efforts of the Clinton administration ended: the US government 
wanted a deal, but the policy of engagement failed due to domestic politics in Iran and 
the US. Still, Obama got further than any other US president in trying to foster a new 
kind of relationship between Tehran and Washington. 
  It is instructive that a grand bargain seemed most likely when Clinton’s second 
and Khatami’s first presidential terms coincided. These two leaders were willing to 
compromise. However, Bush took a harder stance than his predecessor and détente with 
Khatami, a reformist, was not on the agenda anymore. Even though Bush’s first term 
coincided with a moderate Iranian presidency, a bargain was not likely due to 9/11 and 
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the implementation of the Bush doctrine. When Mahmud Ahmadinejad2 was elected, 
meaning he would be the Iranian leader President Bush would have to deal with during 
his second term, rapprochement was out of question because both leaders were less 
willing to compromise, and they were also more aggressive than earlier leaders of their 
countries. President Obama was less aggressive in his approach and his efforts almost 
bore fruit. There seems to be a pattern, a distinct dynamic behind all this: when the US 
pursues a “milder” approach, it has the chance of fostering a dialogue – a pretext for a 
bargain. However, this does not guarantee a bargain, but it does keep the option open – 
something aggressive policies surely cannot.  
  The hypothesis of this work is built around the pattern identified here (to be 
specified in the following chapter). The author wishes to contribute to the debate on the 
US-Iran stalemate by providing a possible theoretical explanation as to why United 
States policies have failed to provide a solution to the conflict so far. The ambivalent 
nature of US-Iran relations highlighted by Henry Kissinger is reminiscent of Thomas C. 
Schelling’s theory about conflicts. Every party to a given conflict has common interests 
despite the obvious clash of their respective interests. Thus, every conflict is a 
bargaining process – one that is marked by threats, incentives, the offer of “carrots and 
sticks”. (Schelling [2008]). The United States and Iran clearly have reasons to 
cooperate. Conjecture and intuition are indispensable assets in research, no matter how 
subjective they maybe. They lead one to believe that aggressive US policies vis a vis 
Iran could be counterproductive – this is the central argument of this dissertation.  
  Although the thesis is about US strategy towards Iran, the aim of this 
dissertation is twofold. First, the author wishes to contribute to the literature on the 
theory of strategy, more specifically, the theory of foreign and security policy strategy. 
An attempt is made to introduce an alternative way of thinking about foreign and 
security policy strategies. Second, the dissertation wishes to present a case study to 
provide evidence that the theoretical approach the author applies holds water in reality.  
  Thinking in an alternative context about foreign and security policy strategy 
does not imply the introduction of a new and fully coherent theory. Rather, the author 
wishes to contribute to existing knowledge by suggesting a new philosophy or 
‘metatheory’ of foreign policy strategy. This philosophy is manifested in taking an 
“indirect approach” to foreign policy strategy. The concept is taken from military 
                                                 
2 Mahmud Ahmadinejad was elected president of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 2005. He was reelected 
after a disputed election in 2009. 
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strategist and historian B.H. Liddell Hart’s concept on military strategy, something the 
dissertation will elaborate on in more detail. This is not entirely without precedent – 
others have applied this approach to US foreign and security policy before (see below). 
However, as the author puts forth, most of those works do not precisely elaborate on the 
theoretical dimensions of the approach. The theory of an indirect approach to foreign 
and security policy strategy is “under-theorized”.   
  Philosophy in this context is less accurate than theory. Philosophy orients 
whereas theory directs the mind. Nonetheless, even orientation could be viewed as an 
asset in the present globalized world, where foreign policy strategists have difficulties 
finding points of reference for trying to determine the direction of policies.  
  What are the social scientific and practical results of a dissertation built around 
the above conjecture? If this dissertation is capable of proving the counterproductive 
nature of aggressive US policies toward Iran, then it will also be able to provide 
answers to the following questions: 
 
 What are the consequences of taking a tougher stance towards Iran? 
 Why have aggressive policies toward Iran failed so far? 
 If they have not failed, what are the reasons? 
 What is the way out of such a stalemate?  
 
In more general terms, the findings may suggest answers to the following questions: 
 
 What could be the consequences of aggressive foreign and security    
policies?  
 Do aggressive policies pay off in the long run in general?  
 In what circumstances do they pay/ do not pay off?  
 
The author deliberately put “suggest” in the previous sentence, since it is obviously 
beyond the limits of this thesis to answer all of these questions properly. Nonetheless, if 
the methodology applied here shows the correlation the author proposes, then a 
significant part of this topic could be discovered. An additional result of the thesis 
would be to deepen our understanding of foreign and security policy strategy in order to 
enrich the theory of international relations by importing new concepts from strategic 
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studies. 
  The first part of the dissertation introduces the hypotheses and it describes and 
analyzes the methodology used in the dissertation. The second part provides the case 
study which tests the author’s hypotheses from the start of the Clinton administration to 
the 2010 beginning of the popular uprisings in the Arab world. Part three is the 
concluding chapter, which introduces a possible philosophy for dealing with the present 
stalemate. This final part also draws up the main theoretical and practical implications 
of the study.   
 
 
 
I. HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY: 
TOWARDS AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO 
FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY STRATEGY 
 
 
1. Why the US and Iran? 
 
  First, the author has to provide a sound explanation as to why the US and Iran 
have been chosen as the subject of this work. The methodological reasoning for 
selecting these two entities is based on the following considerations.  
 
1. The US-Iran stalemate as an ideal ground for testing the theories of the thesis. The 
dynamic of US-Iran relations provide an excellent theoretical terrain for testing the 
concept applied in the thesis. The stalemate between the parties has remained 
unchanged ever since 1979. Nonetheless, there have been (missed) opportunities for a 
“grand bargain”, which has never been realized. At the same time, there are a number of 
examples when US foreign policy strategy3 took an “aggressive” course in the Middle 
East, and, contrary to Washington’s expectations and intentions, Tehran managed to 
enhance its influence in the region. It is logical to ask why, since there has to be a set of 
factors, which explain this. Because there are numerous signs of this dynamic, 
                                                 
3 The author uses foreign policy in a sense that incorporates security policy as well. Sometimes security 
policy will be explicitly mentioned separately. Also, the term “foreign policy” is understood to be 
synonymous with “foreign policy strategy.” The author will elaborate on this in more detail in the chapter 
on the formulation of the hypotheses. 
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conjecture leads one to believe that there is a pattern behind this phenomenon.   
 
2. The US is still the most powerful nation in the international system. With its 
abundance of resources it is the state that faces the highest number of (grand) strategic 
choices over time. It has the most significant ability to combine given tools with given 
goals in order to attain the latter. Therefore, it is an ideal “model” for analyzing how 
great powers think in strategic terms and how they implement strategic concepts. 
 
3. There is sufficient literature on US strategy and grand strategy to provide enough 
researchable sources for the academic analysis of the issue. There is an abundance of 
work on US foreign and security policy and the Iran policy of the US in particular.  
 
4. The relative transparency of US foreign and security policy-making. It is easier to 
examine US foreign policy decisions, since the US foreign and security policy 
community provides more transparency than other countries, e.g. Russia, where foreign 
policy is still considered to be “tsarskoye dolye” – a privilege of the few within the 
elite. (Trenin-Lo [2006]: p. 12.) The same is true of most other great powers, most 
notably China and India. Therefore, given the lack of transparency in these cases, the 
US seems to be the most ideal great power for studying how great power strategy works 
in practice. 
 
Why should one choose Iran instead of any another relationship of the US? As the most 
powerful state, the US has relations with most states of the international system and it 
has a number of conflicts with various different actors. Thus, why does it make sense to 
analyze US Iran-policy when discussing the theory of foreign and security policy 
strategy, rather than, for example, US foreign and security policy towards China? The 
author provides the following reasons to answer that question: 
 
a. Again, the US-Iran stalemate as an ideal ground for testing the theories of the thesis. 
(See above.) 
 
b. The significance of the conflict between the US and Iran. The conflict is relevant 
from the perspective of international security, economy and Middle Eastern peace and 
stability. The way it is handled will have a profound impact on the wider Middle East.  
16 
 
c. The comprehensive use of US national resources to handle the Iranian challenge. 
Washington uses multiple types of national tools to overcome the Iranian challenge – it 
pushed for the adoption of UN enforcement measures and it introduced its own 
sanctions against the Islamic Republic. Washington has at least one US aircraft carrier 
patrolling Gulf waters and it tried to up the ante on Iran by placing diplomatic pressure 
on the regime in Tehran. In other words, the US is pursuing a strategy that is based on 
the coordinated application of different national resources – political, economic and 
military – in order to bring about a change in Iranian policies. Thus, due to its large pool 
of resources, the US faces a number of strategic options (see above).   
 
d. The perceived Iranian “threat”. Washington feels that the Iranian nuclear program is 
a potential threat to its national security and to the realization of its national interests. 
Therefore, the Iranian case provides an ideal situation for studying how US strategy 
works in practice. It provides a window on how US strategy can or should handle a 
problem – in this case a strategic challenge posed by Iran.    
 
e. The personal interest of the author. Although not an expert on Iran, the author has 
been researching US-Iran relations since graduate school and he has been trying to 
understand the effects of Iranian policies on US foreign and security policy by 
researching Iranian foreign policy as well. Also, the author of this thesis was lucky 
enough to be provided with the opportunity to travel to Iran and familiarize himself with 
the local mindset – a valuable asset when researching Washington’s Iran policy. Again, 
this was a further incentive to bring the scholarly interests of the author (theory of 
strategy, the US and Iran) together in one work. The author hopes that his interest in 
understanding Iranian foreign policy thinking significantly contributed to the quality of 
this work.   
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2. Time Frame 
 
  As far as the time frame is concerned, the interval between the inauguration of 
the Clinton administration and the beginning of the 2010-2011 popular Arab uprisings 
will be researched in the dissertation. The Clinton administration was the first US 
presidency to be inaugurated after the end of the Cold War. By January 1993, the Soviet 
Union had been dissolved and William Jefferson Clinton was the president who 
presided over the first phase of US hegemony in the post-Cold War international 
system. The distribution of power changed in the international system altering the 
international structure. The US had more resources to commit to new priorities in the 
“new world order” – still, it never managed to solve the Iranian problem. Thus, from a 
methodological point of view, it is logical to choose the new set of historical 
circumstances as a starting point for the author’s analysis.  
  The beginning of the Arab uprisings has been chosen as the end of the time 
interval researched for more practical reasons. It is clearly a historical watershed in the 
development of the Middle East that may change the region’s political and social 
landscape forever. These popular unrests pose various strategic dilemmas for US 
policies towards the region and they imply a strategic environment fundamentally 
different from the order that prevailed after the end of the Cold War. The course the US 
takes may have profound effects on the region, as well as its own position within it. This 
specific event, however, will not be examined, only the period leading up to the end of 
2010, precisely because of the watershed it represents. To provide a specific date, the 
author will examine events up to December 18, 2010, the day the first large wave of 
protests began in Tunisia.  
  Thus, the dissertation embraces the tenure of three different US administrations, 
roughly three and a half presidential terms encompassing moments such as the policy of 
dual containment, the Oslo process, Iranian President Khatami’s “dialogue of 
civilizations”, a number of sanctions introduced against Iran, the 9/11 attacks of 2001 
and the subsequent Iranian offer concerning a grand bargain, the Bush doctrine, the war 
on terror, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the overtures of President Obama and their 
failures.  
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3. Hypothesis 1a – The Theory of “Strategic Blowback” 
 
  Having established why the US-Iran bilateral relationship was chosen as the case 
study for this work and what interval the dissertation wishes to examine, it is obviously 
necessary to formulate the main hypotheses (H1a; H1b) of the thesis. The author has 
researched and read a significant amount of books, journal articles, primary sources, as 
well as numerous shorter analyses in both printed and electronic form in order to 
comprehend the nature of the relationship between the United States and the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. History suggests that there is a pattern of confrontational US policies 
backfiring in the long run. Hence, the question arises: is it true that when the United 
States pushes ever harder to isolate, confront, deter and intimidate Iran, Washington 
often makes its own situation more difficult in the long run? In order to prove this, one 
needs to find a general theory that can be used for the specific case of the US-Iran 
stalemate.  
  The blowback dynamism has also been observed by a number of other authors 
and sources, although their observations are not necessarily related to the US-Iran 
stalemate specifically. Most notably, the term “blowback” was first used by the US 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the 50's to “describe the likelihood that … [US] 
… covert operations in other people’s countries would result in retaliations against 
Americans, civilian and military, at home and abroad.” (Johnson [2004a]: p. ix.). More 
specifically, the CIA referred to the problem as follows:  
 
“Possibilities of blowback against the United States should always be in the back of the 
minds of all CIA officers involved in this type of operation” (Appendix E - Military 
Critique - Lessons Learned from TPAJAX, paragraph “O”. [1954]: pp. 21-22.) 
   
 Since this is a term used in the US intelligence community to specifically describe the 
negative consequences of an intelligence operation, it is too “narrow” a definition for a 
dissertation dealing with the overall strategy of the US towards Iran. However, it is 
instructive that the above definition is from a declassified CIA document, the purpose of 
which was to analyze the 1953 coup against then Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad 
Mossadeq. That is not the reason, though, why the author wished to highlight this 
definition. Although a concept used in espionage, the definition describes well the logic 
of “blowback” – the logic around which this dissertation is built.  
  The term was first introduced to the academic literature on IR by the late 
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Chalmers Johnson, former professor of political science at the University of California, 
San Diego. He explains the definition by referring to 
 
“[…] the unintended consequences of policies that were kept secret from the American 
people” (Johnson [2001]: p. 8.)” 
 
In the second edition of the same work Johnson writes: 
 
“In a broader sense, blowback is another way of saying that a nation reaps what it sows. 
[…] As a concept, blowback is obviously most easily grasped in its straightforward 
manifestations. The unintended consequences of American policies and acts in country X 
lead to a bomb at an American embassy in country Y or a dead American in country Z.” 
(Johnson [2004a]:  p. xi.) 
 
In another subsequent work he contends that blowback is to be understood as the 
 
“[…] unanticipated consequences of unacknowledged actions in other people’s 
countries.” (Johnson [2004b]:  p. 8.) 
 
In his 2008 book Johnson sums up the concept as follows: 
 
““Blowback” does not mean just revenge but rather retaliation for covert, illegal violence 
that our government has carried out abroad that it kept totally secret from the American 
public (even though such acts are seldom secret among the people on the receiving end)” 
(Johnson [2008]: pp. 1-2.) 
 
Johnson implicitly argues that the more expansive and aggressive (covert) foreign 
policies the US pursues, the more intensive the blowback effect will be, that is, the 
greater the costs the US is likely to incur in the long run. Johnson’s hypothesis uses the 
concept in general to explain setbacks in US foreign policy since the World War II. He 
brings a number of specific examples, such as the 1953 coup against Iranian Prime 
Minister Mossadeq, the blowback effect of which was partly the 1979 revolution itself. 
However, his account is essentially a criticism of “imperialist” US foreign policies in 
general.  
  Despite the values of Johnson’s works, the author of this dissertation is rather 
critical of his views. Although the blowback theory is an interesting and useful concept, 
the author has not elaborated on the theoretical foundations of it. It is not a coherent 
theory, it is a collection of case studies which may suggest that there may be some 
correlation between covert and aggressive US policies and certain negative effects 
which harmed US national interests. It is not entirely clear that all the examples he 
brings are undoubtedly the unintended consequences of US policies.  
  There is also another reason, which makes the author of this dissertation quite 
20 
 
critical of Johnson’s argument – a reason mostly of a moral nature. The moral scruple 
stems from the automatism suggested by Johnson’s approach. Aggressive US policies 
automatically generate negative reverberations which harm US interests. This 
automatism suggests that it is natural for the US to suffer significant setbacks in its 
foreign policies, because “it reaps what it sows.” He evaluates 9/11 as a blowback, 
which occurred due to US policies in the Middle East. Hence, according to Johnson’s 
implicit logic, the US should not have expected anything less than what happened on 
September 11, 2001 – as if this was the natural state of affairs. This logic is just a step 
away from recognizing the justified nature of the attacks by the perpetrators of 9/11. It 
is natural for them to behave the way they did on 9/11 because the US pursued flawed 
policies. This dissertation aims to provide an objective analysis. It aims to assess US 
policies in a critical manner. It is a work that is indeed critical of many US policies – 
including the Bush doctrine. And there maybe something to the argument that US 
policies had a significant role in the aggressive attacks that occurred in September 2001.  
However, it is obviously morally questionable to suggest something even distantly 
sympathizing with the thought of justifying the acts of those who committed the 
terrorist acts on 9/11.  
  Also, it is difficult to find anything in Johnson’s books that the US did right. 
Surely, there has to be at least some policies, which did work out and served the “greater 
good”, as well as the US national interest. It is this lack of balance that questions the 
objectivity of Johnson’s works. It creates an impression that the United States is bent on 
ruling the entire world and it does so at the costs of applying immoral means to attain 
strategic ends, therefore, it provides a reductionist picture of reality. (Zelikow [2000]; 
Ikenberry [2004]) Mainstream authors within IR in the US are also largely critical of 
Johnson’s work, stressing that his works reflect a significant bias against US policies 
ignoring successful moments and decisions (Ibid.). Having read the book, the author 
found these criticisms to be well grounded, thus, he decided not to build his entire 
argumentation around Johnson’s theory. Nonetheless, the author will use the concept of 
the CIA reintroduced to the discourse by Johnson when defining the “blowback” 
concept, but the author will ignore the rest of Johnson’s argumentation. 
  From a methodological perspective, it may seem like a mistake to “borrow” a 
phrase from a CIA assessment, since it carries risks. It may create the impression that 
the author’s stance is somewhat biased. However, this does not express any positive, or, 
for that matter, negative bias on behalf of the author towards the US or any part of its 
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government. It simply shows that the author found the term to be useful for explaining 
the phenomena observed throughout his research of the topic. 
  Douglas Kellner, professor of philosophy at Columbia University, New York, 
refined the definition used by Johnson. He does not only refer to covert operations – he 
widens the concept when explaining Johnson’s theory.4 He writes:  
 
“[…] the unintended consequences of aggressive military and covert policies […]” 
(Kellner [2003a])5 
 
This formulation is more useful as a definition, since it deprives Johnson’s concept of its 
intelligence background, thus, widening its meaning. Intuition leads one to believe that 
US policies towards Iran, which have caused unintended strategic consequences, were 
obviously not only about espionage. Thus, one has to find a deeper and wider 
formulation for precisely defining blowback and this is also needed for formulating the 
hypothesis.  
  A further step in that direction was taken by Paul Rogers, professor of peace 
studies at Bradford University, Bradford, who criticized the Bush doctrine by putting 
forward that: 
    
“[…] the scale of US military objectives will over time ensure the opposite of what is 
intended.” (Rogers [2002])  
 
 
The article is titled “Strategic Blowback” and this expresses well what the author wishes 
to point out. The definition needs to refer to the significance and the extent of the 
setbacks suffered due to flawed policies. Therefore the term “strategic” is an essential 
part of the concept.  
  Another useful account is the theory of Christopher Layne, professor at Texas 
A&M university. Layne’s hypothesis is that the United States has been pursuing “extra 
regional hegemony” since World War II. It did this not because its security interests 
required it to do so, but because the US has been intent on extending its influence ever 
more. “Extra regional hegemony” (as Layne named this strategy) is not a wise strategy, 
since it makes the US less secure as it provokes the counterbalancing efforts of other 
                                                 
4 It is not entirely clear whether Kellner widened the concept on purpose, because he adds „aggressive 
military policies” to the definition when actually summarizing Johnson’s blowback theory.  
5 Kellner’s book on the Bush administration’s policy considers 9/11 a blowback effect of earlier US 
policies.  (See: Kellner [2003b]) As noted above, the author does not agree, since this strand of thought 
provides a sense of legitimacy to the 9/11 attacks. 
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states and it also “fuels terrorism.” Layne follows a similar logic to that of Johnson’s, 
without the strong bias of the latter.  (Layne [2006]: pp. 5-10.) Layne also uses the 
expression “blowback” and he also borrows it from Johnson. (Ibid, p. 190., p. 278. 
footnote 90.).  
  In fact, other authors and analysts (either implicitly or explicitly) suggest a 
roughly similar dynamic: “blowback” (Maier [2008]: p. 61.); “pushback” (Fukuyama 
[2008]: p. 207; p. 209.); capitalism (one of the engines of which is the US) producing 
technological development causing new threats to emerge, and US military presence 
and cultural influence invoking anti-American feelings in the Middle East (Mead 
[2005]: pp. 60-62.; pp. 81-82.); the “axis of evil” speech driving North Korea and Iran 
“to redouble their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.” (Mearsheimer [2005]). Stephen 
Walt puts forth in his 2005 book that if states and certain other actors do not agree with 
US policies and “are simply concerned about keeping American power in check, then 
US leaders will find it harder to accomplish even worthy objectives.” Such states 
“employ a variety of strategies to thwart US aims and to further their own interests in 
the face of American power.” (Walt [2005]: p. 18.). Former US Vice President Al Gore 
states that: 
 
“Newton’s third law states, “For every action force there is an equal and opposite reaction 
force.” National security policy is very different from physics, but the principles of logic 
and reason turn out to be useful and relevant there, too. And something like Newton’s 
third law does seem to be a reality in international relations. When any nation is seen as 
trying to dominate others, there is a “reaction force” (emphasis added by author, I.B.) 
that pushes back.” (Gore [2008]: p. 161.) 
 
  Thus, there is ample indirect evidence to suggest that the blowback dynamism 
exists in some form or another. Since many theoretical experts have observed it or 
referred to it, there has to be a dynamism which explains these observations. There has 
to be a variable, or a set of variables, either at the structural level or below that, which 
explain this. This conjecture was the basis of the hypothesis developed and tested in this 
dissertation. Of course, a number of these works do not touch upon the exact same 
phenomenon that the author calls “strategic blowback” when describing 
counterproductive processes, still, there seems to be an awareness that such effects do 
exist. Despite being mentioned by a number of well-known authors, the phenomenon 
has not been explained by any theory – blowback theory is “under-theorized”, as noted 
above. The author wishes to remedy this.  
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  Theorizing and generalizing calls for identifying patterns. As it is evident from 
the introduction of the thesis, US Middle East policies suggest such a pattern, especially 
the Iran policy of Washington. The more aggressive Washington pushed, the more 
unintended negative consequences (“strategic blowbacks”) it had to suffer.  
  Thus, this doctoral thesis provides a test of the blowback hypothesis. The author 
applies the theory to US-Iran relations from the Clinton administration to the beginning 
of the Tunisian protests in December 2010. The dissertation seeks to provide sufficient 
evidence to support the blowback hypothesis. Therefore, the central argumentation of 
the author is built around the following hypothesis: 
 
H1a: The more aggressive foreign policy strategy the US pursues 
towards Iran, the more significant strategic blowbacks it is going to 
suffer.  
 
 
The above formulation of the hypotheses calls for the exact definition of expressions 
used. Thus, the following are established: 
  
“aggressive foreign policy strategy”: Any effort on behalf of the US 
government to attack, bomb, deter, contain, sanction, roll-back, intimidate, 
isolate, reject a diplomatic offer from or change the Iranian regime either 
by covert or overt means. 
 
“strategic blowback”: Any unintended direct or indirect consequence of 
aggressive foreign policies where a clear relation to such initiatives could 
be established.  
 
“more”: A larger effort in either qualitative or quantitative terms.    
 
 Any assessment of any foreign policy has to take into consideration the costs 
associated with the path taken. (Baldwin [2000]) The theory of strategic blowback and 
H1a is centered on this notion because it implies that the costs of aggressive action can 
outweigh the benefits.  
 Of course, there are still a lot of problematic issues regarding these 
specifications, since the terms used are rather vague: “clear relation”, “larger effort in 
qualitative or quantitative terms”, not to mention a lack of definition of “foreign 
policy”.  
  There is one more important definition issue that needs to be addressed. The 
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author uses the term “policy” to mean efforts on two different levels. When the 
dissertation uses the word “foreign policy” or “policy”, it is meant to cover a specific 
policy initiative – eg. engaging the Khatami administration. One level higher, the term 
“foreign policy” is used to mean “foreign policy strategy”. There is a hierarchy between 
the two levels – specific policies are subordinated to the overall strategic approach to a 
given region or country, eg.: sanctions against Iran are specific policies which come 
under the heading of the foreign policy strategy of containment. Containment is the 
foreign policy strategy and sanctions are the specific policies (tools) which are applied 
in order to implement the strategy. The difference between the two will be consistently 
indicated throughout the dissertation.6 
  “Attack” would be a ground invasion or any kind of limited overt or covert 
ground operation against Iran. Bombing obviously refers to airstrikes. But how is one to 
distinguish between intimidation and various forms of containment, roll-back, 
deterrence, sanctions or isolation? Indeed, a number of these policies cannot be 
distinguished and various categories will inevitably overlap. Sanctions, for example, 
may fit into the categories of “roll-back” and “isolate” as well. These categories cannot 
be further specified beyond a certain point. Thus, there will be situations where the lines 
between these categories will be blurred and choices made during categorizing may be 
arbitrary at times.  
  The issue of falsification must also be addressed. Some of the above definitions 
are not specific enough. The definition of “aggressive” policies is broad indeed and this 
may risk judging most policies as being aggressive in retrospect, thus H1a cannot be 
falsified. Most US policies will inevitably qualify as aggressive. This is not the case, 
however. Indeed, the majority of US initiatives will be considered “aggressive” – except 
for one, and that is diplomacy. Thus, H1a is definitely possible to falsify, as diplomatic 
initiatives will be considered as nonaggressive policies. Intuition suggests that this is 
logical. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been viewed as the enemy of the US, thus, 
most US policies so far must have been aggressive. If that was not the case, then there 
would be no enmity between the two entities and the idea of strategic blowback in 
relation to Iran would not be of importance.  
 Diplomacy needs to be defined in order to apply the term in the thesis. 
                                                 
6 The “conflation” of strategy and policy (eg. “foreign policy strategy”) pose other methodological 
dilemmas which will be addressed in the chapter on strategic thought.  This logic is taken from: Deibel 
[2007]: p. 11. Figure 1.2. “Policy and Strategy. Spiders vs. Honeybees” 
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Diplomacy is taken to mean efforts by official representatives of the US to pursue 
direct talks and pursuing direct talks with official representatives of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran in the same place at the same time.     
  Finally, implications of the “linkage theory” must be emphasized here. The 
theory of strategic blowback suggests the implicit acceptance of the so called “linkage 
theory”.7 This concept holds that Middle Eastern conflicts are linked to one another, but 
most notably to the Arab-Israel conflict. Dennis Ross and David Makovsky regard this 
approach as a “myth” and provide a rebuttal of the linkage theory. (Ross-Makovsky 
[2009]: 12-30) The theory of strategic blowback questions their claim. In fact, the 
blowback theory provides the strongest evidence supporting the linkage theory yet. The 
US-Iran conflict is undeniably linked to the Arab-Israeli conflict and it is linked to 
several other regional conflicts as well. This is true now, as it was true back in 1991, and 
the two-pillar “peace strategy” of the Clinton administration, in which Dennis Ross also 
served, rests on the implicit approval of this hypothesis too. Otherwise, it would not 
have made sense to isolate Iraq and Iran from the peace process. (See below.) Ross and 
Makovsky claim that a number of Middle Eastern conflicts took place regardless of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. However, most of the conflicts they list as evidence of their 
argument were not the most significant conflicts of the region and did not necessarily 
have the kind of impact on regional security that e.g. the 1967 war had.8 In fact, they too 
implicitly draw on the assumption of the linkage theory when analyzing the possible 
policies of an Iran with nuclear weapons capabilities. They argue that a nuclear weapons 
capable Iran: 
 
“Nuclear weapons capability would surely add to Iran’s ability to twist arms in the region. 
Arab and Israeli leaders with whom we have spoken explain that should Iran possess 
nuclear weapons, they fear that the landscape of the region will be fundamentally altered. 
Iranian leaders, they argue, will feel emboldened to use terror and terror groups to 
threaten or subvert others in the area, including particularly those who might be inclined 
to pursue peace with Israel, knowing that their nukes provide an umbrella of protection or 
a built-in deterrent against responses.” (Ross-Makovsky [2009]: p. 205.)  
    
How could Iran subvert the region if there was no linkage between the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and Iran’s regional policies? How could Iran harass a possible peace process if 
                                                 
7 The term “linkage” or “linkage theory” has been used by the literature in different contexts as well. 
James Rosenau uses the term to describe the connections and interactions between domestic and 
international factors.  (Rosenau [1969a-b]) Henry Kissinger applies the term for package deals which 
create links between distinct policy issues during negotiations. (Kissinger [1994]: p. 714.)  
8 E.g. the revolt of Kurds in 1974, the Egyptian-Libyan conflict of 1977 and the Iraqi coup of 1958. See: 
Ross; Makovsky [2009]: p. 13. 
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it was decoupled from the Arab-Israeli peace effort? Without a linkage, Iran would not 
be able to cause significant blowback effects either directly or indirectly. Thus, this 
dissertation is written based on the implicit approval of the linkage theory.      
 If one wishes to use statistical terminology for describing the above relationship, 
then variable “Xa” stands for aggressive foreign policy strategy toward Iran, while 
variable “Ya” represents unintended strategic setbacks. The nature of the relationship is 
causal, thus, “Xa” causes “Ya”. (“Xa”→“Ya”). “Ya” is the explanandum, “Xa” is the 
explanans, “Xa” is the independent, while “Ya” is the dependent variable. (See: Kiss J. 
[2009]: p. 206.) The relationship is also a positive one: the more aggressive foreign 
policy strategy the US pursues, the more/ harsher harms its national interests are going 
to incur. However, it is also a nonlinear and disproportiante relationship, meaning that 
the rate of change in the independent variable (“Xa” or aggressive foreign policy 
strategy) will not constantly lead to the same rate of change in the dependent variable  
(“Ya”, or “strategic blowback”) either in a relative or a total sense. Putting it simpler, 
the same additional “amount” of aggressive foreign policy strategy will not always 
result in the same additional “amount” of strategic blowback. Figure 1 shows how the 
graph of such a mathematical relationship might look like – it indicates the alternations 
in the rates of change of both variables. 
 
Figure 1.  The Positive and Disproportionate Relationship Between the Variables of H1a and H1b 
 
Source: PakAccountants.com. What is a non-linear variable cost? May 11, 2011 
http://pakaccountants.com/what-is-a-non-linear-variable-cost/ Accessed: 01-08-2011 (The 
author renumbered the original graph) 
 
 
  There is an additional dilemma regarding the relationship between the two 
variables. Could it be that beyond a certain inflexion point additional pressure pays off, 
causing the amount and intensity of blowback effects to reduce, essentially suggesting 
that in some cases aggressive foreign policies do pay off. The author suggests that this is 
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possible in certain cases. A strategy of escalation and pressure may work between 
certain entities. However, it is argued that such an approach would not work in the 
specific case of the US and Iran because of Iran’s regional economic and political 
influence, which may become a source of significant strategic setbacks in case Tehran 
was attacked. The author further elaborates on this issue in more detail in the 
concluding chapter. Thus, naturally, the application of force could be effective in certain 
cases, but conjecture suggests that a strategy of escalation would not work in the 
specific case examined in the dissertation.   
 Beyond other factors, it is exactly the nonlinear nature of the relationship that 
makes it extremely hard to tell just how much “additional” strategic blowback the 
further pursuit of aggressive foreign policies is going to cause. One possible method for 
overcoming difficulties associated with operationalization is applying an ordinal scale to 
describe the relationship between “Xa” and “Ya.” This would mean ascribing larger 
values to more aggressive US policies and blowback effects e.g. a US rejection of an 
Iranian diplomatic offer causing a less significant strategic blowback than a more 
aggressive US policy (e.g. airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities). However, even 
this approach is very problematic, since it ignores a lot of qualitative factors, namely, 
that “aggressive foreign policy” can have different meanings in different 
circumstances.9 
  The problem confronted here corresponds with David Baldwin’s suggestion that 
there is no single analytic framework for measuring foreign policy success or the 
success of one particular foreign policy tool (e.g. sanctions or military force). (Baldwin 
[2000]) Since there are obviously a number of other factors at play, the present 
dissertation will not apply a quantitative analysis, as the author would have to face 
difficult dilemmas during the operationalization of the two variables. Regression 
analysis would be a suitable method if the author was able to convert “Xa” and “Ya” 
                                                 
9 The following is a possible example of such an ordinal scale: [1]: (Xa):US rejection of a diplomatic 
offer – (Ya): Iran continuing its nuclear program; [2]: (Xa): US threatening with the US of force – (Xb): 
Iran taking its nuclear program underground; [3]: (Xa): US arms sales to Gulf allies (Ya): Increased 
Iranian support for Shia minorities in the Gulf; [4]: (Xa): US air strikes against Iranian nuclear 
installations – (Ya): Iranian efforts to close down the Strait of Hormuz. The growing values [1-2-3-4] 
indicate the process of escalation causing increasingly significant blowback effects as a result of Iranian 
reactions. This ordinal scale may look neat from a social scientific perspective; however, it is inherently 
arbitrary. It is obviously difficult to make a difference between some of the possible scenarios, e.g. what 
is more aggressive – Iran taking its nuclear program underground or the decision to further enrich 
uranium? Both would imply possible strategic blowback effects but the difference between the intensity 
of the response is hard to discern. Also, both scenarios could take up different values in different 
situations. Thus, carrying out a quantitative research would be too problematic and poses too many 
dilemmas.   
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into objectively measurable quantities. However, this is not the case, hence, the 
dissertation will conduct a qualitative instead of a quantitative analysis.10    
  The thesis applies a deductive logic whereby the general theory of blowback is 
applied to the specific case of US-Iran relations. It is also inductive in a way, since it 
seeks to come up with generalizations on the dynamism of blowback based on the 
individual case of US-Iran relations. It is not without precedent, that such a dual logic is 
applied – Kenneth N. Waltz used a similar approach in constructing his seminal book, 
Theory of International Politics. He put forward that both deductive and inductive logic 
are needed in order to build theories.  (Waltz [1979]: p. 11.) The assumption inherent in 
H1a is of a descriptive nature – it wishes to shed light on how the dynamism of 
“strategic blowback” works in reality between the US and Iran. 
 
4. Hypothesis 1b – The Strategy of “Seeking the Least 
Resistance” 
 
  The dissertation has another hypothesis (H1b) and it is logically related to H1a. 
In fact, it is not an entirely different hypothesis – it is the inverse of H1a and it has been 
generated by applying counterfactual logic. This work wishes to provide a hint as to 
how the US could find a way out of the present stalemate. If the dissertation succeeds in 
underscoring the relationship suggested by the first hypothesis, then it should also try to 
provide some ideas on how the situation could be remedied. Establishing that aggressive 
foreign policy strategies cause strategic setbacks would be a significant result, but 
suggesting an alternative strategy would represent even more added value both from a 
social scientific as well as from a policy perspective.   
  The author proposes that a possible solution to the present stalemate could be 
applying military theorist Basil Henry Liddell Hart’s indirect approach to strategy. 
(Liddell Hart [1954]) In fact, Liddell Hart was among the first to elaborate in detail on 
the “indirect approach to grand strategy”, which will be of great relevance to this 
dissertation in the subsequent chapters.11 (See: Liddell Hart [1954] p. 18; 33; p. 138.) It 
must be emphasized, that Liddell Hart’s concept has been applied to US strategy before 
                                                 
10 For the dilemmas of operationalization in social inquiry see: King-Keohane-Verba [1994] 
11 Of course, the first one to elaborate on this concept was Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu. (Sun Tzu 
[1988]). Furthermore, Clausewitz also had thoughts built on the indirect logic. (See: Clausewitz [1989]) 
However, the author chose to rely on Liddell Hart’s somewhat more modern approach.  
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by Brimley and Singh. (Brimely; Singh, [2008]). However, to the best of the author’s 
knowledge, it has not been applied to the particular case of US-Iran relations. Thus, the 
practice of applying a concept of military strategy to better understand foreign policy 
strategy is not without precedent. This suggests that there is a strand of thinking arguing 
that military strategic concepts can and should be applied for a better understanding of 
foreign policy strategy. 
  However, it may seem strange to apply a concept of military strategy in foreign 
and security policy.  Since the first hypothesis suggests that aggressive policies do not 
pay off, it may particularly seem odd to apply a concept that was originally invented to 
provide a better understanding of warfare itself. However, Liddell Hart’s concept of 
indirect strategy corresponds with the logic of H1a and the theory formulated by the 
CIA, Johnson, Layne and others (see above). Liddell Hart put forward that direct face-
to-face confrontation almost never pays in the battlefield. The harder a general seeks to 
push frontally, the greater the chances of losing the battle. Instead, an indirect approach 
should be taken. Deception, dislocation, encirclement or getting behind the enemy are 
the ways to win battles – all of them being indirect solutions to problems that emerge in 
the battlefield. A direct solution would be to run directly at the enemy on the battlefield. 
Liddell Hart, however, strongly advises against such a strategy, since the force of 
resistance will be largest when approaching the enemy frontally and aggressively. 
(Liddell Hart [1954])  
  How does this approach provide a solution for the present US-Iran stalemate? 
The author argues that strategic blowback can be understood as a form of or 
consequence of resistance on behalf of the other party to the conflict – in this case Iran. 
The more aggressive (direct) strategies and policies Washington pursues, the tougher 
resistance Tehran is going to put up. Strategic blowback and the resistance that Liddell 
Hart’s concept implicitly warns of are very similar in their nature. Liddell Hart’s central 
argument is that the commander should always avoid resistance or seek to find the least 
resistance in order to carry out his plans. (See: Ibid. pp. 18-19; p. 209.) This also 
explains how H1b is connected to H1a. Since aggressive policies will backfire due to 
resistance, which comes in the form of or causes strategic blowbacks, US strategists 
should look for the path of least resistance – in this case policies which do not qualify 
for aggressive initiatives as defined above.12  
                                                 
12 Of course, perceptions and cultural factors will also determine how parties interpret the other party’s 
intentions and policies. A policy considered nonaggressive by Washington may well be interpreted as an 
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  As a military strategist, Liddell Hart obviously developed his concept for a 
better understanding of theater strategy, thus, his concept will not be suitable for this 
dissertation in its original form. That is due to a number of factors, which may create 
confusion. For example, it is hard to define what the foreign and security policy 
equivalent of strategies suggested by Liddell Hart’s approach (deception, dislocation, 
encirclement, getting behind the enemy) would be. In other words, how does one define 
indirect foreign and security policy strategies based on the logic suggested by Liddell 
Hart? The alternatives suggested by the English strategist are misleading in another way 
as well – they all suggest aggressive forms of behavior, which is exactly what one 
would want to avoid if they are believed to cause strategic blowbacks. 
  However, the author finds that the concept is still useful in the realm of foreign 
and security policy strategy for the following reasons. The author only wishes to borrow 
and build upon the logic, the philosophy inherent in the concept, namely, that seeking 
the least resistance in foreign and security policy strategy is the wisest approach when 
trying to realize national interests. Thus, one does not have to deal with or find the 
foreign policy strategy equivalent of alternatives suggested by Liddell Hart (e.g.: 
deception).(See: Liddell Hart [1954]: pp. 18-19.)   
  There is another apparent contradiction that has to be addressed. Talking about 
finding the path of least resistance in the world of politics may seem odd, when politics 
per se is about opposing wills. It may seem unnatural to hope for less resistance, when 
politics in most cases is about overcoming resistance in general. If one is going to have 
it his way, he has to overcome the resistance put up by the opposing will. This does not 
mean, however, that seeking the least resistance is not wise. In fact, it is the only wise 
strategy in the world of scarce resources. Thus, the ideal foreign and security policy 
strategy is one that aims to realize its strategic aims by taking the path of least resistance 
in order to find the most economical way of realizing those goals. Liddell Hart puts 
forward that: 
 
As in war, the aim is to weaken resistance before attempting to overcome it; and the effect 
is best attained by drawing the other party out of his defences. (Liddell Hart [1954]: p. 
18.)  
 
 Thus, following Liddell Hart’s reasoning, the author contends that the “strategy 
                                                                                                                                               
aggressive one by Tehran. However, this will be determined based on the given context and on a case-by-
case basis. 
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of seeking the least resistance” should be applied for overcoming the stalemate in US-
Iran relations. This highlights the logic and the specific part of Liddell Hart’s concept 
that is to be borrowed in the thesis. Therefore, the second hypothesis is formulated as 
follows:  
 
H1b: A “strategy of seeking the least resistance” should be applied vis a 
vis Iran in order to create circumstances conducive to realizing 
Washington’s strategic interests in the Middle East and parts of Central 
Asia.  
 
  Again, there are a number of methodological risks that one should be mindful 
of. First of all, the very fact that the author made the verification of H1b contingent on 
the verification of H1a is quite risky. If H1a cannot be proved, then automatically H1b 
cannot be verified either. Nonetheless, H1a is about the assumption of aggressive 
foreign policies being counterproductive, thus, identifying nonaggressive policies as 
possible ways out of the US-Iran stalemate (H1b) is a logical conjecture. The conjecture 
is somewhat based on deductive logic – if the premises in H1a are valid, then the 
relationship between the two variables of H1b should also be valid. Thus H1b, is 
essentially a consequence of H1a. (H1a → H1b). There is an inverse logic behind this 
reasoning: the strategy of seeking least resistance may pay off, due to the fact that 
aggressive policies do not. If H1b is contingent on H1a, then proving the assumption 
inherent in H1a is crucial for the credibility of the thesis, since H1b is the inverse of 
H1a. Thus, in a methodological and logical sense, H1b is only a “second-tier” 
hypothesis. It is counterfactual logic that leads one to believe that if H1a is proven right, 
then H1b should also be correct. 
  Of course, problems of definition arise again. Which policies constitute 
strategies that are “seeking the least possible resistance”? What does “least” stand for? 
What is strategy? What kind of circumstances is conducive for realizing US interests? 
What are the strategic interests of the US? In order to answer those questions, the 
following meanings have been ascribed to those expressions:  
  
“strategy of seeking the least resistance”: this is synonymous with 
nonaggressive foreign and security policies. Anything that does not belong 
under the category of “aggressive policies” will belong to the category of 
strategies seeking the least possible resistance.  
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“least”: the alternative that is perceived to incur the least costs at the time 
of decision.  
 
“circumstances conducive”: circumstances, which in theory make it 
possible for US strategic interests to be realized.  
 
 
 “Washington’s strategic interests”:  
 
 concluding a peace treaty between Israel and Arab states (most 
notably Syria and Lebanon); 
 the emergence of a stable and non-hostile Iraq that is able to control 
its territory; 
 the emergence of a stable Afghanistan that is able to control its 
territory; 
 the halting or making of Iran’s nuclear program fully transparent;  
 securing the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz; and 
 minimizing or altogether eliminating tensions between the US and 
Iran.13 
 
 
“Middle East and parts of Central Asia”: The expression “Middle East” 
here is used in a narrow sense – it is taken to refer to the following group 
of countries and entities: Egypt, Israel, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, 
Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, United Arab Emirates, 
Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, Kuwait, Iran and Afghanistan. 
 
  Such framing of the suggested strategy highlights the inverse logical relationship 
between H1a and H1b. The term “strategy” is not dealt with here separately – the 
definition of the term will be elaborated on in detail in Chapter I.6.2. For now, it is 
simply taken to be the way in which means are related to ends. (See: Gaddis [1982]: p. 
viii.) The term “perception” highlights the limits of objectivity. Deciding whether an 
alternative qualifies as one that guarantees the least costs, therefore, will inevitably 
require making somewhat arbitrary decisions. The insertion of the term “conducive” 
into the equation reflects caution on behalf of the author. It is absolutely essential, that if 
H1a proves right, it not lead to false conclusions. Thus, if aggressive policies indeed 
backfire, it is not automatic that nonaggressive policies will not. Pursuing 
nonaggressive policies only creates the necessary international circumstances for a 
compromise with Iran in order to promote the realization of US interests. It does not 
automatically result in the realization of US goals. This attests to the assumption that 
even if the US pursues alternative policies, which are least likely to backfire, other 
                                                 
13 Seyed Hossein Mousavian uses a very similar list in his 2012 memoir. (See: Mousavian [2012b]: p. 2.) 
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factors may still hinder the realization of US interests – such as domestic politics in Iran 
or the US.   
  Washington’s strategic interests obviously reflect the most contentious issues in 
the conflict between the two parties. This is due to Iran’s regional “web” of relations. 
Iran has ties to Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. 
All of these groups have a stake in the Arab-Israeli peace process. Iran has traditionally 
had ties with Afghanistan, especially its mostly Shiite Hazara population in Central 
Afghanistan, as well as Herat province in Western Afghanistan. It has also been 
investing in Afghanistan’s infrastructure. Tehran has a strategic alliance with Syria and 
it wields considerable political and cultural influence in Iraq. (See: Addis et al. [2010]; 
see also: N. Rózsa [2007]). Iran has the ability to control the Strait of Hormuz, where 
approximately 40% of the world’s oil trade flows through. (Ibid, p. 2.) Indeed, Iran’s 
regional influence even led King Abdullah of Jordan to talk of the “Shiite crescent”, 
which sparked a large academic debate on the issue. (See: Barzegar [2008]; see also: 
Nasr [2006]) The concept is somewhat exaggerating, but it is obvious that Iran’s 
regional significance cannot be dismissed. The final bullet point is closely connected to 
all the previously mentioned US interests. As a result of Iran’s regional position, the US 
could be interested in pursuing a policy aiming to reach a grand bargain with Iran. 
Central Asia was added to the definition to allow for the inclusion of Afghanistan.   
  In the case of H1b, variable “Xb” stands for the strategy that follows the path of 
least resistance and variable “Yb” represents the presence of circumstances conducive 
to the realization of US strategic interests as defined above. To follow the above logic, 
“Xb” is the “explanans” and “Yb” is the “explanandum” (See: Kiss J.: Ibid), “Xb” is 
the independent variable and “Yb” is the dependent variable. As in the case of H1a, H1b 
also expresses a causal relationship. The relationship is also positive – the more 
intensively least resistance strategies are pursued, the more likely that US interests will 
be realized. As for trying to determine “how much” “additional”, or “more intensive” 
emergence of circumstances conducive to realizing US strategic interests will follow an 
“additional unit” of pursuing certain least resistance strategies is even harder than in the 
case of H1a. It can be established, however, that the relationship is nonlinear and 
disproportionate – an “additional unit of least resistance strategy” (Xb) will not always 
result in the same amount of changes in the “rate” of the emergence of circumstances 
conducive to realizing US strategic interests (Yb). Thus, the author will not conduct a 
quantitative assessment for the same reasons as in the case of H1a and 
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operationalization will not be carried out either. The graph of a function representing 
such a relationship will most likely look like “Figure 1.” above. 
  H1b suggests a deductive logic – Liddell Hart’s general theory will be applied to 
the US-Iran case with some modifications. This experiment is inductive in nature, since 
one of the goals of the dissertation is to suggest a new general philosophy of foreign 
policy strategy, viewing the latter as an effort of constantly looking for the path where 
the least possible resistance is put up by adversaries, rivals and allies. A wall is easier to 
punch through where its thinner, but if one keeps punching it where its thick, he will 
end up breaking his hand – this is what strategic blowback theory is about. H1b is based 
on a normative assumption, as it is a “prescription” for the way out of the present 
stalemate between the US and Iran.  
 
Figure 2.  The Relationship Between the Hypotheses of the Dissertation 
 
A.F.P.= Aggressive Foreign Policy; S.B.B.= Strategic Blowback; 
S.S.L.R.: Strategy of Seeking the Least Resistance; R.S.I.= 
Realization of Strategic Interests. 
 
 
5. Theoretical Foundations – Ontological Assumptions 
 
  The thesis applies two theoretical traditions (disciplines). The two disciplines 
are the Theory of International Relations and Strategic Studies.14  Within the tradition of 
IR, the Realist school of thought is applied. More specifically, the overall theoretical 
approach of the author is reflected by what students of theory of international relations 
                                                 
14 When the author writes “Strategic Studies” with capital letters at the beginning of the words, it refers to 
the discipline itself. Also, if “Strategy”, or “Strategic Thought” is written, it also refers to the discipline 
in general, or “Strategy” in general as an abstract concept and not to a specific set of policies or strategic 
concepts.  
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call Neoclassical Realism.15  
  A number of methodological concerns arise as to how these two disciplines 
match. Does the application of two different theoretical traditions create “theoretical or 
methodological heterogeneity” to the extent that it undermines the logic of the 
dissertation? Is it not contradictory in a logical sense to have two different disciplines, 
two different theoretical traditions for explaining the same phenomena? To be sure, it 
does create a fair chance for confusion. However, the richness of a multidisciplinary 
approach to international relations suggests otherwise.  
  The possibility of a confusion occurring may be minimized if the author can 
establish a clear relationship between the theoretical assumptions derived from the two 
traditions. If this relationship is clear and does not suggest contradictory assumptions 
about the reality the two traditions wish to describe, then the theoretical foundations 
will remain sound. Hence, the author puts forth, that the following relationship can be 
identified between the two traditions. 
  Both traditions could be viewed as ontological assumptions about how the world 
– our reality – works. Neoclassical Realism depicts the world on two levels: the 
interstate level is complemented by the introduction of domestic factors. This tradition 
suggests that states pursue power in order to enhance their security. On the other hand, 
Strategic Thought – broadly understood – puts forward a set of assumptions about how 
states can achieve their goals. Thus, Neoclassical Realism provides a depiction of the 
international environment: an international system that is made up of actors (states) 
pursuing power in order to enhance their security and realize their national interests. It 
describes the nature of the international environment, as well as the motivations behind   
policies pursued by states. Strategic Studies, on the other hand, explains how states – 
driven by security and other motivations – attain or should attain their national goals. 
From this perspective, it is easy to establish a clear relationship between the two 
theories. Neoclassical Realism answers the question “What?” and Strategic Thought 
provides answer to the question “How?” Therefore, they are not contradictory on a 
logical plain.  
  The other reason suggesting that the two theories are not contradictory, is the 
fact that both derive from the same tradition of political thought, namely, Realism. 
                                                 
15 When the author writes “Neoclassical Realism” with capital letters it is to refer to the neoclassical 
offshoot of Realism in general. This logic will be followed regarding other strands of Realism and other 
traditions of International Relations as well, e.g.: “(Neo)liberalism”, “Constructivism”, “Realism”, 
“Human Nature Realism”, “Neorealism”, “Defensive Realism”, “Offensive Realism”. 
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Strategic Thought, understood narrowly, originally dealt with how a state should use its 
military force to attain its politico-military goals. Broadly understood, it provides a 
prescription on how a state should use its power in order to reach its national goals.16 
The core assumption of political Realism is the pursuit of national interest, or interests 
“defined in terms of power.” (Morgenthau [1993]: p. 5.) Thus, strategy, broadly defined, 
has a very similar view of the world as political Realism does. If strategy is only 
narrowly understood, it is reminiscent of Realism in that it views (military) power as 
central in international relations. Thus, Neoclassical Realism provides the researcher 
with how the international strategic environment looks like and Strategic Thought 
describes how actors wish to reach their national goals within that environment.  
  The following chapters provide an overview of how Neoclassical Realism and 
Strategic Studies can be useful for understanding the particular case of US-Iran 
relations. The author wishes to provide a methodological explanation as to why these 
theories were chosen and why they provided the right approach for proving the 
relationship suggested by H1a and H1b.  
 
Figure 3. The Multidisciplinary Approach Applied by the Dissertation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure shows how the “Theory of Strategic Blowback” (T.S.B.) and the 
Theory of the “Strategy of Seeking the Least Resistance” (T.S.S.L.R.). The 
figure is based on: Baylis; Wirtz [2007]: p. 13. Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 The apparent discrepancy between the narrow and broader understanding of Strategy will be addressed 
in the following chapters. 
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5. 1. Ontological Assumptions I: Neoclassical Realism 
 
  Why choose Realism and why Neoclassical Realism in particular for 
understanding the world? An alternative would be to apply (Neo)liberalism, or 
Constructivism, or the tools of Foreign Policy Analysis. However, any choice of theory 
should reflect the nature of the object observed.  (Neo)liberalism is not particularly well 
suited for analyzing a conflict. It focuses on the possibilities of cooperation, 
interdependence, the international economy, international trade, the spread of western 
values and institutions – concepts which are hard to apply in a conflict such as the one 
between the US and Iran. Of course, the theory of complex interdependence could be an 
approach well suited for analyzing the security interdependence between Iran and the 
US. Iran is well positioned in the Middle East to cause setbacks for the US in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, thus, the regional position of the US partly depends on Iranian actions in 
the region. (See: Keohane-Nye [1977]) However, (Neo)liberalism lacks the theoretical 
tools for analyzing a conflict of interests due to its different ontology which is based on 
the possibility of peaceful social change and cooperation.  
  Constructivism seems to be more useful at first sight. This would provide an 
opportunity to research the values, ideas and norms held by the two parties. (See: Wendt 
[1999]) The values held by the US and Iran are conflicting by their very nature. The US 
cherishes human rights, individual freedoms, democracy, good governance, rule of law, 
secularism, etc., whereas the Iranian system is not built on western values, it is a 
theocratic regime with strict laws of sharia. It is a system that does not entirely lack 
democratic elements, but it is obviously very far from a western type liberal democracy 
based on the principle of representation. Applying a constructivist approach could cover 
a significant part of the conflict between the two states.17 However, it does not provide 
the researcher with the entire picture. Applying a constructivist approach, one will 
inevitably make the mistake of neglecting the concept of power – an element central to 
the US-Iran conflict. This standoff is about regional influence as much as about 
                                                 
17 Moreover, the dissertation suggests that only a negotiated solution may work regarding the US-Iran 
stalemate. However, the success of negotiations assumes that the atmosphere of distrust can change 
between the two parties, essentially suggesting that attitudes take on special relevance in the enmity 
between them. Thus, constructivism could be a viable theory for explaining at least one significant part of 
the conflict between the US and Iran.  Furthermore, the Theory of Policy Networks could also be invoked 
for providing an issued based analysis of Iranian influence in the Middle East. Iran is embedded in the 
region in both an economic, as well as a political sense, thus, its links to various regional proxies could be 
analyzed through the Policy Network approach. However, as the author chose Realism for understanding 
the US-Iran relationship, none of those theories will applied. Still, the author wished to highlight most of 
the relevant and alternative theoretical approaches to the problem.  
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historical distrust and grievances. This element suggests that the tradition of Realism is 
the best approach for understanding the nature of relations between the two parties. This 
is further supported by the notion that the Middle East could be best understood through 
the logic of power politics.18 (Indyk [2009]: p. 23)  
  Applying the methodology of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) may seem like a 
logical decision. However, the problem with FPA is that it does not incorporate 
structural factors. It primarily deals with unit level factors (organizational behavior, 
perceptions, limits of rational choice, etc.). FPA does not assume a holistic approach – it 
is particular in nature. It examines how an individual or an organization brings decisions 
and it ignores the consequences of those decisions. It is the lead up to decisions that is 
important for FPA, whereas their consequences are not. (Kiss J. [2009]: pp. 88-85.)  
Thus, this approach would have difficulties in explaining why a particular set of US 
policies caused aggressive behavior on Tehran’s part.19   
  Now that the author has explained why Realism was chosen, it is also necessary 
to provide a sound explanation as to why specifically the neoclassical strand was 
chosen. Realism is not a coherent set of ideas – it is more like “a general orientation” 
and there are many different theories within Realism itself.  (Donelly [2000]: p. 6.) It is 
also a “set of normative emphases”, suggesting that applying Realism is not a result of 
an objective decision. (See: Ferguson-Mansbach [1988]: p. 79. also referenced by 
Donelly [2000]: p. 6.) It is, to a certain extent, a subjective choice, which reflects a bias 
on the researcher’s part towards actually believing that the world works as political 
Realism suggests. This “constructivist reflex”, however, does not mean that applying 
Realism is only “a matter of choice”. Beyond reasons already mentioned, Realism was 
chosen mostly for two reasons. “Realism emphasizes the constraints on politics imposed 
by human nature and the absence of international government. Together, they make 
international relations largely a realm of power and interest.” (Ibid, p. 9.) These two 
factors – power and interest – are central to international relations and to the US-Iran 
conflict in particular. (See also: Morgenthau [1993]: pp. 5-10.).   
  Hans Morgenthau’s Human Nature Realism could be useful for this dissertation 
                                                 
18 This was also emphasized to the author by a well-known Iranian foreign policy expert at a conference 
in Tehran in 2010.  
19 For other works on Foreign Policy Analysis see: Allison [1969]; Allison [1971]; Allison-Halperin: 
[1972].; Clarke [1989]; Frei-Ruloff [1989]; Halperin-Clapp-Kanter [1974]; Hudson [2008]: Lake-Powell 
[1999]; Palmer-Morgan [2006]; Renshon-Larson: [2003]; Rosenau [1966]; Rosenau [1969b]; Singer-
Hudson [1992]; Smith-Hadfield-Dunne [2008]; Snyder-Bruck-Sapin-Hudson-Chollet-Goldgeier [2002]; 
Sprout-Sprout [1965]; Sylvan-Chan [1984]. 
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due to its focus on the motivations and driving factors of states’ foreign policies, 
namely, national interest and power. Thus, the US can make an accurate assessment of 
its choices towards Iran. Being a rational actor, it will choose the scenario which 
implies the least costs and the largest gains. However, Morgenthau’s approach does not 
take into account the real world limits of “rational choice”. (See: Morgenthau [1993]: 
pp. 3-5.) It does not consider institutional rivalries, the process of decision making 
itself, the lack of sufficient information needed for sound decisions, etc. It is hard to 
imagine a full-fledged analysis of US strategy towards Iran without incorporating the 
diverging interests of different domestic political factions in both the US and Iran, since 
these groups have differing views on what kind of strategy their country should follow 
concerning various issues. Furthermore, these competing groups influence important 
decisions. Even if the national interest is defined in detail and agreed upon, it may not 
determine the path the given state takes because it could be “diverted” by particular 
interests.  Since both Iranian and US foreign policy making involves a large number of 
actors, the ideal theory will take into account domestic and international limits to 
rational choice theory.     
  A classic neorealist study would have to treat the state as a “black box”, 
suggesting that the analyst would not have to deal with domestic features of a state.  The 
most important factor would be the analysis of the distribution of power between Iran 
and the US. Beyond this point, however, Neorealism would have significant troubles in 
understanding the dynamic of relations between Washington and Tehran. The difficulty 
derives from the fact that Neorealism is not a theory of foreign policy, it was never 
intended to be one. Waltz contends that “An international-political theory does not 
imply or require a theory of foreign policy any more than a market theory implies or 
requires a theory of the firm.” (Waltz [1979]: p. 72.; See also: Waltz [1996]) The 
essence of Waltz’s theory of international politics is that it is a systemic theory and 
according to this reasoning, it does not require the inclusion of sub-systemic factors, 
such as the state itself. It is the inverse of FPA: while Foreign Policy Analysis neglects 
the structural aspects of reality, Neorealism neglects unit level factors. Thus, they are 
not holistic approaches, they both depict only a “slice” of reality.  Apart from the theory 
of balancing, the lack of perspective on foreign policy decision making makes Waltz’s 
theory of limited value to this dissertation, since this thesis is about foreign and security 
policy strategy.  
  Offensive Realism puts forward that because states seek security, the best 
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position for them to be in is hegemony. (See: Mearsheimer [2001]: pp. 2-11.) Thus, the 
US is seeking hegemony, since it has the resources to do so and it also wishes to become 
a dominant power in the Middle East in the process. Since Iran also has regional 
ambitions, it is obvious that the interests of the two states will clash. This is only a 
slightly better account of reality than that of Neorealism. It is also a systemic theory and 
it also puts forward that states seek power and security. The biggest difference is that 
Offensive Realism is based on states, which are against the status quo. Great powers are 
bent on changing the status quo in the international distribution of power, since they 
want to become hegemons. Thus, apart from classical balancing strategies, it allows for 
one additional strategy: hegemony itself. Waltzian Neorealism has been criticized for its 
neglect of states following the path of “nonsecurity expansion”, referring to states which 
do not seek power for security reasons but for the sake of enhancing their own power. 
(Schweller [1996]: p. 92.) Mearsheimer’s approach clearly remedies this. This could be 
an important asset for this dissertation, since it maybe a sound theory for understanding 
the motivations of great powers, however, it still does not incorporate domestic factors. 
Any theory of a strictly structural nature will be of limited use for a dissertation on 
foreign policy strategy, which is a unit level variable according to Waltz and 
Mearsheimer (see above).  
  Defensive Realism argues that security is not as scarce a resource in the 
international system as Offensive Realism suggests. The US and Iran do not necessarily 
have to be on a collision course. They can identify whether the other’s intentions are 
benign or not and, thus, provide a solution for the “security dilemma”. (See: Herz 1959; 
also Booth-Wheeler [2008]) Defensive Realism is also a structural theory and due to 
Neorealism’s above mentioned “status quo bias”, Defensive Realism is often used as an 
alternative label for Neorealism (see above). However, contrary to Waltz’s theory, 
Defensive Realism does leave space for domestic factors to a certain extent. Walt argues 
that “Defensive realists such as Waltz, Van Evera and Jack Snyder assumed that states 
have little intrinsic interest in military conquest and argued that the costs of expansion 
generally outweighed the benefits. Accordingly, they maintained that great power wars 
occurred largely because domestic groups fostered exaggerated perceptions of threat 
and an excessive faith in the efficacy of military force.” (Walt [1998]: p. 37.) The 
“theory of offense-defense balance” is derived from the assumption that conquest rarely 
pays. The offense-defense balance mostly “tilts” toward defense, meaning that security 
can be achieved through defensive means rather than pursuing offensive policies. 
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(Glaser-Kaufmann [1998]) The security dilemma and war can both be prevented if 
states are able to communicate their benign intentions. (Glaser [1994-1995]: p. 53.) 
Thus, defensive realists complement the traditional equation of the distribution of power 
by adding variables such as domestic groups, intentions, perceptions and 
communication – all of them being unit level factors. In this sense, Defensive Realism 
contradicts its structural roots. Applying this concept would depict the US as a great 
power willing to communicate its intentions, building mostly on defense and not 
seriously contemplating offensive measures against Iran. Thus, the security dilemma 
between the two states could be overcome in the Middle East. Of all the strands of 
Realism examined heretofore, this one comes closest to what this dissertation needs: a 
Realist theory accepting the centrality of power and interests in international relations, 
but also incorporating unit level factors. However, common US threats during the tenure 
of the Bush administration for example regarding US willingness to use force if 
necessary to prevent the emergence of an Iranian nuclear weapons capability contradicts 
the defensive logic. Even though Defensive Realism introduces a number of unit level 
factors, it still does not leave enough room for the introduction of domestic factors, such 
as lobby groups, hard liner factions, economic interest groups, etc. 
  Only one strand of Realism is capable of fulfilling those criteria. Lobell, 
Ripsman and Taliaferro point this out:  
 
“How do states, or more specifically the decision-makers and institutions that act on their 
behalf, assess international threats and opportunities? What happens when there is 
disagreement about the nature of foreign threats? Who ultimately decides the range of 
acceptable and unacceptable foreign policy alternatives? To what extent, and under what 
conditions, can domestic actors bargain with state leaders and influence foreign and 
security policies? How and under what circumstances will domestic factors impede states 
from pursuing the types of strategies predicted by balance of power theory and balance of 
threat theory? Finally, how do states go about extracting and mobilizing resources 
necessary to implement foreign and security policies? These are important questions that 
cannot be answered by the dominant neorealist or liberal theories of international 
politics.” (Lobell-Ripsmann-Taliaferro [2009]: p. 1.)   
  
The authors go on to argue that a number of very significant foreign policy decisions 
and strategies cannot be explained by traditional realist approaches. The Bush doctrine 
too resulted from ““a veritable witches” brew of systemic and domestic-level factors.” 
(Ibid, p. 3.)  
  There were a number of cases in which only structural factors were at play in 
producing the actual outcome. For example, closing Iran out of the Oslo Process led to 
Iranian efforts aimed at preventing the peace process, since it was perceived by Tehran 
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as a way of isolating it in its own region.  This was a pure case of realist balancing 
strategy. Iran perceived the US and Israeli efforts to foster peace with Palestinians and 
Arab countries as a way of balancing Iranian influence. It provoked Iranian policies 
aimed at breaking a potential anti-Iran Israeli-Arab alliance before it was even formed. 
(Parsi [2007]: pp. 175-176.)  
  But a number of other instances remind us that domestic factors are just as 
important. For example, following the Geneva talks of October 2009 some have argued 
that President Ahmadinejad in fact wanted a deal with the west, but was isolated by his 
own domestic rivals and radicals. (Perthes [2010]: pp. 100-101.) 
  Thus, it is only a holistic and global approach that will be able to model the 
intricate realities of US-Iranian interactions. Neoclassical Realism was chosen for its 
“richness”. The problem with other offshoots of Realism is that they exclude domestic 
variables from the analysis, or – as in the case of Morgenthau’s Human Nature Realism 
– neglect the limits of rational choice. The basic tenets of Neoclassical Realism are 
rooted in the belief that, contrary to what Neorealism and its various other offshoots 
propose, domestic factors are important in explaining foreign policies of states. Security 
seeking states are the most important actors in the anarchic international environment. 
According to this view, states are both influenced by the structure of the international 
system, as well as domestic factors when seeking security. (See: Lobell-Ripsman-
Taliaferro [2009]). Indeed, a significant part of the IR literature reflects a realist 
mindset, but also introduces unit-level factors such as (mis)perception (Wohlforth 
[1993]), mobilization (Christensen [1996]), state power (Zakaria [1998]) and 
revisionism (Schweller [1998]). According to their logic, these unit level variables are 
intervening variables between a state’s relative material capabilities and their actual 
foreign policy behavior. Thus, a state’s relative material power may not always 
correspond with its international position. (Rose [1998] pp. 146-147. for a general 
overview of Neoclassical Realism see: Taliaferro [2006]) 
  According to this reasoning, a neoclassical realist explanation of US strategy 
towards Iran would result in the following model. US foreign policy making and 
strategy formulation involves a large number of actors (the National Security Council, 
the Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of Commerce, the 
Department of Treasury, the Intelligence Community, respective committees of the 
House and Senate, various think tanks, lobby groups and different economic interest 
groups) and these actors can and indeed do influence foreign and security policy 
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making. Therefore, even if the national interest is defined clearly, there is a considerable 
chance that US policies will “veer off the ideal course” due to particular interests. The 
same is true for Iran, where the system of foreign policy making is equally byzantine 
and intricate because of a large number of actors involved (the Supreme Leader, the 
President, the Supreme National Security Council, the Revolutionary Guards, the 
Ministry of Intelligence, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Defense, 
respective committees of the Majlis, the Shiite clergy, various think tanks, economic 
interest groups, such as the “bazaari” and other informal networks). (See: Goodman 
[2008]) Even if the US is “able” to pursue cooperation with Tehran, those US policies 
still have to “stand the test” of the intricacies of Iranian domestic politics. Thus, 
Neoclassical Realism provides an accurate depiction of the environment in which the 
US has to implement its policies towards Iran.   
 
   
Figure 4. The Ontology of Neoclassical Realism as Applied to the US-Iran Conflict 
 
“U1;U2”=Unit; “D.I.G.”= Domestic Interest Groups; “U.S.S”=US Strategy; “I.S.”=Iranian Strategy. 
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5. 2. Ontological Assumptions II.: The Universality of Strategic 
Thought? - Foreign and Security Policy as Strategy  
 
 
 The other discipline applied is Strategic Studies. To be more specific, it is used 
to better understand foreign and security policy. First and foremost, it is essential to 
prove that it makes sense to talk of a “foreign policy strategy”. Talking of Strategy as 
such implies accepting that the main tenets of Strategic Thought may be separated from 
the realm of military thought and applied to foreign policy thinking in general.  
 It may seem odd that such basic observations have to be established, however, 
there is no consensus on whether the concept of Strategy should or could be applied to 
any field not of a military nature. The term “Strategy” has been used to mean many 
things – many actors seem to have many kinds of different strategies. Transnational 
companies have marketing strategies, various firms and NGOs have development 
strategies, states have environmental and economic strategies and strategies for 
reforming higher education, etc. (See: Strachan [2008]: p. 422.) Indeed, one gets the 
impression that it is possible to find a strategy for just about any human activity, 
especially in fields which require the coordinated action of many people or different 
organizations. This suggests that the modern usage has distanced itself from the original 
(military) connotation of the expression. (Strachan [2011]) As a consequence, there are 
those who support the application of Strategic Thought in various fields and there are 
those who would prefer to keep it as a “privilege” of military sciences. In order to think 
about foreign policy as a form of Strategy, this debate has to be addressed, since it is of 
crucial importance to the methodological foundations of the present work. Following 
the distinction used in the literature on the evolution of security theory, the author will 
distinguish between “broadeners” and “deepeners”. (Collins [2007] pp. 6-7.; Wirtz 
[2007]: pp. 339-341.) “Broadeners” believe that the underlying logic of strategic 
thought can and should be applied to fields other than military strategy.20 “Deepeners” 
are critical of such an approach – they believe that different policies and various human 
activities not linked to the military realm should not belong under the umbrella of 
Strategic Studies.  
 There is, of course, an important element of military strategy that is not shared 
                                                 
20 Henry Kissinger also notes that strategy and policy should not be separated from each other, even  
though he mainly understands strategy to be concerned primarily with military affairs. (See: Kissinger 
[1957] quoted in: Baylis; Wirtz [2007]: p. 5.)  
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by all the other types of strategies. Namely, that the stakes involved are fundamentally 
different in implementing strategies of different realms. Selling detergent is not exactly 
the same as securing a beachhead or an entire country because the latter categories 
involve matters of life and death.  
 One of the most notable scholars representing the latter approach is military 
historian Hew Strachan. He proposes that strategy should not be confused with policy. 
“Conflation of strategy and policy” is in large part due to deterrence theory during the 
Cold War, which inspired strategists to discover how nuclear weapons could be used as 
tools of foreign policy. He further argues that broadening the meaning of Strategy 
results in definitions which “[…] by being inclusive end up being nothing.” (Strachan 
[2008]: 426-429.; 431. See also: Wirtz [2007]: pp. 339-341.) By giving up the 
traditional definition of Strategy, one will not be able to define or understand war in 
general.  
 Broadeners, on the other hand, are supportive of the tendency to apply the tenets 
of Strategic Thought to fields other than military sciences and this is due to the fact that 
the main concepts and definitions of Strategy can be applied to just about any field of 
human activity where a clear intention to reach a desired outcome can be identified.  
 This group is strengthened by a number of well-known scholars and students of 
strategy. John Lewis Gaddis notes in one of his short papers: 
 
“Our knowledge of it [Grand Strategy – added by author, I.B.] derives chiefly from the 
realm of war and statecraft, because the fighting of wars and the management of states 
have demanded the calculation of relationships between means and ends for a longer 
stretch of time than any other documented area of collective human activity.  
 
But grand strategy need not apply only to war and statecraft: it’s potentially applicable to 
any endeavor in which means must be deployed in the pursuit of important ends. 
[Emphasis added by author, I.B.] That’s why we regularly get papers from our students on 
the grand strategy of navigating the Yale curriculum, or of surviving a summer internship, 
or of achieving success in soccer, football, and especially rowing, a sport that particularly 
attracts the members of our class, probably because of its ancient echoes in Herodotus and 
Thucydides. As does, predictably, one other topic of great significance to them, which is 
the grand strategy of falling in and out of love.” (Gaddis [2009]: p. 7.)   
 
Liddell Hart, another well-known student of Strategy applies a similar argumentation 
when introducing his famous “indirect approach” to strategy: 
 
“With deepened reflection, however, I began to realize that the indirect approach had a 
much wider application – that it was a law of life in all spheres: a truth of philosophy. Its 
fulfillment was seen to be the key to practical achievement in dealing with any problem 
where the human factor predominates, and a conflict of wills tends to spring from an 
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underlying concern for interests. In all such cases, the direct assault of new ideas 
provokes a stubborn resistance, thus intensifying the difficulty of producing a change of 
outlook. Conversion is achieved more easily and rapidly by unsuspected infiltration of a 
different idea or by an argument that turns the flank of instinctive opposition. The indirect 
approach is as fundamental to the realm of politics as to the realm of sex. In commerce, 
the suggestion that there is a bargain to be secured is far more potent than any direct 
appeal to buy. And in any sphere it is proverbial that the surest way of gaining a superior’s 
acceptance of a new idea is to persuade him that it is his idea! As in war, the aim is to 
weaken resistance before attempting to overcome it; and the effect is best attained by 
drawing the other party out of his defences.21 This idea of the indirect approach is closely 
related to all problems of the influence of mind upon mind – the most influential factor in 
human history.” (Liddell Hart [1954]: pp. 18-19.) 
 
Beaufre established that Strategy: 
 
“cannot be a single defined doctrine; it is a method of thought” (Beaufre [1965]: p. 13. 
quoted in Strachan [2008]: p. 429.)  
 
Mearsheimer observes that famous military historian Liddell Hart’s attention turned to 
grand strategy soon after he started researching Strategy due to the following reasons: 
 
There are several reasons for Liddell Hart’s interest in grand strategy. His intellectual 
curiosity was simply too great for him not to move from the narrower realm of strategy; 
serious students of war eventually discover that the study of strategy and tactics benefits 
from considering grand strategy.[Emphasis added by author, I.B.] (Mearsheimer [1988]: 
p. 85.)22  
 
These thoughts attest to an intellectual tradition, which welcomes the application of the 
logic of military strategy in various fields, especially foreign and security policy. 
Moreover, there is a large number of works which use the term “Strategy”- originally 
taken from the field of military strategic studies – to refer to the foreign and security 
policy of a given state. The abundant literature on “grand strategy” belongs to this 
category.23 This tradition of grand strategic thought suggests that the main tenets of 
traditional Strategic Thought have already been applied to the realm of foreign and 
security policy extensively.   
 The debate between broadeners and deepeners also requires the author of this 
                                                 
21 This sentence has already been cited in the chapter on the dissertation’s hypotheses. 
22 It is particularly telling and instructive that Mearsheimer himself started his career as soldier in the US 
Army – he is a graduate of the US Military Academy at West Point. After researching issues of military 
doctrine and strategy he also turned to researching grand strategy and US foreign and security policy. See 
Mearsheimer’s bio at his personal home page at the University of Chicago. John J. Mearsheimer. Bio. 
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/biography.html  Accessed: 07-08-2011. 
23 See for example: Art [2009]; Art [2003]; Deibel [2007]; Gaddis [1982]: Goldstein  [2005]; Kennedy 
[1991]; Layne [2006]; LeDonne [2003]; Luttwak [2009]; Luttwak [1983]; Narizny [2007]; Oye-Lieber-
Rothchild  [1992]; Parker [1998]: Romsics [2010a]; Schmidt [1985]; Weeks [2002] 
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work to decide how this dissertation relates to these two groups. One cannot have a 
theory of foreign policy strategy without accepting the applicability of the main 
concepts of Strategy to the field of foreign and security policy. Accepting this point of 
departure is central to the arguments made in this dissertation. Naturally, the author 
identifies itself with the group who agree that the tenets of Strategic Thought can be 
applied to a wide spectrum of human activities. The author does think that the 
conflation of strategy and policy are useful for a better understanding of foreign policy 
strategy. Thus, unless otherwise indicated, the terms “foreign and security policy” in 
this dissertation stands for foreign and security policy strategy.24 
 The import of concepts of Strategic Studies to the field of IR theory seems not to 
have been continued beyond the application of the concept of grand strategy. Strategic 
Studies is a rich tradition and the author argues that it should be further used to provide 
a better understanding of foreign and security policy – thus, this dissertation 
understands foreign policy to be a distinct form of strategy. 
 It must also be emphasized that it may be true that selling detergent does not 
involve the same risks as securing a beachhead, nonetheless, foreign and security policy 
in general does touch upon matters of life and death,25 especially when one considers 
the fact that an important element of foreign policy is security policy. Thus, the 
distinction between “broadeners” and “deepeners” is somewhat artificial and even 
arbitrary in a sense. Therefore, a theory of foreign policy strategy is, in a number of 
ways, very similar to traditional Strategy. There are goals, which one wishes to attain 
and, ideally, there are tools which one possesses in order to achieve those goals. In this 
respect, military strategy is not all that different from foreign policy strategy in a strictly 
philosophical sense. Even the stakes involved may justify the analogy – foreign policy 
typically belongs to the realm of “high politics”. Decisions brought may involve matters 
of life and death. Carl von Clausewitz wrote:  
  
 “war is thus an aspect of force to compel our enemy to do our will” (Clausewitz [1989]: 
                                                 
24 The dissertation also provides a definition of foreign and security policy strategy in the following 
chapters and a distinction between foreign and security policy strategy is made as well. 
25 This dissertation attests to the fact that every knowledge reflects its very own physical and 
psychological environment. This work is no different. Hence, the unveiled sympathy with those who 
prefer to distinguish between “strategies of life and death” and other strategies. The author of this 
dissertation does not deny the fact that he accepts the distinction between High vs. Low Politics and, 
therefore, accepts the “securitization” of the concept of strategy. (“Desecuritizers” being those who use 
strategy in a universal sense – such as marketing strategy, in other words, the broadeners). This, however 
does not imply that the basic notions of Strategy should solely be the privilege of scholars dealing with 
military sciences.  
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p. 75. quoted in Mahnken-Maiolo, [2008]: p. 2.)  
 
Paraphrasing Clausewitz, the view this dissertation takes is one that could be summed 
up as follows:   
 
“foreign policy is thus an aspect of persuasion to compel our rivals and partners to do our will.” 
The aim, therefore, is to realize one’s will and the least costly way of doing that is by 
taking the path of least resistance – as the author pointed out earlier.  What follows is a 
brief philosophical discussion of the nature of strategy. 
 
 
5.2.1. The Nature and Philosophy of Strategy – Hegel, Tolstoy, Black Swans and the 
Unpredictable Ways of Destiny 
 
 Terry L. Deibel, a well-known student of foreign policy strategy, lists the typical 
features of strategies in general. He puts forward that strategies are comprehensive, 
long-range, means-sensitive, purposeful, coherent and interactive. (See: Deibel [2007]: 
pp. 13-24.) The list is convincing indeed, however, Deibel does not elaborate on the 
nature of Strategy in general. Before the author goes on to analyzing the features of 
Strategy, it is necessary to provide an assessment of the general mindset and the 
underlying presumptions that lay behind planning strategies. 
 As Lawrence Freedman notes, Strategic Thought is inherently a product of the 
assumption that humans can have an impact on their environment and they can shape 
the factors that influence their own perspective and position. Within the agent vs. 
structure scheme, this means that the agent can change the structure, of which the agent 
itself is an organic part of.  Translating this into the terminus technicus of Strategic 
Thought is equal to proposing that the decision maker (theoretically) has the ability to 
shape the strategic environment. There is no point of discussing Strategic Thought and 
Strategy if we accept that agents are by and large passive. The agent has to be proactive 
and believe that decisions made will make a difference. Otherwise all the theorizing 
about Strategic Thought is merely an intellectual exercise lacking any policy relevance. 
An agent that is determined by the structure would mean that the decision maker is 
merely capable of reading the messages of the surrounding environment and 
mechanically executing the ‘orders’ dictated by the structure. Accepting this means 
accepting that the agent is the object of some ‘higher power’ of metaphysical nature, 
without any ability to influence that ‘force.’ In this realm, the concept of Strategy and 
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thinking strategically obviously does not make any sense. Therefore, Strategy is 
proactive and progressive. (Freedman [2007]: pp. 363-364) 
 However, it is also essential to realize that Strategy also has a conservative 
touch. A strategist must accept the notion that planning strategies involves accepting 
certain limits to one’s powers. Strategy is about bridging the gap between goals and 
ends. Thus, there are a number of combinations where means available do not justify 
desired ends. Strategy is about change – but it is also about accepting limits to the extent 
of that change. Accepting those structural limits implies that Strategy is just as 
conservative as it is progressive. These two observations must be added to Deibel’s 
original list.  
 Analyzing the nature of strategy, the question arises: what kind of philosophical 
assumption is Strategic Thought based upon? Researching the roots of the concept of an 
active agent capable of decisively influencing its own environment, one has to go back 
in time – back to the 18th century. The concept that an individual or a group of 
individuals (the decision makers) can shape and more importantly, change society (the 
strategic environment), is rooted in the progressive mindset of the enlightenment. One 
of the main messages of 18th century enlightenment is that social change is possible.  
 This may lead some to come to the conclusion that the underlying philosophy of 
Strategic Thought is closely related to leftist-Marxist revolutionary or liberal political 
thought. Taking that logical leap, however, would be a grave mistake. Thus, this is not 
in any way an attempt to provide the reader with a Marxist interpretation of the 
philosophy of strategy. Moreover, there is a significant difference between the concept 
of Strategy and the leftist revolutionary thought as far as their concept of change is 
concerned. The most important difference is that revolutionary thought is radical and it 
wishes to bring about comprehensive change rapidly. The concept of Strategy, however, 
does not necessarily imply radical and comprehensive changes. In fact, it even implies 
an adaption to realities because it is also conservative, as it has already been mentioned 
above. 
 There are, in general, two differing ontological-philosophical views about social 
change and I will draw on Leo Tolstoy’s famous “War and Peace” and Hegel’s “The 
Phenomenology of Spirit” to demonstrate the two different stances. (Tolstoy [2002]; 
Hegel [1977])   
 Tolstoy’s work is about the clash of two differing views on history and the world 
in general. Napoleon is the best example of the “proactive agent”, who believes that 
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everything depends on “Man” himself, that change is solely a function of competence 
and talent. This view is manifested in the line attributed to him: “Every soldier carries a 
marshal’s baton in his pack.” This emphasizes the will and talent of the individual. 
Everything depends on the individual and the structure is not viewed as an obstacle in 
carrying out the plans of the general. According to Tolstoy’s interpretation, Napoleon is 
active in the battlefield, even “hyperactive” compared to his Russian counterpart, 
General Kutuzov. The French general is busy giving directives, orders and controlling 
units during battle. He believes in change brought about by talented individual(s). He is 
essentially progressive and wishes to change the structure to benefit his interests. 
(Tolstoy [2002]; Berlin [1953]) 
 On the other hand, General Kutuzov advises his generals to be patient and to 
remain passive. His directive is rooted in the belief that no matter how talented or 
competent one may be, man cannot change the course of destiny. The agent is merely a 
small ship in the vast ocean of “higher powers.” The best course of action is to do 
nothing. Napoleon is nearing Moscow and the only thing General Kutuzov emphasizes, 
is to stay inactive for as long as possible. History (or destiny?) will have it her way – 
there is no general who may win over destiny. He may challenge it – as Napoleon did – 
but the individual is ultimately bound to fail in that endeavor. Kutuzov withdraws from 
Moscow and leaves Napoleon to take it. Napoleon wins in a military sense, but he never 
conquers Russia politically. To use an expression often cited after the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq: he won the war, but failed to win the peace. In the end, history proves Kutuzov 
right. He is, therefore, conservative – the agent cannot bring about change, especially 
not against the wishes of history. (Tolstoy [2002]; Berlin [1953]) 
 To a certain extent, Carl von Clausewitz’s reasoning is very similar to that of 
Tolstoy’s General Kutuzov: he warns that theories are indeed useful for the studying of 
war, but when it comes to the practice of fighting wars, theories have their limits in 
providing advice to the commander:  
 
“[…] Theory then becomes a guide to anyone who wants to learn about war from books; 
it will light his way, ease his progress, train his judgment, and help him to avoid pitfalls… 
It is meant to educate the mind of the future commander, or, more accurately, to guide him 
in his self-education, not to accompany him to the battlefield [emphasis added by author, 
I.B.]; just as a wise teacher guides and stimulates a young man’s intellectual development, 
but is careful not to lead him by the hand for the rest of his life.” (Clausewitz [1989]: p. 
141. also quoted by Mahnken-Maiolo, [2008]: p. 1. )  
 
 By stating that every theory is of limited use in practice, Clausewitz implicitly 
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suggests that theory is useful, but events on the ground have their own dynamic, which 
do not necessarily fit into a larger theoretical pattern. There is always the constant 
element of the unknown, which no theory – as perfect and coherent as it may be – can 
predict. Therefore, no matter how well educated and well prepared a commander is, 
there will always be limits to his ability to shape the strategic environment.  
 Clausewitz introduces the concept of “friction” in order to explain the 
differences between theory and practice. “The conduct of war resembles the workings 
of an intricate machine with enormous friction, so that combinations which are easily 
planned on paper can be executed only with great effort.” (quoted in Smith [2005]: p. 
77.) Friction symbolizes the factor that makes it complicated to carry out plans in 
reality. There are a number of factors, which guarantee that a plan can almost never be 
executed in its original form. 
 Similarly, modern examples also attest to the fact that the element of the 
unknown can – and indeed almost always does – modify original plans. Douglas J. 
Feith, former US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from 2001 to 2005, describes in 
his political memoir how chance, and the factor the author of this dissertation calls the 
“element of the unknown”, play a huge role in decision making: 
  
 “When I was a child, I knew people who made a hobby of military board games in which 
they played generals moving artillery, infantry and armor units across maps to fight 
battles. Avalon Hill, as I recall, was the company that made especially sophisticated 
games of this kind. I never became an Avalon Hill fan, however, because dice helped 
determine the outcome of battles. As I saw it, that made the games less true than purely 
cerebral contests of maneuver such as chess. As a grown-up, I still have no interest in 
board games, but I have come to see the wisdom of incorporating dice into the play. 
 There is an old adage: Better to be lucky than smart. In this case, I thought that Rumsfeld 
and those of us on his side of the debate were both, which is better yet. But it is right to 
keep in mind the role that fortune can play in world affairs. [Emphasis added by author, 
I.B.] In our political debates, we often ascribe genius to the people on the winning side of 
a controversy. Sometimes they deserve the praise. But success is not necessarily proof of 
having had the better argument.”[Emphasis added by author, I.B.] (Feith [2009]: p. 146.)  
 
Niall Ferguson quotes a part of former National Security Adviser and Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger’s papers at the Library of Congress: 
 
“Perhaps the deepest problem is the problem of conjecture in foreign policy....Each 
political leader has the choice between making the assessment which requires the least 
effort or making the assessment which requires more effort. If he makes the assessment 
that requires least effort, then as time goes on it may turn out that he was wrong and then 
he will have to pay a heavy price. If he acts on the basis of a guess, he will never be able 
to prove that his effort was necessary, but he may save himself a great deal of grief later 
on....If he acts early, he cannot know whether it was necessary. If he waits, he may be 
lucky or he may be unlucky. It is a terrible dilemma.” [emphasis added by author, I.B.] 
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(Decision Making in a Nuclear World, Henry Kissinger Papers, Library of Congress, 
quoted in Ferguson [2008]: p. 227.)   
 
 Ferguson references Nassim Taleb’s concept called the “black swan” – an 
analogy philosophers use to describe how people simplify reality and come to wrong 
conclusions about their own environment through inductive logic. Someone who lives 
in the Northern Hemisphere has only seen white swans, which may lead one to conclude 
that swans are normally white, unless he or she travels to the south, to Australia in 
particular, where the “theory of white swans will collapse”, due to the presence of black 
swans in that country. “A “black swan” is therefore anything that seems to us, on the 
basis of our limited experience, to be impossible.” (Ibid, p. 248, see note no. 44.). 
Again, this logic suggests that the unknown and the unexpected may always happen, and 
one’s ability to handle it may always be limited.  
 Thomas Schelling points out a very similar phenomenon: 
 
“to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable. The contingency we have not considered 
seriously looks strange; what looks strange is therefore improbable; what is improbable 
need not be taken seriously.” (Schelling: Introduction in Wohlstetter [1962]: pp. vii-ix.; 
also quoted by: Daalder, Lindsay [2005]: p. 81) 
  
It is this nature of our world (our strategic environment) that complicates the job of the 
foreign policy strategist. In this sense, military and political strategy is not different at 
all.  
 Charles Hill, a well-known theorist of grand strategy at Yale University argues 
that classical literature can be applied to understanding the challenges of statecraft and 
grand strategy: 
 
“Literature’s freedom to explore endless or exquisite details, portray the thoughts of 
imaginary characters, and dramatize large themes through intricate plots bring it closest to 
the reality of “how the world really works.” This dimension of fiction is indispensable to 
the strategist who cannot, by the nature of the craft, know all of the facts, considerations, 
and potential consequences of a situation at the time a decision must be made, ready or 
not.” (Hill [2010]: p. 6.) 
  
 Kutuzov’s hesitance to act, Clausewitz’s concept of friction, Kissinger’s problem 
of conjecture, Nassim Taleb’s black swan, Schelling’s dilemma of the unfamiliar, Hill’s 
literature analogy, and the author’s “element of the unknown” all refer to the same 
phenomenon: strategic uncertainty. This uncertainty is caused by the same reason that is 
also the biggest dilemma of social sciences, namely, that human behavior can never be 
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fully determined. Different theories and models devise different solutions to narrow the 
margin of this uncertainty. Human Nature Realism, for example, contends that human 
behavior can be determined to a certain degree. It proposes that the “rational choice” 
choice model is able to minimize the margin of uncertainty concerning the behavior of 
individuals. Neorealism argues that the structure has a determining effect on the agent. 
But none of those approaches can ever be a 100 percent accurate and so the strategist is 
back at the same dilemma.  
 The view held by Napoleon (as depicted by Tolstoy’s novel) is the one shared by 
G. W. F. Hegel. He put forward the existence of the “World Spirit” (der Weltgeist) that 
manifests itself above all in an individual who is the most talented of his age, a true 
genius. He is the one who is capable of bringing about change all by himself. (See: 
Hegel [1977]; Berlin [1953]) 
 Regardless of the fact that Kutuzov is proven right in the end, not surprisingly, 
from Tolstoy’s perspective, the inherent logic of Strategic Thought suggests that 
Napoleon is a true strategist, Kutuzov is not. In fact their battle is a clash of two 
different ontologies. Napoleon represents the one which suggests that reality can be a 
consequence of man’s intended actions, whereas the behavior of Kutuzov implies that 
reality is always the product of some metaphysical will.  
 Therefore, the author puts forward that in an ontological sense, Strategy, to 
paraphrase Jürgen Habermas, is a product of “the project of the Enlightenment”. It is 
progressive and it suggests that our environment, to a certain degree, can be changed by 
the willful actions of man. (Habermas [1998]) It is also a narrative, in which the 
strategist accepts a number of preliminary assumptions about reality. Absent such a 
narrative, however, no Strategic Thought is possible.  
 Does this mean that Kutuzov’s views are dispensable? No not at all. The most 
interesting thing about Tolstoy’s reasoning is the fact that both world views are justified 
from the strategist’s perspective. A strategist has to believe that he can influence reality. 
But he also has to accept the limits of that influence. That limit is largely due to the 
“element of the unknown.”  Essentially, modern foreign policy decision makers are all 
“Hegelian Napoleons” in a way and their job would be senseless if they entirely 
accepted the views suggested by General Kutuzov’s behavior. On the other hand, the 
truth lies somewhere halfway between the two views. As Walter Russel Mead notes: 
“We do not live in a Tolstoyan world where individual leaders and intentions have no 
weight.” (Mead [2005]: p. 18.) However, the Napoleons of today also have to be aware 
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of the fact that the talent demonstrated by them has its limits in the complicated 
strategic environment suggested by General Kutuzov’s behavior.   
 
5.2.2. From Military Strategy to Grand Strategy – The “Demilitarization” of 
Strategy 
 
  At the beginning of Chapter 6, the author established that there is a tradition 
within the literature, which uses the basic concepts of Strategic Thought to describe a 
state’s aspirations. In this sub-chapter the thesis will provide the reader with a brief 
analysis of the evolution of the term “Strategy”. More specifically, the author will draw 
up the process of the “demilitarization” of Strategy. Also, the aim of this chapter is to 
come up with a definition of (foreign and security policy) strategy that could be used 
during the empirical chapters of the dissertation.     
  Foreign policy strategy applies all necessary tools in order to achieve a state’s 
goals – it is not only the territory of the department or ministry dealing with foreign 
policy. Thus, the author has to find a definition, which takes this feature of foreign 
policy strategy into consideration. Such a definition of foreign and security policy 
strategy will necessarily be one that embraces the application of all tools of foreign and 
security policy, be they political, economic, or military. The only concept that is capable 
of recognizing the application of all national resources is the concept of “grand 
strategy”. Since there are many different definitions of the concept, the literature on 
grand strategy will be instructive for finding the “right” formulation. The author aims to 
find the most suitable definition of grand strategy by reviewing the theoretical 
development of the concept.  
  This review is largely based on Hew Strachan’s work, which ironically, by trying 
to criticize the application of the term “Strategy” to fields outside the military realm, 
produced one of the best analyses of the concept’s demilitarization. (Strachan [2008])26 
  Contrary to what certain theorists believe, the origins of the concept of grand 
strategy does not stem from Carl von Clausewitz27, nor was it first used by Paul 
                                                 
26 Unless indicated otherwise, the review of the evolution of grand strategic thought is based on 
Strachan's work.  For other overviews of strategic theory see: Bartholomees, [2008] Mahnken [2010] 
27 Walter Russel Mead writes: “The concept of grand strategy comes to us from the German military 
writer Carl von Calusewitz.” (Mead [2005]: p. 13.) For some inconceivable reason Mead consistently 
refers to Clausewitz elsewhere too, when writing about grand strategy. (See: Ibid. p.14; p. 17.) As I argue, 
the concept does not originate from him and in fact Clausewitz’s famous book is not centered on the 
concept.  
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Kennedy or John Lewis Gaddis, even though the latter two authors’ application of the 
concept received larger attention than previous sources which applied the same logic.  
  Alfred Thayer Mahan was among the first to add nonmilitary (political-
economic) dimensions to the concept of strategy. The famous naval expert wrote mostly 
on the benign political economic effects of sustaining naval superiority. (Sumida [1997]: 
p. 27. quoted in Ibid.)  Later Julian Corbett, a British naval historian in the second half 
of the 19th century, wrote of “major strategy” which is the “predecessor” of the grand 
strategy concept. Corbett wrote that his concept 
 
“in its broadest sense has also to deal with the whole resources of the nation for war, it is 
a branch of statesmanship. It regards the Army and Navy as parts of one force, to be 
handled together; they are instruments of war. But it also has to keep in view constantly 
the politico-diplomatic position of the country (on which depends the effective action of 
the instrument), and its commercial and financial position (by which the energy for 
working the instrument is maintained).” (Corbett [1988]: p. 308. quoted in Strachan 
[2008]: p. 424.)    
 
Strachan notes that the usage of the term “grand strategy” took different paths in 
different places, since “major strategy” came to be known as “grand strategy” in the 
U.K. and as “national strategy” in the US. (Ibid p. 425.) 
  John Frederic Charles Fuller was the next influential theorist who elaborated on 
the concept of grand strategy: 
 
 “our peace strategy must formulate our war strategy, by which I mean that there cannot 
be two forms of strategy, one for peace and one for war, without wastage – moral, 
physical and material – when war breaks out, The first duty of the grand strategist is, 
therefore, to appreciate the commercial and financial position of his country; to discover 
what its resources and liabilities are. Secondly, he must understand the moral 
characteristics of his countrymen, their history, peculiarities, social customs and system of 
government, for all these quantities and qualities form the pillars of the military arch 
which it is his duty to construct.” (Fuller [1923]; p. 218. quoted in Strachan [2008]: pp. 
425-426) 
 
 
 Raoul Castex also contributed to the development of the traditional concept of 
military strategy by adding new, nonmilitary categories to the definition, such as the 
need for the strategist to be concerned with public opinion, geography, coalitions and 
policy in general. (Castex [1993]; quoted in Strachan [2008]: pp. 425-428.). Although 
Strachan writes that Castex kept policy and military strategy completely separated in his 
works, one can tell from the above mentioned example that this was not exactly the 
case. (Strachan [2008]: p. 428.).  
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 There are two things that should be noted here. First, all of the heretofore cited 
definitions and approaches think in terms of military strategy and war time policies. 
Second, they all introduce political and nonmilitary considerations. Corbett regards the 
monitoring of the country’s politico-diplomatic, commercial and financial position as 
important during the conduct of war.  Mahan’s approach dealt with the political 
economy of maritime power during war and Fuller also contended that a country should 
always be aware of its commercial and financial position, as well as the important 
characteristics of the given country’s people. Castex also introduced novel factors into 
the debate, e.g. public opinion. The concept of grand strategy was clearly used to 
describe the war time efforts of a nation, but the immensely political and comprehensive 
nature of those efforts was also realized. Fuller carefully, but clearly goes one step 
further. Until Fuller’s formulation, grand strategy was understood to mean the “politics 
of war”. However, he also gave a “hint” suggesting that strategy does not exclusively 
belong to the realm of military affairs and war. By arguing that a state cannot have 
separate strategies for peace and war, he implies that it can have a strategy in peace time 
as well. Acknowledging that strategies may exist in peace time as well is an important 
step towards the demilitarization of the concept of Strategy and a huge step towards the 
modern definition of grand strategy. Despite all this, Fuller’s concept still had a strong 
military background, since he understood all nonmilitary elements of grand strategy to 
come under the “military arch”. 
 According to Edward Mead Earle, “strategy” is “an inherent element of statecraft 
at all times.” (Earle [1943]: p. viii. quoted in Strachan [2008]: p. 426.). His definition is 
similar to that of Fuller, who contends that strategies can exist during peace time as well 
(see above). This tendency became more intensive, as the strategy of dissuasion in the 
cold war blurred the line between strategy and policy, as noted earlier. Nations 
threatened with war in peace time and this also contributed to the emergence of (grand) 
strategy as a peacetime distinction. (Ibid. p. 428.).    
 George F. Kennan also applied the concept of grand strategy and he defined it as 
 
“[…] the way in which you marshal all the forces at your disposal on the world chessboard. 
I mean not only the military forces you have, although that is very important, but all the 
political forces.” (Excerpt from lecture held by George F. Kennan on October 6, 1947. 
quoted in Harlow-Merz [1991]: p. 258. quoted in Deibel [2007]: p. 417.) 
 
Thus, apparently, the term has lost its military background a lot earlier in the US 
practice than in the European one.  
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 One of the best known theorists of (grand) strategy is the famous military 
historian and soldier Basil Henry Liddell Hart – he wrote several books on this topic. 
(See: Liddell Hart [1972]; [1925]; [1954])28 He distinguished between “strategy”, that 
he understood to mean “generalship”, which referred to the method of applying military 
force; and “grand strategy”, which is “distinct from the policy governing its 
employment [that of military force – added by the author, I.B.] and combining it with 
other weapons: economic, political, and psychological.” He contends that grand strategy 
is synonymous with “war policy.” (Liddell Hart [1954]: p. 31; p. 366.) In this sense, 
Liddell Hart does not go any further in demilitarizing the concept. However, he too 
emphasizes the need for a comprehensive approach, only a part of which is military 
strategy. 
 Towards the end of his book, Liddell Hart goes on to refine his distinction 
between “strategy” and “grand strategy” and distinguishes between “pure strategy” 
(“the art of the general”) and “grand strategy”. (See: Ibid., pp. 333-337) He defines 
grand strategy as follows: 
 
“As tactics is an application of strategy on a lower plane, so strategy is an application on 
a lower plane of ‘grand strategy’. While practically synonymous with the policy which 
guides the conduct of war, as distinct from the more fundamental policy which should 
govern its object, the term ‘grand strategy’ serves to bring out the sense of ‘policy in 
execution’. For the role of grand strategy – higher strategy – is to co-ordinate and direct 
all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political 
object of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy.” (Liddell Hart Ibid., pp. 
335-336.) 
 
According to the military historian, grand strategy should also be concerned with the 
following components of national power: 
 
 economic resources; 
 manpower; 
 moral resources (“fostering the willing spirit of people”); 
 regulation of the distribution of power between military services;  
 regulation of the distribution of power between military services and 
industry; 
 
 fighting power; 
                                                 
28 For Liddell Hart’s intriguing intellectual biography and how he thought about „grand strategy”, see: 
Mearsheimer [1988]: especially Chapter 4 on grand strategy (pp. 84-99.)  
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 financial pressure; 
 diplomatic pressure; 
 commercial pressure; and 
 ethical pressure. (See: Ibid., p. 336.)29 
 
This seems to be the most comprehensive list of means available to a “grand strategist” 
so far. Liddell Hart concluded that war policy should also be concerned with future 
peace and the creation of circumstances suitable for a prosperous postwar future. (Ibid.; 
p. 336; p. 366.)  
 The famous strategist argues that grand strategy is essentially “policy in 
execution”, which is the complete opposite of Strachan’s view, who proposes that 
strategy should not be confused with policy. Thus, Liddell Hart suggests that this 
conflation is a natural process. (See above; Liddel Hart [1954]: pp. 335-336.)  
 J.R.M. Butler wrote one volume of the famous “Grand Strategy” series, a six 
volume edition on the subject. However, he did not go any further than noting that grand 
strategy is “concerned both with purely military strategy and with politics.”(Butler 
[1957]: p. xv. quoted in Strachan [2008]: p. 426.). His approach also suggests that there 
has to be a level of policy higher than that of military strategy where the basic tenets of 
Strategic Thought could be applied. 
 André Beaufre thought of strategy as a concept embracing at least four 
components: political, economic, diplomatic and military. (Beaufre [1965]: p. 14; p. 23. 
quoted in Ibid, p. 428.) This attests to a tradition of thought, which thinks of grand 
strategy and Strategy in general as a comprehensive approach to the application of all 
national resources and tools. This also suggests that the notion does not exclusively 
belong to the military realm.  
 The next influential author who dealt with grand strategy extensively was 
famous British military historian Michael Howard. In his interpretation 
 
“Grand strategy in the first half of the twentieth century consisted basically in the 
mobilisation and deployment of national resources or wealth, manpower and industrial 
capacity, together with the enlistment of those of allied and, when feasible, of neutral 
powers, for the purpose of achieving the goals of national policy in wartime.” (Howard 
                                                 
29
 It is worth quoting Liddell Hart’s exact words on this topic: “Moreover, fighting power is but one of 
the instruments of grand strategy – which should take account of and apply the power of financial 
pressure, of diplomatic pressure, of commercial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the 
opponent’s will. A good cause is a sword as well as armour.” (Liddell Hart [1954]: p. 336.) 
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[1972]: p. 1. quoted in Strachan [2008]: p. 426.)   
 
The “problem” with Howard’s definition is that it is still closely connected to warfare – 
it is suggested to mean the national policies of a state “in wartime”. Again, the 
comprehensiveness of the approach is also similar to the definitions of Hart, Fuller and 
Corbett. The comprehensive nature of grand strategy will become an important element 
of the modern definition of the concept. 
 Edward Luttwak argued that strategy is “the conduct and consequences of human 
relations in the context of actual or possible armed conflict.”  (Luttwak [1987]: p. 4. 
quoted in Ibid, p. 429.) Barry Posen contends that grand strategy is “a political-military, 
means-ends chain, a state’s theory about how it can best “cause” security for itself.” 
(Posen [1984]: p. 13; 220; quoted in Ibid.) Posen’s approach completely strips the 
original definition of its military connotation and transforms it into a definition of what 
one would call security policy. Posen is the author who takes the biggest leap towards 
the modern definition of grand strategy. It is something that exists in peacetime as well 
and obviously embraces a number of quite different means.  
 The eighties were a watershed in the development of the modern definition of 
(grand) strategy. The definitions of Luttwak and Posen were only two of an abundance 
of formulations in the eighties which tried to capture the essence of grand strategy.30  
 
Figure 5. The “Demilitarization” of the Concept of Strategy 
The “demilitarization” of the definition of strategy begun around 1850 and approximately lasted 
until 1991. The following works have been selected for the making of this figure: S. Tzu: The Art of 
War, 6-5th c., B.C.; N. Machiavelli: The Art of War, 1521; C. v. Clausewitz: On War, 1832; A.H. 
                                                 
30 Indeed it would be impossible to make a full list of those definitions here30 but Terry L. Deibel did 
include a selection of those in his book. Deibel [2007] 
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Jomini: The Art of War, 1838; A.T. Mahan: The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783, 
1890; J. Corbett: Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, 1911; J.F.C. Fuller: The Reformation of 
War, 1923; R. Castex: Strategic Theories, 1929; E.M. Earle: Makers of Modern Strategy: Military 
Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, 1943; B.H. Liddell Hart: Strategy: The Indirect Approach, 
1954; G.F. Kennan: Lecture held on October 6, 1947; J.R.M. Butler: Grand Strategy, Vol. 2., 1957; 
A. Beafure: An Introduction to Strategy, 1965; M. Howard: Grand Strategy, 4., 1972; J.L. Gaddis: 
Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy, 
1982; E. Luttwak: Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace, 1987; B. Posen: The Sources of Military 
Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars, 1984. P. Kennedy: Grand 
Strategies in War and Peace, 1991. 
 
 
 Instead of citing and analyzing all of those definitions in Deibel’s book, the 
author wishes to pick a suitable working definition in order to carry out the empirical 
part of the research. The definition the author chose is a combination of the definition 
used by Paul Kennedy and the one John Lewis Gaddis uses for “strategy”. Paul 
Kennedy uses the following definition:  
 
“The crux of grand strategy lies therefore in policy, that is, in the capacity of the nation’s 
leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and nonmilitary, for the 
preservation and enhancement of the nation’s long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) 
best interests.” (Kennedy [1991]: p. 5.) 
 
Gaddis uses a simpler formulation: 
 
“By “strategy,” I mean quite simply the process by which ends are related to means, 
intentions to capabilities, objectives to resources.” (Gaddis [1982]: p. viii.) 
 
The combination the author has made up reads as follows: 
 
Grand strategy is the practice of relating ends to means by using all the 
military and nonmilitary tools available to a state in order to preserve 
and enhance its long-term best interests.31 
 
This definition of grand strategy will be taken to mean “strategy” in general throughout 
the dissertation. The above combination is justified by the following reasons. It has the 
original logic of Strategy – the relating of ends to means. It embraces all military as well 
as nonmilitary means, thus, it also satisfies the criteria of comprehensiveness. The 
author could have chosen a definition, which specifically makes a distinction between 
political, economic, military and other tools, but that would not have been wise, since a 
                                                 
31 This is taken from one of the author’s earlier publications. The earlier version has been slightly 
modified. See: Balogh [2010b]: p. 4. This definition has also been used in one of the author’s other 
publications: Balogh [2011d]: p. 129. 
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number of tools/ policies (eg.: containment) do not necessarily fit into anyone of those 
categories. It would have to be a combination of all those policies covering all aspects 
of containment, thus, the author chose not to specify the nature of those means. The 
distinction between military and nonmilitary means should leave enough space for 
covering all policies pursued by Washington. The formulation “long term best interests” 
also calls for explanation, since the formulation seems to be rather vague and 
problematic. Therefore, as applied to the specific case of US-Iran relations, the 
definition of  a US (grand) strategy towards Iran is understood to mean: 
 
The US practice of relating ends to means by using all its military and 
nonmilitary tools available in order to preserve and enhance its long-
term best interests vis a vis the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
  
In order to clarify vague expressions, the dissertation will use the following meanings: 
 
“The US practice of relating ends to means by using all its military 
and nonmilitary tools available”: Any executive order, directive, 
strategy, decision, measure, law or “speech act”32 focusing on the 
application of any national tool in order to enhance and preserve US best 
interests vis a vis Iran. (Buzan-Waever [1998]) 
 
“long term best interests”: The realization of one or more of the 
following strategic goals: 
 
 concluding a peace treaty between Israel and Arab states (most 
notably Syria  and Lebanon); 
 the emergence of a stable and non-hostile Iraq that is able to control 
its territory; 
 the emergence of a stable Afghanistan that is capable of controlling 
its territory; 
 the halting or making fully transparent of Iran’s nuclear program; 
 securing the free flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz; and 
 minimizing or altogether eliminating tensions between the US and 
Iran. 
 
 
The same list has been chosen as the one constructed by the author when defining the 
term “Washington’s strategic interests” for reasons of consistency and coherence. (See 
chapter: I.4. and also Addis et al. [2010]) However, specific administrations usually 
                                                 
32 “Speech act” is understood to mean rhetoric as well as government documents which outline policies. It 
is taken from the concept of “securitization” introduced by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever. See: Buzan-
Waever [1998]  
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have their individual concept of US national interests and this will always be taken into 
consideration throughout the thesis. Other terms (“preserve and enhance”) in the 
definition, by and large, explain themselves.   
  The above definition of US strategic interests implies a conjecture: that most or 
all of the above US national interests cannot be realized without at least a limited 
cooperation with Tehran. Reaching a climate of cooperation with Iran is a pretext for: 
 
 reducing effects that are the results of the strategic blowback 
dynamic and,  therefore, 
 realizing US national interests both globally and in the wider Middle 
East.  
 
  There is a final theoretical problem which has to be addressed. The 
comprehensive logic of grand strategy suggests the application of a combination of 
national means – political, economic and military – for significant national goals. The 
strategy of containment was a grand strategy. The spread of democracy is a grand 
strategy. Thus, the question arises: can such a comprehensive concept be applied to 
bilateral relations, such as the US-Iran nexus? Can the US have a grand strategy 
toward Iran? Is this not tantamount to applying the theory of an “overall strategy” on a 
tactical level? Obviously, if one is able to find a precedent for applying the concept in a 
bilateral arrangement, then it could be argued that such application of the concept could 
be a viable methodology. In fact, there is a precedent for this approach. Mark 
Simakovsky applies the concept of grand strategy to US-Iran relations. He assesses the 
combined application of US diplomatic, informational, economic, political and security 
tools in order to change Iranian behavior. (Simakovsky, [year of publication unknown]) 
Well-known scholar Thomas J. Christensen also applies the concept to US-Chinese 
relations in one of his works. (See: Christensen, [2006]: p. 108; p. 110). 
  However, this is not enough for a sound methodological justification for using 
the concept for understanding a bilateral relationship. It is the manner in which a nation 
pursues its policies that decides whether the concept can be applied or not. It is not only 
“large” or “overarching” goals that justify the application of grand strategy in general. 
No definition states explicitly that it can only be applied to a state’s overall aspirations 
and no definition states that it cannot be applied to a bilateral relationship. Grand 
strategy can be applied when a state applies all of its tools available in order to attain its 
national goals – this is what most modern definitions of grand strategy postulate. In that 
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sense, it is synonymous with foreign and security policy strategy. Since the US applies a 
host of different assets in order to influence Iranian behavior, grand strategy is a suitable 
concept for describing US motivations.  
  The other reason for applying the concept of grand strategy is that it offers the 
only “demilitarized” concept of strategy. Such definition is imperative if one wishes to 
theorize about foreign and security policy strategy. 
 
6. Methodology and Selection of the Empirical Sample – 
Epistemic Assumptions 
 
  Having established the hypotheses of the dissertation, it is essential to outline the 
exact methodology and the theoretical foundations for justifying H1a and H1b.  
Methodology answers the question “How?” – how does one get to know reality? 
Essentially, it is about a set of epistemic assumptions on how to understand the complex 
nature of reality.  
  As the author pointed out earlier, the methodology he wishes to use is qualitative 
analysis. This approach is warranted by the inherently difficult nature of converting the 
above defined variables into measurable and objective “units”. Thus, the author wishes 
to provide a qualitative analysis of policies expressed in the following primary sources: 
 
 government documents and strategies; 
 diplomatic cables and military logs released by Wikileaks; and 
 speeches of government officials. 
 
 A number of previously classified national security and other documents are now 
available from the tenure of office of the Clinton as well as the George W. Bush 
administrations. Moreover, Wikileaks documents provide interesting insights into policy 
considerations of the US government. The other sources are of a secondary nature. The 
author mostly relies on  
 
 journal articles, 
 books, and 
 political memoirs.  
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Of course, one has to keep in mind that the latter category is very subjective, still, 
memoires could be applied as alternative sources.33 
  It is vital that one thing be established about official policy statements, e.g. 
national security strategies. The author does not necessarily consider these documents as 
credible sources for finding out more about what kind of actual policies the US pursues 
towards e.g. the Islamic Republic of Iran. Melvyn P. Leffler and Jeffrey W. Legro point 
this out in the introduction of their 2008 book: 
 
“Yet formulaic and comprehensive documents such as those designed for submission to 
Congress, and even those more secret national strategy statements that were so important 
to waging the cold war, have had serious deficiencies. They conflate and they generalize; 
they often sound like menus; rarely do they contain the interpretive insights that transform 
strategic vision into strategic policy.” (Leffler; Legro [2008]: p. 9.)   
 
This really captures the essence of the problem. Researchers are not necessarily 
interested in policy statements, they are interested in the policies themselves as they are 
executed as opposed to how they are presented. Professor Richard Doyle of the US 
Naval Postgraduate School distinguishes between explicit and implicit security 
strategies. In the US case, explicit security strategies are mostly official national 
security strategies and official national security policy statements. “Implicit strategy is 
what we mean by observing any country as it interacts with its security environment, 
that is, with other countries and forces that might threaten it or interfere with its 
objectives.” (Doyle [year of publication unknown]). Buckley and Singh remind us that 
national security strategies or “doctrines” serve a dual purpose.34 They inform both 
domestic, as well as foreign audiences. They also highlight the importance of the 
declaratory nature of such strategies and distinguish between the act of declaration and 
the actual implementation of the given policy. (Buckley; Singh [2006a]: p. 2.)  
  Thus, the author is interested in implicit strategies of foreign and security policy 
                                                 
33 Nonetheless, there is a new wave of US political memoirs. This new practice involves publishing a 
book and also the personal, heretofore classified documents to improve the credibility of the printed book. 
The memoirs of Douglas Feith (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from July 2001 until  August 
2005) and Donald Rumsfeld (Secretary of Defense from January 2001 until December 2006) are cases in 
point. See the documents of Douglas Feith published at War and Decision at www.waranddecision.com. 
Accessed: 03-07-2011. For Donald Rumsfeld’s papers see: The Rumsfeld Papers at www.rumsfeld.com. 
Accessed: 03-07-2011 However, the author will mostly rely on the memoirs of Madeleine Albright 
(Secretary of State from 1997 to 2001) and George Tenet (CIA director from 1997-2004) 
34 Buckley and Singh imply that the expressions “grand strategy” and “doctrine” are synonyms and that is 
how the present work uses them too. (Buckley; Singh [2006a]: pp. 1-2.) The author will elaborate on the 
meaning of “doctrine” in more detail in the chapter on the Bush doctrine (see chapter II/2.)   
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– the actual policies as they are executed. As far as the “sample” chosen for research is 
concerned, the following set of policies implemented between January 1993 and 
December 2010 is to be examined: 
 
The Clinton Administration (1993-2001):  
 
 the Oslo process, and the US and Iranian roles within; 
 
 the policy of dual containment, focusing on the Iranian dimension; and 
 
 the attempt to engage Iran during the Khatami presidency. 
 
The Bush Administration (2001-2009): 
 
 the Bush doctrine and Iranian reactions from 2001 to 2006; and 
 
 the policy of containing Iran (2006-2009). 
 
The Obama Administration (2009-2010): 
 
 overtures of the Obama administration; and 
 
 the policy of containing Iran.  
 
 
These are seven different policies embracing some 17 years – a sample sufficiently large 
for drawing conclusions and making generalizations. They were chosen because they 
cover the most significant US initiatives towards Iran. Therefore, this set is ideal for 
examining if there is a “blowback dynamic”.  
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II. A CASE STUDY OF THE THEORY OF 
STRATEGIC BLOWBACK: THE US AND IRAN 
 
 
1. The Clinton administration (1993-2001) 
 
“There are two tragedies in life. One is to lose your 
heart’s desire. The other is to gain it.” George 
Bernard Shaw cited in: Henry A. Kissinger [1994]: 
p. 22.  
 
 Former US national security adviser and secretary of state Henry Kissinger cites 
George Bernard Shaw’s famous words for describing the unusually beneficial position 
of the United States after the end of the Cold War. Historically, most states would have 
envied the new position of Washington: unrivaled and unchallenged. The unipolar 
moment of the US was in the making, but few suspected how many dilemmas 
Washington would have to face in the coming years.35(See: Krauthammer [1990]) The 
“New World Order”, as it came to be called, turned out to be a burden as much as a 
privilege. (See: Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress … Bush [1991]) The 
first post-Cold War US presidency was that of William Jefferson Clinton’s, whose time 
in office attests to Kissinger’s notion that primacy is a double edged sword. 
Unprecedented power was a chance – a chance to promote peace and stability and to 
spread US values, most notably democracy. Interventions in the name of freedom, 
human rights and democracy, deposing dictators and reshaping the strategic 
environment to match US interests suddenly seemed like viable strategies. However, 
unprecedented power also meant an unprecedented burden and responsibility, as the 
Rwandan and Yugoslav cases have demonstrated. Few US decision makers – or scholars 
for that matter – realized the ambivalent nature of primacy at the time. Nonetheless, the 
Clinton administration was initially determined to pursue a number of priorities: NATO 
enlargement and engagement with former Cold War enemies, spreading democracy and 
other Western values, sustaining a balanced relationship with Boris Yeltsin’s Russia, 
expanding the global zone of free trade and pursuing peace in the Middle East.36  
                                                 
35 For an excellent overview of how US hegemony evolved see: Magyarics [2012]. 
36 For a detailed elaboration of those policies see: The National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlargement NSS [1995] 
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 Indeed, “No president ever came to office with a more promising set of 
circumstances for promoting peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors […].” 
(Quandt [2001]: p. 321.) Clinton’s Middle Eastern strategy had two important “pillars”: 
1.) promoting Arab-Israeli peace; and 2.) isolating this process from forces perceived to 
be opposing the peace effort. The approach was termed the “peace strategy” by Martin 
Indyk, Clinton’s special assistant on Middle Eastern affairs and one of the architects of 
this approach. (See: Indyk [2009]: p. 43; 270.) The second pillar came to be known as 
the policy of dual containment in 1993, which will be discussed in a separate chapter. 
This two-pillar approach provided a clear and logical framework for US foreign and 
security policy in the Middle East. In fact, seldom has US policy been so clear-cut and 
rational in the region as under the Clinton administration. 
 Every Middle Eastern foreign policy initiative was subordinated to achieving 
goals set by the “peace strategy”. This concept had a profound effect on the approach 
Washington took towards Tehran. This chapter analyzes how Iran related to the “peace 
strategy” and how the US missed a number of strategic opportunities to start off on a 
new footing with Tehran. I argue that most US initiatives were due to flawed 
perceptions of the Iranian foreign policy posture and its goals, which led to aggressive 
US foreign policy measures, which in turn caused a significant “strategic blowback.” 
 In order to prove that realization of US interests had been hindered by 
counterproductive US initiatives, one needs to define the specific US interests at the 
time. First and foremost, Washington was interested in: 
 
 fostering stability in the Middle East by finding a solution to the 
Arab-Israeli  conflict;  
 securing the free flow of energy trade associated with the region; 
and 
 keeping Saddam Hussein’s Iraq checked after the Gulf War.  
 
 The three policies of the Clinton administration will be examined with a special 
emphasis on whether these interests were realized or not. Initiatives examined in this 
chapter overlap in time and they are closely connected. Their significance, however, 
require them to be examined separately.  The Oslo process, as well as the policy of dual 
containment are both “sub-strategies” of the broader Middle East strategy of the Clinton 
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administration. They were designed to reinforce each other. On the other hand, reactions 
to the policy of Khatami’s détente, the author argues, were not of a strategic significance 
– they were only tactical moves (see below). What follows is a detailed and separate 
assessment of the Oslo process, the policy of dual containment and détente under the 
Khatami administration.  
 
1.1. Missed Opportunities Under the Oslo Process  
 
 In order to prove H1a as defined in the introductory chapter, one has to show 
that indeed, the blowback dynamism was at play during the Oslo peace process.37 
Ideally, in this specific set of circumstances this would mean proving that aggressive US 
moves resulted in Iranian counter moves that hindered the realization of US interests. To 
precisely follow the basic assumptions of Neoclassical Realism and the methodological 
foundations of the thesis, the author puts forward that besides the two main 
governments examined (the US and Iran), a number of domestic political actors played 
key roles in shaping US-Iranian relations. The simplest way of defining those political 
forces would be to label them as US and Iranian hardliners and pragmatists suggesting a 
two-by-two matrix. However, one must add the Israeli lobby, most notably the 
American-Israeli Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), as well as other US domestic 
organizations.38 Furthermore, perceptions also influenced policy outcomes. Thus, a 
Neoclassical Realist interpretation would have to take all these factors in to 
consideration. 
 I argue that at least three strategic opportunities were missed by Washington to 
initiate a gradual thaw in US-Iran relations after the end of the Cold War. This means 
that at least three opportunities arose when the US had realistic chances of pursuing 
nonaggressive policies that could have prevented strategic blowback effects. The three 
opportunities were the following:  
 
                                                 
37 It is surprising how shallow the literature on Iranian involvement in the Oslo peace process is as the 
mainstream tends to neglect the thorough analysis of the Iranian involvement  therein. There are some 
sources, however that do shed sufficient light on the nature of Iranian engagement in the process. See: 
Parsi [2007]; Quandt [2001]; Kurtzer, Lasensky [2008]; Ross [2004].  
38 Established in 1953, AIPAC is believed to be the most powerful lobbying force on Capitol Hill. See: 
Mearsheimer- Walt [2007] and also Parsi [2007]: pp. 182-189.  
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 the immediate period after the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War (1991); 
 the lead up to, as well as the aftermath of the Madrid Conference and 
the  conference itself (1991-1993); and 
 the Oslo peace process (1993-2000). 
 
The author will prove that in all of these cases Iran tried to be constructive, but 
Washington snubbed Iranian overtures causing unintended negative consequences.39 Of 
course, two of these cases took place before the Clinton administration. However, US 
and Iranian perspectives on the Oslo peace process cannot be understood without 
comprehending the Middle Eastern strategic environment after the fall of the Soviet 
Union and the period leading up to the signing of the Oslo Accords.  
 Iran was largely cooperative during the Gulf war, despite the fact that it 
perceived it had not received sufficient rewards for demonstrating goodwill towards the 
US in Lebanon concerning the issue of US hostages. Tehran allowed its air space to be 
used by the US.  It refused to support the Shia uprising in Iraq and declared “positive 
neutrality” – actions, which undoubtedly served US interests. A generally cooperative 
Iranian attitude, however, was not realized by Washington as a strategic opportunity for 
rapprochement. Instead, the US built up its military presence in the Persian Gulf – Iran’s 
historic zone of influence. This caused Iran to be even more wary of Washington in a 
climate initially cooperative and possibly suitable for reconciliation. (Parsi [2007]: pp. 
139-143.) Mohammad Reza Tajik, who used to be an adviser to President Mohammad 
Khatami, described Tehran’s perceptions of the new situation as follows: 
  
“The US managed to portray Iran as a greater threat to the Arabs than even Israel. This 
had a crucial impact on our thinking. The US sold more weapons to the Arabs as a result 
and became the hegemon [emphasis added by author, I.B.] of the Persian Gulf.” (quoted 
in: Ibid., p. 143.)  
 
In fact, limited Iranian rearmament efforts are believed by some to have partly been due 
to heavy US military presence in the Gulf, which was perceived to be threatening 
Iranian security. (Ehteshami; Hinnebusch [2002], p. 83. referenced in: Ibid.)  
 Of course, Iran thought of itself as a state of regional significance and, therefore, 
                                                 
39 This reasoning extensively draws on Parsi [2007]: pp. 139-201. In essence, Parsi also argues that a 
number of opportunities were missed by Washington to remedy problems between the two countries.  
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it wished to become a leading power in the region. The best way to achieve that was to 
fix relations with the Arab states in the Gulf and also with the United States. The 
Rafsanjani government (1989-1997) began a diplomatic offensive to warm up relations 
with the GCC states and Saudi Arabia in particular. However, the possible warming of 
relations between Tehran and the GCC states meant that US presence in the Gulf would 
be less welcome – or even questioned by Arab sheikdoms. Washington started pushing 
the GCC to choose between two alternatives: “[…] a Middle East order with Iran, or an 
Arab order with the United States.” (Ibid. p. 147.) Thus, Arab states chose the latter 
alternative and Iranian ambitions to create a multilateral arrangement based on the 
inclusion of Iran were snubbed. (Ibid. pp. 145-147.)   
 Iran took a relatively pragmatic approach in the period between the defeat of 
Iraq in the Gulf War and the Madrid Conference. Washington reacted by strengthening 
its political influence in the region through its military presence and forcing a Middle 
Eastern order based on the exclusion of Iran. By strengthening its ties with Arab states 
in the Gulf, the US compensated for Iran’s diplomatic overture towards those countries. 
The “unipolar moment” of the US was an incentive for Washington to be assertive and 
even aggressive in a way. Iran was pragmatic, but Washington did not see that as a 
strategic opportunity to mend US-Iran relations. The Neoclassical Realist interpretation 
of this dynamic would suggest that structural and even unit level Iranian variables (i. e. 
the pragmatic foreign policy of the Rafsanjani administration) were ideal for 
cooperation between Washington and Tehran. Unit level variables, however, on the US 
side were not ideal. US leaders saw the US as a power that is capable of attaining just 
about any objective in the Middle East. Hence, they did not see the caveats in the 
closing window of opportunity for cooperation with Iran. The blowback effects, 
however, were not experienced by Washington until after the Madrid Peace Conference.  
The author suggests that at least 2 of the above mentioned US strategic interests were 
harmed as a result of this approach: regional stability and checking Saddam Hussein’s 
Iraq. Both of those would have been a lot easier to realize, if the US had included Iran 
in the reshaping of Middle Eastern order. That was not to happen, however, as the 
analysis of the Madrid Conference shows below.  
 By 1991, both Israelis and Palestinians were exhausted by the first intifada 
(1987-1991). Despite the Shamir40 government’s initial resistance, the Bush 
                                                 
40 Prime Minister of Israel from 1986 to 1992. 
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administration pushed hard for a regional settlement and Prime Minister Shamir gave in 
by the end of 1991. This led to the Madrid Conference of October 30, 1991. George H. 
W. Bush emphasized that every significant regional power was to be invited in order to 
provide them with a stake in the new Middle Eastern peace and order. Hence, the first 
ever direct negotiations between Israel and its Arab neighbors took place in Madrid. A 
Palestinian delegation, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt and members of the GCC, as well 
as the European Community were all invited. Altogether 43 nations participated at the 
conference and negotiations took place in two different formats: a bilateral one in 
Madrid, and a multilateral one in Moscow from the beginning of 1992. The Moscow 
track was to discuss every regional issue (security, economy, water, environment, 
refugees, etc.). There was one nation, however, that was not part of the arrangement 
from the outset: Iran, which never received an invitation from the US. (Ibid. pp. 148-
152)  
 The US never provided Iran with incentives or at least the prospect of rewards. 
(Hunter [2010]: p. 49.) There was a sense of pragmatism in Iranian foreign policy, 
which never received due credit in Washington. The Rafsanjani government even 
declared that it was prepared to support any solution to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict 
that Palestinians were ready to accept. However, this positive attitude was not 
recognized by Washington. According to Trita Parsi’s interview with Dennis Ross41, the 
latter said: 
 
“Certain images get formed, and when they are formed, even when there are behaviors 
that seem to contradict the image, if there are other images at the same time that tend to 
confirm it, you give much more weight to those that tend to confirm it, and you dismiss 
those that should point you in a different direction…. The signals from Rafsanjani tended 
to be dismissed, but they were there. The behaviors that actually tended to fit with the 
traditional images were treated as if that was the real Iran.” (cited in Ibid. p. 152.) 
 
 In addition, both Israelis and Americans believed that Iran was not a player in 
the Arab-Israeli dispute, therefore, it was viewed as a state that did not have much to 
contribute to the process.  However, according to Trita Parsi’s logic, the Bush 
administration never took into account that Iran may become a “spoiler” not only if it is 
invited, but also if it is left out. Former US Ambassador to Israel Daniel Kurtzer said of 
the self-perception of the US at the time: “Everything was going our way. All systems 
were go. And Iran was a problem for us, but so what? We had everything else.” (Ibid. p. 
                                                 
41 Dennis Ross was Special Coordinator for the Middle East in the White House during the Madrid 
Conference.  
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153.; see also: Hunter [2010]: pp. 49-50. and Indyk [2009]: p. 2.)  
 Iran saw the refusal to invite it as an effort to leave it out of shaping the Middle 
Eastern international order. (Ibid. pp. 153-154.; Freedman [2008]: pp. 299-300. see also: 
Hunter [2010]: p. 50.) The key to the theory of strategic blowback is whether Iran ever 
transformed its disappointment into actual policies. Was there either a direct or an 
indirect blowback effect? Indeed, there was. Parsi notes:   
  
“Convinced that Washington wouldn’t grant Iran its legitimate role in the region, Tehran 
concluded that it was left with no choice but to make America’s nonrecognition as costly 
as possible by sabotaging its policies.” (quoted in Ibid. p. 155.)  
 
 
 Iran felt that if it lost its influence with the Arab street and if Tel-Aviv made 
peace with the Palestinians, then Iran would lose its regional influence. Furthermore, the 
possibility of an Israeli-Syrian peace could seriously jeopardize Iranian regional 
influence. (See: Tyler [2009]: p. 447.; Rabinovich [2004]: p. 76.) There is evidence of 
Iran’s willingness to support the peace effort if it was offered a seat at the table.42 Since 
that was not the case, Tehran denounced the peace process and stepped up its support 
for Palestinian groups and various militant organizations opposing talks, such as 
Hezbollah.  On March 17, 1992, a bomb was detonated at the Israeli embassy in Buenos 
Aires, Argentine. Israel thought that Iran had been the main driving force behind the 
attack.43 After Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo Accords in Norway on September 13, 
1993, the Iranian Majles adopted a statement in March, 1994, emphasizing that Israel 
needed to be wiped off the “world map.”44 (Parsi [2007]: pp. 175.) Then, Israel’s new 
government, led by Yitzhak Rabin, made Arab-Israeli peace a corner stone of its policies 
and sought to portray Iran as the main obstacle of that effort. Together with the 
influential AIPAC, it pushed for a tougher US stance on Iran. Since the US needed 
Israeli cooperation for its peace strategy, Washington’s policy shifted and it began 
taking Israel’s stance by October 1994. Following that, the policy of ‘dual containment’ 
was introduced (see next chapter). Then, on July 18, 1994, the building of the 
Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association was blown up by a bomb in Buenos Aires, 
Argentine. Some Israeli experts suggest this to be a result of earlier Israeli operations in 
                                                 
42 Parsi cites the words of an Iranian reformist, Ali Reza Alavi Tabar: “We would have been more 
inclined to support, and cooperate with, the peace efforts if we were given an active and participatory 
role from the outset, instead of them creating the entire plan and then expect us to simply go along with 
it” (Parsi [2007]: p. 176.) 
43 Even though there is no direct open source evidence to support this link.  
44 The Majles is the parliamentary organization of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
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South Lebanon against Hezbollah.45 Nonetheless, the Israeli perception was that Iran 
undertook a shift in its policies and started using terror as a tool for realizing its regional 
interests. Additionally, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad launched an aggressive terror 
campaign against Israel beginning in the spring of 1994 and tensions remained high 
throughout 1995. (Ibid. pp. 155-180.; See also: Rabinovich [2004]: pp. 75-76.; Pirseyedi 
[2013]: pp. 57-59.)   
Hamas set off a bomb on July 24, 1995, killing 5 Israeli citizens in Tel-Aviv. 
Yitzhak Rabin and Yasser Arafat were originally planning to sign the deal dubbed ‘Oslo 
II’ the next day – July 25.  As a result of the explosion, Israel froze negotiations and it 
closed down its borders. Thus, the Oslo II accord was only signed on September 28, 
1995. The situation escalated as Israel conducted operations against Palestinian 
militants. Those groups, however, kept striking back. Israel liquidated a leader of 
Islamic Jihad and a couple of days later a bomb exploded in Tel-Aviv wounding Israeli 
citizens. Then, on November 4, 1995, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was killed by an 
Israeli radical, which was a further blow to the Oslo process.46  Later on, in January 
1996, Peres had a Palestinian extremist killed by Israeli authorities and Hamas 
responded by sending suicide bombers to blow up buses and set off bombs in public 
places. (Quandt [2001]: p. 335-336; p.338.) Israeli and US intelligence believed that 
Iran was involved in this “wave of terror” in order to sabotage the peace process, which 
threatened Iran with isolation. (Tyler [2009]: p. 449.; see also: Freedman [2008]: pp. 
301-302.)  
Thus, the US aim of isolating Iran from regional arrangements contributed to 
hindering the realization of a key US strategic interest: fostering peace and stability in 
the region. Of course, Iran may not have been the primary driving force behind these 
attacks. However, it did support groups, which rejected the peace process and, thus, 
contributed to creating circumstances conducive to the failure of the peace effort.  
 If strategic blowback is a result of escalation and aggressive policies as defined 
in the introductory chapter, then, logically, de-escalation and less aggressive policies 
should result in the decreasing intensity of the blowback effect. This is exactly what 
happened. Partly as a result of the terror attacks, Shimon Peres lost the Israeli elections 
in May 1996. The most striking evidence of aggressive policies backfiring against Iran 
                                                 
45 There is no direct and open source evidence to support Iran was behind all this, or that it was behind all 
this because US and Israeli policies aimed at isolating it. Nonetheless, it made strategic sense on Iran’s 
behalf to be involved in such a campaign.  
46 This is not to suggest that Iran had anything to do with Rabin’s death. 
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are evident in how the Netanyahu government’s shift resulted in a less aggressive 
Iranian foreign and security policy posture. Netanyahu was an ardent opponent of the 
peace process. He knew that one way of de-escalating the situation partly caused by 
terrorist attacks was initiating a brief thaw in Israeli-Iran relations by slowing down the 
peace process. As Iran felt that the process began to stall, it also felt less isolated, thus, it 
was less motivated to disrupt the peace effort that was already dying. It even pushed 
Hezbollah to accept a cease-fire with Israel as Tel-Aviv conducted an operation in 
Lebanon in 1996. Tehran also helped with the release of a number of hostages. (Parsi 
[2007]: pp. 196-201.)  
 Once the blowback effects undermined trust between the Palestinians and the 
Israelis, the peace process got stuck. Of course, this should not be directly attributed to 
Iran and its actions, but it is fair to say that Iran, to a certain extent, contributed to this 
outcome. It therefore undermined Middle Eastern stability, which went against US 
strategic interests (see above). It is true that both the Hebron agreement of January 17, 
1997 and the Wye River Memorandum of October 23, 1998, were signed by the 
Netanyahu government, nonetheless, these were halfhearted efforts to breathe life into a 
peace process that has already been stalling for a while. Then the process came to a halt 
in March 1997. (Rostoványi [2006], p. 173.) This tendency remained under the Ehud 
Barak-led Labor government as well, which took over in May 1999. Barak was a 
supporter of the Rabin approach, therefore, he supported the peace process too. (Quandt 
[2001]: pp. 344-345; p. 353.)  
 He withdrew from Lebanon and this meant a strategic blow to radical Iranian 
policies, since Iran was not in a position to indirectly harass Israeli presence through 
Hezbollah. It had to find Palestinian militants instead, to maintain its reach into Israel. 
Iran even offered a secret dialogue through a back channel and there were signs that 
Israel would be willing to take a more constructive stance on Iran. Still, Iranian 
overtures were rejected because the Barak government wished to concentrate on the 
Arab-Israeli peace process. (Parsi [2007]: pp. 215-218.)  
The Barak administration was particularly focused on the Syrian track of this 
process. Negotiations started between Syria and Israel on a possible peace accord. Even 
though Tel-Aviv withdrew from South Lebanon, it was not ready to give up the Golan 
Heights – a precondition for peace according to Syrian President Hafez al-Assad. As al-
Assad died in the summer of 2000, the peace process came to an end on the Syrian 
front. With the Israeli-Syrian peace process coming to a halt, Clinton turned to the 
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Israeli-Palestinian conflict again. He invited Arafat and Barak to a summit, which 
started off on July 11, 2000. However, as neither Arafat nor Barak were in a position to 
make tough and sensitive decisions due to their own constituencies, the summit ended 
in failure on July 25, 2000. Hopes for peace under the Clinton administration finally 
evaporated when Likud leader Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount in Jerusalem. 
This unleashed a series of events that eventually culminated in the second Intifada. This 
did not stop Clinton from trying – in October, Barak and Arafat met and agreed on the 
need to stop violence. One final and desperate attempt was made by the Clinton 
administration at achieving Middle East peace. Clinton took his final shot: on December 
23, 2000, he introduced a new plan, which touched upon every sensitive aspect of 
Palestinian-Israeli peace.47 Efforts were made even in January, 2001, but to no avail. 
Even though both parties seemed willing to continue negotiations, Clinton’s tenure of 
office as president ended. (See: Quandt [2001]: pp. 357-364; pp. 369-372)   
 It is telling that with the failure of dual containment and rapprochement between 
Iran and the Arab countries in the region as a result of President Khatami’s détente (see 
next chapter), Iran was not nervous anymore about Arab-Israeli peace isolating its 
regional position. Furthermore, as the second Intifada broke out in the fall of 2000, Iran 
did not need to intensify its support for Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, since the 
peace process seemed to collapse anyway – even without Iranian involvement. Hence, 
Iran kept a low profile during the Camp David II. talks during 2000. (Parsi [2007]: pp. 
221-222.) This attests to the fact that when not cornered, Iran does not feel the need to 
deny processes that are centered on its exclusion and isolation. This behavior suggests 
that Iran is rather pragmatic in its conduct and even though ideology plays a relevant 
role in its foreign policy, rational considerations seem to be more important in 
explaining its policies. 
 
1.1.1. Explaining Outcomes – Strategic Blowback under the Oslo Process 
 
 Does the Oslo process underscore or refute the hypothesis of strategic 
blowback? First, one has to test if US policies could be considered “aggressive” as 
defined in the introduction. In fact, the isolation of Iran and/or  the rejection of 
                                                 
47 For details on the issue of Palestinian statehood, territorial issues, the status of Jerusalem and refugees. 
See: Quandt 2001, pp. 371-372. 
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constructive Iranian behavior form part of the definition of “aggressive” (see 
“Hypothesis 1” in the introductory chapter). The question, then, is whether Iranian 
responses led to unintended consequences detrimental to US national interests in the 
region.  
 The strategic blowback dynamic is, in fact, quite evident in the period between 
1991 and the end of the Oslo process (fall of 2000). A relatively constructive behavior 
on the part of Iran was met with US rejection and denial as the US perceived that Iran 
could not challenge its overwhelming power in any case. This trend became more 
prominent when the Oslo Accords were signed in September 1993. Iran responded by 
attempting to undermine the peace process because it felt isolated. By reaching out to 
groups rejecting the Oslo Accords, Iran dashed realization of one of the central elements 
of Washington’s Middle East strategy: fostering peace between the Israelis and the 
Arabs.   
 The really interesting aspect of this period is that the US was not necessarily 
aggressive at the beginning. President Clinton ordered a review of US Iran policy as he 
took office and he was noted for breaking with the old tradition of US foreign policy 
realism – a concept implicitly supported by Brent Scowcroft and George H.W. Bush. 
(Freedman [2008]: p. 278; p. 300) The US may have been overly ambitious and perhaps 
too confident in a sense, but it was not necessarily aggressive when it came to dealing 
with Iran.   
 Israeli influence, however, led Washington to take a tougher stance, thus, it 
declared the ‘policy of dual containment’. An even more spectacular shift came as Israel 
was able to convince the Clinton administration through official channels, as well as 
AIPAC that Iran meant a threat far larger than originally perceived by Washington. 
According to Parsi48 (see above), Washington revised its stance and took a more 
aggressive position against Iran in order to maintain Israeli willingness to make peace 
with Arab entities. Since Washington wanted Arab-Israeli peace more than anything in 
the region, it was willing to sacrifice a possible engagement with Iran. In the process, 
however, it undermined its own strategic goal of fostering regional peace and stability in 
the Middle East by not taking into consideration regional influence. A strategy of 
excluding Iran missed the fact that Iran was deeply and organically embedded in its 
own region. Strategic blowback occurred because Washington focused on only a certain 
                                                 
48 In essence, Parsi’s book is the best narrative and evidence in support of the blowback theory. 
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segment of the “Middle Eastern chessboard.” By focusing on Arab-Israeli peace too 
intensively, it lost sight of a set of systemic and sub-systemic factors, which, if not 
taken into consideration, could prove to be game changers. Washington did sense the 
willingness of certain Arab entities to make peace with Israel and, thus, it had a more or 
less accurate picture of at least one segment of regional realities. However, it missed 
another set of realities of equal importance – Iran’s regional position. 
 Israeli and US efforts at isolating Iran indirectly contributed to regional 
instability. Even though Iran may not have been the principal actor directly behind all 
those acts of terrorism49, it did support those groups at the time. This served Tehran’s 
strategic interests in the region. Iran benefited from those attacks indirectly and delaying 
the peace process won Hamas and Iran time as the Israeli and US elections were nearing 
in 1996. Iran could have thought that those two elections may shift policies in Tel-Aviv 
and Washington, thus they wanted to win time.50  
 How does this fit with the methodological and theoretical model outlined at the 
beginning of the dissertation? Neoclassical Realism obviously requires the identification 
of both structural level, as well as sub-systemic variables that were at play during the 
Oslo process. The author identifies the following systemic and sub-systemic factors 
which explain the blowback dynamic. 
 
Systemic factors: 
 global distribution of power; and the 
 regional distribution of power. 
 
Sub-systemic factors: 
 government policies of the US (Israel) and Iran; 
 perceptions; and 
 domestic constituencies and political forces. 
 
 The most important systemic factor stems from the international distribution of 
power. In fact, Shireen Hunter points out quite accurately that there is a “perennial” and 
perhaps even irreconcilable “tension” between global and “middle powers with regional 
                                                 
49 There is no direct evidence to support this, at least. 
50 Parsi also notes that Netanyahu’s election “was privately welcomed in Tehran” as it signaled the end of 
isolating Iran. (See: Parsi [2007]: p. 200.) Of course, Hamas and Iran opposed the deal for different 
reasons. Hamas did not support it mainly for ideological reasons and Iran due to its regional interests. 
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ambitions”. (Hunter [2010]: p. 36.) Global powers inevitably collide with regional 
powers as the latter wish to question the regional influence of global powers, whereas 
global powers are not comfortable with and suspicious of regional powers. The two only 
cooperate if the global power in question needs the regional power against a global rival 
in that specific region. (Ibid.)  
  In comparative terms, the United States was by far the most powerful state after 
the Cold War. US population stood at 253 million and its territory was the third largest 
in the world.51 (CIA [2012]) US GDP calculated at purchasing power parity in current 
US dollars for 1991 (the year of the Madrid Conference) surpassed the GDP of every 
other nation in the world. The economic superiority of the US was in fact so profound, 
that its GDP was almost twice as large as that of Japan, which had the second biggest 
GDP in the world at the time. US GDP per capita was the fourth largest in the world and 
it was only preceded by countries with significantly smaller population, geographic area 
and economy.52 This suggests enormous economic power, even if the US economy 
experienced a slight recession in 1991. China and Japan demonstrated significant 
economic development, but the annual growth of GDP in the EU and India was rather 
weak and the Russian economy was in recession.53 Of the six entities examined, the EU 
had the largest export sector and the share of US exports and services within the US 
GDP was only the fourth largest.54 (World Bank [2012-2013]) Despite a slight recession 
and a relatively smaller export sector, the US was still one of the strongest economies in 
the world. Not surprisingly, US military expenditure outweighed that of every other 
nation in 1991. 55 The number of US active duty military personnel stood at 1,716,000 
                                                 
51 Population data for 1991 from: World Development Indicators & Global Development Finance, World 
dataBank, The World Bank Group. http://databank.worldbank.org Accessed: 02.02.2012. The area of the 
US is: 9,826,675 sq km. See data on territories of countries: Area, Country Comparison to the World, 
Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/fields/2147.html#ir Accessed: 01-02-2012     
52 According to World Bank data, US GDP at PPP (purchasing power parity) in current international 
dollars amounted to 5,930,700,000,000 in 1991. The same data for Japan for the same year was 
2,501,189,612,359. The 1991 GDP per capita data calculated at PPP in current international dollars for the 
US was 23,443.  See: Selected indicators for the United States. World Development Indicators & Global 
Development Finance, World dataBank, The World Bank Group. 01-02-2012   
53 For the 1991 annual growth of GDP of some of the most significant powers and entities see: China: 
9.2%; Japan: 3,3%; India: 1,1; EU: 1,2%; US: – 0,3%; Russia: - 5,1. (Numbers have been rounded.) See: 
Selected indicators for the above countries. World Development Indicators & Global Development 
Finance, World dataBank, The World Bank Group. 28-01-2013   
54 For data on export of goods and services as percentage of GDP for 1991 see: EU: 26,7%; China: 
17,4%; Russia: 13,3%; US: 10,1%; Japan: 9,9%; India: 8,4% (Numbers have been rounded.) See: 
Selected indicators for the above countries. World Development Indicators & Global Development 
Finance, World dataBank, The World Bank Group. 28-01-2013   
55 The exact data in constant 2009 million US dollars are: US: 441,561 (1991); Russia: 232,546 (1990 – 
1991 data were unavailable); China: 18,000 (1991). All data are from the SIPRI Military Expenditure 
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in 1993. (Selected Manpower Statistics …  DoD [1997]: p. 53.) Washington’s military 
supremacy was obviously also strengthened by the quality of the military hardware it 
possessed. 
 Even though Iran was obviously much weaker than the US, much of this was 
compensated for by the fact that Iran is geographically, politically, culturally and 
historically embedded in the region and it is also a significant regional power. Every 
indicator of Iranian power will suggest that Iran is a less significant player compared to 
the US. However, the most important aspect of assessing Iranian power stems from the 
above mentioned fact, namely, that it is in the region and it is a powerful country in its 
own neighborhood when compared to other states in the Middle East. This was the 
segment of reality neglected by the Clinton administration from 1993 onwards. A 
regional comparative perspective would have proven that Iran is a formidable power 
despite its economic deficiencies and relative economic weakness when compared to 
the US.   
 Compared to seven other regionally significant countries (Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Israel) Iran stood out in a number of ways in 1991.56   
Its population was only second to that of Egypt and its territory made Iran the 18th 
largest country in the world, which was only second to that of Saudi Arabia’s in the 
Middle East.57   (World Bank [2012]; CIA [2012]) Iran’s GDP was larger than that of 
any of those seven countries.58 Its GDP per capita was the fourth largest in the Middle 
East – it was larger in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon and Israel.59 Compared to indicators of 
                                                                                                                                               
Database, Stockholm Institute for Peace Research (SIPRI). http://milexdata.sipri.org/ Accessed: 25-02-
2012 
56 These states were chosen as a basis of comparison because they are the most influential states either in 
economic or political sense. Other Gulf states could be mentioned, but in terms of territory, population, 
regional geopolitical influence and military capabilities, these states are relatively insignificant in 
comparison to the eight countries compared here. Iraq should have also been examined, but the author 
was not able to find such indicators for 1991 neither at the World Bank nor the IMF.   
57 See population data for 1991 for those eight countries and Iraq: Egypt: 57952386; Iran: 56071545; 
Turkey: 55068880; Iraq: 18706561; Saudi Arabia: 16669764; Syria: 12690183; Jordan: 354500; Lebanon: 
3026061; Israel: 4949000.  Population data from: World Development Indicators & Global Development 
Finance ,World dataBank, World Bank. For data on territory see: Saudi Arabia: 2,149,690 sq km; Iran: 
1,648,195 sq km; Egypt: 1,001,450 sq km; Turkey: 783,562 sq km; Iraq: 438,317 sq km; Syria: 185,180 
sq km; Jordan: 89,342 sq km; Israel: 20,770 sq km; Lebanon: 10,400 sq km. Area, Country Comparison 
to the World, Central Intelligence Agency, The World Fact Book. Accessed: 01-02-2012     
58 For data on GDP calculated at PPP in current international billion US dollars for 1991 see: Iran: 
286.0762; Saudi Arabia: 253.8417; Turkey: 250.3011; Egypt: 138.9032; Israel: 68.4406; Syria: 29.4709;  
Lebanon: 17.4561; Jordan: 7.9368; All data from World Development Indicators & Global Development 
Finance World dataBank, World Bank. Accessed: 01-02-2012        
59 For data on GDP per capita calculated at PPP in current international thousand US dollars for 1991 see: 
Saudi Arabia: 15227.67; Israel: 13829.18; Lebanon: 5768.58; Iran: 5101.99; Turkey: 4545.24; Egypt: 
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aforementioned states, the annual growth of Iranian GDP stood at approximately 13 
percent, second only to Lebanon’s GDP growth.60 In terms of exports of goods and 
services as percentage of GDP, Iran was quite weak as data show this percentage to be 
only the 6th largest compared to indicators of the other countries mentioned above. It did 
not do particularly well in terms of FDI either.61 However, its total stock of external debt 
was relatively low.62 (World Bank [2012-2013]) In 1993-1994 the size of its military 
amounted to approximately 528.000 active duty personnel in its regular forces and the 
number of reserves amounted to 350.000.63 (Cordesman [1994]: p. 29.) Though Iran’s 
military forces used, by and large, outdated hardware, its conventional and asymmetric 
capabilities, as well as its manpower still made it a relevant military power. (See: 
Cordesman [1994]) In a relative sense, Iran’s economic power and formidable 
conventional military capabilities together with its large territory and significant 
population size definitely made it one of the most powerful states in the region in 1991.  
 These are only some material variables which obviously do not reflect the 
overall global and regional position of either the US or Iran. In Iran’s case, the most 
important additional dimension of its influence is the fact that it is deeply embedded in 
its own region. A helpful concept for providing a more accurate picture of Iranian 
influence is “latent political leverage”.64 (See: McAdam [1999]: p. 37.; quoted in Banks 
                                                                                                                                               
2396.85; Syria: 2322.34; Jordan: 2238.87; All data from World Development Indicators & Global 
Development Finance ,World dataBank, World Bank. Accessed: 01-02-2012        
60 For data on GDP growth (annual %) for 1991 see: Lebanon: 38.2; Iran: 12.59; Saudi Arabia: 9.1; 
Syria: 7.9; Israel: 7.7; Jordan: 1.82; Egypt: 1.08; Turkey: 0.72. All data from World Development 
Indicators & Global Development Finance World dataBank, World Bank. Accessed: 01-02-2012        
61 For data on export of goods and services as percentage of GDP for 1991 see: Jordan: 59.46; Saudi 
Arabia: 38.57; Israel: 29.88; Egypt: 27.82; Syria: 24.41; Iran: 14.97; Turkey: 13.84; Lebanon: 13.21. For 
data on net inflows of FDI (balance of payments, current million US dollars) for 1991 see: Turkey: 
810.0000; Israel: 345.6000; Egypt: 253.0000; Saudi Arabia: 160.0000; Syria: 54.0000; Iran: 22.5900; 
Jordan: -11.8874; Lebanon: no available data for 1991. All data from World Development Indicators & 
Global Development Finance World dataBank, World Bank. Accessed: 01-02-2012   
62 For 1991 data on total external debt stocks (total, current million US dollars) see: Turkey: 50873.4800; 
Egypt: 32625.0950; Syria: 19291.5860; Iran: 11330.0380; Jordan: 9700.2600; Lebanon: 1562.5900; 
Saudi Arabia: no available data for 1991. All data from World Development Indicators & Global 
Development Finance World dataBank, World Bank. Accessed: 01-02-2012 The relatively low level of 
Iranian debt was partly due to Khomeini Ayatollah’s economic principle which regarded debt as “un-
Islamic.” The author wished to use data on external debt stocks as percentage of GNI here, but no such 
data were available for 1991. Thus, the author used data on total external debt stocks, which is not as 
informative as the other one when one wishes to assess the relative position of a given state. However, the 
thesis will apply data on external debt stocks as percentage of GNI in assessing the regional balance of 
economic power in the Middle East under the Bush and Obama administrations, as those data were 
available for the years 2003 and 2009. (See the chapters on the Bush and Obama administrations.)   
63 Cordesman uses data of the 1993–1994 Military Balance of IISS.  
64 The concept is used by social scientist Doug McAdam, although in a totally different context and sense. 
See: Doug McAdam [1999]: “Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930-
1970.”The University of Chicago Press, Chicago. p. 37. McAdam is also referenced by Angela M. Banks 
in a work on the relationship between participatory systems and the constitutional process in post-conflict 
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[2007]: p. 131.) “This is demonstrated by its cultural and religious ties to Iraq and 
Afghanistan. It is a major player in the Gulf in a position capable of controlling the 
Strait of Hormuz. It is also an important player in Afghanistan. It also has ties to Hamas 
and Hezbollah, which make it an important political actor in the Arab-Israeli peace 
process.” (Balogh [2011a]: pp. 2-3.) Its oil and gas reserves obviously add to its 
relevance as a regional player. 
 How does the relative global and regional position of the US, as well as Iran 
explain their foreign policies from 1991 to 2000? The structural dimension of 
Neoclassical Realism establishes that states pursue power (and security). In the post-
Cold War era it was natural for the US to extend its influence in the Middle East in 
order to (re)shape the regional political landscape according to its interests. Aware of its 
overwhelming power and military force, Washington believed it could easily exclude 
Iran from regional arrangements and it could just as easily handle possible negative 
consequences. By the same token, of course, Iran was also a state which pursued power 
(and security) according to its own national interests. The structural element in 
Neoclassical Realism suggests that “power can only be countered by power”, thus, Iran 
exerted its influence to oppose Washington’s will. It had the resources and tools to do so 
and, therefore, it contributed to the undermining of the peace process. On one level, the 
US-Iran “collision” is the consequence of structural laws which are manifested in the 
opposing national interests of both states.   
 A further empirical observation also reinforces the strategic blowback 
hypothesis.  As the policy of dual containment could not reach its original goals and 
Iran managed to break out of its Israeli-US “cage” through Khatami’s rapprochement 
with Arab countries, Tehran did not feel threatened and cornered anymore. This led to 
toning down the rhetoric on the Arab-Israeli peace process and decreasing support for 
Palestinian rejectionist groups.  As structural realities (détente between Arab countries 
and Iran) were shifting the balance of power in Iran’s favor, Iran gave up the aggressive 
support of groups aiming to undermine the peace process. This underscores the dangers 
of isolating Iran and it emphasizes that in case the Islamic Republic feels secure, it does 
not perceive the need stop Israel and Arab countries from reaching a peace agreement. 
                                                                                                                                               
states. Thus, like that of McAdams, it is also a work outside the discipline of International Relations. 
However, the author found the expression and the concept to be useful for the dissertation. See: Angela 
M. Banks [2007]: “Challenging Political Boundaries in Post-Conflict States.” University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of International Law Vol. 29. Iss. 1. p. 131. 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/journals/jil/articles/volume29/issue1/Banks29U.Pa.J.Int%27lL.105%282007%
29.pdf  Accessed: 13-10-2010 
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Peace built on the exclusion of Iran will fail, while peace organized around the 
inclusion of Tehran has a realistic chance of being realized.  This confirms that 
aggressive US policies based on isolating Iran from regional arrangements are 
counterproductive.  
 These factors, however, provide only one part of the picture. Neoclassical 
Realism tells us that structural realities are important but only the addition of sub-
systemic variables can provide the analyst with an accurate picture of reality. Thus, on a 
different level, the US-Iran confrontation was due to sub-systemic (domestic) factors. 
One such factor was the “peace strategy” of Washington, which thought of Arab-Israeli 
peace as more important than anything else in the region. This morally justifiable 
“obsession”, however, led Washington to lose sight of a significant segment of Middle 
Eastern realities. This corresponded with the strategy of the Rabin government, which, 
for entirely different reasons, saw Arab-Israel peace as the sine qua non of its foreign 
and security policy. Thus, the government of Israel and its US supporters (most notably 
AIPAC) persuaded Washington to adopt its threat perception. Iran, on the other hand, 
felt isolated, thus, it disrupted policies and actions aimed at undermining its regional 
position.  
 This leads one to the next sub-systemic variable – domestic constituencies. The 
all-time president of the US must walk a very fine line when it comes to dealing with 
Israel. The “special relationship” is a sensitive issue in US domestic politics. AIPAC, of 
course, draws on this, but even without AIPAC, a number of different US constituencies 
(e.g. Christian Evangelicals) consider US support for Israel as an unquestionable 
maxim. These opinions even feed into the process of presidential elections.  Political 
actors have to take into consideration that not supporting Israel may lead to decreasing 
popularity with voters. The “pro-peace” Rabin government also had to push for peace in 
order to demonstrate the results of its “policy of peace” before the 1996 elections. 
President Rafsanjani, on the other hand, had to deal with his own radicals. His 
constructive initial attitude became increasingly costly as Iranian hawks demanded a 
tougher stance against Israel and the “Great Satan.” In each case, systemic constraints 
were linked to domestic ones.  
 Government “intricacies” and strategies have been described and analyzed 
above, however, the issue of personalities has not been addressed yet. President 
Clinton’s willingness to engage in dialogue was a positive condition for facilitating 
peace talks. He also had a “hesitant political style” as noted by William Quandt. 
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(Quandt [2001]: p. 376.) The president possessed what John Dumbrell calls “contextual 
intelligence” - the ability to see the interplay between domestic and international 
factors. (Dumbrell [2009]: p. 165; p. 171.) ) Clinton obviously understood the 
intricacies of Middle Eastern politics and the linkage between domestic politics and 
foreign policies. Thus, he refused to go against all odds and confront the Israeli lobby, 
as well as Congress, or change the strategy and set in motion a policy based on dialogue 
with Iran. It is also noted in the literature that Warren Christopher had a rather hostile 
view of Iran because of his personal experience with that country as a negotiator during 
the Iranian hostage crisis. (Fayazmanesh [2008]: p. 4; p. 73.; Katouzian-Shahidi [2008]: 
p. 110.) At the State Department, Dennis Ross was not absolutely sure that the Clinton 
administration’s approach to the Middle East was appropriate, but others (Daniel 
Kurtzer, Aaron Miller and Robert Malley)65 thought it was absolutely wrong. (Indyk 
[2009]: p. 24.) The personalities, personal views and experience of these key people 
obviously played a significant role in the outcomes analyzed above.  
 The final sub-systemic variable to be analyzed is the issue of perceptions. This 
factor is closely intertwined with previous sub-systemic as well as systemic variables. 
The US perceived that it was the sole super power in the world. It believed it could do 
anything. Israel perceived that it would be isolated once a détente between the US and 
Iran got under way, thus, it was determined to stop it. Iran also perceived the possibility 
of losing its seat at the “regional table”, thus, it launched a full-fledged counter-
offensive to stop that from happening.   
 The period leading up to and following the Oslo Accords is a tragedy of missed 
opportunities from Washington’s perspective. A less aggressive posture could have 
initiated at least some kind of confidence building process.  Overall, the mixture of the 
above variables explain and provide strong evidence of the strategic blowback effect 
between the 1991 Gulf War and the beginning of the second intifada.  
 
 
                                                 
65 Kurtzer served as the ambassador to Egypt from 1997 to 2001. Before that, he served at in the State 
Department in various positions as part of Clinton’s “peace team.” (See: Kurtzer-Lasensky [2008] p. xi.); 
Aaron Miller served as an advisor for a number of secretaries of state on Arab-Israeli affairs and issues 
related to negotiating and he also served was Dennis Ross’s deputy at the Special Middle East 
Coordinator’s office.  (See: Indyk [2009]: p. 24.);  Robert Malley served on the NSC and he was 
responsible for issues related to the Arab-Israeli peace process. (See: Indyk, Ibid.) 
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1.2. The Policy of Dual Containment 
 
 Containment is deeply rooted in US foreign policy traditions. The father of the 
containment concept is generally considered to be George F. Kennan who is originally 
said to have coined the term in 1946-1947. The Long Telegram, as it came to be known, 
was a diplomatic cable wrote by Kennan as a diplomat stationed in Moscow. It focused 
on Soviet fears, perceptions and uncertainties, and it outlined a strategy of countering 
the Soviet Union by force. (The Charge in the Soviet Union (Kennan) to the Secretary of 
State. February 22. [1946]).66 A year later it was published in the journal Foreign 
Affairs, titled “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” under Kennan’s alias, “X.” He put 
forward that “[…] the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet 
Union must be that of long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian 
expansive tendencies.” (Kennan [1947]; p. 575.) Ever since then, containment has been 
one of the “mantras” of US foreign and security policy and US strategic thought.  
 The famous historian of the Cold War, John Lewis Gaddis gave a broad 
definition of the concept: “[…] to prevent the Soviet Union from using the power and 
position it won as a result of [World War II. – added by author, I.B.] to reshape the 
postwar international order […]. (Gaddis [1982]: p. 4.)67 However, this definition is too 
vague and general for judging the policy of dual containment. Robert Art’s explanation 
of the term is equally general in nature: [containment] “aims to hold the line against a 
specific aggressor that either threatens American interests in a given region or that 
strives for world hegemony.” (See Art [2003]: p. 83. also quoted in Yetiv [2008]: p. 91.) 
Most definitions provided by most of the literature examined here are just as sketchy. 
Containment was in essence a strategy based on the use of every US national asset 
(political, economic, military, soft power) available to keep the Soviet Union from 
                                                 
66 John Lewis Gaddis notes that Kennan had used the term “at least once” before the publication of the 
1947 Foreign Affairs article in front of an audience in the State Department in September, 1946. See: 
Gaddis [1982]; p. 4. 
67 The concept was put into practice by President Harry S. Truman by introducing what later came to be 
known as the “Truman doctrine” on March 12, 1947 during a speech in front of Congress. (Special 
Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey. March 12. [1947]) This political statement was then 
complemented by an economic strategy for the recovery of Europe. The Marshall Plan was announced at 
Harvard University by then secretary of state George C. Marshall on June 5, 1947. (See: The “Marshall 
Plan” speech at Harvard University, June 5. [1947]) Due to limits of space, the author will not elaborate 
on the details of the history of containment or the massive political and historical debate it provoked (and 
still provokes). For excellent assessments of the topic see: Anderson [2008]; Chamberlin [1953]; Deibel-
Gaddis [1986]; Deibel [2007]: p. 328 in particular; Gati [1974]; for a grand strategic narrative see 
Kennedy [1991] and Kennedy [1987]; Kissinger [1994]; for a cognitive social psychological approach 
see: Lars [1985]; Layne [2006]; Leffler [1992]; Lind [2006]. Rees [1967]; Spalding 2006; Wildavsky 
[1983]. 
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expanding its influence. Thus, the author will define containment regarding Iran as 
follows: 
 
US efforts as well as concerted efforts by the US and its allies to 
globally counter and roll back Iranian political, economic, military 
and soft power influence by political, economic, military and soft 
power means. 
 
 This definition is acceptable because it distinguishes between certain types of 
US assets. This is important due to the different dimensions of US containment policies 
towards Iran and it strengthens the grand strategic dimension of the concept, since grand 
strategy is based on the application of all of the nation’s tools to achieve specific goals. 
It also qualifies as an aggressive policy according to the definition of “aggressive US 
policies” in the theoretical chapter of the dissertation. (See hypothesis 1 above).68 Thus, 
the author has to look for evidence of blowback effects, which prove that dual 
containment was, to a certain extent, counterproductive.  
 Analyzing the dual version of the containment concept, it is quite surprising how 
little has been written on the Iranian dimension of the policy. Most of the literature 
focuses on US policy on Iraq and only a few recent works deal specifically with the 
Iranian aspects of dual containment. (Fayazmanesh [2008]: p. 1.) The recent surge of 
works focusing on the containment of Iran, however, led to a lively scholarly debate on 
the concept. This debate will be elaborated in the following analysis of the concept. 
 The policy of dual containment was officially announced on May 18, 1993, by 
Martin Indyk, at the time Special Assistant to President Clinton and Senior Director for 
Near East and South Asia at the US National Security Council. (The Clinton 
Administration’s Approach to the Middle East. May 18. [1993]); see also Berger [2008]: 
p. 85.). The announcement sums up the essence of the dual containment strategy as 
follows: 
 
“A short-hand way of encapsulating the Clinton administration strategy is thus: “dual 
containment” of Iraq and Iran in the east; promotion of Arab-Israeli peace in the west; 
backed by energetic efforts to stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction and promote 
a vision of a more democratic and prosperous region for all the peoples of the Middle East.” 
(The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East. May 18. [1993]: p. 3.) 
 
                                                 
68 It should be stressed that containment is not labeled “aggressive” arbitrarily, thus, it fits the framework 
of the author’s hypothesis. In fact, the essence of containment is some type of confrontation, which makes 
containment an aggressive policy regardless of the definitions developed in the theoretical chapter.   
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The interesting part of Indyk’s assessment was the notion that Washington was so 
powerful that it did not need either Iraq or Iran to balance one against the other: 
 
“Accordingly, we do not accept the argument that we should continue the old balance of 
power game, building up one to balance the other. We reject that approach not only because 
its bankruptcy was demonstrated in Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. We reject it because of a 
clear-headed assessment of the antagonism that both regimes harbor towards the United 
States and its allies in the region. And we reject it because we don’t need to rely on one to 
balance the other.” (Ibid.) 
 
 
Thus, the administration did not want to continue the old practice of balancing one 
country against the other – which was the official policy when the US supported Iraq 
against Iran in the Iran-Iraq war. (Magyarics [2000]: p. 379.)  It is also worth noting the 
apparent difference in the Clinton administration’s approach to Iraq and Iran. Iraq’s 
regime was considered 
  
“[…] a criminal regime, beyond the pale of international society and, in our judgment, 
irredeemable. […] We will not be satisfied with Saddam’s overthrow before we agree to lift 
sanctions. Rather, we will want to be satisfied that any successor government complies fully 
with all UN resolutions.” (The Clinton Administration’s Approach to the Middle East. May 
18. [1993]: p. 3.) 
 
 
In Iran’s case, however, Indyk’s words were somewhat softer after listing US grievances 
with regard to Tehran:  
 
“I should emphasize that the Clinton administration is not opposed to Islamic government 
in Iran. Indeed we have excellent relations with a number of Islamic governments. Rather, 
we are firmly opposed to these specific aspects of the Iranian regime’s behavior, as well 
as its abuse of the human rights of the Iranian people. We do not seek a confrontation but 
we will not normalize relations with Iran until and unless Iran’s policies change, across 
the board.” (Ibid. p. 4.) 
 
 
The final part of the speech (“Pursuing Middle East Peace”) provides a hint to the 
broader political context of the Clinton administration’s strategy of creating peace in the 
region. (See previous chapters; Ibid. pp. 4-6).  
 The other clear articulation of the policy came in the form of an article in 
Foreign Affairs in 1994 by Clinton administration National Security Adviser Anthony 
Lake.69(Lake [1994a]; Lake [1994b]) The text applies expressions and concepts such as 
“outlaw states” and “backlash states.” (Lake [1994a]: pp. 1-2)  Backlash states are 
essentially dictatorships, which suppress rights of their people. Cuba, North Korea, Iran, 
                                                 
69 The article was also published separately in booklet format by the Executive of Office of the President 
in 1994. The author used this one in the dissertation. See: Lake [1994a] 
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Iraq and Libya are specifically mentioned as states belonging to this strand. “These 
nations exhibit chronic inability to engage constructively with the outside world, and 
they do not function effectively in alliances even with those like-minded.” (Lake 
[1994a]; p. 1.; on the Lake article see also: Litwak [2000]: p. pp. 60-61.; Hunter [2010]: 
p. 51.; Dumbrell [2009]: p. 153.) After defining the group, Lake moves on to set out the 
administration’s policy:  
 
“As the sole superpower, the United States has a special responsibility for developing a 
strategy to neutralize, contain and, through selective pressure, perhaps eventually 
transform these backlash states into constructive members of the international community. 
[…] We seek to contain the influence of these states, sometimes by isolation, sometimes 
through pressure, sometimes through diplomatic and economic measures. […] The United 
States is also actively engaged in unilateral and multilateral efforts to restrict  their 
military and technological capabilities.” (Lake [1994a]: p. 2.)   
 
 
Then, the text outlines the premises of dual containment (“The Logic of Dual 
Containment”). (Ibid. pp. 3-8.) This reinforces Indyk’s assessment that the US is 
powerful enough to counter the influence of both states instead of balancing one against 
the other. Both powers are regarded as hostile regimes, which need to be checked. The 
article also establishes the broader regional context, i.e. that both countries need to be 
contained in order to keep them from intervening in the Arab-Israeli peace process. 
Lake does point out that the approach distinguishes between Iraq and Iran. The text is 
quite aggressive on Iraq, and besides pressuring Baghdad to comply with resolutions of 
the UN Security Council (UNSC), it even goes as far as implicitly advocating regime 
change by providing support to opposition groups. On the other hand, better relations 
with Tehran are not entirely impossible according to Lake’s analysis. It emphasizes that 
the US is only worried about the Iranian government and not the people. He also 
recognizes that there is no multilateral framework for sanctions as in Iraq’s case, thus, 
containing Iran is an entirely different initiative. (Ibid.; pp. 3-9.; see also: Berger [2008]: 
p. 85.; Hunter [2010]: p. 50.; Litwak [2000]: p. 2.; pp. 60-61.)  
 Finally, the other important primary source on the policy of dual containment is 
the 1995 National Security Strategy (NSS) – The National Security Strategy of 
Engagement and Enlargement. The document defines the military dimension of the dual 
containment policy: 
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“In Southwest Asia, the United States remains focused on deterring threats to regional 
stability, particularly from Iraq and Iran as long as those states pose a threat to US 
interests, to other states in the region, and to their own citizens. We have in place a dual 
containment strategy aimed at these two states, and will maintain our long-standing 
presence which has been centered on naval vessels in and near the Persian Gulf and 
prepositioned combat equipment. Since Operation Desert Storm, temporary deployments 
of land-based aviation forces, ground forces and amphibious units have supplemented our 
posture in the Gulf region.” (NSS [1995]: p. 30.) 
 
The document also deals with Iran specifically: 
 
“Our policy toward Iran is aimed at changing the behavior of the Iranian government in 
several key areas, including Iran’s efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction and 
missiles, its support for terrorism and groups that oppose the peace process, its attempts to 
undermine friendly governments in the region and its dismal human rights record. We 
remain willing to enter into an authoritative dialogue with Iran to discuss the differences 
between us.”(Ibid. p. 31.) 
  
 Official texts of the policy of dual containment highlight some of the most 
contentious issues of the concept: its nature, its effectiveness, its tools and goals in 
general. First of all, it should be noted that there seems to be a wide consensus among 
scholars that the dual containment plan was not a new initiative at all – in fact, it was a 
policy that has been in place at least since George H. W. Bush’s presidency. (Hunter 
[2010]: p. 50.; Litwak [2000]: pp. 57-59; Yetiv [2008]: p. 91.) Others point out that the 
logic of dual containment has always been implicit in the US approach to the Gulf ever 
since the fall of the Shah. Professor John Dumbrell of Durham University notes that 
dual containment was different to earlier policies in the Gulf only in that it relied on US 
military superiority. (Dumbrell [2009]: p. 153.; Fayazmanesh [2008]: p. 1.; Indyk 
[2009]: p. 34.; Marr [2008]: p. 14.; p. 17.; Rostoványi [2004]: p. 207.; Alikhani [2000]: 
p. ix.) 
 There is a lack of such consensus on the exact nature and goals of the policy. 
Indyk notes that even though the policy reflected a unified approach to tackling 
problems stemming from tensions between Iraq, Iran and the US, still, the strategy was 
tailored to reflect differences between the Iraqi and Iranian cases of containment. 
Indeed, Anthony Lake’s article spells out clearly that “”Dual containment” does not 
mean duplicate containment.” (Lake [1994a]: p. 5.) Martin Indyk also notes the 
differentiated approach the administration took: Iraq was to be contained through 
pushing Baghdad to comply with multilateral UNSC resolutions, whereas Iran was 
pressurized through unilateral US arrangements. Indyk thought of containing Iraq as 
“aggressive containment” and Iran was seen as being checked through “active 
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containment”. (Indyk [2009]: pp. 40-41) In Iraq’s case, pursuing regime change was a 
possibility, but in Iran’s case the objective was not to change the regime, instead, the 
goal was to alter the behavior of the regime. (Ibid.; O’Sullivan [2003]: p. 75.; Berger 
[2008]: pp. 85-86.) Indeed, others note as well that containment of Iran was more 
“limited”, as it was based on laws passed in the US and aimed at changing certain 
dimensions of Iran’s policies. (Dumbrell Ibid.; Litwak [2000]: p. 59.; Marr [2008]: p. 
18.;) Still others view the concept in a different light. They believe that dual 
containment was just as tough against Iran as against Iraq and its implicit and long term 
goal was to change the Iranian regime too. (Fayazmanesh [2008]: p. 78.;Yetiv [2008]: p. 
100; p. 102.) Hunter even notes the pursuit of regime change by some elements of the 
US national security establishment. (Hunter [2010]: p. 56.) 
 A similar debate has seen light regarding whether dual containment was status 
quo oriented or not. Some indicate that it was purely aimed at “holding” existing lines 
in the region (Tyler [2009]: p. 408; p. 429.) On the other hand, Martin Indyk notes that 
“dual containment was one branch of a broader strategy designed to generate a dramatic 
shift in the regional balance of power that we hoped would result from achievement of 
comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.” (Indyk [2009]: p. 43.) Another account points out 
that the policy sought to “transform the Middle East’s political landscape” (Hunter 
[2010]: p. 50.) 
 The structure of dual containment was built on the premise of decoupling Iran 
from a possibly successful Arab-Israeli peace process. (Dumbrell [2009]: p. 146.; pp. 
149-151.; Freedman [2008]: p. 298; p. 300; Indyk [2009]: p. 43.; Mattair [2008]: p. 68.; 
Tarock [1997]: p. 218.;Yetiv [2008]: pp. 104-105.)  Phebe Marr, a historian of Iraq 
distinguishes only two different dimensions of dual containment: economic and 
military.  Thomas R. Mattair, executive director of the Middle East Policy Council also 
highlights the military component of the policy. (Marr [2008]: p. 17; Mattair [2008]: p. 
68.). These two dimensions (economic and military) could be interpreted as having 
political significance by themselves, however, they do not cover various other political 
efforts by Washington to keep Iran checked in the region. The economic dimension 
obviously refers to sanctions and the military component covers Washington’s military 
presence in the Gulf since the 1991 Gulf War. Thus, the author argues that dual 
containment basically had three different layers: political, economic and military.70 This 
                                                 
70 Adam Tarock distinguishes between an internal and an external dimension of containing Iran. The 
internal dimension refers to support for Iranian opposition groups, while the external aspect of the policy 
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view is also shared by Kenneth Polack who distinguishes among the same areas of 
containment.71 (Pollack [2008]: pp. 372-375.) The structure of this chapter follows this 
categorization. 
 Political containment took many forms under the Clinton administration. 
Washington tried to persuade as many of its (mostly European) allies as possible to 
support implementation of economic sanctions against Iran. Even though the 
administration never fully succeeded in this, it did invest considerable political energy 
into such efforts. (See: Fayazmanesh [2008]: pp. 77-78.; O’Sullivan [2003]: pp. 53-55; 
p. 88-90; Litwak [2000]: p.4.) The Clinton government also tried to use the Mujahedin-
e-Khalq (MEK), an exile opposition group considered a terrorist organization, against 
Iran.72 (Fayazmanesh [2008]: pp. 79-85.; Tarock [1997]: p. 216.) Another example of 
political containment was applying pressure on Azerbaijan to leave Iran out of an 
international energy consortium. The project aimed at constructing a pipeline in the 
region and the most economical way of transportation would have been to make the 
pipeline run through Iran. Instead, the US pushed Baku to exclude Iran and have the 
pipeline go through the port of Ceyhan in Turkey. (Fayazmanesh [2008]: p. 86.; 
Freedman [2008]: p. 303.) This resulted in the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline 
partly based on circumventing Iran.  Furthermore, isolating Iran would have meant 
decoupling Syria from Iran. This would have resulted in a loss of strategic significance 
to Tehran.73 (See: Indyk [2009]: p 43; p. 151.; Tyler [2009]: p. 447.; Freedman [2008]: 
p. 298.; on political isolation as part of a broader containment strategy see: Yetiv [2008]: 
p. 101.) The other important dimension of political containment was Clinton’s support 
for CIA covert operations against the Islamic Republic. These mostly included 
propaganda measures, which aimed at destabilizing the regime. (Yetiv 2008; p. 102.)  
Such a program was publicly debated in the US Congress, which was then used as an 
Iranian propaganda tool against the US. (Freedman [2008]: p. 303.) President Clinton 
signed the bill in 1995 – the law increased CIA’s financial resources by $ 20 million 
specifically for a “covert anti Iran program.” (Fayazmanesh [2008]: p. 78.; Tarock 
                                                                                                                                               
refers to trying to change the international policies of the Iranian government. Tarock [1997]: pp. 216-
217. 
71 Pollack lists the following areas specifically: military, economic and diplomatic. See: Pollack [2008]: 
pp. 373-374.  
72 Officially, even the US considers it a terrorist organization. See: Current List of Designated Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, January 27, 2012, Bureau of Counterterrorism, 
State Department. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm  Accessed: 02-23-20102 
73 This has always been the goal of U.S. foreign policy in the region since the end of the Cold War. 
However, the U.S. could never really realize this goal.  
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[1997]: p. 216.)  
 Analyzing economic sanctions requires one to find an appropriate definition for 
“sanctions” first. Here, the author will rely on Hossein Alikhani’s work on US sanctions 
against Iran. Hence, economic sanctions are taken to mean: 
 
“nonmilitary actions of the United States that adversely affect the flow of goods, 
services, or financial assets to a specific foreign country in order to penalize or 
coerce a country for political purposes or to express US displeasure with that 
country’s actions.” (Alikhani [2000]: p. 25.)74    
 
 As noted by Alikhani, this approach is comprehensive enough to account for 
most US sanctions measures during the tenure of the Clinton administration. It should 
be noted, however, that “nonmilitary” will be taken to mean military actions not of an 
offensive nature because the author argues that dual containment did have a military 
dimension, but this did not amount to large and sustained military operations against 
Iran. (See below.) 
 Economic enforcement measures took the form of unilateral economic 
sanctions. A number of new measures were added to the economic sanctions already in 
force75 as the Clinton administration took office. The interesting aspect of sanctions is 
that US-Iran relations were not particularly bad at the beginning of the 90’s in a relative 
sense, as noted in the previous chapter. There was even a brief thaw in relations between 
the two entities just after the Gulf War. (O’Sullivan [2003]: p. 52.) Iran and the Gulf 
states were also experiencing a brief détente during the same period. (Tarock [1997]: p. 
                                                 
74 For an excellent overview of other possible definitions see: “Definition” in Alikhani [2000]: pp. 23-25. 
75 This included the following:  
 As a reaction to the taking of hostages at the US Embassy in Tehran, President Carter signed  
executive order 12 170 which froze some $ 12 billion worth of Iranian assets and  banned all 
US bound Iranian imports on November 14, 1979.   
 In April 1980 the Carter administration suspended all trade and travel between the two 
countries – only humanitarian aid was allowed to reach Iran.  
 As a consequence of the Algiers Accord the US ended the freeze on most Iranian financial 
assets and the trade embargo was also suspended on January 19, 1981.  
 In 1984 Iran was categorized as a sponsor of terrorism which led to the halting of arms- related 
shipments. The US also imposed controls on shipments of dual-use goods as well as a ban on 
economic assistance to Iran.  
 In 1987 Iran was categorized as narcotics-trafficking country and the Reagan administration 
strengthens sanctions already introduced.  
 October 29, 1987. The Reagan government suspends imports from Iran for the support of 
terrorism.  
 The 1992 Iran-Iraq Non-proliferation Act: this act basically strengthens the 1984 sanctions. It 
also includes measures against companies and persons involved in Iranian conventional 
weapons programs. It was amended in 1996 to include provisions which call for sanctions 
against any government which supports the development of Iranian weapons of mass 
destruction. All of this was taken  from O’Sullivan [2003]: p. 50. 
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204.; pp. 220-221.)  Thus, Iran appeared to be more constructive than before. This fact 
and Clinton’s constant readiness for dialogue could have meant the beginning of a new 
phase in US-Iran ties. (See: Indyk [2009]: p. 32.) However, the new Israeli government 
had a more negative perception of Iran.   
Yitzhak Shamir’s Likud party lost the June 1992 Israeli elections to the Israeli 
Labor Party led by Shimon Peres76 and Yitzhak Rabin77. Rabin and Peres wished to 
pursue peace with Arab countries. However, they feared that potential peace with Arab 
states would devaluate Israel’s strategic significance to Washington. This would have 
been reinforced if the US and Iran moved towards normalizing their relations as a result 
of the brief détente mentioned above. Thus, Israel redefined its threat perceptions and 
foreign policy priorities to portray Iran as the gravest threat in the region (see chapter on 
the Oslo process). However, Iran was not a significant threat at the time. Iranian military 
spending in 1991 amounted to $ 6.7 billion whereas Saudi spending stood at more than 
$ 40 billion in the same year. President Rafsanjani even cut spending to $ 4.2 billion by 
1992. Israel, however, spent $ 8.7 billion on its military, but its population stood at four 
million and Iran was a country of sixty million at the time. This was when a possible 
Iranian nuclear weapons capability was inserted into the Israeli political discourse by 
the Rabin government and this was the context in which the US policy of dual 
containment was introduced. Thus, the latter policy was at least partly a result of Israel’s 
and AIPAC’s efforts to define Iran as the most important regional threat. (See: Parsi 
[2007]: pp. 158-170.; on Israel’s anti-Iran campaign see also Fayazmanesh [2008]: p. 3.; 
Menashri [2001]: p. 295.) 
 A number of authors note Israel’s influence over US Iran policy with regard to 
sanctions against Tehran in particular. Even Martin Indyk, the father of the policy of 
dual containment notes the influence Israel had on US foreign policy considerations: 
“So for the first time, but by no means the last, the Clinton administration took an 
Israeli idea and turned it into an American proposal to make it more palatable to the 
Arabs.” (Indyk [2009]: p. 27.) Israel and its lobby groups in particular wielded 
considerable influence over sanctions legislation in the Congress. AIPAC was quite 
successful in this regard. (See: Fayazmanesh [2008]: pp. 72-73.; Ansari [2008]: p. 112.; 
O’Sullivan [2003]: p. 53-54.; p. 90.; Yetiv [2008]: pp. 104-105.; and see “The Effect of 
                                                 
76 President of Israel since 2007 and former Prime Minister from 1995–1995, from 1984 to 1986 as well 
as in a short  period in 1977. 
77 Prime Minister of Israel from 1986 to 1992. (1992–1995)      
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Lobbying” in Alikhani [2000]; pp. 177-203.; Mearsheimer-Walt [2007]; Clawson 
[1998]: pp. 87-88.) Professor Dumbrell, however, notes that Israeli influence over 
sanctions and US legislation has been somewhat “overstated” in the literature. (See: 
Dumbrell [2009]: p. 150.) Nonetheless, it is probably fair to say that Israel had 
considerable, but not decisive influence over sanctions legislation. After all, the final 
decisions were brought by the US government and legislature, no matter how it was 
influenced. This, of course, does not take away from the fact that AIPAC proved very 
much adept at exerting influence and implementing its agenda.  
 The political context of the first sanction introduced by the Clinton 
administration against Iran is telling when one thinks of Hypothesis 1a (see chapter on 
Hypothesis 1a). The subsidiary of the American oil firm Conoco was granted a $ 1 
billion deal by Iran in March 1995. However, Israel (and AIPAC in particular) would 
not accept a thaw between the US and Iran unless Iran altered its policies. In order to 
avoid starting a long and difficult legislative process, President Clinton signed an 
executive order instead on March 15, 1995. (Hunter [2010]: pp. 52-53.; Fayazmanesh 
[2008]: p. 86. Litwak [2000]: p. 67.; Mattair [2008]: p. 70.).  The irony of this is that the 
Rafsanjani government thought of the deal with Conoco as a “gesture of goodwill”, but 
the US bluntly rejected it. (Ibid; See: O’Sullivan [2003]: p. 54.; Freedman [2008]: p. 
302.; Parsi [2007]: pp. 186-187.) Executive order 12957 prevented actors from 
investing into the development of the Iranian petroleum industry. The main reasons 
provided by the administration were Iran’s support of terrorism, efforts to develop 
weapons of mass destruction and meddling in the Arab-Israeli peace process. 
(O’Sullivan [2003]: p. 50.; Executive Order 12957 of March 15. [1995]) The order 
basically “prohibited US citizens and companies from financing, supervising, and 
managing projects in Iran.” (Fayazmanesh [2008]: p. 86.) 
  On April 30, 1995, President Clinton announced the strengthening of sanctions 
before the World Jewish Congress. (Mattair [2008]: p. 70.) On May 6, 1995, the US 
government suspended all economic ties with Iran. (O’Sullivan [2003]: p. 50.) This 
resulted in another executive order (Executive Order 12959), which prohibited “all US 
trade, trade financing, loans and financial services to Iran.” (Mattair [2008]: p. 70; p. 
85.; Executive Order 12959 of May 6. [1995])  
 On April 24, 1996 the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 
became law. This banned every financial transaction with Iran (and all states considered 
sponsors of terrorism,) as well as aid to countries, which provide Iran help with its 
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military programs. (O’Sullivan [2003]: p. 50.; p. 55.; Mattair [2008]: p. 70.; Public Law 
104-132 Apr. 24. [1996]) 
 A more controversial act came only at the end of the summer of 1996.  In 1995, 
the republican Senator of New York state, Alphonse D’Amato introduced a bill, which 
was passed by the senate on December 20, 1995. This required foreign firms to be 
sanctioned by the US if they invested more than $ 40 million per annum in the 
petroleum sector of Iran (Foreign Oil Sanctions Act of 1995). (Hunter [2010]: p. 53.) 
D’Amato was a staunch supporter of Israel and a reliable ally of various Israeli lobbies, 
most notably AIPAC. (O’Sullivan [2003]: p. 54.; Fayazmanesh [2008]: p.4.) This act 
was then extended by Senator Edward Kennedy to include Libya and it became law on 
August 5, 1996 under the title of The Iran Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA). (Hunter 
[2010]: p. 53; Fayazmanesh [2008]: p. 77; Public Law 104-172-Aug. 5. [1996]) In fact, 
the case is a testament to the logic of Neoclassical Realism. The language of the actual 
bill was – in the words of Harvard University sanctions expert Meghan O’Sullivan – so 
“extreme” that the Clinton government started negotiations with Congress to “soften” 
the text. This was partly due to “démarches delivered to the administration by European 
countries.” (O’Sullivan [2003]: pp. 54-55) AIPAC applied considerable pressure – 
Sasan Fayazmanesh of the California State University cites a report in the Journal of 
Commerce which suggested that despite the obvious difficulties ILSA caused for US 
corporations wishing to invest in Iran, the Clinton administration did not want a 
confrontation with AIPAC which is a “key to both media and political support.” (Quoted 
in Fayazmanesh [2008]: p. 75.) The Act itself mandated the president to apply at least 
two of six sanctions against firms, which invested more than $ 20 million per year into 
the energy sector of the Iranian economy.78 (O’Sullivan [2003]: pp. 54-55.; Public Law 
104-172-Aug. 5. 1996])  
                                                 
78 The legislation mandates the president to use two of either of the following six alternatives against 
foreign firms “(entities, persons)” which invest more than $ 20 million per annum into the Iranian energy 
sector: “The sanctions menu (Section 6) includes (1) denial of Export-Import Bank loans, credits, or 
credit guarantees for US exports to the sanctioned entity; (2) denial of licenses for the US export of 
military or militarily-useful technology to the entity; (3) denial of US bank loans exceeding $10 million in 
one year to the entity; (4) if the entity is a financial institution, a prohibition on its service as a primary 
dealer in US government bonds; and/or a prohibition on its serving as a repository for US government 
funds (each counts as one sanction); (5) prohibition on US government procurement from the entity; and 
(6) restriction on imports from the entity, in accordance with the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. 1701). In the original law, the President may waive the sanctions on Iran if 
the parent country of the violating firm agrees to impose economic sanctions on Iran (Section 4(c)) or if 
he certifies that doing so is important to the US national interest (Section 9(c)). It terminates application 
to Iran if Iran ceases its efforts to acquire WMD and is removed from the US list of state sponsors of 
terrorism.” Katzman [2007]; p. 2.    
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 This was the most criticized piece of legislation as it provoked fierce opposition 
from European allies. Furthermore, Europeans criticized US “hypocrisy”, since 
Washington tried to persuade allies to join the US in sanctioning Iran, but the US 
economy itself still maintained significant ties with the Islamic Republic. (O’Sullivan 
[2008]: p53-55; pp. 88-89.; Fayazmanesh [2008]: pp. 77-78) The original $ 40 million 
threshold in the 1995 senate version of the act was reduced to $ 20 million because 
European allies never supported the act.79 (Katzman [2012a]: p. 2.) One of the first 
foreign entities that should have been sanctioned under ILSA was the TotalFina joint 
French-Italian consortium. The EU even threatened with measures at the WTO and, 
thus, the Clinton administration applied the waivers in ILSA in order to avoid 
sanctioning companies of European allies. In turn, the US expected those European 
states to introduce similar sanctions against Iran. (Becker-Nixon [2010]; Katzman 
[2007]: pp. 2-3.) Stuart E. Eizenstat, a former official of the US Department of Treasury 
in the Clinton administration pointed out that Iran was able to create tensions in the 
transatlantic relationship by seeking investments from European firms. (Becker-Nixon 
[2010]) Besides, a number of countries questioned the moral legitimacy of the US 
because dual containment was aimed at weakening countries due to their non-
democratic nature and behavior, however, Washington had good relations with a number 
of non-democratic Arab states. (Richter [2008]: p. 209.) Indeed, Gulf allies were the 
ones who were relatively easily persuaded to accept and support (although to varying 
degrees) the policy of dual containment. (Fürtig [2008]: p. 129.) But even they had 
scruples about supporting US policies for fear of Iranian subversion in their own 
countries. (Rostoványi [2004]: p. 208.)  
 On August 17, 1997, President Clinton signed executive order 13059, which 
restricted Iran bound re-exports. This order highlighted the fact that most investment 
and trade activities between the US and Iran have to be suspended. (O’Sullivan [2008]: 
p. 50.; Executive Order 13059 of August 19. [1997]) The period between 1998 and 2000 
saw a brief thaw in US-Iran relations and a number of sanctions were even lifted. (See 
                                                 
79 The original $ 40 million sum was reduced to $ 20 million a year after the introduction of the original 
sanctions. This is explained by Katzman as being a result of US allies not joining multilateral sanctions 
against Iran. (Katzman [20102] p. 2.) However, the explanation is confusing since a lower investment 
threshold means that less could be invested, which is a stricter rule of course. European countries’ 
problem was exactly ILSA and the threshold on investments – hence they were not interested in a lower 
threshold. The explanation to this contradiction could be that due to lack of European support for 
multilateral sanctions, the US had to find a way to squeeze the Iranian economy by itself since its allies 
were not willing to join in. The only way to make sanctions stricter in this situation was to make 
unilateral US arrangements more aggressive, which resulted in reducing the threshold.   
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the next chapter on the détente under the Khatami presidency.) Still, further sanctions 
were introduced in 2000. The next important sanctions measure was the Iran 
Nonproliferation Act, which became law on March 14, 2000. The legislation suspended 
the export of certain military technologies, particularly to countries which were found to 
have helped Iran with its military and weapons programs. (O’Sullivan [2008]: p. 51.; 
Public Law 106-178-Mar. 14. [2000])80 
 The effectiveness of sanctions81 has been and still is hotly debated. One striking 
aspect of US sanctions policy is the fact that despite legislation to heavily restrict 
economic ties between the US and Iran, the value of trade between the two entities was 
still significant. Adam Tarock notes that the US became Iran’s third largest trade partner 
in 1994 “surpassing Italy and France”. (Menashri [2001]: p. 198; Freedman [2008]: pp. 
302-303.; Tarock [1997]: p. 220.) Since most allies never really supported US unilateral 
arrangements (and ILSA in particular), enforcement was impossible. (Fayazmanesh 
[2008]: p. 78.; Freedman [2008]: p. 302.)  
 O’Sullivan establishes that even though sanctions did play a limited role in 
weakening the Iranian economy, this effect did not carry the kind of weight originally 
expected in Washington. Iran’s own economic problems and its debt service made sure 
that Iran had grave economic problems anyway.82 In fact, the relatively bad domestic 
economic situation was only exacerbated by sanctions, but was not caused by them. 
Sanctions did not enforce a change in Iranian behavior. The only connection that could 
be made between sanctions and domestic economic instability is that sanctions did have 
                                                 
80 Furthermore, the US government did not allow US aircraft manufacturer Boeing to sell its products to 
Iran. See: Freedman [2009]  
81 A complex and thorough political economic analysis would be required to fully assess the effectiveness 
of sanctions. This, however, is not the goal of this dissertation. The point is to find out whether aggressive 
US strategies created blowback effects or not.  Besides, most of the referenced literature does not really 
draw on deep economic analysis of the problem either – but their focus does not require them to do so 
either. Nonetheless, the efficacy of sanctions is a topic that cannot be ignored when assessing the Iran 
policy of the US, thus, the dissertation provides a limited and brief introduction to the topic, but since it is 
not the main focus of this thesis, it will not be elaborated on in detail.  However, see the following works 
on the topic. Pape argues that sanctions cannot be effective: see Pape [1997]; Pape [1998]; Hufbauer et al 
[1990]; Tsebelis [1990]. Eaton and Engers have developed a model that measures the efficiency of 
sanctions based on how “tough” the sender and target are. [1992]. Podhoretz points out that economic 
sanctions only make the target country’s society suffer but generally do not accomplish their political 
goals. Podhoretz [2007]; Hovi, Huseby and Sprinz develop a model, which suggests that sanctions may 
actually work, when they are really implemented as opposed to only threatening with them. (Hovi-
Huseby-Sprinz [2005]) 
82 For data on total Iranian debt service on external debt for the period between 1993 and 2000 see: 
1.803.267.000; 1994: 3.292.826.000; 1995: 5.721.209.000; 1996: 6.434.680.000; 1997: 6.221.714.000; 
1998: 2.747.796.000;1999:3.881.241.000; 2000: 2.916.890.000. All data are given in current US dollars. 
Source: Iran, Islamic Republic, Debt Service on External Debt, Total, (TDS, current US$) Index Mundi – 
World Bank, Global Development Finance. http://www.indexmundi.com/facts/iran/debt-service-on-
external-debt Accessed: 23-02-2012. 
97 
 
an effect on inflation, which in turn influenced living standards. However, even this 
connection provides only a partial explanation to Iranian economic problems. When 
compared to the original political objectives of changing the regime’s behavior, US 
sanctions were not successful. The reasons of ineffectiveness were the following:  
 
 relatively minor economic influence; 
 the domestic politics of Iran and the US;  
 the unilateral nature of sanctions;  
 hiatus of further tools to be combined with sanctions. (O’Sullivan 
[2003]; p. 75-76; pp. 77-78; pp. 81-89.)   
 
They “[…] did have a notable impact […] but were neither effective nor useful.” 
O’Sullivan also points out that sanctions targeting Iran’s military development were 
among the most effective ones, since Iran’s military programs did slow down to a 
certain extent.83 (Ibid. p. 88- 89.) 
All in all, a consensus is reflected by the literature, that US unilateral sanctions 
against Iran have not been particularly effective. The extent to which they were is 
explained more or less by Iranian domestic economic problems as well as 
mismanagement and less by the introduction of US sanctions. Patrick Clawson’s 
arguments are quite similar. He does contend that sanctions had a significant impact on 
the Iranian economy and armament programs, however, they have “not persuaded Iran 
to change the behavior to which Washington objects.” (Clawson [1998]: p. 94.) The 
introduction of sanctions came at a price. The US economy lost 3 billion US dollars as a 
result and even more as a consequence of reduced trade. The indirect political costs 
were significantly larger as sanctions also caused friction with allies and Russia. 
(Clawson [1998])  
 Having described the political and economic dimensions of dual containment, 
only the third aspect of the policy remains, which is military containment. The 1994 
Lake article outlined that one of the goals of containing Iran was to restrict the country’s 
                                                 
83 Iran’s military expenditure did grow between 1993 and 2000 in relative terms, however, it was a 
relatively slow and gradual process. See data on Iranian military expenditure in percentage of GDP: 1993: 
1.52 %; 1994: 2.36 %; 1995: 1.79%; 1996: 1.92 %; 1997: 2.13 %; 1998: 2.35 %; 1999: 2.97%; 2000: 3.68 
%. All data are from: Islamic Republic of Iran, Military expenditure (% of GDP), World Development 
Indicators & Global Development Finance, World DataBank Beta, The World Bank. No data were 
available for total military expenditure. 
http://databank.worldbank.org/Data/Views/VariableSelection/SelectVariables.aspx  Accessed: 24-02-2012 
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access to “military and technological capabilities” (Lake [1994a]: p. 2.). The military 
component of containing Iran was obviously built upon the US military presence in the 
Gulf as already noted above. This – at least according to some voices in the Pentagon – 
caused Iran to partially rebuild its forces. In order to prevent Iran from closing down the 
Strait of Hormuz, the US Navy activated its 5th fleet with headquarters in Bahrain. 
(Mattair [2008]: pp. 68-70; on the military component see Marr [2008]: p. 17.) 
Washington established a system of cooperative defense agreements in the region with 
Oman, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in 1990. Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE) followed suit in 1991, 1992 and 1994, respectively. Essentially, these were 
access agreements, which provided for close military cooperation between signatories.84 
(Hajjar [2002]: pp. 19-20.) According to the Arms Transfers Database of the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the US exported some $ 1049 million 
worth of arms to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain and the UAE altogether 
between 1993 and 1997. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were among the top fifteen arms 
recipients in the world between 1993 and 1997. (SIPRI [2012])85 Thus, the military 
component of containment also included substantial arms sales to the region.  
 The political, economic and the military “tracks” obviously overlapped and 
complemented one another. This combination, however, did not really change Iranian 
policies, as noted above, and the policy drew criticism from many experts. One of the 
most referenced criticisms was published together with one of the basic texts of the 
policy. Gregory Gause III’s article was published in the same Foreign Affairs edition in 
which Anthony Lake’s article on confronting backlash states appeared. Gause’s main 
argument was that containing both Iraq and Iran could actually force the two states to 
form an alliance against the US. However, dialogue and engagement with Iran could be 
more successful in changing Tehran’s policies and containing Iraq at the same time. 
(Gause III. [1994]) Another authority on US Iran policy, Gary Sick put forth that despite 
all the sanctions, dual containment was not able to reach its original goals.86(Sick 
                                                 
84 Access in this context would mean basing rights military assets. 
85 All numbers based on SIPRI’s Arms Transfers Databases. The sum $ 1049 is the result of the addition 
of the values of US exports to individual countries. All figures indicate sums in constant (1990) million 
US dollars. (Bahrain: 313; Kuwait: 2401; Oman: 70; Qatar: 0 – meaning less than 0.5 million US dollars; 
Saudi Arabia: 7212; UAE: 495) See: TIV of arms exports from USA, 1993-1997. In the period between 
1993 and 1997 Saudi Arabia received some $ 9076 million worth of arms and Kuwait received $ 3033 
million in arms deliveries. Saudi Arabia was the second and Kuwait was the 13 largest recipient of arms 
in the period. (All figures in constant 1990 US million dollars) TIV of arms imports to the top 50 largest 
importers, 1993-1997.  
86 Member of the US National Security Council responsible for Gulf affairs under the Carter 
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[1998]) Further criticism of the policy came from Brent Scowcroft, Zbigniew 
Brzezinski and Richard Murphy in the form of an article titled “Differentiated 
Containment” in Foreign Affairs. They put forth that the policy has not been able to 
attain its preset goals. They contended that dual containment was “more a slogan than a 
strategy” and it was also quite costly. (Brzezinski-Scowcroft-Murphy [1997]: p. 20.) 
Keeping the two countries in the same box could push them towards Russia.87 Thus, 
differentiation specifically refers to the need for a tailored approach to both countries. 
(Brzezinski-Scowcroft-Murphy [1997]) The concept was then further elaborated on in 
the framework of a Council on Foreign Relations task force. Similar to the Foreign 
Affairs article above, the paper calls for “nuanced containment” and for lifting some 
sanctions enacted against Iran, as well as toning down aggressive rhetoric. (Murphy, et 
al. [1997]: p. 8; p. 13.)   
 More recent criticisms of containment against Iran point out that Washington has 
been trying to foster a consensus among Arab states that was built on the false 
assumption of Arab willingness to team up with Israel against Iran, instead of 
“gravitating” towards Iran to counter Israel. (Nasr-Takeyh [2008]) 
 Phebe Marr points to inherent contradictions in the policy, which aimed at 
weakening both states and Iraq in particular, thus, creating a chance for upsetting the 
regional balance of power. (Marr [2008]: p. 17.) Patrick Tyler points out that dual 
containment was a “holding strategy” which was “devoid of substance.” (Tyler [2009]: 
p. 429.) Others contend that dual containment’s prescription on Iran was not clear. 
(Hunter [2010]: p. 50.) Litwak emphasizes that the initiative was a “policy born of 
frustration.” (Litwak [2000]: p. 57.) Lars Berger notes that the containment policy was 
initiated due to a “lack of alternatives”. (Berger [2008]: p. 85.) Steve Yetiv highlights 
that even though the policy was labeled as a balancing act, it could never fulfill criteria 
of balance of power policies. Dual containment aimed at changing the Iraqi regime and 
the behavior of Iran, but balance of power policies do not pay attention to the domestic 
nature of a power. Such considerations only require the assessment of the configuration 
of power. (Yetiv [2008]: p. 96.) By introducing dual containment the Clinton 
administration aimed at making an artificial distinction between “those who supported 
violence, repression and isolation and those more inclined to peace, freedom, and 
                                                                                                                                               
Administration from 1976–1981.  
87 It is unlikely, however, that Iran will ever develop a close relationship with Russia, since Iran is also 
wary of Russian influence.    
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dialogue.” (Freedman [2008]: p. 283.) Such distinction was difficult to make because 
the US had friendly relations with a number of autocracies in the region, as noted above. 
(Ibid.) Sandy Berger, the Clinton administration’s second national security adviser noted 
once that containment is “aesthetically displeasing but strategically sufficient.” (Ibid. p. 
284.) However, containment also involved admitting that the US could not solve the 
root of the problem, hence, it tried to deal with the symptoms. “A problem contained, 
therefore, was not a problem solved” (Ibid. pp. 284-285.)  
 Despite all the criticisms, certain voices implicitly suggest that other strategic 
options were not better either (O’Sullivan [2003]; pp. 92-94; Indyk [2009]: p. 40.; 
Pipes-Clawson [1992-1993]). Thus, it is difficult to make a judgment. In assessing 
whether dual containment was “worth its price” and following the theoretical and 
methodological framework of the dissertation, the author has to examine if either the 
political, economic or military strands of dual containment caused any setbacks of 
strategic significance to Washington. The author argues that all three “tracks” of 
containment led to significant blowback effects.  
 As far as the political dimension of dual containment is concerned, Indyk’s 
assessment of the flaws of the policy partly articulated by him is quite interesting:  
 
“What we failed to foresee was that a reverse symbiosis could also take hold. If Clinton 
failed at peacemaking, the rogue states would become less isolated and contained, and if 
he failed at dual containment peacemaking would become that much more difficult.” 
(Indyk [2009]: p. 43.)  
 
 
In fact, this is an implicit acknowledgment that the possibility of strategic blowback was 
always inherent in the structure of the broader Clinton Middle East strategy from the 
very beginning. The “reverse symbiosis” Indyk refers to is exactly what happened when 
Iran was denied a stake in the Arab-Israeli peace process. He also refers to the 
possibility that the Clinton administration may not have been sensitive enough “to how 
local politics in the Middle East could affect an approach designed in Washington.” 
(Ibid. p. 25.) 
 The author has already mentioned above that as the Arab-Israeli peace process 
started veering off track, a number of suicide bombings occurred against Israeli citizens 
(see chapter on the Oslo process). Although there is no direct evidence to suggest that 
Iran was directly behind those, it still supported Hamas and Hezbollah – groups accused 
of applying such tactics. (Tyler [2009]: p. 449.) Shireen Hunter provides a more detailed 
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assessment of such Iranian activities. It has been noted earlier that on March 17, 1992, 
Islamic radicals set off a bomb at the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires, and another 
bomb went off on July 18, 1994, at the Buenos Aires building of the Argentine-Israeli 
Mutual Association. Iran and Hezbollah were accused of those attacks. (Hunter [2010]: 
p. 51.) On June 25, 1996, another bomb was detonated in the city of Khobar, Saudi 
Arabia, killing 19 US soldiers. The Khobar Tower bombing was later also linked to Iran, 
although there is no official proof to support this and later on Al-Qaeda was also 
suspected of having committed the attacks.88 (See: Freedman [1999]; Freedman [2008]: 
pp. 303-305; Tyler [2009]: p. 460.; Mattair [2008]: p. 72.)  Hunter evaluated the 
possibility of Iran’s complicity as follows: 
 
“Considering that similar attacks within the same time frame were carried out in Europe 
against Iranian opposition figures by Iran’s intelligence ministry and its notorious head, 
Ali Fallahian there is a reasonable case for suspecting Iran of complicity in these acts. 
Another factor which might have prompted Iranian radicals to engage in such activities, 
especially the 1994 Argentine bombing, was its coincidence with a particularly sensitive 
period in Arab-Israeli peace making. In fact Iran was blamed for the failure of Arab-
Israeli peace talks by supporting Hamas and Hizbullah. The bombings might have 
contributed to the Likud victory in 1996.” (Hunter, Ibid.)   
 
 
The ethics of scholarship requires the author to avoid “cherry picking” of ideas and 
highlight that Hunter continues her assessment as follows: 
 
“But the main causes of the failure of the peace talks were Rabin’s assassination by an 
Israeli, the backtracking of Ehud Barak’s government on the implementation of the 
provisions of the Oslo Accords, and diverging visions of the Palestinian and the Israelis 
on the terms and conditions of peace. In 1994, neither Hamas nor Hizbullah was strong 
enough to derail the peace talks. And Iran has never been nor would it be in a position to 
prevent an Arab-Israeli peace if Israel and the Palestinians were to agree to it.” (Ibid.)   
 
 Adam Tarock also argues that Iran’s capabilities to influence the Middle East 
peace process are “exaggerated”. (Tarock [1997]: p. 218.) There are two things that 
should be noted here. First, Hunter makes the case that Iran would not have been able to 
stop Arab-Israeli peace through its regional surrogates. However, the blowback 
hypothesis does not “require” Iran to do so. The question is whether any blowback 
effects occurred that hindered realization of US regional interests. The point is that 
                                                 
88 The Clinton administration had always thought that the Khobar Tower bombings were the committed 
by Hezbollah and that Iran had supported the attack. This is supported by Clinton’s secret letter to 
Khatami emphasizing that “The United States Government has received credible evidence that members 
of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), along with members of Lebanese and Saudi 
Hizballah, were directly involved in the planning and execution of the terrorist bombing in Saudi Arabia 
of the Khobar Towers Military Residential Complex on June 25, 1996.” See: Message to President 
Khatami from President Clinton [1999].  
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those attacks did happen and they did hinder the peace process – a setback of strategic 
importance to the US. Then, the only aspect that needs to be proven is some sort of 
Iranian complicity in all of this. In fact, most sources accept Hezbollah’s complicity in 
those attacks. (See examples: Howard-Sawyer [2006]: p. 539; Indyk [2009]: p. 40.; 
Mattair [2008]: p. 70.) Thus, as noted above in the earlier chapter, it is fair to assume 
that although Iran cannot be directly linked to the failure of the peace process, it was 
interested in derailing it and it did support elements directly involved in making peace 
talks fail. Therefore, it did support factors conducive to the failure of the Arab-Israeli 
peace process, which was clearly a strategic blowback for the United States.  
 Others argue that dual containment undermined a future possible rapprochement 
with Iran. (Katouzian-Shahidi [2008]: p. 112.) Confronting and rolling back Iran’s 
influence was by itself an incentive for Iran not to be constructive and such conduct 
decreased the chances of engagement, which could have normalized relations. This 
reinforces Robert Litwak’s opinion on the rogue state rhetoric of US administrations. He 
puts forward that “the rogue state designation – that is, demonizing a disparate group of 
states – significantly distorts policy-making. It perpetuates the false dichotomy that sets 
up containment and engagement as mutually exclusive strategies” (Litwak [2000]: p. 
xiv.) He also notes that “the rogue state approach […] undermines its effectiveness by 
lumping a disparate group of countries under this pejorative rubric.” This policy “limits 
strategic flexibility” if it is needed in case of changes in the strategic environment. (Ibid. 
pp. 74-75.) Dual containment “– by perpetuating confrontation with two major powers 
in the region – helped preclude the emergence of a more peaceful and stable 
arrangement that could have served America’s regional interests at lower financial and 
diplomatic costs.” (O’Sullivan [2003]: p. 86.) It should be noted that this may have even 
worse connotations in Iranian culture, where a sense of dualism – such as good vs. evil, 
light vs. darkness – has always been inherent in Iranian thinking.  
 Regarding the economic component of the policy, Fayazmanesh notes that a 
former official of the Department of Commerce evaluated US unilateral sanctions 
against Iran as “suicidal” because it is against US corporate interests. (Fayazmanesh 
[2008]: p 76.) Sanctions that did not allow Iranian oil to be purchased by US companies 
ran counter to US business interests. It has already been mentioned above that many 
countries were not willing to support ILSA and this led to tensions in transatlantic 
relations (see the US-EU confrontation over the case of French company Total). (Ibid. 
pp. 77-78.) Fayazmanesh also contends that US willingness to support further sanctions 
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in the second term of the Clinton administration was due to the ineffectiveness of ILSA 
in a global sense, the relative stability of the Iranian government, as well as the pressure 
exerted by US corporate interests. (Fayazmanesh [2008]: pp. 85-86.)  
 The logic suggested by Katouzian-Shahidi and Litwak on the general philosophy 
of dual containment and US “rogue” rhetoric is also present in Meghan L. O’Sullivan 
thinking about economic sanctions. She contends that “[…] the concrete nature of 
sanctions dampened the prospects for rapprochement with the United States that could 
have served US interests, a rapprochement that might have been less visible, less 
controversial and less subject to appropriation by one side of the political debate in 
Iran.” (O’Sullivan [2003]: p. 74.) She holds the view that sanctions contributed to the 
growing influence of conservative elements in the Iranian political establishment and 
this made any shift in Iran’s policies difficult to carry out for more reform-minded 
politicians. Overtures of President Rafsanjani were “rebuffed with sanctions”. (Ibid.; 
see also: Arjomand [2009]: pp. 143-148.) This is another proof of aggressive US 
behavior, which made any US-Iranian bargain impossible because it contributed to the 
isolation of reformers in Iran. O’Sullivan also refers to the relatively large costs of 
sanctions that were, by and large, ineffective. Sanctions harmed Washington’s political, 
economic as well as energy interests. Instead of offering dialogue, the US imposed 
sanctions. US rhetoric regarding Iran was quite aggressive and yet it did not provide 
Iran with real incentives to change its behavior. The “rogue” and “backlash state” 
narrative precluded future “rehabilitation” of Iran. Iranian behavior was rational because 
altering its policies would have been “costly”, whereas staying the course was “cheap.” 
Poorly designed overtures, however, undermined the position of reformers. (Ibid. pp. 
88-92.)    
 Indeed, Japan and the EU had a stake in the Iranian economy – they held large 
parts of Iranian financial assets, thus, they were not willing to support sanctions. Iran 
simply responded to economic enforcement measures by starting to rely on North Korea 
and Russia for weapons. (Freedman [2008]: p. 303.) This is another indication of 
ineffective sanctions causing consequences, which go against the logic of US national 
interests.   
 Shireen Hunter lists the introduction of sanctions against Iran as a source of 
discord between Washington and Tehran. (Hunter [2010]: pp. 36-37.) This adds to the 
impression that not only were sanctions ineffective, they precluded the possibility of 
warming up relations between the two entities. 
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 As far as military containment is concerned, Phebe Marr points out that US 
military presence in the Gulf added to tensions between Iran and the US. They served as 
targets both for terrorism, as well as anti-American propaganda. (Marr [2008]: p.18.) 
The Khobar Tower bombing is a case in point. (See above.) US military presence was 
primarily targeting Iraq, but it was also a deterrent against Iran. By 1995, the Clinton 
government started developing a sense of fear as Iran built up its military forces in the 
Gulf. Still, some Pentagon officials noted that Iran’s deployments were defensive in 
nature and that they were a result of US presence in the region. Washington still 
“reactivated the Fifth Fleet as part of the Central Command, basing the fleet in Bahrain 
and giving it responsibility for the Gulf and the Indian Ocean” in 1995. (Mattair [2008]: 
pp.68-69.) It is reasonable to suggest that this reaction-counter-reaction pattern was an 
indirect result of US military deployments in the Gulf. This heightened tensions and it 
decreased chances of a thaw in US-Iran relations.  
 
1.2.1. Explaining Outcomes – Strategic Blowback as a Result of Dual Containment 
 
 In assessing whether dual containment led to any strategic blowback effects, one 
finds an abundance of circumstantial and direct evidence to support Hypothesis 1a.  
Again, the author has to determine if dual containment qualifies as an “aggressive 
policy” as set out at the beginning of the dissertation. Indeed, one finds that containment 
as defined above does fulfill the criteria of an aggressive foreign policy (see chapter on 
methodology and definitions). The question, then, is if this policy “backfired” or not. 
 According to Neoclassical Realism, the author has to identify both systemic as 
well as sub-systemic factors at play. As in case of the previous chapter on the Oslo 
Process, the following factors can be listed. 
 
Systemic factors: 
 global distribution of power; and the 
 regional distribution of power. 
 
Sub-systemic factors: 
 government policies of the US (Israel) and Iran; 
 perceptions; and  
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 domestic constituencies and political forces. 
 
 The author’s observations regarding systemic factors are, by and large, the same 
as in the previous chapter. The global and regional position of the US, as well as the 
regional influence of Iran, to a certain extent, explain actions of the two powers. Even 
though Iran did experience an increase in its military capabilities in the Gulf, it is fair to 
assume that the balance of power between the two states remained roughly the same as 
depicted in the chapter on the Oslo peace process. (See chapter on the Oslo peace 
process.) The regional distribution of power also explains why the US, Israel and Iran 
confronted each other as a result of dual containment. The growth of US influence in the 
region and the prospect of Arab-Israeli peace built upon the exclusion of Iran could 
have shifted the regional balance of power in the Middle East in the favor of 
Washington and Tel-Aviv. Thus, for systemic reasons Tehran was interested in 
preventing such a shift. And obviously for the same reasons the US was interested in 
limiting Iran’s power in the region – an influence that can undermine the peace process.  
 This can be complemented by one other consideration. US allies (the EU and 
Japan in particular) refused to go along with US sanctions exactly because they wanted 
to exert their own (economic) influence in the international system and the Middle East. 
This led to a temporary clash of interests with the United States and caused tensions in 
transatlantic relations. The expansion of Moscow’s economic ties is another example of 
this. Russian economic and political influence to a certain degree filled the vacuum 
created by the prohibition of U. S. companies from doing business with Iran. Thus, the 
ineffectiveness of sanctions is partly due to systemic factors.         
 As far as sub-systemic factors are concerned, three government strategies are 
key to understanding outcomes. The US and Israel pursued the strategy of isolation, 
whereas Iran used its regional ties with its surrogates to keep the US and Israel from 
fostering a new regional order based on denying Iran’s influence. Part of this was to do 
with systemic incentives, e.g. the regional configuration of power, but the policies of 
individual governments, as well as certain individuals were also influential.  
 By the time of the Conoco case, perceptions were so distorted that Washington 
never realized that the Rafsanjani government thought of the offer as a gesture to the 
US. The US did not see it as such and the deal was rejected. Iran was viewed as a 
hostile country and behavior that did not confirm this from time to time was dismissed 
because it did not fit the “overall scheme”. (See Denis Ross’s comments on such 
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schemes in the chapter on the Oslo process. See: Parsi [2007]: p. 152.) Negative Iranian 
perceptions of the US were reinforced by the imposition of sanctions and aggressive 
containment. These two tendencies confirmed the already existing negative perceptions 
of the “other” on both sides and fueled further distrust.   
 The other very important sub-systemic factor was the role of Congress and the 
general dynamics of US domestic politics – this is noted by a number of authors. (See: 
Berger [2008]: p, 86.; Katouzian-Shahidi [2008]: p. 112.; Litwak [2000]: p. 3; p. 67.; p. 
173.; Freedman [2008]: p. 302.; O’Sullivan [2003]: pp. 54-55.; p. 88.; pp. 90-91.). The 
domestic political landscape was of equal importance in Iran’s case. (Litwak [2000]: p. 
96.; Freedman [2008]: p. 308.) On the other hand, US initiatives often undermined the 
position of reform-minded politicians due to the internal dynamic of Iranian domestic 
politics. (O’Sullivan [2003]: p. 92.) Even if the Clinton administration would not 
support a particular sanction, Congress and individual representatives supported such 
measures regardless of the administration’s stance on the issue.   
 More interesting is the fact that a number of authors note Rafsanjani's 
constructive attitude and his efforts at expanding Iran’s economic ties. It has already 
been noted that the Conoco deal was an offer from Iran to start a limited rapprochement 
with Washington. (O’Sullivan [2003]: pp. 53-54; Tarock [1997]: pp. 219-220.; Parsi 
[2007]: p. 186.) Some note that Rafsanjani even indicated that Iran would have played a 
constructive role, had it been invited to Madrid. (See: Freedman [2008]: p. 299.) 
Another indication of this conciliatory voice was that Rafsanjani also noted in 1995 that 
Iran would not prevent peace in the region – even though there were still signs that Iran 
had actually been supporting militant groups at the time. (O’Sullivan [2003]: p. 80.) 
Still, the US “had to” reject these efforts at reconciliation due to domestic political 
considerations.  
 The author already elaborated on the role of Israeli interest groups in the United 
States. What has not been examined though is the US corporate lobby. Sanctions did 
infringe the commercial interests of US companies who could not invest in Iran because 
of sanctions. Fayazmanesh even suggests implicitly that the US corporate lobby was 
almost as relevant a player as the Israeli lobby in the domestic politics of sanctions. The 
corporate lobby wielded sufficient influence to mobilize well known foreign policy 
experts such as Brent Scowcroft, Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter, and Senator 
Richard Lugar. According to Fayazmanesh, the Brzezinski-Scowcroft suggestion on 
differentiated containment as a result of work in the framework of a Council on Foreign 
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Relations (CFR) project was also influenced by corporate lobby interests (see above). 
According to this argumentation, the Institute for International Economics, the CFR as 
well as the Cato Institute and the Center for International and Strategic Studies (CSIS), 
were, to a certain extent and indirectly, all involved in efforts aimed at lifting sanctions. 
The American-Iranian Council also tried to stop legislation to pass sanctions and it was 
supported by companies such as Conoco, Unocal, Mondoil and Intermarine. A large 
group of companies in the agricultural industry formed USA*ENGAGE – an “umbrella 
organization” of 600 firms for representing interests of the agricultural industry. This 
industry established relations with some think tanks – the CSIS in particular – and it 
supported the publication of position papers which criticized sanctions and suggested 
lifting them. (See: Fayazmanesh [2008]: p. 4.; pp. 85-95.; see also: Rostoványi [2004]: 
p. 208.; Mattair [2008]: p. 71.; Litwak [2000]: p. 3.; p. 168.; O’Sullivan [2003]: pp. 85-
86.) 
 Thus, what unfolded was a fully-fledged rivalry between two relatively strong 
lobby organizations within the US economic and political elite. This all contributed to a 
“chaotic policy that took no particular direction” as both sides tried to realize their 
interests. (Fayazmanesh [2008]: p. 91.)  
 Another important issue worth examining is the well-known problem of “turf 
wars” within the bureaucracy of the US national security establishment. Indyk points 
out that “In Washington, no policy decision goes uncontested, not even one driven by a 
presidential decision and supported by the secretary of state.” (Indyk [2009]: p. 24.)  He 
also emphasizes that some in Washington thought that the “Arabists” at the State 
Department considered the US-Israeli special relationship to be “a liability”. (Ibid.) 
Dumbrell notes Denis Ross’s exceptional influence on policy: sometimes his office 
would leave the State Department’s Near East Affairs Bureau or various ambassadors 
out of the loop. Conflicts regularly occurred between the State Department and the 
Pentagon, especially on the issue of the use of force. The Pentagon was reluctant to 
engage in warfare, whereas the State Department was more willing to apply military 
force. Such tensions could also be felt between the White House and the State 
Department, but this was kept under control. (Dumbrell [2009]: p. 147; p. 167-168.) 
This rivalry was obvious from the moment Indyk announced the policy of dual 
containment. Later that year, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs 
Edward Djerijian did not regard US Middle East policy as “dual containment” during an 
official event. Indyk quickly responded by saying that the policy was still being 
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implemented to avoid “rumor of an NSC-State rift over dual containment.” (Litwak 
[2000]: p. 60.) 
 Again, one also needs to consider the role of individual personalities. Most 
observations here are the same as in the previous chapter on the Oslo process. There 
could be one important addition, though. Senator D'Amato's commitment to the Israeli 
lobby, as well as his leading role in pushing for sanctions in the Congress should be 
mentioned, but his role has already been discussed above in detail.  
 US dual containment efforts were a resultant of the above systemic and sub-
systemic variables. This mix of variables explains why dual containment was pursued, 
as well as why it caused strategic blowbacks.   
 
1.3. Détente Between the US and Iran under the Khatami Presidency 
 
 Clinton’s second term (1997-2001) brought an unexpected thaw in US-Iran 
relations. With sanctions and dual containment in general seeming to be ineffective, the 
US was not efficient in reaching its goals set out at the beginning of Clinton’s first term. 
Then, in May 1997, a reformer candidate named Mohammad Khatami won the Iranian 
presidential elections by an unexpectedly large margin.89 His conciliatory tone in 
domestic politics90  was soon followed by efforts to improve Iran’s relations in its own 
region.91 (Freedman [1999])  
 Interestingly, Laura Neack cites Ruhi K. Ramazani’s assessment of Khatami’s 
foreign policy as a policy built on the notion of “democratic peace.” Ramazani points 
out Khatami’s concept, which aims to create a government that is “the servant of the 
people and not their master”. (See. Ramazani [1998]: p. 183. quoted in Neack [2003]: p. 
195.) In foreign policy, this concept “neither seeks to dominate others nor to submit to 
domination.” (Ibid.) His overall approach to “foreign policy can suitably be termed the 
                                                 
89 Khatami received 69 percent of the votes during the elections. Takeyh [2009]: p. 187. 
90 For a good overview of the reformist movement under Khatami see: Chapter 11: “The Ecstasy and the 
Agony” In: Pollack  [2004]: pp. 303-342. 
91 President Kahatmi managed to establish a cabinet in which a number of key positions were filled by 
reformers. For example, Ata’ Allah Muhajirani became minister of culture and Abdullah Nuri, noted for 
his progressive views and his knowledge of Iranian security organizations, became minister for interior. 
Muhajirani intended to ease restrictions related to censorship and he supported a détente with the US 
(See: Ibid.p. 188.) Moreover, Khatami’s policies in general targeted the increasing of “cultural and 
personal freedom in Iran”. (Freedman [1999].) 
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drive for moderation.” (Ehteshami [2002]: p. 302.)92 
 Khatami had three foreign policy priorities: détente with Arab countries and 
Saudi Arabia in particular; improving relations with Europe; and, finally, explore the 
possibilities of a thaw in US-Iran relations. (Takeyh [2009]: p. 207.) His reformist ally, 
Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi toured the region in order to mend relations with Arab 
countries. Then, in December 1997, Iran hosted the summit of the Organization of 
Islamic Countries (OIC) in Tehran and President Khatami was elected chairman of the 
organization for three years. The Iranian politician managed to gain support of Islamic 
countries against US sanctions and he stated that Iran would not be opposed to a 
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict Palestine is ready to settle for. Former President 
Rafsanjani paid a visit to Saudi Arabia, where the two countries discussed possibilities 
of cooperation in the oil sector. (Freedman [1999]; see also: Bakhash [2004]: pp. 254-
255.). Then, in 1999, Khatami became the first Iranian president in office to visit Saudi 
Arabia. (Takeyh [2009]: p. 199.) Iran even sought rapprochement with Iraq and Saddam 
Hussein’s regime showed signs of willingness to move in this direction. Still, relations 
never improved due to old grievances and the Iran-Iraq war. The only contentious issue 
in its own region was the question of the Tunb and Abu Musa islands in the Gulf.93 
Even this did not seem to be that relevant at the time. (Freedman [1999]) 
 Then, in December 1997, President Khatami hit a conciliatory tone during a 
news conference, which was followed by the famous CNN interview in January 1998, 
where he proposed a US-Iranian exchange program for US and Iranian journalists, 
university teachers, intellectuals and tourists. His other messages were also very 
positive – he expressed respect for the US people and civilization.94 Soon, US wrestlers 
were invited to participate at an Iranian competition. The Clinton administration moved 
swiftly: Clinton announced in January, 1998, that tensions in the US-Iranian relations 
were not “insurmountable.” (Quoted in Freedman [1999]) Martin Indyk, then US 
                                                 
92 Arshin Adib-Moghaddam notes that it is a mistake to view the domestic base of Iranian foreign policy 
dichotomously. It is misleading to equate “reformism” with „pragmatism and pro-Western policies” and 
identifying the conservatives with “pan-Islamic” and “anti-Western” ideas is equally flawed. (See: Adib-
Moghaddam [2008]: p. 69.) Thus, the labels “conservative” and “reformist” are only used here tentatively. 
Csicsmann also notes that conservatives and reformers are part of the same elite within the political class. 
(Csicsmann [2008]: p. 201.)    
93 These islands are the following: Small Tunb, Great Tunb and Abu Musa. They constitute disputed 
territory as officially they belong the UAE but Iran occupies them. (See: Freedman [1999]). 
94 For the transcript of the CNN interview see: Transcript of interview with Iranian President Mohammad 
Khatami. January 7, 1998, CNN. http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview.html Accessed: 
24-02-2012. 
110 
 
ambassador to Israel, also emphasized that Washington was ready for dialogue and that 
it “recognized Iran’s Islamic government”. (Parsi [2007]: p. 205.) In an April speech, 
President Clinton recognized Iran’s negative historical memory regarding Western 
intervention in Iran’s affairs. (Ibid.) In May 1998, Clinton refused to impose sanctions 
on French, Russian and Malaysian firms, which were planning to develop gas fields in 
Iran. (See the case of Total in the previous chapter.) In June 1998, Madeleine Albright 
held a speech before the Asia Society, where she highlighted the possibility of 
normalizing relations with Iran and suggesting a “road map” for rapprochement. 
(Freedman [1999]; Speech by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright.  June 17. 
[1998]) Albright points out in her memoirs that she felt it was time for Washington to 
“move beyond containment”. (Albright [2004]: p. 443.) Clinton also sent reassuring 
signals when in June 1998, he expressed in a statement before the US-Iranian match at 
the 1998 soccer World Cup that he considered the event another step towards 
reconciliation. (Parsi: Ibid.)95 Clearly, by 1998, the US was forced to give up containing 
Iran.    
 Because dual containment started unraveling and as a result of Khatami’s new 
approach, Iranian opposition to Arab-Israeli peace began to lose its intensity. Its 
rapprochement with Arab states meant that it managed to break out of the isolation 
imposed upon it by US and Israeli efforts to advance the peace process based on Iran’s 
exclusion. A heated debate began under Khatami whether Iran’s support for Islamic 
militants and opposing the peace process was worth the price. Clearly, reformers 
thought it was not. Many reformers explicitly pointed out that Iran was not opposed to a 
peace deal if it was accepted by the Palestinians and that Iran would be ready to accept a 
two state solution. This implicitly meant that Iran was ready to tacitly accept the 
statehood of Israel. Still, this was not realized by Israel and the US. (Parsi [2007]: pp. 
202-214.) The regional international system was clearly shifting in favor of 
normalization of relations between the US and Iran.  
 Khatami replied to Albright’s speech by stating that even though US rhetoric has 
indeed changed, this had not been transformed into real policies yet. The level of 
distrust is characterized well by the discussion an American diplomat had with one of 
                                                 
95 Another symbolic episode of the brief rapprochement between Washington and Tehran included the 
Iranian wrestling team’s visit to the US in the framework of a wrestling competition there. However, US 
laws required the short detention of some of those athletes, which was a rather unfortunate measure given 
the sensitive period of détente between the two countries. (Holmes [1998])   
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his Iranian counterparts. The Iranian diplomat expressed Tehran’s fears that America’s 
conciliatory tone is only a trick. He reminded his American colleague of George H.W. 
Bush’s words that “goodwill begets goodwill”. (Albright [2004]: pp. 444-445.) When 
Iran tried to act constructively by mediating for the release of hostages in Lebanon, 
those efforts were never recognized nor rewarded. As a result of this perception, US 
efforts to set up an unofficial channel to Tehran were rebuffed by Iran. (Ibid.)  
 Then, the Clinton administration was “forced” to accept new measures of 
Congress: Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL) were commissioned to 
broadcast in Persian into Iran. Khatami’s much anticipated speech at the U.N. Assembly 
in 1998 criticized the US and Israel as well. When Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi 
was invited to a meeting at the U.N. on Afghanistan – convened with the assistance of 
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan specifically for creating an opportunity for high level 
US-Iranian direct contacts – Kharrazi did not show up. It turned out later that Supreme 
Leader Ayatollah Khamenei ordered both Khatami and Kharrazi to avoid direct and 
official contacts with US officials. (Albright [2004]: pp. 446) This was the result of 
Khatami and his, by and large, reformist administration coming under fire from 
conservatives. He chastised the US for the broadcasts of RFE and RL, frozen Iranian 
assets and sanctions, and US efforts to isolate Iran from realizing profits from Caspian 
oil. This was particularly the case after Khatami considered the Salman Rushdie case 
closed. Later, in September 1998, Kamal Kharrazi held a speech before the Asia Society 
with basically the same message that he had delivered at the U.N. (Freedman [1999]) In 
late 1998, a number of reformers were imprisoned and some of them were key allies of 
Khatami. Some reform-minded papers were shut down. (Freedman [2008]: p. 307.) A 
possible grand bargain seemed to be in danger.  
 For much of 1999 the reformist movement was under harsh attacks from 
conservatives and violence was used in rolling back the influence of reformists. 
Conservatives shut down a number of pro-Khatami newspapers, which sparked violent 
clashes in July 1999 between protesters and law enforcement still controlled mostly by 
conservatives. (See: Arjomand [2009] p. 95.) Further rapprochement only seemed 
possible when Khatami’s reformer allies gained a majority in the Iranian Majles in 
February 2000. Iran signed the Chemical Weapons Convention, contributed to the 
enforcement of U.N. sanctions against Iraq and fought against drug trafficking. On the 
other hand, Khatami did not conceal the fact that Iran was supporting anti-Israel militant 
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groups. At the end of 1998, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) claimed to have 
found evidence of Iranian involvement in the Khobar Tower bombing. Then, a US court 
indicted 13 members of Saudi Hezbollah in connection with the bombing in 2001 and 
the court proceedings also suggested Iranian involvement. (See chapter on dual 
containment). The United States considered military action against Iran, but figured this 
would only isolate Khatami and his allies, thus, it did not take action. (Freedman 
[2008]: p. 307.) Still, the US tried to use the brief momentum of the reformist 
movement and lifted sanctions on Iranian carpets, caviar, nuts, pistachios and dried 
fruits. (Albright [2004]: pp. 447-448.; Fayazmanesh [2009]: pp. 94-95.) Albright’s 
speech on March 17, 2000 contained an implicit apology for the 1953 CIA coup 
deposing Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadeq from power, who gained his position 
through democratic elections. (Remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine Albright… 
March 17. [2000]; Parsi [2007]: p. 205.; Fayazmanesh [2009]: p. 94.)  
 However, the Albright speech almost coincided with the March 14, 2000 
approval of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000, which sanctioned foreign persons 
who had been associated with the development of Iranian WMD-programs. Section 6 of 
the law prohibits any special transactions to the Russian Aviation and Space Agency 
regarding the International Space Station, unless the US president could verify that the 
organization or any other entity under its control had not provided any assistance to Iran 
regarding its WMD or missile development programs during the year in question. 
(Katzman [2012b]: p. 31.; Public Law 106-178-Mar. 14. [2000]) 
The Iranian response to the Albright speech was somewhat mixed and this must 
have had something to do with the confusing signals that Washington sent. It was 
willing to soften its stance on Iran, but new unilateral sanctions suggested otherwise. 
Again, Khatami emphasized the importance of real actions on the part of the US and 
Khamenei’s response was even more negative. (Albright [2004]: pp. 448-449.) As a 
result of domestic political battles between reformers and conservatives, Khatami’s 
speech before the U.N. Assembly in the fall of 2000 was carefully formulated. (Albright 
[2004]: p. 449.; Freedman [2008]: p. 307.) However, Supreme Leader Khamenei 
intervened and put an end to US-Iran rapprochement under the Khatami-Clinton period. 
(Freedman [2008]: pp. 307-308.) 
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1.3.1. Explaining Outcomes – Strategic Blowback Under Khatami’s Détente 
 
 One may suggest that Khatami’s brief détente period (December 1997-
December 1998) actually undermines the blowback hypothesis, since it is hard to find 
evidence of aggressive US initiatives. Washington was quick to reciprocate Khatami’s 
constructive tone. Furthermore, the conciliatory tone of the US did not result in any 
significant change of Iran’s conduct, since overtures by President Clinton were not 
really rewarded by Tehran, except for a few, albeit very important, gestures (e.g. Iranian 
invitation of the US wrestling team). In order to prove the hypothesis of strategic 
blowback, the author has to look at the hypothesis by applying an inverse and 
counterfactual logic. If there was a lack of aggressive US policies, then Iran should have 
become more constructive too. Clearly, such pattern cannot be identified. Furthermore, 
it is difficult to identify any blowback effects at all.  The problem with this 
interpretation is that it does not fully cover what actually happened during the détente 
period.  
 When one takes a closer look, it is possible to identify US initiatives that count 
as aggressive foreign policies and, accordingly, strategic blowbacks that occurred as a 
result. It is true that the Clinton administration sent positive signals in return for 
Khatami’s overtures, but Clinton’s speeches, Albright’s overtures, as well as Martin 
Indyk’s words signaled more of a tactical shift rather than a strategic one. This is 
proved by the fact that a number of sanctions were still being implemented under the 
period of détente, including ILSA – probably the harshest measure against the Iranian 
energy sector at the time. Even lifting some sanctions on trading of nuts, carpets, 
pistachios, caviar and dried fruits did not make a significant difference because Iran’s 
economy is highly dependent on income from its oil sector. Though Iran is one of the 
world’s most important pistachio exporters, it is obvious that income from foreign oil 
purchases is definitely more relevant to the government. Income from the oil sector has 
been one of the “main pillars of Iran’s grand strategy.” (Ehteshami [2002] p. 288.)  
Thus, the overtures of the Clinton administration would have been of a strategic nature 
if the harshest sanctions were lifted and US technology and investment was allowed to 
be exported to Iran. By overtures on one level and sanctions on the other, the US sent 
mixed signals that Iranian conservatives exploited. Halfhearted overtures without 
offering any substantial rewards were only enough to isolate Iranian reformers. The gap 
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between US rhetoric and actions provided Iranian conservatives with sufficient political 
latitude to isolate reformers.96  
 Thus, aggressive foreign policy here is taken to mean the sustained 
implementation of sanctions and strategic blowback came in the form of: 
 
 domestic isolation of Iranian reformers, and  
 diminished chances for a grand bargain between Iran and the US.  
 
This is obviously not to suggest that Washington directly caused the isolation of Iranian 
reformers – this would be equal to saying that whatever Washington does is wrong and 
cannot be successful anyway. Besides, Washington does not have such direct leverage 
over Iranian domestic politics. Such evaluation of events would also lead to problems 
with falsification, namely, that a vague definition of aggressive policy could lead to 
labeling any US policy as “aggressive.” Furthermore, such argumentation undermines 
the entire logic of strategic blowback, the essence of which suggests that constructive 
and nonaggressive policies pay off. Thus, the conclusion to be drawn is not that 
conciliatory US policies do not pay off. The right conclusion is that halfhearted and 
poorly designed overtures may not reach intended goals.  
 It should be noted that nonaggressive policies obviously do not, by themselves, 
cause or guarantee an end to blowback effects. However, they do create a situation 
conducive to a thaw in US-Iran relations, which can minimize blowback effects in the 
long run.97  
 It is instructive that Iran changed its policies as it did not feel threatened or 
isolated by the policy of dual containment anymore – not because Washington changed 
its policies, but because the policy fell apart due to ineffectiveness. This unintended 
decrease of pressure on Iran led it to give up its intensified support for Palestinian 
militants who could jeopardize the peace process. Iran was not opposed to the peace 
                                                 
96 It is worth noting that Iran used the same argumentation during President Obama’s overtures. Supreme 
Leader Khamenei voiced criticism that the US may have changed its rhetoric, but it has not changed its 
actions. (See the chapter on the Obama administration.)  
97 It is also worth noting that Khatami’s détente period suggests that blowback theory works from 
Tehran’s perspective too. In case Iran becomes constructive, there is a fair chance that a situation could be 
created which will be conducive to a diminishing impact of strategic blowback effects (sanctions, 
isolation, containment). However, this is not the main focus of this dissertation, thus, it will not be 
elaborated upon in detail.  
115 
 
process because it was not isolating Tehran anymore. Washington’s unintended decrease 
of pressure on Iran led to a more constructive Iranian conduct. Again, this is evidence of 
the blowback dynamic: less aggressive policies, intentional or unintended, cause a more 
constructive Iranian behavior, which minimizes the effects associated with strategic 
blowback.  
 How does the Neoclassical Realist framework explain this above dynamic? 
There are obviously good reasons why the Clinton administration, as well as President 
Khatami could not go any further on the path of rapprochement. Thus, the above 
criticism does not necessarily amount to a direct criticism of the Clinton 
administration’s policies. Sub-systemic factors will provide compelling answers as to 
why the Clinton government could not take further steps for normalizing relations with 
Tehran.  Again, the following factors can be distinguished:  
Systemic factors: 
 global distribution of power; and the 
 regional distribution of power. 
 
Sub-systemic factors: 
 government policies of the US (Israel) and Iran; 
 perceptions; and 
 domestic constituencies and political forces. 
 
  It is important to note that structural factors did not change significantly. The 
regional distribution of power remained roughly the same. What is really intriguing in 
this case is the constellation of domestic factors, which had a significant impact on 
systemic factors. It is the interplay of sub-systemic and systemic factors that is 
particularly interesting here.  
 On a sub-systemic level, the government policies of the US and Iran did change 
as a reaction to the other side’s conciliatory intentions. Mutual gestures were made in 
order to sustain the process of reconciliation. Israel’s policies, however, did not change 
– it dismissed Iran’s détente. Since the Netanyahu government did not pursue a peace 
agenda, it tried to open towards the Rafsanjani government, but Israel’s efforts were not 
rewarded. Thus, when Khatami’s détente came, it was dismissed. The Barak 
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government pursued peace with Arab countries, thus, it chose not to focus on a possible 
thaw in Israel-Iranian relations. This had a profound impact on the chances of 
reconciliation. It should be pointed out that Khatami’s détente policy caused a shift in 
regional relations. As a consequence of Khatami’s approach, US-Iranian reconciliation 
seemed possible. This caused fear in Israel, which sought to stop the process because it 
feared it may lose its special status in US foreign relations if Washington was to make a 
deal with Tehran. (See: Parsi [2007]: pp. 206- 218.)98 This fear was caused by the fact 
that the process of détente increased Iran’s influence with Washington. This slight, albeit 
very significant change caused Washington to slightly gravitate toward Iran and 
concentrate less on Israel’s anti-Iran agenda. Khatami’s change brought about a slight 
change in US orientation. A change in a sub-systemic factor led to a slight change in 
Iranian influence, which had an impact on the structural landscape of the region. Iran’s 
position seemed to be improving because it managed to break out from its “cage.” 
Israel, on the other hand felt that its position in Washington was devalued.      
 Again, perceptions played a role in limiting the extent to which distrust could be 
dissolved. The mindset of Tehran as described by an Iranian diplomat while having 
discussions with a US counterpart during the period of the Clinton-Khatami détente is a 
case in point. (See above.) His explanation of Tehran’s perceptions suggests that the 
Islamic Republic viewed gestures by Clinton and Albright as “tricks.” Even if the 
climate is suitable for reconciliation, preexisting negative images and earlier experience 
will always have an impact on thinking about the “other.” (See Dennis Ross’s comments 
on preexisting “schemes” that impact policy making in the chapter on the Oslo peace 
process.) 
 As far as domestic political forces are concerned, the role of the Israeli lobby 
(AIPAC) as well as Iranian conservatives must be noted here.  For example, the Israeli 
lobby expressed its fears following Albright’s March 2000 speech on US-Iran relations. 
Her friendly and conciliatory tone was attacked by Israeli officials as well as the Israeli 
lobby. (Fayazmanesh [2009]: pp. 94-95.) In fact, Albright notes in her memoirs that 
Israel’s warnings about a possible Iranian nuclear weapons capability started sounding 
like a self-fulfilling prophecy after a while. (Albright [2004]: p. 447.) It has already 
been noted that one of Israel’s main goals was to prevent a deal between the US and 
                                                 
98 It is interesting to note that the same mechanism was responsible for outcomes under the Obama 
administration. See the chapter on the Obama administration.  
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Iran. Thus, Tel-Aviv’s interests differed from Washington’s and this was an incentive for 
Israel to prevent the US from tilting towards Iran. The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 
2000 should also be noted as a success for domestic political forces, which did not want 
a détente with Iran. This, however, only worsened the situation for Iranian reformers 
and fueled further distrust in the Islamic Republic. This obviously played into the hands 
of those who wished to end rapprochement with Washington. Thus, further US 
sanctions obviously contributed to the failure of détente and proves the strategic 
blowback dynamic.  
 In Iran, the reform movement was isolated by its own hardliners – Khatami had 
to make gestures to these political forces and use foreign policy for domestic political 
purposes. The foreign policy space of Khatami was constrained because conservative 
elements still had a decisive influence over key issues. (Gonzalez [2007]: p. 86.)  
Essentially, the Islamic Republic of Iran had two foreign policies at the time. One led by 
Supreme Leader Khamenei and aimed at supporting militant groups in Lebanon and 
Palestine; and one articulated by Khatami in order to realize the reintegration of Iran 
into the international community. (Rakel [2007]: pp. 166-167. on the foreign policy rift 
between Khamenei and Khatami see also: Bakhash [2004]: pp. 254-255.)  Others note 
institutional rivalries within the foreign policy establishment of Iran, which have clearly 
affected US-Iran relations. (Wehrey et al. [2009]: p. 22-31.) Under Khatami, the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Intelligence as well as the Quds Force of 
the IRGC engaged in fierce competition over a number of issues and Afghanistan in 
particular. (Ibid. p. 29.) These domestic divisions contributed to the weakening of the 
reformist flank within the government, which in turn could not pursue its détente policy 
effectively.  
 Empirical evidence vividly corresponds with one particular interpretation of 
Neoclassical Realism. Fareed Zakaria’s model of the “resource extractive state” 
corresponds perfectly with what happened during the Khatami-Clinton détente. Zakaria 
and Taliaferro point out that in order to pursue the national interest in the international 
system, states need to mobilize their domestic resources first. These resources may 
mean building a strong state, a capable army, or it may refer to domestic political 
support for certain policies. (See: Zakaria [1998] and also Taliaferro [2006]) According 
to this interpretation, normalization of relations could not be achieved between the US 
and Iran because none of them could mobilize the necessary domestic support for their 
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foreign policies. Nonaggressive policies on the government level are not, by themselves, 
sufficient for a reconciliation process that could minimize blowback effects. Domestic 
constituencies and various political interest groups need to be persuaded to follow a 
distinct agenda aimed at reconciliation with Iran. Otherwise – as evident in both the US 
and Iranian cases – schizophrenic foreign policies will be pursued where the most 
powerful domestic political forces will decisively influence government policies.   
 This interpretation provides a far more accurate picture of why strategic 
blowback (failure of conciliatory initiatives) was experienced. The Clinton 
administration did its best to set in motion a détente, but it was constrained by domestic 
political realities. Changing these circumstances would have been politically too costly.  
The administration had to deal with a number of other domestic and foreign policy 
priorities as well, thus, its political resources were obviously limited. 
 This does not take away from the fact, however, that a “full détente” would have 
required lifting some of the toughest sanctions to provide reformers in Iran with 
“results” they can point to as positive consequences of their policies. Hence, the 
Khatami détente does not undermine the strategic blowback theory – it actually 
reinforces it.    
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2. The Bush Administration (2001-2009) 
 
“I dread our own power and our own ambition; I 
dread our being too much dreaded. […] We may say 
that we shall not abuse this astonishing and hitherto 
unheard-of power. But every other nation will think 
we shall abuse it. It is impossible but that, sooner or 
later, this state of things must produce a combination 
against us which may end in our ruin.”  Edmund 
Burke, quoted in Stephen M. Walt [2006]: page 
unmarked. 
 
Much like under the Clinton administration, the United States’ power was still 
unrivaled in the international system under the government of George W. Bush. Russia 
was recovering from its post-Cold War economic hardships and China had already been 
on the rise for years, but Washington was still an unchallenged superpower. Both 
presidencies had roughly the same resources and capabilities – a power of 
unprecedented magnitude. The big difference between them was that Clinton showed 
restraint, but Bush, given the circumstances, was willing to use America’s military 
power extensively. (See: Daalder; Lindsay [2005]: p. 14.) The words of conservative 
political philosopher Edmund Burke on the international position of 18th century 
England capture well the dilemma of such power: it implies a number of strategic 
opportunities, but it also carries a number of grave risks. The presence of overwhelming 
power in the international system breeds its own rival: a power or a combination of 
powers matching that of the challenger. (See also: Morgenthau [1993]: pp. 183-193.; 
Walt [1987]: pp. 147-180.) The United States’ Middle East strategy under President 
Bush – the ‘Bush doctrine’ as it later came to be known – produced the same dynamic in 
practice. U.S. overreactions to the 9/11 attacks produced a set of circumstances, which 
indirectly led to a decrease of U.S. influence in the Middle East.  
President Bush frankly admitted that he is not an expert on foreign policy 
issues. His campaign focused on domestic political issues as did the first eight months 
of his presidency. The most important foreign policy issue that came up during the 
campaign was relations with Mexico – not surprising from a presidential candidate who 
used to be the governor of Texas. (Daalder; Lindsey [2005] p. 18; p. 47.) Terrorism, 
Saddam Hussein and Iraq or Osama bin Laden were not important topics in the 
elections (Anderson [2011]: p. 55.) The pre-9/11 phase of the Bush presidency included 
focusing on the issue of withdrawing from the ABM treaty and missile defense, as well 
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as military transformation. Other than that, Bush adopted an entirely “domestic policy-
first” agenda mostly concentrating on tax-cuts and education. (Moens [2004]: pp. 2-3.) 
Bush expressed that he was not in support of nation-building or interventions and he put 
forth a more or less realist agenda. (Buckley; Singh [2006b]: p. 14.) During the first 
NSC meeting of the Bush administration on January 30, 2001, Iraq was already a topic 
and most high level officials received directions from Bush regarding the Middle 
Eastern country. It was decided that Washington would “disengage” concerning the 
Arab-Israeli peace process and favor Israel over the Palestinians. (Anderson [2011]: p. 
58.) The administration did not show specific interest in terrorism or the threat posed by 
al-Qaeda.  The priority was building a missile shield, partly as a defense against 
terrorism.  (Ibid. 58-59; p. 64.) 
 And then, quite ironically, history intervened: a president who was self 
admittedly not educated in foreign policy was forced to face possibly one of the 
toughest foreign policy challenges any U.S. president had to face up until that point. 
9/11 had clearly transformed the Bush presidency into a foreign policy one. (Daalder, 
Lindsay [2005]: p. 79.) The attacks of 9/11 attacks had a transformational effect on US 
foreign and security policy, even though many elements of Bush’s foreign policy were 
not entirely new. (Buckely; Singh [2006]: pp. 14-15.)  
However, it is a mistake to imply that the Bush doctrine was the only foreign 
policy approach the US government subscribed to between 2001 and 2009. This chapter 
argues that the Bush doctrine was only pursued for the first five years of Bush’s tenure 
of office from 2001 to 2006. The last two years have seen a more moderate and 
traditional approach, one that was based on containing and pressuring enemies and one 
that did not exclude diplomacy all in all. Those last two years are important concerning 
Iran, since the administration started running out of political capital and resources, thus, 
it was forced to return to the more subtle ways of multilateral methods, such as pursuing 
sanctions within the framework of the UNSC. This even included meetings in the P5+1 
format from 2006.99 2006 is, therefore, a watershed and, thus, it marks an interim period 
between the two specific policies examined here. (See: Dalby [2006]: p. 47.)  
This chapter argues that the foreign policy strategy of the Bush administration 
                                                 
99 The P5+1 was an expansion of the EU3 – the UK, France and Germany. This expansion took place in 
2006. The new format included Russia, China and the United States, thus, the new configuration was 
called the „Permanent 5+1” referring to the permanent members of the UN Security Council and “+1” 
meant Germany.  
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provides the best evidence of the blowback theory yet. The aggressive foreign policy 
posture of the Bush White House set in motion a number of factors which then caused a 
string of blowback effects. This part of the dissertation argues that US policies hindered 
realization of the following key US national interests in the Middle East: 
 defeating militant Islamic terrorism; 
 rolling back Islamic extremism by spreading US values and 
democratic institutions; 
 preventing the emergence of an Iranian nuclear weapons capability; 
 securing the free flow of energy trade associated with the region; 
 fostering stability in Iraq and Afghanistan; and 
 fostering stability in the Middle East by finding a solution to the 
Arab-Israeli  conflict. 
 
The chapter extensively elaborates on the concept that defined the approach of 
the administration to foreign policy – the “Bush doctrine.” This includes an in-depth 
analysis of the doctrine’s Iranian implications and the analysis of the 2003 May offer of 
Iran to cooperate on a host of issues and a possible grand bargain between the two 
nations. Then, the chapter elaborates on the period of containing Iran (2006-2008).   
 
2.1. Neoconservatism and the Bush Doctrine  
 
 Before outlining the actual doctrine, it is worth introducing a few thoughts on 
the intellectual and philosophical fundamentals that influenced a number of the key 
decision makers who surrounded President Bush when devising his new strategy after 
the 9/11 attacks.100 Then, the chapter provides a detailed analysis of the Bush doctrine in 
general by examining primary sources first and then it goes onto elaborate on what 
experts had written about the concept.101   
                                                 
100 This chapter extensively draws on one of the earlier publications of the author. See: Balogh István 
[2011b]: A Bush-doktrína és “a fekete hattyúk átka” MKI-tanulmányok. T-2011/29 especially: pp. 3-15. 
http://www.hiia.hu/pub/displ.asp?id=DGSFQJ Accessed: 01-09-2012. 
101 The doctrine probably influenced the social discourse on US foreign policy more than any other 
foreign policy concept in US history.  It is interesting to note that –  much to the surprise of the author –  
the Bush doctrine even has its own Facebook page: Bush Doctrine http://www.facebook.com/pages/Bush-
Doctrine/113525865324786?ref=ts Accessed: 09-09-2011. 
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 According to conventional wisdom, Bush and his top advisers were 
neoconservatives. (Daalder; Lindsay [2005]: p. 14.) While this is not accepted by every 
expert, it is true that neoconservative ideas had a significant impact on the foreign 
policy of the Bush administration. (See: Dalby [2006]: pp. 35-45.; Smith [2009]: pp. 54-
56; pp. 74-75.) This worldview had its roots in the philosophy of Leo Strauss,102 but as 
far as its views on US domestic politics and foreign policy are concerned, 
neoconservatism emerged in the 1960's and 70's and it was a school of thought 
associated with former or disappointed liberals at the time. That is how Irwing Kristol, 
the founding father of neoconservatism identified himself. Another key figure of this 
intellectual tradition was Norman Podhoretz, who, along with other like-minded 
intellectuals, argued that détente with the Soviet Union equaled to appeasement. 
(Anderson [2011] p. 60.; Rostoványi [2004]: p. 188.)  
The neoconservative worldview is based on patriotism, rejection of the idea of 
‘world government’, clear distinction between friends and enemies and defining US 
national interests based on a clear set of principles, as well as defined in terms of global 
interests. [Kristol [2003] quoted in Rostoványi [2004]: pp. 188].103 Neoconservatives 
reject the idea of classical Kissingerian realism, which is based on pragmatism and the 
neglect of values. On the contrary, they believe that US foreign policy should always be 
based on morality and a clear distinction between good and evil. Thus, Ronald Reagan, 
whose foreign policy rhetoric reflected much of the above listed principles, is 
considered to be one of the ‘role models’ for neoconservatives.  (See: Mándi [2008]; see 
also: Kaufman [2007]: pp. 113-123.) 
 One of the best known articulations of neoconservative foreign policy ideas is 
associated with Charles Krauthammer's piece titled “The Unipolar Moment”, published 
                                                 
102 For the impact of Leo Strauss on neoconservative thought and the limits of applying Straussian ideas 
to understanding neoconservative foreign policy thinking see: Ryan [2010]: p. 8.; also Ch 7. 
103 According to Ryan there were two distinct neocon generations. The Cold War neocons were ardent 
anticommunists and believed that a strong and assertive, albeit defensive US foreign policy built on 
containment could defeat the USSR. The new generation came to political life in the nineties and thought 
that US hegemony needed to be protected by military means and offensive action when necessary. The 
first generation included people like Jeane Kirkpatrick, US Ambassador to the UN in the Reagan 
administration, Irwing Kristol and Norman Podhoretz mentioned above. The second generation came 
from circles initially sympathetic towards the right wing of the Democratic Party and former aids of 
senator Henry „Scoop” Jackson – e.g. Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and Frank Gaffney. A lot of these 
people as well as other neocons (Robert Kagan, Elliot Abrams, William Kristol) held positions in the 
Reagan as well as the Bush 41 administration too but became members of the second generation as they 
held different views on US foreign policy from those of members of the first generation. Still others came 
from the think tank world, journalism or they were originally activists  – e.g. Charles Krauthammer 
(journalism) Joshua Muravchik (activist).  (See: Ryan [2010]: p. 2.; pp. 12-14; pp. 19-20)  
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in the journal Foreign Affairs in 1990-1991. The central idea of the article was that the 
US enjoyed an unprecedented freedom in international relations, since its main rival, the 
Soviet Union, had collapsed. Thus, the most important goal of the US should be to 
sustain the unipolar situation in the international system. (Krauthammer [1990-1991]; 
Ryan [2010]: pp. 14-15.) 
 Another important document of neoconservative thought was an official policy 
paper. The principles of Irwing Kristol listed earlier were also reflected in the 1992 
Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), which set out the basic tenets of the Pentagon’s 
strategy at the time. Produced under the supervision of Paul Wolfowitz, then Under 
Secretary of Defense for Policy; and Dick Cheney, then Secretary of Defense, the paper 
argued that US hegemony should be sustained for as long as possible because the 
military dominance of the US serves the cause of global peace. The other principle goal 
of the document was to underscore the need for preventing the emergence of rival power 
centers in order to sustain US hegemony. Spreading US values and the possibility of 
unilateral action also featured in the text. After parts of the document were leaked to the 
New York Times and the Washington Post, the White House had the document rewritten 
and, thus, it never became official policy. (Excerpts from 1992 Draft Defense Planning 
Guidance [1992]; See also: Rostoványi [2004]: pp. 186-187; Ryan [2010]: pp. 19-26.).  
 In their 1996 piece titled “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy”, published 
in the Foreign Affairs, William Kristol, son of the founder of the neoconservative 
tradition along with Robert Kagan, argue that US foreign policy strategy should be built 
upon a US self-perception they called “the benevolent hegemon”.104 (Kristol-Kagan 
[1996]: p. 20.) In fact, the article reflects very similar thinking to the ones found in the 
1992 draft Defense Planning Guidance. Benevolent hegemony requires the US to 
“preserve and enhance that predominance by strengthening America’s security, 
supporting its friends, advancing its interests, and standing up for its principles around 
the world.”   The expression “rogue state” also surfaces in the text in relation to Iraq, 
Iran and Libya. The paper mentions aspirations to change the Beijing regime and puts 
forth that sustaining US hegemony requires increasing defense spending, the 
involvement of citizens and “moral clarity.” (Ibid. p. 27; pp. 20-28; see also: Anderson 
[2011]: p. 61.) This strand of thought and the prominence of neoconservative ideas 
                                                 
104 William Kristol also served in government as the chief of staff to Vice President Dan Quayle (1989-
1993). 
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derived from a sense of “triumphalism” perceived in the US following the end of the 
Cold War. (Dalby [2006]: p. 35) Indeed, the central idea of neoconservatism was to 
apply force in order to sustain US hegemony around the globe in order to deter 
aggression and, thus, serve the cause of peace in the long run. (Ryan [2010])  
 Irwing Kristol – sometimes referred to as the “godfather” of neoconservatism – 
engaged in significant institution building in order to provide the neoconservative 
school with infrastructure. (See: Ryan [2010]: p. 7.) He began by reorganizing the think 
tank ‘American Enterprise Institute’ and other think tanks also became part of this 
network (e.g. Cato Institute, Heritage Foundation, Center for Security Policy). 
(Rostoványi [2004]: pp. 188-189.; Ryan [2010]: p. 13.) Later on in 1997, William 
Kristol organized the Project for the New American Century and it had a number of 
well-known conservatives among its ranks: Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Richard 
Perle, Elliot Abrams, as well as James Woolsey. The newly established neoconservative 
think tank sent an open letter to then President Bill Clinton in order to persuade him that 
a tougher US stance was needed against Iraq and, therefore, regime change seemed to 
be the only viable option. Cheney, Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz, Perle, Woolsey, John 
Bolton, Francis Fukuyama, Zalmay Khalilzad, Robert Zoelick, Peter Rodman were all 
among the signatories. Later on, most of them took up positions in the Bush 
administration in  the field of national security and foreign policy. (See PNAC website; 
Letter to President Clinton on Iraq [1998]; Anderson [2011]: pp. 61-62.; Rostoványi 
[2004]: pp. 189-190; see also: N. Rózsa [2003]: p. 57.). Furthermore, William Kristol 
has established his own foreign policy think tank in 2009, the Foreign Policy Initiative 
in Washington, D.C.105 The institutional background has been complemented with 
considerable influence in the media, since a number of well-known papers and journals 
became associated with the neoconservative world view – Norman Podhoretz used to be 
the first editor of Commentary magazine and William Kristol is the eidtor-in-chief of the 
Weekly Standard. Furthermore, the National Interest regularly had publications by 
neoconservatives. (Ryan [2010]: p. 14.) 
 Criticism of Clinton’s foreign policy on Iraq partly derived from the 
neoconservatives’ frustration with Saddam Hussein and his regime. A number of them – 
such as Paul Wolfowitz – though that George H. W. Bush had made a mistake by not 
                                                 
105 See the mission statement of FPI: Mission Statement. The Foreign Policy Initiative, 
http://www.foreignpolicyi.org/about Accessed: 29-08-2012 
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removing Saddam Hussein from power at the end of the Gulf War. (Daalder; Lindsay 
[2005]: p. 103.; Bolton [2008]: p. 179.) In fact, the Bush doctrine’s birth was partly due 
to Republican influence and dominance in Congress between 1994 and 2006; 
disagreement over interventions; public disinterest in foreign policy and the fact that 
few other groups had a clear vision for the US besides the “neocons”.  Although, as 
mentioned earlier, 9/11 had a transformational effect, a number of foreign policy 
elements were already present before the attacks. Neglect and even suspicion regarding 
international institutions was already visible shortly after the administration took office. 
(Buckley; Singh [2006b]: pp. 15-16.)  
 Before moving on to analyzing the doctrine itself, it is necessary to describe 
what a “doctrine” is and how it relates to “strategy” as such and other similar concepts. 
By looking at those expressions first, one can surely establish that doctrine implies a 
stronger commitment to a set of goals and/ or values.106 Strategy, on the other hand, is 
less about commitment to a certain set of worldviews, it tends to be more pragmatic. In 
the author’s typology, doctrine is ideological and strategy is pragmatic. They relate to 
one another as political philosophy and science do: the former is subjective and the 
latter more – if not entirely – objective. Nonetheless, the two concepts inevitably 
overlap and, as the author argues, they may be considered synonyms in the Bush 
administration’s case. (See: Buckley; Singh [2006a]: pp. 1-2.) The reason for this 
argumentation is the fact that the main driving force of foreign policy for at least four to 
six years after the 9/11 attacks had been the Bush doctrine. Thus, it is difficult to discern 
the two concepts when it comes to analyzing the Bush administration’s foreign policy.  
The doctrine came to dominate every other issue and consideration and, thus, for a 
relatively long period of time, strategy and doctrine became synonyms. That is due to 
the fact that the US government’s commitment to pursuing terrorism became so strong 
that it defined the entire strategic approach of the administration. Normally, a doctrine 
could be seen as a concept summarizing the most important foreign and national 
security policy priorities of a state. Thus, it is considered to be a narrower concept then 
strategy in general. However, in certain cases – like that of the Bush administration – 
they not only overlap, they become identical. (Balogh [2012]: p. 9.)  
 No doubt, the Bush doctrine was a new grand strategy for the US. (Buckley; 
                                                 
106 E.g. Rehnson argues that presidential doctrines essentially provide answers to the most significant 
strategic dilemmas facing the country. (Rehnson [2010]: p. 38.) 
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Singh [2006a]: pp. 1-2.; Rhenson [2010]: p. 38.) This approach to the concept by the 
administration is highlighted by some of the speeches examined here. These speeches 
and other sources highlight the fact that the doctrine implied the use of every national 
tool at hand to achieve a particular political goal. Thus, a number of authors refer to the 
notion in grand strategic terms. (See: Kaufman [2007]: p. 1.; Dalby [2006]: p. 33.; 
Ikenberry [2011]: pp 221-278.) The all-encompassing and comprehensive view of the 
administration is supported by the fact that a number of sub-strategies have been 
released by the Bush administration which all followed the principles set out in the 2002 
and 2006 national security strategies.107 
 It is interesting to note that the basic elements of the Bush doctrine were 
outlined by Bush within the first days after the 9/11 attacks. It was a concept born as 
events unfolded after the actual attacks and – quite understandably – it was not result of 
previous considerations. (Moens [2004]: p. 164.) It was formulated gradually as new 
components were added continuously until the release of the 2002 National Security 
Strategy. (Smith [2009]: p . 54.; Davis [2006]: pp. 206-207.) The author puts forward 
that the six most important sources of the Bush doctrine are four speeches and one 
document. The four speeches are the following: the ones held on September 11 and 20, 
2011; as well as on January 29 and June 1, 2002. The first one was the president’s 
speech to the nation on the evening of the actual attacks, the second one was held before 
Congress, the third speech was the (in)famous State of the Union Address, and the final 
one was held at the US Military Academy at West Point.  The fifth and final source is 
the 2002 National Security Strategy itself.  
  The 2006 National Security Strategy is very similar but, as mentioned above, 
the year marks a watershed as US foreign policy became somewhat more subtle and 
more traditional. I argue that this softer tone is reflected in the 2006 National Security 
Strategy, even though it still retained most of what the 2002 strategy put forward. Also, 
by 2006, a bloody sectarian civil war erupted in Iraq and the chances of stabilizing Iraq 
                                                 
107 The administration released the Quadrennial Defense Review Report (2001; 2006), the National 
Strategy of Combating Terrorism (2003; 2006); the National Strategy for Homeland Security (2002; 
2007); the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction (2002); the National Intelligence 
Strategy of the United States (2005); The U.S. National Strategy for Public Diplomacy and Strategic 
Communication (2007) and the US Army Field Manual: Counterinsurgency (2006). Except for the 2007 
edition of the homeland security strategy, all of these are listed in: (Rehnson [2010:] p. 39.) These will not 
be addressed separately, however, as they are all based on the basic principles of the Bush doctrine and 
the 2002 National Security Strategy, the author thought it necessary to mention them. They are also 
included in the list of references among the “Primary Sources” at the end of the thesis.  
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were diminishing. The US was forced to reevaluate its policies in the region as it 
became bogged down in Iraq, thus, Washington returned to containment. Therefore, the 
2006 strategy will be examined in the next chapter, which will elaborate on the US 
containment policy towards Iran between 2006 and 2008. 
 One of the most important parts of the Bush doctrine was coined in the first 
speech in the immediate aftermath of the incident during the evening of September 11 
2001. Bush noted:  
“We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those 
who harbor them”. (Text of Bush’s address. September 11. [2001])  
 
This lack of distinction is one of the most aggressive aspects of the doctrine. It is 
aggressive because it leaves no room for a certain type of traditional foreign policy 
behavior: neutralism. Taking sponsors of terrorism and terrorists themselves as equals 
come with another significant consequence: it extends the front line of confrontation as 
the targeted group becomes considerably larger. (see: Dalby [2006]: pp. 42-43.; p. 45.; 
Kellner [2003b]: p. 61.; p. 72; p. 126; p. 207.; also: Rehnson [2010]: p. 30.) The other 
important element of the speech is the following one:  
 
“America and our friends and allies join with all those who want peace and security in the 
world and we stand together to win the war against terrorism.” (Ibid.)  
 
It is interesting to note, that the “classical” version of the term “war on terror” does not 
appear in the speech yet, however, the first formal reference to the core of the Bush 
doctrine is already there: “war against terrorism.” Indeed, as Moens notes:  “Within days 
the President wiped out years of conventional knowledge on terrorism […]”. (See: 
Moens: Ibid.; also: Anderson [2011]: p. 101.)  
 A more powerful and even more aggressive speech was delivered on September 
20, 2001, before Congress. This is where the actual term “war on terror” was first used 
by Bush: 
“Our war on terror begins with al Qaeda, but it does not end there.  It will not end until 
every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated.”  (Transcript 
of President Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress on Thursday night. September 
20. [2001]) 
The US president further blurred the line between terrorists and their sponsors:  
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“Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists and every government that supports them.” 
(Ibid.)  
  
The first hint concerning the doctrine is the reference to the attacks as an “act of war”:  
“On September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against our 
country. […] How will we fight this war? We will direct every resource at our command -
- every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, every instrument of law 
enforcement, every financial influence, and every necessary weapon of war -- to the 
destruction and to the defeat of the global terror network.” (Ibid.)  
 
These lines are important for two reasons. One is that it proves that the administration 
thought of the concept as a real grand strategy, which is based on the application of all 
necessary means in order to succeed in reaching certain political ends. The other one is 
the creation of a “war mentality”, which keeps recurring in the rest of the text. This war 
mentality and the long term nature of Bush’s new commitment are both reflected by the 
following lines: 
 
“Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. Americans 
should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign unlike any other we have ever seen. 
It may include dramatic strikes visible on TV and covert operations secret even in 
success.” (Ibid.) 
 
And then, the notion of not making any distinctions emerges again:  
 
“And we will pursue nations that provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation in 
every region now has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the 
terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism 
will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime. (Ibid.) 
 
The logic of “with us or against us” led to significant tensions between Washington 
and its Western European allies. (See: Anderson [2011]: p. 97-99.; Buckley; Singh 
[2006b]: p. 17.; Ikenberry [2008]: p. 98) Donald Rumsfeld spoke of the western 
part as being “old Europe”, whereas the expression “new Europe” was used to 
highlight the cooperative attitude of Central and Eastern Europe concerning the 
war on terror, and the Iraq war in particular. (See: Orbán [2003]; DoD News 
Briefing… [2003]; Anderson [2011]: pp. 125-126.)  France opposed the doctrine, 
thinking that it was too “simplistic” and arguing that there were a lot of other 
challenges besides terrorism. (Ibid. p. 98.) Indeed, the doctrine implied a rather 
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monolithic perception of power, since military might constituted the basic tenet of 
the strategy. (Buckley; Singh [2006b]: p. 22.) Interestingly, the concept of 
preemtpive action is not part of the doctrine yet – in fact, it puts the emphasis on 
defense:  
 
“Our nation has been put on notice, we’re not immune from attack. We will take 
defensive measures against terrorism to protect Americans. Today, dozens of federal 
departments and agencies, as well as state and local governments, have responsibilities 
affecting homeland security.” (Transcript of President Bush’s address to a joint session of 
Congress on Thursday night. September 20. [2001]) 
 
The speech is an emotional one, but it does not include all elements of what later came 
to be known as the Bush doctrine. However, it does include some core “items” 
associated with the concept: lack of distinction between enemies and their sponsors and 
the perception of war.  
 Perhaps the best known speech associated with the Bush doctrine is the former 
president’s state of the union address on January 29, 2002. This was the “axis of evil” 
speech that has been cited and referenced by so many sources. Again, there are a 
number of references to an ongoing war. 
 
“What we have found in Afghanistan confirms that, far from ending there, our war against 
terror is only beginning.” (State of the Union address by George W. Bush. January 29. 
[2002]) 
 
Then, the expression “outlaw regime”, used by a number of other key US decision 
makers in US history, such as Reagan, appears108: 
 
“Thousands of dangerous killers, schooled in the methods of murder, often supported by 
outlaw regimes, are now spread throughout the world like ticking time bombs, set to go 
off without warning.” (Ibid.)  
 
And then, the other core element of the doctrine is pronounced, which is prevention: 
 
“And second, we must prevent the terrorists and regimes who seek chemical, biological or 
nuclear weapons from threatening the United States and the world.” […] Our second goal 
                                                 
108 See for example Ronald Reagan’s 1986 speech on the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. Bass [1992]: p. 
194.    
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is to prevent regimes that sponsor terror from threatening America or our friends and 
allies with weapons of mass destruction.” (Ibid.) 
 
The following part of the address elaborates on three specific regimes – North Korea, 
Iran and Iraq: 
 
“States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten 
the peace of the world.” (Ibid.) 
  
 The final speech considered relevant in the process of introducing the doctrine is 
the one held at the US Military Academy at West Point on June 1, 2002. (See: 
Magyarics [2007]: p. 87.) The most important part relates to preventive action: 
“Deterrence, the promise of massive retaliation against nations, means nothing against 
shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not 
possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those 
weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. We cannot defend 
America and our friends by hoping for the best. We cannot put our faith in the word of 
tyrants who solemnly sign nonproliferation treaties and then systematically break them. If 
we wait for threats to fully materialize we will have waited too long. Homeland defense 
and missile defense are part of a stronger security. They’re essential priorities for 
America. Yet the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle 
to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the 
world we have entered the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will 
act.” (Text of Bush’s Speech at West Point. June 1.  [2002]) 
 
From a grand strategic perspective, it is important to note the following part: 
“Because the war on terror will require resolve and patience, it will also require firm 
moral purpose. In this way our struggle is similar to the cold war. […] America 
confronted imperial communism in many different ways: diplomatic, economic and 
military. ” (Ibid.)  
 
Linking the war on terror to the Cold War struggle and implying that the Cold War 
required the application of many different means, again suggests that the Bush 
administration thought of the Bush doctrine as a design of grand strategic relevance. 
The speech also includes a number of further references to “evil” and “lawless 
regimes”, which correspond with the rhetorical traditions of US foreign policy. Finally, 
the passage includes an emphasis on the need for allies and coalitions: 
 
“Today, from the Middle East to South Asia, we’re gathering broad international 
coalitions to increase the pressure for peace.” (Ibid.) 
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This may remind one of the “coalitions of the willing” – an important part of the 
doctrine. However, the term was only used by Bush during the Prague stop of a 
European trip on November 20, 2002, in order to threaten Iraq by demanding Saddam 
Hussein to disarm. (Bush [2002b]) The fundamental idea behind this was to rely on 
groups of like-minded countries, rather than slow and ineffective international and 
multilateral institutions. As Douglas Feith, Under Secretary for Policy at the Pentagon 
at the time notes in his memoirs, Rumsfeld thought the point was to find the mission 
and then rally the partners around that single purpose, but other missions may rely on a 
different configuration of partners. (Feith [2009] pp. 56-57.; Rehnson [2010]: p. 47.) As 
Rumsfeld put it: “The mission must determine the coalition, and the coalition must not 
determine the mission.” (Moens [2004]: p. 183.)  
 The most important document concerning the doctrine is obviously the National 
Security Strategy of September 2002. Having analyzed the above speeches, it is 
interesting to see that the strategy itself draws upon the same building blocks and 
clichés. The presidential foreword of the document heavily draws on Bush’s earlier 
speech at West Point, sometimes even literally. (NSS [2002]: pp.3-5) Essentially, the 
strategy is a ‘grand design’ against terrorism. All of the previously mentioned elements 
emerge in the document and the expression “global war on terrorism” is also in the 
passage (Ibid. p. 27.)  
 The most important part of the document is obviously the one focusing on 
preventive action. Two chapters focus on preventing specific security threats. Chapter 
III. (Ibid. pp. 5-7.) is titled “Strengthen Alliances to Defeat Global Terrorism and Work 
to Prevent Attacks Against Us and Our Friends” and V. is  “Prevent Our Enemies from 
Threatening Us, Our Allies, and Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction.” 
(Ibid. pp. 9-11.)  Chapter III. begins with the definition of the enemy: 
 
“The enemy is terrorism – premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated 
against innocents.” (Ibid. p. 5.)  
 
The text emphasizes again the lack of distinction between terrorists and their sponsors, 
but the most important provision of the strategy is the sentence specifically emphasizing 
preemption:  
 
“While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international 
community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self 
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defense by acting preemptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm 
against our people and our country.” (Ibid. p. 6.) 
 
 
This statement adds unilateralism to the list of core ideas associated with the doctrine. 
Still, the strategy does emphasize working with partners and international organizations, 
such as the UN. (Ibid. p. 7.) The document reflects the war mentality mentioned earlier 
by using phrases such as “the best defense is a good offense”.(Ibid. p. 6.)  
 Chapter V. continues this logic, although specifically in the context of weapons 
of mass destruction. The passage highlights the threat of “rogue states” – another 
variation that draws on the “outlaw” tradition in US foreign policy rhetoric. (Ibid. p. 
13.) The document elaborates on the outdated nature of traditional deterrence, since it 
puts forward the following argumentation: 
 
“The United States has long maintained the option of preemptive actions to counter a 
sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of 
inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend 
ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy’s attack. To 
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if 
necessary, act preemptively.” (Ibid. p. 15.)  
 
 
This set of thoughts is just as relevant as the one on preemption. Those statements 
together constitute the most radical and unconventional part of the document and they 
clearly define the Bush doctrine. 
 The picture provided by primary sources becomes more sophisticated by 
drawing on what the literature has written on the Bush doctrine. According to Stephen 
Van Evera, neoconservative foreign policy consists of unilateralism, the concept of 
preemptive war, applying pressure aggressively, threatening with the use of force, an 
imperial mindset as well as less role for diplomacy. (Van Evera [2008]: pp. 28-29.) 
Another well-known international relations expert points out that the neoconservative 
logic assumed that the US is the “world’s Leviathan”, which neglects international 
institutions and relies on “coalitions of the willing instead”. (Ikenberry [2008]: pp. 97-
98) It also leaves no room for neutrality, as those who do not join the US in the war on 
terror are considered to be enemies. (Ibid. p. 98.; See also Hirsch [2003]: pp. 174-175.).  
Niall Ferguson sums up the substance of the Bush doctrine as follows: unilateralism, 
preemptive action and “export” of US economic and political institutions. (Ferguson 
[2008]: pp. 227-228) Others put forward that the doctrine was based on US efforts to 
free itself from the limits imposed on it by international institutions, so it could carry 
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out its policies without institutional limits. According to this assessment, the second 
part of the concept involved using US power to change the status quo.  As a result, 
unilateral and preemptive action was no longer considered as a last resort. The final 
element of the concept meant changing regimes of “rogue states.” (Daalder-Lindsay 
[2005]: pp. 14-15.) Others refer to the concept as “global unilateralism.” (See: 
Rostoványi [2004]: p. 186) Dalby calls the policy “imperial geopolitics.” (Dalby 
[2006]: p. 47.)  Kaufman contends that the doctrine has two basic elements: preemption 
and democracy promotion. (Kaufman [2007]: p. 1.) Rehnson contends that the doctrine 
reflected four basic premises: American primacy, assertive realism, stand-apart 
alliances, new internationalism, democratic transformation. (Rehnson [2010]: pp. 40-
56.)  Based on these works, the following “items” sum up the contents of the Bush 
doctrine109:  
 
 unilateralism, 
 extensively relying on military force as a tool of foreign policy, 
 the possibility of preemption, 
 a reduced role for multilateral diplomacy and international institutions, 
and110 
 changing the regimes of rogue states. 
 
 There are two further things that should be discussed here. The global war on 
terror (“GWOT”) and democracy promotion are both closely associated with the Bush 
doctrine, but how do they exactly relate to the doctrine?111 They are also closely 
connected as there are less unsatisfied people in democracies, thus, democracy could be 
a form of government that helps rolling back the influence of radical groups. (Carothers 
[2003]) The author argues that the GWOT and democracy promotion are specific 
policies, which are derived from the doctrine and its above listed principles. Thus, they 
are based on the doctrine, but are not identical with it. To use the terminology of 
strategic thought, principles define the strategy but policies derived from those 
principles represent the “tactical” level of foreign policy strategies. (See: Deibel [2007]: 
p. 11.) 
                                                 
109 Ikenberry also lists very similar elements regarding the contents of the Bush doctrine. (Ikenberry 
[2011]: pp. 254-262.) 
110 The Bush administration did not recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice it did 
not support the Kyoto Protocol and it unilaterally withdrew from the ABM treaty.  
111 For an excellent overview of the war on terror see: Glant [2012]esp. pp. 515-518. 
134 
 
 Furthermore, democracy promotion and nation building had never really been 
part of the foreign policy consensus within the administration. (See: Ryan [2010]: pp. 5-
6.)112 Not even the neocons outside the administration thought of it as a priority 
regarding Iraq’s future. (Ryan [2010]: p. 184.) True, most of Bush’s senior advisers 
accepted a “hegemonist” interpretation of the world – Condoleezza Rice113, Bush’s 
National Security Adviser and later Secretary of State; Paul Wolfowitz, the Pentagon’s 
Deputy Secretary of Defense; Vice President Dick Cheney, former Director of the CIA 
and Secretary of Defense; as well as Donald Rumsfeld shared the opinion that the US 
had to use its overwhelming military and economic power to dominate the international 
order.114 (Daalder; Lindsay [2005]: pp. 41-47.; see also: Dorrien [2004]: p. 2.) Still, 
people who actually thought that US military force should be used to spread American 
values and democracy constituted a minority. Richard Perle115 and Paul Wolfowitz 
believed that that was the right course of action. (Daalder; Lindsay [2005]: p. 46.)116 
However, some decision makers associated with neoconservatism – Dick Cheney and 
Condoleezza Rice – were skeptical about nation-building projects in general. Rice even 
pointed out in one of her well known speeches that “We don’t need to have the 82nd 
Airborne escorting kids to kindergarten”, by which she meant that the US military was 
not for carrying out tasks related to nation-building.  (Rice quoted in Vaïsse [2007]: p. 
18.) Bush was also skeptical about using the US military for nation building projects. 
                                                 
112 This is true even though some experts suggest otherwise and put forward that democracy promotion 
was an integral part of the Bush doctrine. See: Buckley; Singh [2006b]: p. 17.; Kaufman [2007]: p. 1.  
113 In fact, Condoleezza Rice is referred to as being a „hawkish realist.” Dorrien [2004]: p. 2. 
114 Neoconservative hegemonist ideas lead one to the problem of theorizing about the US role in the 
world. However, due to limits of space, the present work will not elaborate on this debate in detail. Still, 
the author found it important to highlight at least one important aspect of this debate because it relates to 
neoconservative ideas and the concept of the Bush doctrine itself. The literature discusses this problem 
extensively.  The discourse mainly focuses on the “Hegemony” vs. “Empire” dichotomy. (See: Vitalis 
[2006]: pp. 22-26.) According to Ikenberry “empire” “refers to the political control by a dominant state of 
the domestic and foreign policies of weaker peoples or polities.” (Ikenberry [2011]: p. 24.) Hegemony, 
however, is different. It implies a system where other polities are less subordinated to the hegemon and 
the latter’s position is accepted by other states because it provides certain ‘public goods’ – eg. security – 
to weaker entities. In turn, it also sets the norms and rules (institutions) of the system, which it expects to 
be supported by weaker players of the system. It is less about control of domestic politics, it is more about 
influencing weaker entities’ foreign policies. Ikenberry puts forth that it is the liberal quality of US 
leadership that makes its position sustainable. (Ibid. pp. 23-26.) However, neoconservative ideas as well 
as the Bush doctrine supposed a stronger subordination to the US, thus, it was rejected and could not be 
sustained. (Ibid. pp. 249-278.) For thought-provoking contributions to the topic see: Magyarics [2007]; 
Magyarics [2012]; Romsics [2010b]; Rusett [2011]; Lavina [2009]; Held; Koenig-Archibugi [2004]; 
Black [2007]; Zartman [2009]; Chomsky [2004].   
115 Richard Perle used to be the chairman of the Defense Policy Planning Board Advisory Committee in 
the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2003. 
116 Certain other authors do not agree – Dorrien specifically points out that Wolfowitz did not really 
believe in social engineering either. (Dorrien [2004]: p. 65.) 
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(Anderson [2011]: p. 56.)117  
 Thus, it is not entirely right to say that Bush and his top advisers were 
neoconservatives. In fact, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney and George W. Bush were 
conservatives who were influenced by neoconservative ideas, but they were not 
necessarily neocons. (See: Smith [2009]: pp. 55-56.; Dorrien [2004]: p. 3.; Rehnson 
[2010]: p. 31.) Daalder and Lindsay point out that these people were not 
neoconservatives, they were rather “democratic imperialists”. (Daalder; Lindsay 
[2005]: p 46; see also Carothers [2003]) Ryan calls them “conservative nationalists/ 
conservative unipolarists” who were allied with neoconservatives within the US 
political arena, but were not neocons themselves. (Ryan [2010]: p. 6.; pp. 179-189.) 
They shared the neocon view on the need to sustain US hegemony. (Ibid.) Kaufman puts 
forth that the Bush doctrine was based on “moral democratic realism”, which is not 
entirely the same as neoconservativism, but it is the closest intellectual tradition to this 
category.118 (Kaufman [2007] pp. 2-4.)  Buckley and Singh point out that they were 
simply “nationalists”.  (Buckley; Singh [2006b]: p. 16.) Rostoványi calls it “global 
unilateralism” and Dorrien refers to it as “unilateralist militarism” (Rostoványi [2004]: 
p. 186.; Dorrien [2004]: p. 1.)  Rehnson contended that the Iraqi implementation of the 
Bush doctrine was in fact based on “assertive realism.” (Rehnson [2010]: p. 29)119 This 
also indicates that conventional wisdom has exaggerated the impact of neoconservatism 
on the Bush administration and its foreign policy doctrine. (Smith [2009]: pp. 74-75.) 
However, as Anderson points out, it is fair to say that Bush “listened to the neocons”.120 
(Anderson [2011]: p. 62.) Others emphasize the intellectual and political alliance 
between the neocons and hawkish republicans such as Dick Cheney and Donald 
Rumsfeld. (Ryan [2010]: p. 6; p. 180.; Dorrien [2004]: p. 2.) Drawing on the literature’s 
                                                 
117 Rehnson notes that democracy promotion was originally not part of the Bush doctrine. However, later 
on as Iraq became unstable as a result of the invasion and the fact that the US had not found any WMD 
stockpiles, government communication increasingly started focusing on the theme of democracy 
promotion and, thus, it became an important aspect of the doctrine. (Rehnson [2010]: p. 34.) 
118 Kaufman takes moral democratic realism to mean efforts aiming to defend US values and its free 
society and choosing the right (prudent) means to achieve this goal. His theory is based on St. Thomas 
Aquinas’s theory and is partly rooted in Christian philosophy. See: Kaufman [2007]: 3-4. 
119 Rehnson applies an interesting definition of the Bush doctrine. He puts forth that: “The Bush Doctrine 
is best understood as a set of strategic premises or a framework for analysis to be applied, with 
modifications, to specific circumstances. Rehnson argues that the doctrine applied an approach based on 
differentiating between various challenges – e.g. Iran and Iraq were treated quite differently within the 
framework of the doctrine. (Rehnson [2010]: p. 29.) Interestingly, he argues that the Bush doctrine was 
based on an exceptionally aggressive notion of realism –  it resembled the concept of John J. 
Mearheimer's offensive realism. (Ibid. p. 32.) 
120 For an excellent account on the neocons rise to power as well as the “philosophical /ideological war” 
between the “neocons and the traditionalists” see: (Rehnson [2008]: pp. 216-239.) 
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doubts about the neoconservatism of top decision makers within the Bush 
administration, the author will refer to them as “hawkish conservatives” because this 
expression is less ideological and refers to the original conservative idea of sustaining 
US hegemony. “Hawkish” highlights the willingness to use military force – even if it 
implies unilateral action.  
 Assessing the doctrine’s overall legacy requires listing the successes as well as 
the failures of the doctrine, keeping in mind that the present chapter is not well suited to 
take every aspect of the issue into consideration due to limits of space. First, it is 
necessary to establish that the doctrine did not lack strategic logic. The cost of inaction 
right after 9/11 could have been enormous. (Kaufman [2007]: p. 13.9.) The idea behind 
the concept was radical and aggressive deterrence that was reached by the psychology 
of fear in the region as a result of Iraq’s invasion and the doctrine of preventive war. The 
Bush administration took on a proactive posture, arguing that the Clinton administration 
had always been reactive in its response to terrorism. Bush is said to have said: “I’m 
tired of swatting flies. I’m tired of playing defense. I want to play offense. I want to take 
the fight to the terrorists.” (Moens [2001]: p. 127.;see also Daalder; Lindsay [2005]: p. 
75)  Thus, preemption was a logical consequence of this reasoning. The goal was to 
invoke fear in potential enemies and “rogue states.” By defeating Iraq, no US enemy 
(Syria and Iran in particular) could be sure if their “name was not on the list”. This fear 
was the direct consequence of uncertainty caused by the fact that potential targets could 
never be sure if they would be next or not. (Feith [2009]: pp. 507-508; Gordon [2003]) 
The advantage of this posture was that Washington could now take the initiative instead 
of being on the defensive and the fact that there was a sense of unpredictability in US 
foreign and security policy. (Feith [2009]: p. 86.; p. 307.) Just as the US was afraid of 
terrorists because it did not know exactly when and where they would strike, “rouge 
states” and terror groups had to fear the US because they could never be certain when 
Washington would come after them. The “world’s Leviathan” woke up and it was eager 
to find its enemies. The success of the Bush doctrine rested on the psychological 
spillover of this effect.  
 As a result, Washington succeeded on a number of fronts initially. Libya gave up 
its WMD-program and Syria withdrew from Lebanon after twenty years. (BBC [2003]; 
Feith [2009] p. 508.; Ghattas [2005]). Ties with Russia and China improved as a result 
of the “war on terror”, partly because both countries had their own problems with 
extremists in their territories. (Hirsch [2003]: p. 175.) Clearly, the ‘psychological 
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spillover’ had some effect on US adversaries in the region. (See: Mead [2005]: pp. 129-
130; Dorrien [2004]: p. 186.)121 
 On the other hand, the doctrine caused a number of setbacks for the US. First of 
all, the concept of the doctrine was problematic. It was difficult to implement due to a 
lack of limited US resources. (Buckley; Singh [2006b]: p. 13.)  A lot of debate occurred 
concerning the issue of preemption and prevention. In fact, the Bush administration 
blurred the line between the two. Preemption means action against an imminent threat, 
whereas prevention means war against a threat in the more distant future. Both are 
problematic as preemption is only permissible if the threat is imminent indeed, which 
was not the case with Iraq.  Also, Article 51. of the UN Treaty puts forward that action 
in the name of self-defense is allowed only against attacks which are already under way. 
The administration used the expression “prevention” on many occasions, which led one 
to think of preventive war. But this is an entirely different category in international law. 
(See: Valki [2005]: pp. 103-104.) What actually happened in Iraq was basically a 
preventive war, since Iraq did not constitute a source of instant dangers, instead, it could 
have become dangerous over time in the more distant future. Thus, like many experts, 
the administration “blurred” the line between those two different cases. (See: Freedman 
[2004]: p. 86. quoted in Gray [2007]: p. 29. Ikenberry [2011]: pp. 258-259.; Doyle; 
Macedo [2008]) 
 In fact, Bush’s foreign policy was counterproductive in many ways. The 
neoconservative idea of unipolarism was too simplistic and it was based on a false 
premise. Neocons thought of military capabilities as the main source of international 
power, however, the nature of modern influence was more complicated and consisted of 
multiple layers – political, economic, military, etc. (See: Keohane; Nye [1977]) The 
proactive and offensive posture of neoconservative foreign policy condemned 
traditional approaches, such as deterrence and containment. Still, much of the 
administration’s task following the invasion of Iraq covered “containment of forces that 
the invasion unwittingly unleashed, containment of new terrorism, of the new al-Qaeda 
franchise, and containment of sectarian rivalries that simmer through Iraq and 
beyond.” (Ryan [2010]: p. 186.) Even though the US did not have to experience another 
9/11-like attack again, the number of terrorist attacks still increased worldwide 
significantly after the implementation of the doctrine. Ryan notes that between 2003 and 
                                                 
121 The next chapter deals with Iran separately, thus, it does not list the doctrine’s consequences with 
respect to Iran. 
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2007 jihadist attacks outside Iraq and Afghanistan increased by 35%. If one adds the 
attacks committed in those two countries, the increase in jihadist terrorist attacks adds 
up to a 607% rise. (Ibid.; Dorrien [2004]: p. 216.) The implementation of the doctrine in 
Iraq caused the emergence of circumstances that the Iraqi invasion precisely sought to 
avoid. Thus, the enterprise became a “self-fulfilling prophecy” (Bolton [2008]: p. 199.; 
Dorrien [2004]: p. 192.) Dorrien called the neocon project “self-defeating” and not 
suitable for handling the problem of terrorism (Dorrien [2004]: p. 5.) This all 
underscores the argumentation that the Bush doctrine in fact caused a number of 
strategic blowbacks, which made it harder for the US to accomplish its foreign policy 
goals in the Middle East.        
 The other frequently brought up criticism argues that wars are waged on states 
rather than terrorism, which is a tactic, a form of violence. (Howard [2003]; Byford 
[2002]; see also: Buckley; Singh [2006b]: p. 17.; Dalby [2006]: p. 42.; Moens [2004]: p. 
164.) Zbigniew Brzezinski referred to this as “siege mentality”. (Brzezinski [2007] 
quoted in Anderson [2011] p. 73.). Indeed, the process of radically securitizing the issue 
of terrorism was intentional. Brzezinski and Scowcroft point out the “culture”, 
“atmosphere” and “environment” of fear that “has also been propagated” by the US 
government. (Brzezinski-Scowcroft-Ignatius [2008]: p. 2; p. 19.; p. 239; p. 3. 
respectively)  Francis Fukuyama and others point out that the threat of terrorism has 
been “overstated” and “inflated”.  (Fukuyama [2008] pp. 208-209.; Leffler and Legro 
[2008]: p. 3.). Ikenberry contends that the security situation of the US has in fact 
worsened as a result of the doctrine’s implementation. (Ikenberry [2008] p. 96.) Another 
expert argues that the “war on terror” contradicted efforts to spread democracy, since 
Washington had to cooperate with states that were not democratic (e.g. Saudi Arabia) in 
order to be effective against terrorists.  (Carothers [2003]) Fixing the “intel around the 
policy” regarding Iraq was another practical result of the doctrine. (Anderson [2011]: p. 
102.)122 As a consequence of aggressive US behavior, Syria did not keep insurgents 
from infiltrating Iraq. (Hinnebusch [2005]: p. 6.) North Korea doubled its efforts at 
acquiring a nuclear weapons capability and it conducted test explosions with nuclear 
weapons in 2006 and 2009. (Moon; Bae [2003]; Mearsheimer [2005]; BBC [2003]; 
BBC [2009]).  
 The US also incurred significant alternative costs as a result of the doctrine. The 
                                                 
122 Dalby notes that preemption has to be based on successful intelligence operations but Iraq showed that 
US intelligence did not operate perfectly well. (Dalby [2006]: p. 47.)   
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“war on terror” distracted the administration’s attention from other important regions 
such as Latin America or the Arab-Israeli peace process. (See: Anderson [2011]: pp. 58-
59) The US did not respect other states’ national interests and opinion, which made it 
hard for Washington to realize its national interests in the long run. (Van Evera [2008]: 
pp. 19-20.)   The doctrine resulted in significant anti-American sentiment.123 (Daalder; 
Lindsay [2005]: p. 190.; Anderson [2011]: p. 117; p. 127.; Buckley; Singh [2006b]: p. 
14.; Bolton [2008]: p. 174.) US foreign policy divided Europe and caused tensions in 
transatlantic ties. (Guertner [2007]: 33-39.; Anderson [2011] p. 98.; Bolton [2010]: p. 
178.)124 US actions were not supported in the Middle East and US strategy alienated 
allies in general. (Dalby [2006]: p. 45.; p. 49.) 
 The previous “list” of successes and failures clearly show that the 
implementation of the doctrine caused more setbacks than advantages overall. 
Prevention caused more trouble than what it could tackle. It was also dangerous, as it 
could have created a precedent. It was difficult to judge what standards could be applied 
for identifying threats that required anticipatory action. Extensive application of US 
military power led to the “overstretch” of Washington’s resources and this “maximalist 
foreign policy” led to “minimalist results” (Buckley; Singh [2006b]: pp.  21-23.) In the 
long run, the concept compromised world security rather than strengthening it. (Dalby 
[2006]: p. 49.) These observations all support the theory of strategic blowback.    
 Not surprisingly, experts outside the administration were divided on the doctrine.  
A number of well-known foreign policy intellectuals opposed the Iraq war. Brent 
Scowcroft, James Baker, Lawrence Eagleburger, Richard Holbrooke all criticized the 
approach. (Buckley; Singh [2006b]: p. 21.; Anderson [2011]: p. 111.; Kaufman [2007]: 
p. 137.)125 Theoretical experts and scholars were equally divided but many provided a 
relatively objective analysis of the doctrine. Some well-known intellectuals supported 
the doctrine such as John Lewis Gladdis, Philip Zelikow and Michael Ledeen. 
(Buckley; Singh [2006b]: p. 20.; Anderson [2011]: p. 111.) Daalder and Lindsay refer to 
the Bush doctrine and the foreign policy of the Bush administration as a “revolution” in 
                                                 
123 In Poland, a country with strong transatlantic credentials, only 50% of those asked had a positive 
opinion on the US and the same data for the United Kingdom was only 48%. A poll conducted in various 
Islamic countries not long after the invasion of Iraq showed that the majority of the people did not trust 
Bush’s leadership in countries such as Pakistan, Indonesia and places like Palestine. A significant number 
of people had a favorable opinion concerning Osama bin Laden.  See: Daalder; Lindsay [2005]: p. 190. 
124 See then defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s statements on “Old” vs. “New Europe”. (DoD [2003]) 
125 For a detailed and rather critical assessment of the Bush administration’s foreign policy see the 
document released by the Iraq Study Group. (Iraq Study Group Report… [2006]; also: Rehnson [2010]: 
pp. 61-62. 
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US foreign policy. (Daalder; Lindsey [2005]: chapter 1, esp. pp. 1-15) Others point out 
that the US has always been striving to spread its own values, thus, the Bush doctrine 
did not represent a novel approach to foreign affairs. (Kagan [2008]: p. 37.; Buckley; 
Singh [2006b]: p. 13.; Grondin [2006]: p. 13.) Ikenberry thought of the strategy as a 
‘grand offer’ from the US regarding its own role in the international system. (Ikenberry 
[2011]: p. 255.) The US requested subordination to its will and offered global security in 
turn. (Ibid. pp. 254-273.)  Niall Ferguson emphasizes that the doctrine was never as 
radical as its critiques had been suggesting. No US president has ever closed out the 
possibility of preemptive action. Thus, the concept itself was not radical nor was it 
novel – it was the actual practice of foreign policy that differed from other presidencies. 
(Ferguson [2008]: p. 228.; also: Ryan [2010]: p. 9.; Dorrien [2004]: p. 1.; also: Rehnson 
[2010]: p. 33.) Kaufman considered it a “prudent” strategy for tackling modern 
challenges of the international security environment. (Kaufman [2007]: pp. 128-129) 
Preemption was needed against Iraq and the application of force was a wise choice. 
(Ibid.) Lynch and Singh provide another account, which actually defends the doctrine 
against its critiques. (Lynch; Singh [2008])126 
 It is difficult to define what type of theoretical approach the doctrine followed. 
Ryan puts forth that neoconservative ideas were based on the pursuit of national 
interests rather than the promotion of certain values. Thus, it is part of the realist 
tradition. (Ryan [2010]: p. 7.)127 Rehnson also concludes that the concept was a realist 
one. (Rehnson [2010]: pp. 31-32.) Yet it included a number of liberal elements as it built 
on the concept of “democratic peace theory”, the idea arguing that democracies do not 
fight wars among themselves. (Kaufman [2007]: p. 129.; Dalby [2006]: pp. 42-43.) 
Tony Smith argues that the doctrine followed the principles of Wilsonianism, while 
Thomas Knock and Anne-Marie Slaughter contend that the Bush doctrine did not 
respect international norms and institutions, thus, it was not a Wilsonian concept. (Smith 
[2006]; Knock [2006]; Slaughter [2006]) According to Buckley and Singh, it was an 
“amalgam” of realism and “an extensively muscular Wilsonianism”. (Buckley; Singh 
[2006b]: pp. 12-13.) Ikenberry puts forth that the doctrine made the US an “order-
creating Leviathan” which spreads its values (democracy) because the creation of 
                                                 
126 The work by Lynch and Singh comes as a surprise, as an earlier book written by Robert Singh together 
with Mary Buckley is in fact quite critical of the doctrine. (See: Buckley; Singh [2006a-b]) 
127 Ryan contends though, that this realism was different from the traditional, Kennan- and Morgenthau-
style, balance-of-power realism mainly in that it was based on a more “expansive” concept of the US 
national interest. (Ryan [2010]: p. 7.) 
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democracies corresponds with US national security interests. (Ikenberry [2011] pp. 255-
262.) The creation of order is a realist distinction and the spreading of democratic 
values and norms is a liberal concept. Altogether it was a notion based on “realist 
liberalism” as the Bush administration sought to spread liberal values (democracy) by 
realist means (military force).  (Balogh [2012]: pp. 4-5.) Thus, it is fair to conclude that 
specific elements of the Bush doctrine were not new in US foreign policy thinking. It 
was the new emphasis on specific elements and the practice itself that differed from 
those of previous administrations.    
  
2.2. The Bush Doctrine and Iran 
 
 It is surprising how little has been written on the Iranian implications of the 
Bush doctrine.128 As opposed to the topic of the Bush doctrine itself, this specific aspect 
of the concept is not discussed by a large number of sources. Hardly any book has been 
published on the issue. Two excellent books, however, provide unique insight into how 
Iran reacted to the implementation of the Bush doctrine – Trita Parsi’s 2007, as well as 
David Crist’s 2012 book.129  
 These sources highlight that Iran’s immediate reaction to US actions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq was mostly cooperative, since the Taliban and Saddam Hussein 
constituted two of Iran’s fiercest enemies. Suddenly, the near term interests of Iran and 
the US were aligned. Iran was ready to use the opportunity and demonstrate its 
influence in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
 It should be noted that despite the importance the US government attached to 
Iran, no real strategy existed on the inter agency level on how to deal with the Islamic 
Republic between 2003 and 2005. Condoleezza Rice tried to push a draft through the 
bureaucracy, but no consensus was reached as the administration could not decide 
between two different alternatives. Vice President Cheney, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld and people in their policy shops would not agree to anything less than regime 
                                                 
128 One aspect of the Bush doctrine that involved Iran was the introduction of sanctions in the framework 
of the “war on terror”. On September 23, 2001, President Bush signed Executive Order 13324, which 
froze the financial assets of entities supporting terrorism and it also prohibited all transactions with such 
actors. The order primarily targeted al-Qaeda, but it was also often used against Iranian organizations as 
well. (Katzman [2012b]: p. 29.)   
129 Trita Parsi’s book has been referenced earlier  a number of times. See: Trita Parsi: Threacherous 
Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, the U.S. and Iran. Yale University Press, New Haven, 2007.; 
David Crist: The Twilight War: The Secret History of America’s Thirty-Year Conflict with Iran. The 
Penguin Press, New York, 2012. 
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change. Condoleezza Rice and Colin Powell on the other hand, would have accepted 
direct talks with Iran, especially regarding matters related to Iraq. In the end, the draft 
never developed into a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) – strategic 
papers for implementing government wide policies on specific subjects. (Crist [2012]: 
pp. 443-447.)130   
 Thus, US policy towards Iran was rather ad hoc. It was initially one of symbolic 
and limited engagement, but mostly for realizing Washington’s unilateral goals. 
Nonetheless, Iran was willing to engage the US. According to accounts, the US and Iran 
established channels with each other at least four times altogether between October 
2001 and 2006, and some of these were initiated by Iran. (See: Figure. 8.) Some 
meetings were organized parallel to one another and some of the participants took part 
in negotiations of more than one track.  
 
Figure 6. Direct High-Level Communication Channels Between the US and Iran 2001-2007 
 
Source: Parsi [2007]: pp. 227-257; Crist [2012]: pp. 430-535.  Names in brackets indicate people who 
joined the negotiations at some point but were not necessarily there from the beginning or the whole time. 
                                                 
130 The draft included that “The United States should not at this point respond to overtures from the 
current regime but will continue to meet with the Iranian Government representatives in multilateral 
settings when it serves U.S. interests.” According to Crist, this was added by Vice President Cheney. Crist 
[2012]: pp. 446-447. 
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Indicated names are only those found in the two sources, which means that this is by no means a full list 
of the participants. MOIS stands for the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security, GER/IT is for 
German and Italian diplomats who provided cover for what would seem to be a multilateral track for 
outsiders. In case no specific name is indicated – as in some Iranian cases in the first box on the October 
2001 Geneva-Paris channel –  that means that the two sources did not specify the exact names of those 
present. The positions of those indicated in the boxes at the time of the negotiations are as follows (in 
case of retirement the most important milestones of the given persons career are highlighted): 
Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker: former US ambassador to several Middle Eastern countries and 
appointed chargé d’affaires to the interim Afghan government in 2002. Ambassador James Dobbins: 
former US ambassador to the EU (1991-1993), Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (2001) 
and chief US negotiator in the lead up to the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan in December 2001 where 
he was the US representative to Afghan opposition groups. Ambassador Mohammad Taherian: former 
Iranian ambassador to Afghanistan (80's) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (90's). Lakhdar Brahimi: Special 
Representative of the UN Secretary General for Afghanistan and head of UN Assistance Mission in 
Afghanistan (UNAMA) 2001-2004. James Pavitt: Deputy Director of Operations (1999-2004), CIA. 
Mohammad Javad Zarif: Deputy Foreign Minister for Legal and International Affairs (1992-2002); 
Ambassador of Iran to the UN. Zalmay Khalilzad: Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director 
for Southwest Asia, Near East, and North African Affairs at the National Security Council (2001-2002). 
William J. Luti: Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (2001-
2005). Harold Rhode: analyst at the Office of Net Assessment (1982-2010). Paul H. O’Neill: Secretary 
of the Treasury (2001-2002). Ambassador Richard W. Murphy: former ambassador to several countries 
(e.g. Syria and Saudi Arabia) and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 
(1983-1989). Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering: former ambassador to several countries (e.g. India, 
Russia, Israel, etc.) and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (1997-2000). Kamal Kharrazi: 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iran (1997-2005). Ambassador Hassan Kazemi Qomi: ambassador of Iran 
to Iraq since 2003. Nouri al-Maliki: prime minister of Iraq since 2006. It is quite likely that the ‘Deputy 
FM’ in the first Geneva-Paris channel was in fact Javad Zarif, whom Crist does not identify by name but 
he indicates that the person is an expert on “international political organizations”, which fits Zarif’s 
profile perfectly. See: Crist [2012]: p. 431.   
 
 Colin Powell’s Department of State was receptive to Iran’s cooperative attitude, 
thus, US and Iranian diplomats started meeting in Geneva, Switzerland, in October 
2001. Powell’s policy was to offer partnership to Iran in return for ending Iranian 
support to anti-Israeli extremist groups. The meetings were organized with the help of 
Lakhdar Brahimi, the leader of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 
(UNAMA). The US delegation was headed by Ambassador Ryan Crocker on the US 
side, while the Iranian delegation consisted of a deputy foreign minister, an IRGC 
general and Ambassador Mohammad Taherian – Iran’s former ambassador to Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Afghanistan. German and Italian diplomats provided cover to make 
the event look like multilateral negotiations. The Iranian delegation showed unanimous 
support for US actions in Afghanistan and even provided a detailed map with exact 
troop locations and information on which military sites and installations the US should 
bomb. It offered its airports to the US and search and rescue assistance with downed US 
pilots. Iran served as a communications channel between Washington and the Northern 
Alliance in the fight against the Taliban and they caught some al-Qaeda fighters using 
intelligence from the US. Furthermore, Iran proposed the normalization of relations 
between the two nations and the State Department had in fact prepared for such an 
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option. (Parsi [2007]: pp. 226-228.; Crist [2012] pp. 431-433.)131  
 The Geneva-Paris channel had a sidetrack: it was led by CIA deputy director for 
operations James Pavitt and Iran was represented by MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence 
and Security) agents. US intelligence requested help on finding or handing over “high 
value” al-Qaeda operatives. Iran did not want to hand over some of them because it 
viewed them as an insurance against al-Qaeda. As a response, Javad Zarif travelled to 
New York to provide information on over two hundred al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives 
in Iranian custody. In the meantime, Iranian president Khatami traveled to the US for 
the annual UN General Assembly sessions and requested to visit the site of Ground Zero 
in order to pay tribute to those perished in the 9/11 attacks. Also, the IRGC wished to 
expand the Geneva talks by introducing additional IRGC officers to the dialogue. 
Washington rejected both initiatives. (Crist [2012]: pp. 432-438.)  
  The Department of State was willing to engage Iran on issues other than 
Afghanistan, but the Pentagon was strictly against it. “[Vice President] Cheney and 
[Secretary of Defense Donald] Rumsfeld were always there to sabotage our cooperation 
in Afghanistan if it got too far” according to Colonel Wilkerson, who served as Powell’s 
chief of staff at the Department of State. (Parsi [2007]: p. 228.)  
 The second and parallel track was the Bonn channel in December 2001, where 
the US was represented by Ambassador James Dobbins. (Parsi [2007]: p. 229.; Crist 
[2012]: p. 433.) This channel worked entirely separately from the Geneva-Paris track.132 
During the Bonn Conference on Afghanistan in December 2001, Iran pointed out that 
the draft declaration that was to be adopted by the conference did not contain any 
references on democracy or commitments on Afghanistan’s behalf to fight international 
terrorism. It was Iranian chief negotiator Javad Zarif who persuaded the representative 
of the Northern Alliance to accept a more limited role in the post-conflict government of 
Afghanistan, thus, saving the negotiations from breaking down. Iran was also willing to 
                                                 
131 There is considerable confusion in the literature as to the exact participants of the different tracks. Crist 
points out that two different channels were established: the Geneva-Paris channel headed by Crocker on 
the US side and the Bonn channel headed by Dobbins. (Crist [2012]: pp. 430-435.) On the other hand, 
Parsi writes that the Geneva-Paris track was headed by Dobbins for the US and Crocker was merely a 
member of the negotiating team. Parsi [2007]: p. 227-228. The author chose to rely on Crist’s description 
of the events as his book provides a fresher account of these developments, thus, he could base his 
research on a larger pool of information as 5 years have gone by since Parsi’s 2007 book has been 
published.  
132 The two channels were coordinated by Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (2001-2005) Marc 
Grossman at the State Department. It is also interesting to note that the US kept up two separate channels, 
while Iran rotated some of the participants in the two meetings, thus, they always had a consistent 
position. Crist [2012]: pp. 433-434. 
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equip and organize the new Afghan army. Clearly, Iran was cooperative and open to 
discuss issues that went beyond the problem of Afghanistan.  At the Tokyo summit In 
January 2002, Iran promised to contribute $ 500 million to the reconstruction of 
Afghanistan – the most significant sum offered by any country at the event. Moreover, 
Iran helped rebuild the infrastructure needed for radio and television broadcasts, gave 
more than a billion US dollars in the form of financial aid. Iran also initiated direct 
flights between Tehran and Kabul. (Parsi [2007]: pp. 226-231; see also: Crist [2012]: 
pp. 435-436.) 
 Contacts were sustained throughout the above mentioned Tokyo donor 
conference in January 2002.  During the course of discussions, Secretary of Treasury 
Paul O’ Neill received a note from the Iranian diplomats passed on by the former UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees saying that Iran was ready to discuss any issue 
regarding the standoff between the US and Iran. It was forwarded to the State 
Department, but no one ever reacted. (Crist [2012]: p .436.)  
 The Pentagon and hawkish conservatives were bent on stopping a 
rapprochement from happening and sought to cut the Geneva channel by provoking 
extremists in Iran to pressure the reformist Khatami government to shut down the 
channels. They succeeded by organizing a secret meeting with an Iranian opposition 
figure, Manuchehr Ghorbanifar, who was involved in the Iran-Contra scandal. His 
American contact was Michael Ledeen. Ledeen was also implicated in the Iran-Contra 
affair and now worked as a consultant to Under Secretary for Policy Douglas Feith. The 
meeting was organized in Italy and was attended by the head of the Italian military 
intelligence service (SISMI), Niccolo Pollari. They had close ties to the Pentagon’s 
Office of Special Plans, the unit accredited with distorting intelligence on Iraq. Other 
Iranian exiles were also present at the meeting.  The local office of the CIA in Rome 
learned of the meetings and it intervened, thus, the meetings were forced to end. Still, 
the Iranian government gotten word of the US reach out to Iranian opposition groups 
and the regime in Tehran was upset. (Parsi [2007]: pp. 226-233; Crist [2012]: 448-451; 
Crist [2007]: pp. 448-451.) 
 Furthermore, the Israeli interception of the cargo vessel named “Karine A” in the 
Red Sea added to tensions between the US and Iran. The ship contained several types of 
weapons and guns, and according to Israel it was headed to Palestine for Palestinian 
extremist groups. Still, none of the members in Khatami’s National Security Council 
admitted to having been involved in the shipment. The interception was puzzling 
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because it is quite rare for supplies to be shipped by sea rather than air through Lebanon 
and Syria. The Pentagon started accusing Iran of providing support to al-Qaeda fighters 
on the run from Afghanistan, in order to use them against the US. Iran had in fact 
increased the number of its troops stationed on the Iranian-Afghan border and it 
provided reports on the 290 al-Qaeda fighters it caught. Moreover, there was no 
sufficient intelligence to support the Pentagon’s accusations. (Parsi [2007]: pp. 233-
235.; Crist [2012]: p. 436.)  
 The final blow to the Geneva channel was the “Axis of Evil” speech. This was 
the final in a series of events that played into the hands of the hard-liners in Iran. 
Khatami was isolated both domestically and internationally. The speech came just 
weeks after Iran made serious efforts to demonstrate its cooperative attitude. Some 
Iranian officials, who supported the opening, had to pay for the failure of opening with 
their jobs. This forced everyone to be even more wary of establishing contacts with the 
US in the future. As a result of the speech, Iran shut down the Geneva channel. 
Ambassador James Dobbins had warned Condoleezza Rice that Iran may respond by 
destabilizing Afghanistan, but Rice did not ascribe any importance to such a scenario. 
The administration was focusing on Iraq by then. By early 2002, neoconservative 
columnists were arguing for an attack on Iran. In order to avoid a possible military 
action against Iran, Tehran agreed to revive the secret communications channel during 
the spring of 2002 in Geneva after the State Department approached it. In fact, Iran 
accepted that the US was going to attack Iraq anyway. Thus, Teheran chose to 
demonstrate limited support for the US effort. (Parsi [2007]: pp. 235-243.)133  
 In September 2002, another channel was opened with the mediation of 
Hooshang Amirahmadi, president of the American Iranian Council. Talks took place at 
Javad Zarif’s house in New York, as he became Iran’s permanent representative to the 
UN. Amirahmadi had coordinated with former Secretary of State George Shultz in 
bringing five experienced diplomats to the talks – Thomas R. Pickering and Richard W. 
Murphy were both among them. Under Secretary of State for Policy Nicholas Burns let 
Pickering know before the talks that the US was ready to normalize relations as long as 
Iran renounced support for terrorism and halted its nuclear and missile programs. When 
Pickering relayed this to Zarif, he indicated that in order for Iran to change its policies, 
                                                 
133 Crist also mentions that the Iranian military attaché in Bahrain also let US officers know that Iran 
would be ready to help US actions in Iraq and provide assistance with search and rescue operations in 
case US airmen were downed. However, Crist does not elaborate on whether the US responded to the 
message or not. Crist [2012]: p. 466. 
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the US needed to demonstrate some “goodwill” first. (Crist [2012]: p. 455-456.) Staffers 
of senators Joe Biden and Chuck Hagel were also present at the meeting. The Iranian 
delegation, however, was much higher level than the US one. The Iranian Minister for 
Foreign Affairs Kamal Kharrazi was personally present and he indicated that Iran was 
ready to normalize relations with the United States. All this was passed on to the NSC in 
Washington. Zalmay Khalilzad, the senior official responsible for Iran and Iraq, did not 
have objections against a policy of rapprochement. From then on the meetings were 
held between Crocker and Zarif and the latter kept proposing normalization of relations. 
Despite several Iranian attempts to remedy tensions between the two countries, the Bush 
administration rejected Tehran’s offers. Khalilzad joined the discussions headed by 
Crocker, but he would only be allowed to continue talks concerning issues which helped 
realize US national interests.  (Crist [2012]: pp. pp. 456-459.)    
 Conservative hawks, such as Ledeen, tried to undermine the Geneva channel by 
organizing further meetings between Iranian exiles and Pentagon officials. Still, Iran 
chose not to shut down the channel. It took steps to sustain Iraqi stability by calling on 
influential Iraqi Shia factions to take part in the reconstruction of Iraq, instead of 
waging war against coalition forces. (See: Parsi [2007]: pp. 242-243.; Nasr [2006]: p. 
91; pp. 177-178.) The US crushed the Iraqi army in a few weeks, which “sent shivers 
down the spines of America’s foes in the region and beyond” (Parsi [2007]: p. 243.) Iran 
was now encircled by the US military. Tehran decided to once again engage in dialogue 
with the US and worked out a detailed offer, which was essentially a roadmap for a 
grand bargain. The proposal was sent to the US through Swiss mediation in May 2003. 
It contained all the contentious issues that hindered a US-Iranian rapprochement. Iran 
would give up sponsorship of militant groups. Tehran also put its nuclear program on 
the agenda of possible negotiations, since it offered full transparency on its program and 
proposed to abide by international norms related to its nuclear program. It offered 
cooperation on fighting against terrorism and Iraq and it was also willing to accept the 
2002 Saudi peace proposal on resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict. Essentially, this meant 
Iranian acceptance of the “two-state solution” of the conflict. (Ibid. p. 244.) In turn, Iran 
sought to exchange al-Qaeda fighters it detained for members of the Iraqi based 
Mujahedin-e Khalq Organization (MKO). Finally, Iran wanted US recognition of its 
legitimate security interests and an end to US threats. (Parsi [2007]: pp. 240-245.; see 
also: Appendix A, B, in Ibid. pp. 341-346.; IAEA [2003]) Iran tried other channels too – 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. Few weeks before the Swiss delivered the Iranian 
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message, Iran made a gesture to Israel as well. Former IRGC commander General 
Mohsen Rezai offered to work out a plan for handling Israeli-Iranian enmity at a 
meeting attended by Israeli, US and Palestinian officials. Still, the US and Israeli hard-
liners never supported the idea, and no response was ever given to the Iranian offer. 
(Parsi [2007]: pp. 250-251)  
  Even though the State Department and Condoleezza Rice were ready to 
negotiate, Rumsfeld and Cheney vetoed responding to the Iranian offer. Washington 
even “rebuked” Switzerland’s role in delivering the message – Parsi highlights that this 
was a clear message: anyone who even tried to mediate between the US and Iran would 
be “punished.” (Parsi [2007]: p. 248.). In the meantime, hawkish conservatives were 
targeting the Geneva channel, but it was kept open and Khalilzad, Crocker, Zarif and 
Taherian – by then Iran’s Ambassador to Afghanistan – met in Switzerland.  The US 
wanted assistance with al-Qaeda and Iran wanted assurances that the MKO would 
remain designated as a terrorist organization by the US. Khalilzad pointed out that Iran 
held five al-Qaeda operatives who were involved in planning attacks which were about 
to take place imminently. Zarif promised to look into the matter. On May 12, 2003, 
three different sites linked to Western firms were attacked by terrorists in Riyadh killing 
thirty-five people, seven of whom were US citizens. Intelligence suggested that al-
Qaeda members in Iran had prepared the attack. Despite a lack of direct evidence of 
Iranian knowledge on the planned attacks, the incident was enough to minimize the 
chances of a grand bargain between the US and Iran. The next Geneva meeting was 
scheduled for May 25, 2003. However, days before the meeting, Washington informed 
Iran that the event would not take place. The channel was shut down. Moreover, 
Arkansas senator Sam Brownback introduced a bill which designated a $ 50 million 
sum for supporting Iranian opposition groups and the creation of an Iran Democracy 
Fund. The bill never became law, but it almost made Iranian regime change official US 
policy. All in all, the Iranian domestic political effect of the US rejection of the May 
2003 offer was that hardliners were strengthened and reformist elements open to 
dialogue were pushed aside within the domestic political arena. (Parsi [2007]: pp. 251-
256; Crist [2012]: pp. 476-481).  
To make US strategy toward Iran even more complicated, regime change had 
become official policy by 2005. Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern Affairs Elizabeth Cheney (daughter of the Vice President) and Deputy National 
Security Advisor for Global Democracy Strategy Elliot Abrams headed the “Iran-Syria 
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Working Group”.134 Its aim was to direct government policy on Iran and Syria. The 
output of the group’s deliberations was the “Iran Action Plan” which was signed by 
President Bush in 2005. The idea was to facilitate freedom and democracy in Iran 
through information operations and intensifying interactions between the societies of 
the US and Iran through exchange programs. The policy entailed new financial 
sanctions and sought to limit Iran’s reach of dual-use technology. One additional 
element of the overall policy was the Democracy Project headed by Elizabeth Cheney at 
the State Department. This program promoted Western values through certain media 
outlets and aimed to influence Iranian society. The State Department spent 10 million 
US dollars for Iranian democracy promotion and this sum increased to 75 million US 
dollars in 2006.135 The money went to groups which promoted Western values inside 
Iran and US organizations with the same goals. Radio Free Europe’s Farsi edition 
(Radio Farda) was also involved in the programs. However, the overall success of the 
policy of Iranian democracy promotion was rather limited. The Congress also passed 
the Iran Freedom Support Act, which is the legal basis for democracy promotion in Iran. 
(Crist [2012]: pp. 495-499. See also: Katzman [2008]: pp. 41-43.; Public Law 109-293-
Sept. 30. [2006]) The US increased the number of Farsi-speaking diplomats in the 
vicinity of Iran and elsewhere – Baku, Istanbul, Frankfurt, London and Ashqhabad. All 
of these US embassies were strengthened by “Iran-watcher” positions not to mention 
the enlargement of the US Consulate in Dubai. Since these countries have a large 
number of Iranian immigrants, the US sought to find Iranian partners for implementing 
projects related to US democracy promotion programs. (Katzman [2008]: p. 41.) Other 
sources have reported that the State Department had created an Office of Iranian Affairs 
within the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. (Weisman [2006]) According to certain 
sources, the organization had close ties to the Pentagon’s Iranian Directorate, which 
dealt with intelligence related to Iran and undermining the government in Tehran. 
                                                 
134 The Iran-Syria Working Group (see above) used to work under the auspices of the Office of Iranian 
Affairs and its primary task was to work out plans for promoting democracy in Iran. (Dinmore [2006]) 
135 The Congressional Research Service (CRS) says slightly otherwise. Kenneth Katzman of the CRS lists 
the exact Congressional appropriations for promoting democracy in Iran – these data are the following on 
a yearly basis. FY2004: $ 1.5 million for promoting democracy and human rights; FY2005: $3 million for 
development of parties, the media, and civil society as well as labor and human rights. FY 2006 (regular): 
$11.5 million in the form of foreign aid appropriation. FY2006 (supplemental): $ 66.1. million (out of $75 
million requested by the government). The breakdown is as follows: $20 million for democracy 
promotion; $5 million for public diplomacy; $5 million for cultural exchanges; $36.1 million for Voice of 
America-TV and Radio Farda.  See: Katzman [2008]: pp. 41-43. 
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(Alexandrovna [2006]; Rozen [2006])136  
These efforts clearly imply that the US intended to change the regime in Tehran. 
Nonetheless, while the author accepts that the US would have been more than happy to 
see the Tehran regime collapse – to say the least – and it is clear that it had even taken 
steps to promote democracy in Iran, however, the overall policy was rather symbolic. If 
Washington had really wanted to or could change the regime in Iran it would have done 
it by force by then. Thus, the policy of promoting Iranian democracy was a way of 
countering Iran’s growing influence and not so much intended at regime change per se.  
It was an inherent acknowledgment of the limits of US actions and influence. Still, the 
policy played in to the hands of hardliners in Tehran. 
 By 2006, the US had stepped up its actions against Iran’s presence in Iraq and 
placed significant military pressure on Iran’s agents and surrogates in Iraq. Iran bowed 
to the pressure and signaled its willingness through the government of Iraq in 2006 to 
engage in discussions with the US.  The talks were held in Baghdad on May 28, 2007, 
and they were facilitated by Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki. The US delegation 
was led by Ryan Crocker once again and Iran was represented by Iran’s ambassador to 
Iraq, Hassan Kazemi Qomi.137 Crocker wanted an end to Iran’s meddling in Iraq, while 
Kazemi Qomi proposed the idea of Iranian assistance in rebuilding the Iraqi army and 
establishment of a mechanism for coordinating between Iran, Iraq and the US on Iraqi 
security issues. The talks continued in July 2007, but to no avail. The two sides could 
not agree on a common platform. (Crist [2012]: pp. 533-535.)    
 It is interesting to note, that in terms of rhetoric, the first term of the Bush 
presidency focused mostly on Iraq and the issue of Iran was not emphasized in 
particular. The wording of President Bush’s speeches was not particularly harsh, except 
for the “Axis of Evil” speech. Despite the strong and aggressive words in the speeches 
analyzed above and the 2002 National Security Strategy, only a few other speeches 
highlighted Iran in the context of sponsorship of terrorism, pursuit of nuclear weapons 
                                                 
136 Part of this has been taken from the author’s graduate dissertation. (Balogh [2008b]) and the logic also 
builds on another publication of the author together with László Láng. See: Balogh-Láng [2007b]. The 
logic has also been applied in a paper submitted for an essay writing competition for graduate students 
also written together with László Láng. (Balogh-Láng [2007a]) 
137 Hassan Kazemi Qomi used to be Iran’s ambassador to Iraq until 2010, when Hassan Danafar took 
over. Qomi is said to have been a member of the Quds Force of the IRGC and he used to be a consultant 
to Hezbollah in Lebanon before that. Danafar used to serve in the Navy of the IRGC. (See: Guzansky 
[2011]: p. 87.; Cordesman et al. [2012] p. 11.)  
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as well as the need for democratic reforms.138 (See: Bush [2003]; [2004]) This is true 
even if the administration kept threatening Iran with the use of force occasionally. (USA 
Today [2005])  
 Furthermore, Iranian surrogates in Iraq played a constructive role in the Iraqi 
transition period, with Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani specifically speaking out against 
resistance against US forces, as well as encouraging the Shia to take part in the 
democratic process of electing the representatives and leaders of Iraq. (Nasr [2006]: p 
91; pp. 173-175.; Bolton [2008]: 193-195) Still, the Iraqi situation between 2004 and 
2006 is best described as sectarian strife. Muqtada al-Sadr’s role should also be noted – 
he was a cleric who received support from Tehran. He was considerably more 
aggressive than Sistani and sought to counter US military presence, as well as Sunni 
influence. Both al-Sadr and Sistani were influential in post-invasion Iraq and both had 
ties to Iran. When Iran sensed that its constructive behavior regarding US actions in 
Afghanistan, as well as the invasion of Iraq did not pay off, it reversed its policies. 
Although it is far-fetched to say that Iran was directly behind the civil war that unfolded 
by 2004 in Iraq, it is clear that it did not mind that the US was losing resources and 
political capital in the Middle Eastern country, as well as in Afghanistan.   
 Iran became a significant player in the domestic Iraqi political disputes and it 
started providing “tactical military assistance” to various Shiite factions and militias. 
(Guzansky [2011]: p. 86.) Since 2003, Iran’s neighbors have been trying to meddle in 
Iraq, but Iran’s presence outweighed other foreign influence. The secret Quds Force of 
the IRGC sent a number of operatives to Southern Iraq with diplomatic passports “to 
identify and train Iraqi fighters, set up safe transit routes for activists and arms between 
Iraq and Iran, and aid militias in terrorist activities.” (Ibid.) Some sources point out 
that as much as 1.5 million Iranians crossed the border following the invasion of Iraq. 
Many of those were exiles but a number of them had ties to the IRGC. General 
Petraeus, former commander of coalition forces in Iraq, called these undercover 
operatives as the “executive arm of Iranian foreign policy in Iraq.” (Ibid. p. 87.) Both 
of the last two Iranian ambassadors to Iraq (including the one in office) had or still have 
                                                 
138 The author counted 22 relevant speeches between 2001and the March 16 2006 release of the second 
National Security Strategy of the Bush administration, which included thoughts on Iran in the context of 
supporting terrorism, and/or lack of democratic practices and/or the Iranian nuclear program. Those 22 
include the 4 speeches that actually laid the foundations of the Bush doctrine itself. These speeches can be 
found in a separate appendix at the end of the thesis, along with other relevant speeches mentioning Iran 
after the 2006 release of the Bush administration’s new National Security Strategy. (See: Appendix). 
‘Relevant’ is taken to refer to the speeches listed by the website “Presidential Rhetoric.” See: 
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/bushpresidency.html Accessed: 30-11-2012 
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ties to either the IRGC or the Quds Force. (Ibid.)139 
 The study by researchers of a prominent Washington, D.C. think tank claims that 
although it is difficult to estimate the number of Iranian operatives in Iran, but experts 
put the presence of the Quds Force to the order of several hundred operatives in the 
period between 2003 and 2011. Iran supplied Iraqi groups with components for IEDs 
and EFPs.140 The latter appeared in Iraq in 2003, but they became a serious threat to 
security in 2005. Besides supporting Shiite Iraqi groups, the outfit is also claimed to be 
providing support to the Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as certain Sunni groups in Iraq. 
Iran provides these groups with training, funding, weapons and even guidance.141 
(Cordesman et al. [2012] pp. 114-119.)  
 It is true, though, that Iran was perhaps not interested in an all-out civil war and 
unlimited instability in Iraq, since that could have backfired. However, it was interested 
in “keeping the U.S. preoccupied and at bay” and in “promoting a degree of chaos but 
of a manageable kind.” (International Crisis Group [2005]: pp. i-ii) Iran has probably 
shown restraint and had not done all it could to undermine Iraqi stability between 2003 
and 2005. A 2005 report points out that Iraq could have been regarded as a bargaining 
chip by Teheran in its relations with the U.S. In case the US further threatened its 
security, Iran would answer by causing chaos in Iraq. Also, Iran had been afraid that the 
Bush administration’s “hawks […] set their sights on Teheran as well.” (International 
Crisis Group [2005]: p. 9.) Iran felt that its cooperative attitude regarding the issue of 
Afghanistan was not rewarded duly by the US, thus, it chose not to cooperate with it. 
Still, identifying Iraq as an Iranian proxy is an exaggeration, since the Iraqi Shia wish to 
maintain their independence. Thus, all Iran was interested in is a “strategy of managed 
chaos.”(International Crisis Group [2005]: p 11.; pp. ii-23.) The significance of Iranian 
(military) influence and the existence of a calculated Iranian strategy in Iraq are further 
reinforced by another source. It points out that Iranian power projection in Iraq is 
                                                 
139 The influence of Iran is analyzed in detail by Guzansky who divides Iran’s power into four categories: 
military, political, economic and religious. It is instructive, that the value of Iraqi-Iranian trade was 
around four billion US dollars altogether in 2009 which signals a significant Iranian economic influence. 
(Guzansky [2011]: p. 92.) For a fresh and official US assessment of Iranian military power see: Annual 
Report on Military Power of Iran. April 2012. Department of Defense. Federation of American Scientists 
(FAS) http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/dod-iran.pdf pp. 1-4. Accessed: 15-12-2012 Also referenced by 
Cordesman et al. [2012]: p. 114. 
140 IED stands for improvised explosive device and EFP is for explosively formed projectile/ penetrator. 
Both are rather primitive and relatively cheap devices but still capable of causing significant destruction. 
A large number of US deaths in Iraq and Afghanistan resulted from the presence of such explosives.  For 
more on this see: Burton [2007] 
141 According to the CSIS report, Iran provides the above mentioned groups with advanced rockets, sniper 
rifles, automatic weapons, mortars,  IEDs and EFPs. (See: Cordesman; Wilner; Gibs [2012] p. 119.) 
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limited and Iran’s main source of influence is not of a military nature because Iran 
focuses on providing support to Iran’s domestic political allies in Iraq. Tehran’s primary 
strategy rested on supporting almost every political faction in Iraq in order to have 
surrogates in power no matter who won in the political battles. The source provides 
details on Iranian assistance provided to Iraqi Shiite militias in the form of funding, 
weapons supplies and training in both Iran, as well as Lebanon by Hezbollah. (Felter, 
Fishman [2008]) 
 There is also a large pool of primary sources, which provide empirical evidence 
proving that Iran has been trying to exert its influence in Iraq through supporting 
various Iraqi factions and militias. One of the Iraqi war logs leaked by Wikileaks 
describes an attempt by a group of men to smuggle explosives from Iran to Iraq.142 
(Intel Report… [2005]; Gordon; Lehren [2010]). Another document highlights training 
provided to an Iraqi Shiite insurgent by the Quds Force of the IRGC in July 2006.143 
(Alleged Jaysh Al-Mahdi plans to… [2006]); Gordon; Lehren [2010]) Still another war 
log describes a border skirmish between a US platoon teamed up with an Iraqi squad 
against Iranian border guards east of Balad Ruz in Diyala province.144 (Summary of 
Incident on Iraq-Iran Border … [2006]; Gordon; Lehren [2010]) There is further 
evidence of Iran attempting to plot assassinations in Basra, as well as the IRGC 
smuggling weapons into Iraq.145  (Threat Warning … [2005]; Intel Report: Ammunition 
                                                 
142 The report notes: “It is clear that the movement of explosives and bomb—making equipment was 
taking place from Iran into Iraq on the night of 9/10 Nov 05 in northern Basra Province. An anti-
smuggling operation mounted by the DBE Border Police in Basra disrupted the movement and recovered 
a quantity of bomb-making equipment, including explosively formed projectiles (EFPS).”  The 
abbreviation in the sentence represents text that has been redacted by the New York Times for security 
reasons. (Intel Report … [2005])  
143 The report notes: “Salim [a senior commander of the Jaysh Al-Mahdi group – added by author, I.B.] 
chose Dulaymi [a Shiite insurgent – added by author, I.B.] because he allegedly trained in Iran on how to 
conduct precision, military style kidnappings (NFI). Dulaymi reportedly obtained his training from 
Hizballah operatives near Qum, Iran, who were under the supervision of Iranian Islamic Revolutionary 
Guard Quds Force (IRGC-QF) officers in July 2006.” The abbreviation in the sentence represents text 
that has been redacted by the New York Times for security reasons. (Alleged Jaysh Al-Mahdi plans to… 
[2006])  
144 Apparently, the Iranians wanted to discuss matters related to border crossing with the Iraqis, but the 
US platoon leader judged the situation to be too dangerous and ordered its forces and the Iraqis to leave. 
That is when Iranian forces started engaging the US platoon which returned fire killing one Iranian 
soldier.  The report notes: “As the PLT [platoon – added by author, I.B.] broke contact – Iranian indirect 
fire landed around them for approx 5:00 minutes.” (Summary of Incident on Iraq-Iran Border … [2006]) 
145 According to the report – which states that the information therein has not been fully verified – “The 
IRGC provides Sayed Al Shuhada, Hezballah, Thar Allah, Al Fadilah, Badr Brigade and other Basrah-
based Islamic militia groups with assassination instructions. The instructions include the target’s 
biographical data and the method of assassination. The instructions also detail if a handgun or rifle 
should be used and what part of the target’s body should be targeted, for example, the head, stomach, 
back, or heart. If an order is given to assassinate multiple targets at the same time, the instructions for 
each target will be different in order to mislead investigators, news media and the public that it is a 
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… [2005]; Steele [2010]) 
 The same is true for Afghanistan, where according to the Afghanistan war logs, 
Iran has been supporting various factions and conducting covert operations. (Tisdall 
[2010]) There are also reports of Iran having provided safe haven for Taliban 
leaders.146((Threat Report) Attack Threat… [2005]; Tisdall [2010]) Other documents 
point to financial support to certain entities in Afghanistan and the presence of Iranian 
intelligence in the country.147(Threat Report (Crime)… [2005]) Still another war log 
confirms the presence of Iranian intelligence and highlights the forged Afghan IDs of 
Iranian intelligence personnel. 148(Threat Report (Other)… [2006]) Finally, another 
document reports about groups originally from Afghanistan residing in Mashhad, 
Iran.149((Threat Report) Other RPT Hirat … [2005]) 
 The above provide ample evidence that Iran established and strengthened its 
positions within Iraq and Afghanistan by 2005-2006. It followed a strategy of keeping 
the US bogged down in both places while expanding its political, military, economic, as 
well as its cultural and religious influence in the region. The author argues that this had 
much to do with the US rejection of the May 2003 Iranian offer – this linkage is 
explained in detail in the next chapter.  
   
 
                                                                                                                                               
random act of violence.” (Threat Warning … [2005]; Steele [2010]) Concerning the issue of the IRGC 
smuggling weapons into Iraq, a report emphasizes that  “Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) 
personnel smuggled Ammunition, explosives, and rockets from Iran to unknown individuals in Al 
Amarah.” The document adds that these rockets are likely to be surface-to-air missiles, which are quite 
sophisticated weapons. (Intel Report: Ammunition … [2005]; Steele [2010]) 
146 The report states: “A joint group of GOA [Government of Afghanistan – added by author, I.B] officials 
who held their government positions during the TB [Taliban – added by author, I.B] regime and other TB 
commanders are planning for future attacks in the Baghran district, Helmand Province, and Deh Rawood 
district, Oruzgan Province. This joint group currently resides in Iran.” (Threat Report Attack Threat… 
[2005]; Tisdall [2010]) 
147 The referenced source notes that: “On 30 January 2005, Iranian Intelligence agencies brought ten 
million Afghanis (approximately 212,800 USD) from Bir Jahn (CNA), IR to an unknown location on the 
border of IR and Farah Province, AF. The money was transferred to a 1990's model white Toyota Corolla 
station wagon. The money was hidden with various food stuffs. The Corolla was occupied by four 
members of the Hezb-E-Islami, Gulbuddin (HIG) terrorist organization. The money was transported to an 
unknown location.” (Threat Report (Crime)… [2005])   
148 The source puts forth that “Two members of the Iranian Intelligence Secret Service have arrived in 
SYAHGERD village (42SVD 883726)/ GHORBAND district/ PARWAN province, being helped by JAWED 
GHORBANDI (important local person in PARWAN province). These two Iranians have forged AFG IDs 
on the names of ABDUL JALIL and AHMADDIN. Those 2 AFG forged IDs were made in SYAHGERD 
village/ GHORBAND district/ PARWAN province.” (Threat Report (Other)… [2006]) 
149 The report states that “ISMAEL KHAN associate FAIZ AHMAD met with HERAT TB members in 
MASHAD, IRAN to discuss plans on conducting Attacks against the AF Government. Allegedly ISMAEL 
KHAN associate FAIZ AHMAD is currently living in and representing ISMAEL KHAN in MASHAD, 
IRAN.” ((Threat Report) Other RPT Hirat… [2005])  
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2.2.1. Explaining Outcomes – Strategic Blowback, Iran and the Bush Doctrine 
 
 In order to follow the theoretical tenets set out by the dissertation, it is necessary 
to see if the Bush administration’s “behavior” towards Iran could be considered as 
“aggressive” according to the original definition.150 Recall that rejection of a diplomatic 
offer also counts as aggressive foreign policy. Also, intimidation is another element of 
the definition that applies to US behavior between 2001 and 2006. Thus, it is reasonable 
to qualify the foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration as “aggressive” in 
the given interval.  
 What remains is the examination of whether this aggressive foreign policy led to 
strategic blowback effects, i.e. if it hindered the realization of US national interests as 
defined at the beginning of the chapter.  
US actions contributed to the relative growth of Iranian power, which in turn 
hindered the realization of the most basic US national interests, since Iran’s growing 
influence indirectly led to intensified Iranian support for its regional surrogates – some 
of whom were designated as foreign terrorist organizations by the State Department.  
Confronting Iran also increased instability in the region, which was an ideal situation 
for terrorist organizations to strengthen their organizations and increase their influence. 
It is also worth recalling that the threat of international terrorism actually increased as 
a result of the Bush doctrine. (See the chapter on the Bush doctrine.) A possible 
cooperation with Tehran could have reduced the threat of Islamic radicalism as Iran was 
interested in fighting those elements, since it viewed some of them as a threat too. This 
is true even if Iran supported various terrorist elements in the region, since it mainly 
supported them on political grounds. Deeper cooperation could have meant less Iranian 
support for those elements in the long run. It could have turned Iranian influence and 
knowledge into a US asset that could have helped with stabilizing the region and 
countering Islamic extremism. This would have also contributed to the security of 
energy supplies from the region because Iran had considerable control over a large part 
of Gulf waters, and the Strait of Hormuz in particular. Iranian cooperation would have 
contributed to securing these routes as well. Finally, less Iranian fear would have meant 
less motivation for developing a nuclear program. However, as the US rejected the idea 
                                                 
150
 The dissertation used the following definition for “aggressive” foreign policy behavior: “Any effort 
on behalf of the US government to attack, bomb, deter, sanction, roll-back, intimidate, isolate, reject a 
diplomatic offer from or change the Iranian regime either by covert or overt means.” (See chapter I.) 
156 
 
of deeper and more meaningful cooperation with Tehran, it inherently limited the 
possible success of its own policies.  
Of course, the post hoc propt er hoc logic does not work – we cannot know for 
sure, whether every Iran related blowback effect occurred because it happened after 
repeated US rejections and threats. Still, empirical experience as well as intuition leads 
one to argue that US rejections and intimidation did have consequences, which in turn 
led to blowback effects. Thus, it is argued here that the two variables are indeed related. 
Similar to previous chapters and based on the Neoclassical Realist logic, the author puts 
forth that this is due to factors at two different levels: systemic and sub-systemic. 
Specifically, the following factors were at play: 
 
 Systemic factors: 
 global distribution of power; and the 
 regional distribution of power. 
 
 Sub-systemic factors: 
 government policies of the US and Iran; 
 perceptions; and  
 domestic constituencies and political forces.           
 
As far as the global distribution of power is concerned, it is necessary to note 
that despite the growing influence of emerging powers, such as China, India and Brazil, 
the United States still enjoyed an unprecedented advantage in terms of global economic 
and military power. At the time of the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, US population stood 
at 290 million and the US GDP roughly amounted to 12 trillion dollars. This is about 
three times larger than that of China, four times larger than the GDP of Japan, six times 
larger than the GDP of India, and approximately ten times larger than the same data for 
Russia.151 (World Bank [2012]) Similarly, GDP per capita data, which are slightly better 
                                                 
151 For population data for 2003 see: China: 1,288,400,000; India: 1,105,885,689; EU: 488,161,510; US: 
290,107,933; Indonesia: 221,839,235; Brazil: 181,633,074; Russian Federation: 144,599,446. For data on 
GDP at PPP (purchasing power parity) in current international dollars for the year 2003 see: EU: 
11,959,189,022,040; US: 11,089,300,000,000; China: 4,121,011,961,876; Japan: 3,571,046,814,300; 
India: 2,011,118,500,955; Brazil: 1,366,232,501,576; Russian Federation: 1,338,190,713,151. (Numbers 
have been rounded.) The author choose these countries as they are among the most relevant international 
economic powers, thus, their standing is a relatively good indicator of the international configuration of 
economic power. World Databank, World Bank [2012] 
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indicators of economic power, show an even larger US lead.152 (World Bank [2012]) 
Annual growth of US GDP, however, only stood at 2.5 %, whereas Chinese economic 
growth stood at 10%.153  (World Bank [2012]) The US GDP share of exports amounted 
to 9.4% and the same data for China was 29.5% for 2003.154 (World Bank [2012]) This 
demonstrates that even though a number of countries were developing rapidly, the US 
was still the number one economic power in the international system.  
 In terms of military power, not surprisingly, the US outweighed every other 
military power in the world. The total number of active personnel in the US military in 
2003-2004 amounted to 1.4 million people. (IISS [2005]: p. 23) The number of Russian 
active personnel stood at 1.2 million people, while the same number for China and India 
was 2.25 and 1.3 million, respectively. (IISS [2005]: p. 104; 170; 151) The US outspent 
all three countries in terms of military expenditures and it was also one of the leading 
countries in terms of military expenditure as percentage of GDP.155 The US armed 
forces employ state-of-the-art military technology, which is second to none and this has 
important implications for the deployability of its forces. Although all three powers 
have formidable conventional and non-conventional capabilities, still, their ability to 
project force into great distances is limited in comparison to US force projection 
capabilities. US bases are scattered all over the globe, giving the US an overwhelming 
supremacy in terms of its ability to respond rapidly in case it needs to.156  
 Thus, US positions in the world were strong and stable. The United States could 
fight wars over an extended period of time at just about anywhere in the globe or even 
in two different places at a time. Thus, as a global super power it was natural for the US 
to exert its power in different regions of the world – including the Gulf. The political, 
economic, and military capabilities of the US made it possible for Washington to sustain 
                                                 
152 For data on GDP per capita at PPP (purchasing power parity) in current international dollars for the 
year 2003 see: US: 38,225; Japan: 27,960; EU: 24,498; Russia Federation: 9,254; China: 3,199 (Numbers 
have been rounded). World Databank, World Bank [2012] 
153 For data on annual GDP growth for the year 2003 see: China: 10; India: 7.9%; Russian Federation: 
7.3%; Indonesia: 4.8 %; US: 2.6%; Japan: 1.7%; EU: 1.4%. World Databank, World Bank [2012] 
154 For 2003 data on exports of goods and services as percentage of GDP see: Russian Federation: 35%; 
EU: 34%; Indonesia: 30%; China: 29.5%; Brazil: 15%; India: 14.7%; Japan: 11.8%; US: 9.4%.   
(Numbers have been rounded) World Databank, World Bank [2012] 
155 According to the SIPRI database on military expenditures the four countries spent the following 
amounts on their armed forces in 2003. (All data are indicated in 2010 billion US dollars and all numbers 
have been rounded.) US: 492; China: 52; Russia: 39; India: 27. For military expenditures as percentage of 
GDP for the same four countries in 2003 see: Russia: 4.3 %; US: 3.7; India: 2.8 %; China: 2.1 %.SIPRI 
[2012].  
156 According to the 2005 edition of the Military Balance the US had 400.000 personnel deployed in some 
120 countries of the world. See: “Global Force Posture Review Changes” and “Maritime Force 
Projection Development” IISS [2004]: pp. 16-18. 
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and even enhance its presence in the Middle East and the Gulf region.  
 Concerning the regional distribution of power, it must be highlighted that Iran 
was still one of the most formidable regional powers in the Middle East. It covered an 
enormous piece of land in the region with littoral access to both the Caspian and the 
Gulf. Its population amounted to 68 million, the second largest in the region.157 Its GDP 
was also the second largest – only Turkey had a bigger gross domestic product.158 Iran 
did not do particularly well in terms of GDP per capita and exports, but the annual 
growth of its GDP stood at 7%, which was second only to the growth of Saudi Arabia.  
Iran also had the lowest external debt stocks as percentage of its GNI among countries 
examined.159 Iranian net inflows of FDI were only surpassed by those of Lebanon and 
Israel.160 Thus, Iran’s economy was one of the most significant ones in terms of 
economic performance and size. (World Databank, World Bank [2012]) It must also be 
noted that even though oil prices were not particularly high in 2003, the rise of world oil 
prices between 1998 and 2008 significantly contributed to the growth of Iranian 
economic influence. When Iraqi sectarian strife became really intensive between 2004 
and 2006 for example, oil prices rose from 38 to 58 US dollars per barrel.161 (EIA 
[2012]) Given that approximately 50% of Iranian government revenues stem from oil 
exports and the petroleum sector contributes 20% to the Iranian GDP, it is obvious that 
the spread of Iranian influence during the period was partly due to the growth of the 
                                                 
157 For 2003 data on population of Middle Eastern states (million people) see: Egypt: 71; Iran: 68; 
Turkey: 66; Iraq: 26; Saudi Arabia: 22; Syria: 17,4; Israel: 6.7; Jordan: 5; Lebanon: 4. (Numbers have 
been rounded.) World Databank, World Bank [2012]  
158 For 2003 data on GDP at PPP (purchasing power parity) in current international dollars for Middle 
Eastern countries see: Turkey: 587,855,258,606; Iran: 551,013,802,433; Saudi Arabia: 415,642,925,000; 
Egypt: 288,462,768,535; Israel: 148,909,637,223; Syria: 63,355,803,12; Iraq: 53,394,758,731; Lebanon: 
33,721,406,615; Jordan: 18,812,857,174. (Numbers have been rounded.) World Databank, World Bank 
[2012] 
159 For 2003 data on GDP per capita at PPP (power purchasing parity) in current international dollars for 
various countries of the region see: Israel: 22,260; Saudi Arabia: 18,610; Turkey: 8,861; Lebanon: 8,569; 
Iran: 8,096; Egypt: 4,034; Jordan: 3,643; Syria: 3,622; Iraq: 2,035. For 2003 data export of goods and 
services as percentage of GDP: Jordan: 47%; Saudi Arabia: 46%; Israel: 37%; Syria: 33%; Iran: 27%; 
Turkey: 23%; Egypt: 22%; Lebanon: 17%.For 2003 data on the annual growth of GDP see: Saudi Arabia: 
7.7%; Iran: 7.1.%; Turkey: 5.3%; Jordan: 4.2%; Lebanon: 3.2%; Egypt: 3.2%; Israel: 1.5%; Syria: 0.6%; 
Iraq: -41%. For 2003 data on external debt stocks as percentage of GNI see: Lebanon: 117%; Jordan: 
81%; Turkey: 48%; Egypt: 37%; Iran: 12%. No data were available for Syria, Israel, Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia. (Numbers have been rounded.) World Databank, World Bank [2012]  
160 For data on net inflows of FDI (balance of payments, current million US dollars) for 2003 see: Israel: 
3322; Lebanon: 2860; Iran: 2698; Turkey: 1702; Jordan: 574; Egypt: 237; Syria: 160; Iraq: -0,02; Saudi 
Arabia: -587. (Numbers have been rounded.) World Databank, World Bank [2013] 
161 According to the Energy Information Agency (EIA) the US average real “crude oil domestic first 
purchase prices” (1949-2011, dollars per Barell) one Barrell of oil cost 37.99 US dollars in 2004, and rose 
significantly by 2006 when the real price stood at 57.82 US dollars per Barell. See: EIA [2012] 
Table 5.18. Crude Oil Domestic First Purchase Prices, 1949-2011  (Dollars per Barrel). September 27, 
2012 EIA  
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Iranian economy as a result of rising oil prices. (See: Katzman [2012b]: p. 2.)   
 According to data from 2003-2004, some 540.000 people were serving in the 
Iranian armed forces altogether – the largest number in the Middle East.162 (IISS [2004]: 
pp. 124) It spent the fourth largest sum of money on its armed forces in the region and it 
was outspent only by Israel, Turkey and Saudi Arabia.163 (SIPRI [2012]) In terms of 
military expenditure as percentage of GDP, Iran only devoted 2.7 % of its gross 
domestic product to its armed forces, which was only the eighth largest ratio and it 
hardly surpassed that of Iraq.164 (SIPRI [2012]) However, Iran’s asymmetric warfare 
capabilities and its considerable inventory of conventional forces make up for the 
disadvantages in military spending. (See: IISS [2004]: pp. 124-125)  
  The US was still the preeminent super power and Iran still had a formidable 
regional influence in 2003. There is another factor that belongs to the systemic level and 
this factor is the geopolitical reality of the region. This indicates that one of the most 
important dimensions of the conflict between Iran and the US cannot be captured 
through indicators of power. Iran’s regional web of relations (Syria, Lebanon, the Iraqi 
Shia, Hezbollah, Hamas, etc.), its economic and military power, as well as its strategic 
position in the Gulf make it one of the most important regional poles in the Middle East. 
The United States is also part of this geopolitical explanation: its enormous resources 
and military capabilities provide it with the opportunity to be physically present in the 
region. US bases in the Gulf, as well as Iranian ties to various entities in the Middle East 
mean that both countries are significant powers. Furthermore, as the author argued in 
the previous chapter, Iran’s relative power was even more salient in 2003 because its 
regional presence was ‘natural’. The US is present, but it is not embedded in the 
historical and cultural context of the region as Iran is. This is the factor that provides 
Iran with some compensation in terms of regional influence. This is also the reason why 
US presence is more costly – while Iran’s presence is a given, the US has to devote a 
significant amount of its resources to sustaining its presence. Even if Iran does not 
                                                 
162 For the number of active personnel in Middle Eastern armed forces for the year 2003 see: Iran: 
540.000; Turkey: 514.850; Egypt: 450.000; Syria: 296.800; Israel: 168.000; Saudi Arabia: 124.500; 
Jordan: 100.500; Lebanon: 72.100;  Iraq: no data available. See “Middle East and North Africa” in: IISS 
[2004] pp. 120-140. 
163 For data on military expenditures in 2010 billion US dollars for the year 2003 see: Saudi Arabia: 25; 
Turkey: 19; Israel: 16; Iran: 8.; Egypt: 5; Syria: 2.3; Iraq (2004): 1.8; Lebanon: 1.2; Jordan: 0.9. (In case 
of Iraq no data were available for 2003, thus, the author applied 2004 data) Numbers have been rounded.  
SIPRI [2012] 
164 For data on military expenditures as percentage of GDP for 2003 see: Israel: 9.6%; Saudi Arabia: 
8.7%; Syria: 6.2%; Jordan: 6%; Lebanon: 4.6%; Turkey: 3.4 %; Egypt: 3.3%; Iran: 2.7%; Iraq (2004): 
1.7%. (In case of Iraq no data were available for 2003, thus, the author applied 2004 data)  SIPRI [2012] 
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pursue policies which raise the costs of US presence, Washington still has to invest a lot 
of political and financial capital just to sustain its positions in the region.  
 This tendency was even more prominent when the US removed Saddam Hussein 
(and the Taliban) from power because the US tilted the regional balance of power in 
Iran’s favor and Teheran’s regional influence grew rapidly as a consequence. (Balogh 
[2008a]) Iran felt unsafe due to US military presence and it sought to break out of the 
geopolitical ‘cage’ constructed by the US. (Barzegar [2010]: 173; 176-177.)  
 On the sub-systemic level, the most important variables at play were the 
government policies of the US and Iran. US policies qualify as “aggressive” as defined 
by the methodological section of the dissertation. The US rejected several Iranian offers 
to cooperate and move towards normalization of relations. The author argues that 
Washington missed at least four opportunities to capitalize on Iran’s regional influence 
by reaching a grand bargain with Tehran: the Geneva-Paris-New York-Bonn-Tokyo 
talks between October 2001 and January 2002; the Geneva-Paris-New York talks from 
the fall of 2002, the May 2003 offer from Iran and the Baghdad channel, which was set 
up as a result of communication that started in late 2006.  The official US position never 
really went beyond negotiations on the specific problem at hand – Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Since Iran was rejected, it moved from cooperation to confrontation and started 
sabotaging US policies in Afghanistan and Iraq. Thus, it started pursuing policies, which 
made it harder for the US to realize is regional objectives. It stepped up its support for 
various Shiite groups in Iraq, supplied them with financial resources and weapons, and 
provided logistical help, as well as training to various Shiite Iraqi militants. It also 
provided some factions in Afghanistan with similar help. Later on, it ended its 
moratorium on uranium enrichment – a deal negotiated by the EU3 in 2003 – and 
restarted its nuclear program in 2005. (Statement by the Iranian Government and 
Visiting EU Foreign Ministers. October 21. [2003]) Thus, a number of clearly 
identifiable blowback effects occurred. Hence, the Iraqi invasion produced a lot of 
“unintended consequences” as it “emboldened” Iran in the region. (Slavin [2007]: p. 
209.) 
 Still, there were some events, which seem to contradict the logic of the 
blowback hypothesis. First of all, initial aggressive US behavior did seem to be paying 
off. The 2007 CIA National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) assumed that Iran stopped 
working on its nuclear weapons program in 2003. (NIE [2007]: p. 6.) Could this be the 
result of the “psychological spillover” effect? We cannot know for sure, however, US 
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aggressive actions probably contributed to the resumption of uranium enrichment in 
2005. (See above.) Thus, even if there was some linkage between the implementation of 
the Bush doctrine and the halting of the nuclear weapons program in 2003, the US did 
not capitalize on it as it kept pushing Iran against the wall. As a result, the earlier 
moratorium on uranium enrichment was suspended in 2005.  
Furthermore, as US soldiers emerged in Iraq toppling Saddam Hussein's regime 
in just three weeks, the pressure on Tehran obviously intensified, thus, it decided to 
prevent the possible invasion of Iran. Even though that was not to happen, Iran may 
have perceived that it is a realistic option. Thus, the deterrent effect of aggressive 
actions in Iraq and earlier in Afghanistan may have prompted the Iranian regime to 
make an offer concerning a possible grand bargain. This may actually refute the 
blowback hypothesis as aggressive US actions may have led to cooperative Iranian 
behavior, implying that aggressive measures do pay off. In fact, this is not the case. 
Cooperative Iranian behavior was not a direct consequence of the US invasion of Iraq – 
it predates that event. Iran was already cooperative before the toppling of the Taliban 
regime in Kabul. Thus, Iranian overtures did not signal a change in policies – it was a 
mere continuation of rapprochement that begun earlier as a result of common US-
Iranian interests concerning Afghanistan. US aggression did not change Iranian 
behavior – Tehran was already pursuing a policy of détente with Washington. 
 It may well be that the psychology of US presence and the rapid toppling of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime made Iran even more willing to engage in dialogue, but it was 
not the original reason behind Iran’s cooperative attitude. From a US perspective, the 
attack on Iraq did have some ‘positive’ side effects, no doubt. However, aggressive US 
behavior came when Iran was already willing to engage – thus, Iranian cooperation was 
not entirely a direct result of the US invasion of Iraq.  
 When one examines the US response to the May 2003 offer, it was one of 
outright rejection. Thus, even when Iran repeatedly offered gestures, and even when the 
side effects of the Iraqi invasion intensified Iranian cooperation to a limited extent, 
Washington rejected the Iranian offer and “punished” the Swiss ambassador for 
delivering the Iranian message. Furthermore, regime change became official policy by 
2005 and it is not a mere coincidence that tensions in the ongoing Iraqi sectarian strife 
peaked between 2004 and 2006. 
 Of course, it is entirely wrong to assume that Iran was entirely cooperative all 
the time and did not engage in any nefarious activities. The case of the cargo ship 
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“Karine A” and the May 12 2003 terrorist attacks in Riyadh against Western interests 
may signal at least some Iranian complicity, but there is no direct evidence to support 
such a claim. Still, such conduct may fit into the pattern of Iranian behavior. Iran’s 
leaders are seasoned strategists – they are entirely aware of the fact that a good strategy 
will try to hedge against future uncertainty. In Iraq, the Iranian leadership chose to both 
support the democratic process; and the reconstruction of the country, as well as various 
Shiite militant groups. (See: Crist [2012]: pp. 466.)  
Iran in fact supported solutions implying different outcomes. The idea was no 
matter how events unfolded in the end, Iran always had its surrogates in power because 
it supported almost every Shiite faction in Iraq. Thus, Iranian strategy in Iraq was both 
supportive and disruptive at the same time. This may seem irrational, but in fact it is 
not. It is the best strategy for hedging against uncertainty. No matter which path led to 
stability, Iran supported them all because it did not know in advance which one would 
lead to a solution of the Iraqi situation. Thus, it chose to support every possible avenue 
towards an Iraqi settlement in order to maximize its influence in Iraq. It did the same 
thing regarding the US: it was willing to talk, but it was also sabotaging US policies in 
Iraq (See: Ibid.) Thus, it is not entirely farfetched to think that some of the incidents, 
which served as additional reasons for rejecting Iranian offers, happened with Iranian 
support or complicity.  
Does this undermine the blowback hypothesis? It does not, since US cooperation 
never really went beyond discussing issues other than Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, 
Iranian offers concerning a grand bargain were rejected. Thus, the two incidents may 
have been results of bureaucratic infighting within the Iranian government itself, aiming 
to isolate reformists who wished to mend relations with Washington. It may have also 
been conducted by a “rogue element” of the regime aiming to sideline reformists. It 
could have been hardliners’ response to what seemed to be a failed policy of 
rapprochement from Iran’s perspective. This may mean that leaders of the executive 
branch were still willing to engage in dialogue, but some elements were against it. If 
those incidents had anything to do with Iran, then they may not have represented the 
official and overall cooperative approach of the Iranian regime.   
 The logic of supporting and disrupting something at the same time leads one to 
the next sub-systemic factor that explains outcomes: governmental politics. The politics 
of US foreign policy following the 9/11 attacks is a textbook example of governmental 
politics as described by Graham T. Allison’s 1969 work. (Allison [1969]) The State 
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Department was willing to engage in a dialogue, even moving towards mending 
relations. Condoleezza Rice of the National Security Council was also willing to give 
this option a chance. The CIA was not against it either. However, the Department of 
Defense and the office of the Vice President did almost everything to sideline those in 
favor of rapprochement. By opening up channels to Iranian exiles, the aim was to annoy 
Iran and provoke hardliners to shut down the Geneva channel that was set up in the fall 
of 2002. Introducing regime change as an official US government policy was also a 
product of the Pentagon. The US government invested almost as much energy into 
fighting itself as concentrating on executing actual policies.165 Thus, even governmental 
politics hindered a possible cooperation that could have helped the US fight radicalism 
in the Middle East and secure energy supplies.  
 If governmental politics played a role in US foreign and security policy, then it 
must be noted that it definitely had an impact on Iranian decision making as well. 
President Khatami played a dangerous game by insisting on dialogue with the US – he 
risked his political career and probably even his freedom. In fact, Khatami having been 
sidelined in Iranian politics is partly due to his rapprochement with America. However, 
hardliners were bent on stopping Iran from engaging with Washington. It is realistic to 
suggest that if Iran had a hand in the incidents examined above, it was due to hardliners 
who did not agree with the official policies of the Khatami government. In fact, the 
return of hardliners to power with the election of President Ahmadinejad was partly a 
response to Khatami's failed policies. Thus, an indirect blowback effect of failed 
rapprochement with the US was the return of hardliners to power in Iran. The strange 
irony of governmental politics is that hardliners on both sides had a common interest: 
stopping their own moderate forces from engagement with each other. Hardliners 
played into each other’s hands by strengthening the position of the other in the opposite 
government.   
 The final sub-systemic factor is perceptions. Cognitive dissonance is an 
instructive model that explains events on both sides. Both the US and Iran had 
established and ‘nurtured’ three decade old perceptions about the other. (Beeman 
[2008]) Both sides were extremely sensitive to events which fit the pattern of perceived 
US and Iranian behavior, but tended to neglect developments which did not “fit” into 
this preconception – eg. rapprochement, goodwill and cooperative attitude. The US 
                                                 
165 For excellent accounts on this see: Woodward [2004]; [2006]; [2008] 
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military encirclement of Iran and Iranian nefarious activities in Iraq both reinforced 
negative perceptions, whereas cooperative behavior was always dismissed as 
“exceptions that prove the rule”, even if such overtures were, in fact, sincere.166  
 US rejections of Iranian offers hindered the realization of almost all US strategic 
interests in the region. They served as incentives for Iran to create instability in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. This also made the US national interest of rolling back Islamic militancy 
and extremism significantly harder, as Iranian support for various Iraqi groups and other 
forces in Afghanistan indirectly led to the exact opposite effect. The decision to resume 
uranium enrichment also infringed upon US interests. Thus, blowback effects hindered 
or prevented the realization of at least four out of the six US strategic national interests 
identified at the beginning of this chapter.167 
   
2.3. The Return to Containment: 2006-2009 – Business as Usual 
 
 The last two years of the Bush administration’s tenure of office marked a return 
to containment.168 The 2006 National Security Strategy did keep the language on 
preemption and preventing threats before they actually emerge. Regardless of the 
unchanged principles169 of the document, the text did soften the US stance on the use of 
military force. The document realized that preemption may set a dangerous precedent 
for other countries.170 (NSS [2006]: p. 18.) The dissertation argues that this slight change 
marks an even larger change in the actual practice of US foreign and security policy 
                                                 
166 See the thought of Dennis Ross on preconceptions and images regarding the “other” referenced earlier 
in the chapter on the Clinton administration’s approach to Iran. 
167 Those were defined as follows: defeating Islamic militancy and terrorism; rolling back the appeal of 
Islamic extremism by spreading US values and institutions; securing the free flow of energy from the 
Middle East, fostering stability in Iraq and Afghanistan and, finally, fostering stability in the Middle East 
partly by reaching a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. (See the beginning of this chapter.)  
168 This part and other sections on the policy of containment under the Bush era in the dissertation partly 
draws on a specific chapter of the author’s graduate thesis. (Balogh [2008b]: pp. 50-60.) It also partly 
draws on a paper written together with László Láng for two different essay writing competitions for 
graduate students in 2007 and 2009. (Balogh-Láng [2007a]; the logic is also applied in: Balogh-Láng 
[2007b]. 
169 The document puts forth that “When the consequences of an attack with WMD are potentially so 
devastating, we cannot afford to stand idly by as grave dangers materialize. This is the principle and 
logic of preemption. The place of preemption in our national security strategy remains the same. We will 
always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. The reasons for our actions will 
be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.” (NSS [2006]: p. 23.) 
170 The document states that “To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United 
States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense. The United 
States will not resort to force in all cases to preempt emerging threats. Our preference is that nonmilitary 
actions succeed. And no country should ever use preemption as a pretext for aggression.” (NSS [2006]: p. 
18.) 
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after 2005. The shift started in 2005 and a new policy was in place by 2007. This policy 
was one of aggressive containment that aimed to isolate Iran by every means, except for 
the application of military force.  
 The author argues that this change itself was due to the realization that the US 
did not have enough resources to confront every threat everywhere in the world. US 
military capabilities were stretched too thin due to two parallel wars, and as tensions of 
the Iraqi sectarian strife intensified between 2004 and 2006, it was increasingly clear 
that the US had serious difficulties stabilizing Iraq. This led to a redefinition of the US 
role in the world and resulted in returning to more traditional ways in foreign and 
security policy. This approach meant a more moderate engagement globally, and in the 
case of the Middle East and Iran it marked a return to containment, even if the basic 
tenets of the Bush doctrine had never been given up rhetorically by the US. Thus, 
applying military force against Iran was never really an option after 2006. Instead, the 
administration tried to roll back Iranian influence by applying all the other tools it had. 
Thus, containment was pursued through several different tracks. Just like under the 
Clinton administration, containment had three components again: political, economic 
and military. (See: Pollack [2008]: pp. 372-375.) It was pursued through unilateral US 
policies, multilateral forums and mostly in the form of rhetoric, diplomacy, and limited 
military measures.171 It is telling that all efforts aiming to isolate Iran became 
dramatically more intensive after 2006 – the year that was defined as a watershed by 
this dissertation.  
 Considering a policy of containment regarding Iran goes back to 2005 when 
Condoleezza Rice traveled to Moscow in October to gain Russian support for isolating 
Iran. The IAEA established that Tehran did not fulfill its obligations under the 
safeguards of the nonproliferation treaty (NPT) and referred the Iran file to the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2006. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs 
Nicholas Burns traveled to Europe multiple times in order to prepare for a UNSC 
resolution on Iran. The US even began a public affairs campaign in order to publicize 
Iranian activities in violation of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The idea was to 
pursue two different tracks: Iran was offered incentives by promising to engage the 
                                                 
171 Note that the author applied the following definition of containment earlier: “US efforts as well as 
concerted efforts by the US and its allies to globally counter and roll back Iranian political, economic, 
military and soft power influence by political, economic, military and soft power means.” (See the 
chapter on “The Policy of Dual Containment” in Chapter I.  
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Tehran regime if it froze uranium enrichment. However, it would be the target of strict 
sanctions if it did not comply. Tehran was offered the possibility of easing sanctions 
against it, permission to import light-water reactor technology and modernization of 
Iran’s energy sector. In case Iran came clean concerning its nuclear program, US 
officials would not reject the possibility of Iran resuming uranium enrichment. 
However, domestic Iranian political forces could not agree on the offer, and Tehran 
rejected the initiative. Thus, on December 23, 2006, the UNSC passed resolution 1737. 
(Crist [2012]: pp. 504-507.)  
 The policy of containment, however, did not begin with UNSC 1737. It rather 
began with repeated rhetorical threats concerning the Iranian nuclear program and 
Iranian domestic politics, as well as Iran’s foreign policy. The author researched all the 
major foreign policy speeches of President Bush’s eight years in office and found that 
the Bush presidency devoted significantly more rhetorical attention to Iran in the last 
two years of its tenure of office, than in the previous 6 years. The growth in the number 
of speeches mentioning Iran between 2006 and 2008 is remarkable. The author 
identified 22 speeches between 2001 and the March 2006 release of the administration’s 
new National Security Strategy, which mentioned Iran either in the context of 
sponsorship of terrorism, criticism of its foreign and domestic policies, as well as its 
nuclear program. On the other hand, the number of those speeches nearly doubled 
between March 2006 and the end of 2008 – Bush had given 39 major speeches 
altogether mentioning Iran as a threat in one way or another.172 This does not include 
the instances when the administration intensified its rhetorical threats by reminding Iran 
every now and then that “every option was on the table.” (Iran Focus [2006]; CNN 
[2007]; BBC [2008]; BBC [2008]) This intensified focus on Iran was not a result of a 
proactive foreign policy – in fact, it marked an implicit recognition of US limits in the 
Middle East. The Bush administration could not be effective against Iran by taking 
military action, thus, rhetorical pressure was applied against Tehran in order to sustain a 
credible US deterrence. This rhetorical deterrence formed the backbone of political 
containment in the last roughly two and a half years of the administration’s tenure of 
office.  
                                                 
172 See the appendix at the end of the dissertation for the list of those speeches. Major Bush speeches are 
defined as speeches which had been listed as “major” ones by former president by the website 
“Presidential Rhetoric.” See: http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/bushpresidency.html 
Accessed: 30-11-2012 
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 Political containment did not close out multilateral diplomacy either. From 2006 
on, the US was included in the P5+1 framework as a result of expanding the EU3 group 
to include Russia, China and the US. 173 Their June 2006 proposal to Iran demanded 
suspension of enrichment, which Iran rejected. Then in May 2008, Iran came up with 
another proposal, which focused on creating “nuclear fuel production consortiums” in 
various locations in “the world – including Iran”. (Arms Control Association [2012]) 
Then, in June 2008, the P5+1 repeated their 2006 offer during a meeting in Tehran; this 
time, however, they highlighted the potential benefits of Iranian cooperation. The US 
was not included in this offer, as it did not take part in this particular initiative. This 
meeting was followed by another one in Geneva in July 2008, where Iran offered a 
roadmap for negotiations and using the common provisions of previous offers by the 
two sides as a platform for further negotiations. The meeting, however, did not produce 
any results. (Arms Control Association [2012]; Slavin [2007]: pp. 221-227.) 
 Multilateral diplomatic initiatives were not really supported by the US – 
Washington even chose to abstain once. It was a half-hearted effort to demonstrate US 
willingness to talk, but Washington probably never really expected any results. The 
P5+1 adopted the US demand that Iran suspend uranium enrichment, thus, they 
requested something that Iran was sure to reject. Thus, diplomatic initiatives were not 
based on meaningful offers and excluded the possibility of real dialogue with Iran. US 
diplomatic activity within the P5+1 format may contradict the blowback hypothesis. 
The US pursued not only aggressive policies, it also demonstrated the willingness to 
engage in diplomacy with Iran. However, even if the US pursued diplomacy, it did this 
in a very limited and halfhearted fashion and it also kept pressuring Iran at the same 
time (e.g. sanctions and military containment.) Thus, even if the “mantle” of 
nonaggressive policies existed, the overall “aggressive” approach was maintained. 
Diplomacy could not be successful according to the logic of strategic blowback theory 
because it did not signal substantial changes in US foreign policy strategy. 
                                                 
173 The “EU3” referred to the UK, France and Germany. They negotiated with Iran between 2004 and 
2006. The official name of the group was “EU/Iran Political and Security Working Group”. Iran came up 
with four plans during the course of these negotiations (January 17, 2005; March 23, 2005; April 29, 
2005; July 18, 2005.) All of those included various possible limitations on Iran’s uranium enrichment 
efforts but not actually giving up enrichment for good altogether. They included proposals on regional 
security issues as well as the Iranian willingness to join the IAEA Additional Protocol. In August 2005 the 
EU presented its own proposal, which focused on providing Iran with nuclear fuel and low enriched 
uranium but assumed that Iran would agree to suspension of enrichment for at least ten years. Iran 
rejected the offer saying it infringed its right to enrich uranium. Then, after an unsuccessful Russian 
proposal, the EU3 format expanded in 2006. See:  Arms Control  Association [2012]. 
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 The other form of political containment meant rallying other nations to support 
multilateral and US sanctions against the Islamic Republic. These diplomatic measures 
targeted two groups of countries in particular: countries of the EU and Arab states in the 
Middle East. (Eggen [2008]; Myers [2008])  
 One of the most important manifestations of containment and creating an anti-
Iran consensus was the convening of the Annapolis Conference on the Arab-Israeli 
peace process on November 27, 2007. The conference aimed to forge an anti-Iran 
consensus in the region. The essence of the strategy pursued after 2006 was based on 
the notion that Iran is connected to every major regional conflict – the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, Iraq, Afghanistan, etc. Thus, isolating Iran would not only contain its influence, 
it would also be the only logical solution to the problems of the Middle East. However, 
the most important conditions for realizing such a consensus did not exist. First, the idea 
is flawed from a historical perspective, since Iran has always been a key player in the 
region, thus, its influence is more or less ‘natural.’ (N. Rózsa [2007] p. 38.; Nasr-Takeyh 
[2008]) The concept is also questionable from a cultural perspective. It is true that Iran 
and the Arab countries, which should also not be handled as members of a single 
monolithic block, are very different, but they still have more in common than Arab 
countries and Israel do.  However, Vali Nasr and Ray Takeyh point out that Arab 
countries are much more willing to confront Israel with Iran on their side than remedy 
relations with Israel in order to form an Israeli-Arab front against Iran. There is no 
such thing as an “anti-Iranian consensus”, however, there is one against Israel. (Nasr-
Takeyh [2008]; Takeyh [2009]: pp. 261-264.) Thus, the concept of containing Iran was 
flawed from the start. Furthermore, a number of Gulf states have important economic, 
religious and cultural ties to Iran. (The Economist [2007]) In Afghanistan’s case, 
everyday food supplies depend on the Iranian economy. (Tahir [2007]) 
 As Iran felt the weakness of the US as a result of the situation in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, it became emboldened and it was increasingly willing to test the US and 
its allies in its neighborhood. In 2007, Iran detained 15 British sailors as they were 
sailing in international waters. They were released later on, but the case demonstrated 
that Iran is not afraid to escalate the situation. (Lyall [2007]) It sought to increase its 
influence in Afghanistan and Iraq during the period examined. (See: Rohde [2006]; 
Leithead [2007]) Other sources also reported of Iran’s growing power in Iraq and US 
encounters with Iranian Quds Force agents in Iraq in 2006-2007. (Roggio [2007]) Iran 
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also filled the vacuum left by the EU and US after they stopped the transfer of aid to 
certain Palestinian entities when Hamas won the 2006 parliamentary elections. Iran 
immediately offered 50 million US dollars to Hamas in order to fill this political and 
economic vacuum. (Balogh [2008a]: p. 202) A further sign of Iran’s strength at the time 
was Iran’s indirect involvement in the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war and Hezbollah’s 
relatively successful war efforts during the conflict. (See: Sharp et. al. [2006]: p. 1.; 
Inbar [2007])  
 The economic dimension of the return to containment did not begin with UNSC 
1737 either.174 On June 28, 2005 President Bush signed Executive Order 13382, which 
froze the assets of those involved in WMD-proliferation. (Executive Order 13382 of 
June 28. [2005]) Then the US Congress passed the Iran Nonproliferation Amendments 
Act of 2005 on November 22, 2005. (Public Law 109-112-Nov. 22. [2005]) This 
expanded the original law passed in 2000 (Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000) to include 
Syria. This legislation was later further changed and became the Iran, North Korea, 
Syria Nonproliferation Act of 2006 on October 13, 2006. (State Department [2012]; 
Katzman [2012b]: p. 31.; Public Law 109-353-Oct. 13. [2006])  
This trend continued with the passing of the Iran Freedom Support Act of 2006 
(IFSA) – a unilateral US arrangement that modified and extended the ILSA of 1996. 
(Public Law 109-293-Sept. 30. [2006])175 The law kept every major provision of the 
original ILSA with some minor changes.176 It changed the original name of ILSA to Iran 
Sanctions Act (ISA) by leaving out Libya from the title and extended the law until the 
                                                 
174 It is worth recalling that the author applied the following definition for sanctions: “nonmilitary actions 
of the United States that adversely affect the flow of goods, services, or financial assets to a specific 
foreign country in order to penalize or coerce a country for political purposes or to express US 
displeasure with that country’s actions.” (Alikhani [2000]: p. 25.) 
175 It should be noted, however, that some sanctions targeting Iran had already been introduced as part of 
the efforts in the “war on terror” in 2001 (e.g. Executive Order 13224 – see the chapter titled “The Bush 
Doctrine and Iran”; Executive Order 13224 of September 23 [2001]).  It is also important to note that the 
Bush government kept implementing and extending the executive orders issued under the Clinton 
presidency sanctioning various forms of trade and investment activity with Iran. There are some 
exceptions to this rule – e.g. the Bush presidency allowed civilian aircraft parts to be sold to Iran. The US 
allowed General Electric to sell parts for Airbus engines and only European firms were allowed to 
actually install those parts.  In theory it is allowed to swap Caspian Sea oil with the Islamic Republic. 
Communication of personal nature as well as remittances are not forbidden either. Food and certain 
medical goods have been allowed, however, providing credits for exports is strictly limited and no 
exporter is allowed to deal with Iranian banks in a direct manner. Finally, import of certain food stuffs 
(nuts and fruit products), carpets and caviar were permitted under the Bush administration. (See: Katzman 
[2012b]: pp. 21-22.)  
176  See the detailed description of the law’s provisions in the earlier chapter on dual containment. 
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end of 2011, since it was to sunset on August 5, 2006.177 Provisions of the new law 
banned the sale of WMD-related technology and significant numbers of advanced 
conventional weapons or types of arms that are considered to be “destabilizing” by the 
text of the law. The legislation also suggests that any violation of the law should be 
determined in 180 days by the US government. It added a “national security interest” 
waiver changing the previous system of waivers. The law prohibited the US from 
entering nuclear agreements with states which had a track record of supplying Iran with 
nuclear technology. Katzman [2007]: pp. 1-3.) Finally, the text also included a part that 
aimed to stop money laundering by criminal groups, terrorists, or proliferators. 
(Katzman [2007]: p. 3.; Public Law 109-293-Sept. 30. [2006])  
 Besides sanctions limiting investment in Iran’s energy sector, the US also 
introduced financial sanctions against Iran.  On September 6, 2006, the Bush 
administration sanctioned so called “U-turn transactions” with Bank Saderat, a bank the 
US accused of supporting terrorist organizations including Lebanese Hezbollah.178 
Then, on November 6, 2008, the US moved to sanction such transactions with all 
Iranian banks. (Katzman [2012b]: p. 26.) Also, the Treasury Department started an 
extensive information campaign to further isolate Iran and raise awareness of Iranian 
“deceptive financial conduct.” (Levitt [2010]: p. 125.) 
 Moreover, President Bush signed Executive Order 13438 on July 7, 2007, which 
targeted persons associated with providing arms and financial transfers to Iraqi Shiite 
militias and, thus, promoting instability in Iraq. The measure was mostly against the 
Quds Force of the IRGC. (Katzman [2012b]: p. 35.; Executive Order 13438 of July 17. 
[2007]) Unilateral arrangements were complemented by multilateral arrangements as 
the IAEA referred the “Iran file” to the UN Security Council under US pressure. This 
effort resulted in the adoption of four UNSC sanctions between 2006 and 2008.  UNSC 
1696 requested that Iran halt its uranium enrichment activities and all related research 
                                                 
177 The original ILSA was to expire on August 5, 2001. However, the 107th Congress enacted a law that 
extended the 1996 act – it was called the ILSA Extension Act of 2001. (Public Law 107-24-Aug. 03. 
[2001]) The law “changed the definition of investment to treat any additions to preexisting investment as 
new investment, and required an Administration report on ISA’s effectiveness within 24 to 30 months of 
enactment. That report was submitted to Congress in January 2004 and did not recommend that ISA be 
repealed.” Again, as Congress was considering various bills on extending the law, it extended the act 
until September 29, 2006 to win some time before the law was to expire on August 5, 2006. Thus, this 
law was titled “An Act to Amend the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 to Extend the Authorities 
Provided in Such Act Until September 29, 2006.” Katzman [2007]: p. 3. ; Public Law 109-267-Sept. 29. 
[2006] 
178 “U-turn transactions” refer to “transactions with non-Iranian foreign banks that are handling 
transactions on behalf of an Iranian bank.” Katzman [2012b] p. 26.  
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and development efforts. It prohibits all sales related to nuclear or missile technologies. 
(Resolution 1696… UNSC [2006]) UNSC 1737 added further provisions to the above. It 
prohibited all heavy water reactor-related activities and introduced sanctions against 
specific persons and firms related to the Iranian nuclear program. More specifically, it 
froze their financial assets and limited freedom of their international movement. It 
prohibited any contributions to Iran’s nuclear program and all possible proliferation-
related Iranian trade. (Resolution 1737… UNSC [2006]) UNSC 1747 introduced a 
weapons embargo besides extending earlier sanctions to further entities and persons. It 
also banned all Iranian weapons trade. (Resolution 1747…. UNSC [2007]) UNSC 1803 
targeted Iranian exports and imports, thus, it prohibited all credits for trade headed for 
Iran, as well as exports from the Middle Eastern country. (Resolution 1803 … UNSC 
[2008]) The UNSC adopted one further resolution (UNSC 1835) which reinforced all 
four previous resolutions. (Resolution 1835… UNSC [2008]; Arms Control Association 
2012; Starr [2010]: pp. 119-122)  
Finally, it should also be noted that other multilateral bodies have also taken 
steps to weaken Iran economically. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF)179 released 
a number of warnings between 2007 and 2009 in order to persuade members and their 
financial institutions to exercise “enhanced due diligence” when engaging in business 
with Iran. Meanwhile, OECD has “raised Iran’s risk rating” in 2006. (FATF [2012]; 
Levitt [2010]: p. 125.) 
The time of the introduction of unilateral and multilateral sanctions is instructive 
again – all of these efforts took place from 2005 and 2006 onwards with the toughest 
and most far reaching laws and executive orders passed and signed in 2006 and 2007. 
Some experts point out that Iran’s economy has not been doing well during the period. 
It is a type of soviet economy, which sustains sectors and businesses even if they are not 
profitable. The energy sector lacked refined oil products at the time and Iran did not 
have the resources to modernize its infrastructure. The situation at the time was so bad 
that Iran lacked even the resources for maintenance, which effectively threatened the 
sustainability of Iranian oil exports. Roger Stern put forth that Iran may even stop 
exporting oil by 2014-2015. (Stern [2007]) The Iranian energy sector is responsible for 
about 80-90% of Iranian export revenues. Thus, lack of foreign investment may threaten 
                                                 
179 The Financial Action Task Force was established by the G-7 in Paris in 1989 and it comprises 34 
countries. Its primary goal is to combat money laundering and financing of terrorism. See: “What do we 
do?”; “History of the FATF” (www.fatf-gafi.org) Accessed: 03-12-2012  
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the stability of the economy. (Campbell [2007]) Others point out that the index of the 
Iranian stock exchange fell almost 25% after Ahmadinejad was elected, signaling that 
markets did not trust the leadership of the new President. (Burns [2005]) Bread, tea and 
sugar had been subsidized during the examined period. Due to the bad economic 
situation, the unemployment rate among the youth was around 30%. (Milani [2005]: p. 
45.)  
Others point out that the Iranian economy was not in a particularly bad situation. 
Its energy sector still attracted considerable investment over time and the volume of 
trade has also been growing since 2003.180 According to the US Government 
Accountability Office (USGAO), Iran has signed deals altogether worth some $ 20 
billion with foreign companies in order to develop its energy sector between 2003 and 
2007. (Iran Sanctions – Impact in Furthering… [2007]: pp.  3-4.) The growth of the 
Iranian economy stood at 5.8% on average in the years preceding 2007. Poverty was on 
the decline and social differences did not seem to be growing. (Campbell [2007]) 
If opinions regarding the state of the Iranian economy were contradictory, then, 
just like under the Clinton presidency, the effect of sanctions was an even more divisive 
issue.181 Essentially, there were two different opinions concerning the topic between 
2005 and 2007. Some pointed out the strategic vulnerabilities inherent in the Iranian 
economy and energy sector – these voices supported sanctions because they were 
thought to be effective. (Berman [2008a]; Berman [2008b]; Clawson [2007]; [2009]; 
Ross; Makovsky [2009]: pp. 216-219.) Another report established that cumulated 
sanctions efforts over the years have started taking “a dramatic toll on Iran’s economy.” 
(Katzman [2012b]: p. 52.) This, however, is a relatively recent report, which was 
published after the October 2012 collapse of the Rial that was probably due to stricter 
sanctions introduced under the Obama administration. Thus, its conclusions may not be 
entirely appropriate for the period examined here (2006-2009). 
Others pointed out that the embargo was not likely to be successful and as the 
sanctions in question were not part of a unitary effort on behalf of the EU and the US, 
                                                 
180 Between 1987 and 2006 Iranian exports grew from $ 8.5 billion to $ 70 billion in 2006 constant US 
dollars. “The annual real growth in Iran’s exports between 1987 and 2006 was nearly 9 percent; however, 
the export growth rate between 2002 and 2006 was 19 percent, reflecting the steep rise in oil prices since 
2002.” (According to the USGAO these rates have been calculated using the “ordinary least square 
method.”)  See: Iran Sanctions – Impact in Furthering… [2007]: p. 27.  
181  See the debate on the sanctions introduced under the Clinton presidency and the works referenced 
regarding the efficiency of sanctions in Chapter II. 
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American companies forced to leave the Iranian economy had in fact left an investment 
vacuum for European or other actors to fill. (Becker-Nixon [2010]) This may have even 
contributed to driving a wedge between the two sides of the Atlantic. (Milani [2005]: p. 
53.)  
Another rather surprising account established that “The federal government has 
awarded more than $107 billion in contract payments, grants and other benefits over 
the past decade to foreign and multinational American companies while they were doing 
business in Iran, despite Washington’s efforts to discourage investment there, records 
show.”182 The article also reported that of the altogether 74 companies doing business 
with both the US government and Iran, 49 were still engaged in business with the 
Islamic Republic. It is also instructive that the ILSA (called ISA after the 2006 
amendments) was never really implemented due to the objection of European allies. 
William A. Reinsch, the President of the National Foreign Trade Council pointed out the 
counterproductive nature of uncoordinated international sanctions. He argued that 
sanctions are “futile” as US energy companies that left the Iranian economy had 
“simply been replaced by foreign competitors.” (Becker-Nixon [2010]) He also pointed 
out that a number of those US companies employ a lot of US citizens, thus, if they are 
kept from investing abroad, those workers’ jobs will be more difficult to sustain. (Ibid; 
Becker-Nixon et al. [2010])183 Moreover, a 2008 article emphasized that the volume of 
US-Iran trade kept growing despite sanctions and the aggressive rhetoric of the Bush 
administration. The astonishing part of the piece is that it provides information on US 
military hardware indirectly being sold to Iran. (The New York Times July 8, 2008. – 
author unknown)   
Indeed,  the USGAO had reported that US military and sensitive dual-use goods 
have been shipped to Iran through the UAE, Malaysia, Singapore, Brazil, Colombia and 
Canada, Australia, Thailand and a number of European countries. (Iran Sanctions – 
Complete and Timely Licensing… [2010]: p. 15.; pp. 1-15.) The US Department of 
Justice has registered a number of cases in which components for F-14 fighter aircraft, 
F-4 fighter-bombers, F-5 fighters, “US-built military helicopters, military-grade night 
vision equipment, submachine guns, computers” and equipment for laboratories were 
sold to Iran. (Ibid. p. 15.)  
                                                 
182 It is also worth noting that the total volume of US-Iran trade amounted to $ 247 million. Iran 
Sanctions – Impact in Furthering… [2007]: p. 27. 
183 See the chapter on the sanctions introduced during the Clinton administration.  
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Figure 7. Illegal Transshipment Routes to Iran 
 
 
Source: Iran Sanctions – Complete and Timely Licensing Data Needed to Strengthen Enforcement of 
Export Restrictions.  March 2010. Report to Congressional Requesters. US Governmental 
Accountability Office GAO-10-375. http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-375 Accessed: 05-12-
2012 
 
Kenneth Katzman of the Congressional Research Service writes that “There is a 
consensus that U.S. and U.N. sanctions have not, to date, accomplished their core 
strategic objective of compelling Iran to verifiably limit its nuclear development to 
purely peaceful purposes. By all accounts—the United States, the P5+1, the United 
Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—Iran has not complied with 
the applicable provisions of the U.N. Security Council resolutions requiring that 
outcome.” (Katzman [2012b]: p. 50.) Furthermore, Katzman’s report puts forth that 
there is no clear evidence to support the assumption that sanctions have slowed down 
the development of Iran’s nuclear program. It has not rolled back Iranian influence in 
the Middle East either. Iranian short and medium range ballistic missile capabilities 
have been improving and Tehran continued to procure ships and submarines. Thus, Iran 
may have been violating provisions of UNSC 1747. Iran’s human right record has not 
been improving either. (Ibid.) 
Still others point out that “[…] it is not apparent that the mounting costs of 
sanctions have brought the clerical leadership any closer to a meaningful process of 
dialogue—much less serious compromises—on its nuclear programme or the other 
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elements of its provocative policies.” (Takeyh-Maloney [2011]: p. 1305.; p. 1311.) 
Thus, sanctions have not changed the policies of the regime. 
All in all, the picture is blurred. This is underscored by a 2007 report of the 
USGAO, which found that almost any sanctions could be evaded if companies exported 
goods through third countries. The USGAO has also pointed out that foreign firms kept 
investing into the Iranian energy sector and the volume of trade has also been growing 
(see above). The report states that “U.S. officials and experts report that U.S. sanctions have 
specific impacts on Iran; however, the extent of such impacts is difficult to 
determine.[…]However, other evidence raises questions about the extent of reported economic 
impacts.” (Iran Sanctions – Impact in Furthering… [2007]: p. 3.) Sanctioned banks can 
circumvent financial sanctions by handling transactions through third financial institutions or 
manage transactions in currencies different from the US dollar. The other, rather surprising fact 
discovered by GAO was that a number of US government agencies do not actually collect data 
needed for feedback on the efficiency of sanctions. The report goes on to state that Iran’s 
international positions on the global energy market may make it nearly impossible to isolate it 
economically. (Iran Sanctions – Impact in Furthering… [2007]: pp. 2-5.) 
 It is perhaps safe to state that sanctions may have had some economic and social 
effects between 2006 and 2008, but they were definitely not enough to change the 
Iranian regime’s policies. Thus, in a political sense, they cannot be judged as having 
been efficient. However, there is no reason to believe that more crippling sanctions 
would have been effective. There are good reasons to believe that the stricter the 
sanctions are the more strategic blowback they are going to cause. In fact, Suzanne 
Maloney argues that crippling sanctions lead to more tensions as they weaken the 
Iranian economy, which provide further incentives for Iran to move ahead with nuclear 
weapons development for a deterrent capability. The bottom line is that Iran, if pushed 
against the wall, will be less risk-averse. (Maloney [2012]: Joshi [2012]; Takeyh-
Maloney [2011]: p. 1312. also referenced in Joshi [2012]) 
 What remains to be examined is the military component of containment. This 
dimension of the policy was based on traditional Cold War-like containment that aimed 
to build military “bastions” (or strengthen existing ones) around Iran by tightening the 
“military encirclement” of the Islamic Republic. The first signs of the military 
component came in the form of constant rhetorical saber rattling, which the author 
discussed earlier.  However, the military component was more than just rhetoric. During 
the fall of 2006, the US media reported that the administration was planning to send an 
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additional aircraft carrier to the Gulf to strengthen US military presence there. The USS 
Stennis was to join the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower that had deployed to the Gulf area 
in October 2006. (Global Security [Date unknown])  Thus, containment had a military 
dimension from the very start. It is interesting to note again that all this happened during 
2006, the year which has brought a shift in US policies. 
 The other military-related measure was the initiation of the Gulf Security 
Dialogue (GSD). The idea belonged to Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military 
Affairs John Hillen. He wanted to “get the Gulf Arabs engaged in working together in a 
common defense against Iran.” (Crist [2012]: p. 516.) The plan was to deter Iran, 
counter terrorism and promote stability in the Middle Eastern region. The backbone of 
this policy was selling arms to Gulf Arab states – Patriot missiles, fighter aircraft, radars 
and certain combat ships. Essentially, all of these were to become integrated elements of 
a Gulf air defense system. (Crist [2012]: pp. 516-517.)   
 Again, the problematic part of the concept was exactly what Nasr and Takeyh 
had elaborated upon in their 2008 Foreign Affairs article referenced earlier. No doubt, 
Gulf Arab states feared Iran and they were anxious about the growth Iran’s influence. 
However, the administration drew the wrong conclusion regarding the priorities of Gulf 
states. Their fear resulted in the exact opposite of what the US wanted: instead of 
forming a unitary front against Iran, some of them rather opted out in order to avoid 
annoying Iran. Oman and Qatar had quite significant economic ties to Iran and they did 
not want to risk their relatively good relations with the Islamic Republic. (Crist [2012]: 
p. 517.; Blanchard-Grimmet [2008])  
 Overall, the military component did not produce meaningful results but it did 
contribute to escalating political tensions between the US and Iran. The GSD was never 
really realized and no significant arms transfers took place as a result of the initiative 
during the tenure of office of the Bush administration. (Blanchard-Grimmet [2008]) It 
was more about ‘posturing’ than real actions and this corresponds with the concept of 
the author, which puts forth that containment was based on the implicit 
acknowledgment of the limits of US influence and resources. A ground military 
operation against Iran was out of question by 2006 as US resources were stretched too 
thin. The only theoretical option was airstrikes, but too many technical dilemmas were 
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associated with it.184 (Balogh [2010a]: pp. 367-369) After the release of the 2007 NIE, 
which stated that Iran is likely to have halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, it 
was politically unrealistic to expect that Washington was still planning on attacking 
Iran. (See: Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities… [2007]; see also: Ross; 
Makovsky [2009]: pp. 213-216.)  
Military threats, isolation and coercion did not seem to be accomplishing their 
original goals – quite to the contrary, they have supported the Iranian regime by 
providing it with legitimacy in its fight against an ‘external enemy.’ (Nasr-Takeyh 
[2007]) 
There are certain prominent analysts who prefer some form of containment. 
(Pollack [2005]: pp. 412-416.; Pollack [2008] pp. 372-375.; Takeyh-Lindsay [2010b]; 
Clawson [2000])185 However, a number of critiques point out the problems associated 
with this solution. Milani argues that Washington’s policy of containment leads Iran 
“[…] to neutralize the United States' attempts to contain it, the Iranian government is 
both undermining U.S. interests and increasing its own power in the vast region that 
stretches from the Levant and the Persian Gulf to the Caucasus and Central Asia.” 
(Milani [2009]: pp. 46-47.) While the US was trying to limit Iranian influence in the 
region, Iran continued the development of its weapons programs and its nuclear 
program. (Ibid.) Others have noted the difficulty of defining what containment really is 
as so many different actors have ascribed so many different meanings to the expression. 
(Kaye-Lorber [2012]) Still others point to the counterproductive nature of containment 
and deterrence. Since containing Iran’s nuclear aspirations can only be successful if US 
threats are credible, the US will be motivated to apply force in order to prove the 
credibility of its deterrent. (Leverett-Leverett [2010a]. Ray Takeyh’s insightful 2006 
book puts forward that:  
“Since the inception of the Islamic Republic, the United States has pursued a policy of 
containment in various forms, essentially relying on political coercion and economic 
pressure to press Iran in the right direction. The failure of this policy is routinely 
                                                 
184 It is worth noting that most experts point out a number of technical and political difficulties associated 
with a potential air strike on Iran. They put forward that Iran would only redouble its efforts in order to 
reach nuclear weapons capability. Moreover, Iranian nuclear sites are scattered all over Iran with some 
being underground, thus air strikes would have to be sustained over a long period of time and they would 
be difficult to carry out. Bombing Iran could cause a surge in the popularity of the regime and play into 
the hands of radicals.  Iran could attack US targets in the gulf and it may even block the Strait of Hormuz. 
(Balogh [2010a]: p. 368.) 
185 It should be noted, however, that Takeyh and Lindsay write about the implication of an Iran with 
nuclear weapons capability, thus, their usage of the term “containment” and “deterrence” refers to a 
completely different situation. (See: Takeyh-Lindsay [2010b])    
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documented by the U.S. State Department, which insists on issuing reports denouncing 
Iran as the most active state sponsor of terrorism and warning that its nuclear program is 
rapidly advancing toward weapons capability. The American diplomats fail to appreciate 
how, after twenty-seven years of sanctions and containment, Iran’s misbehavior has not 
changed in any measurable manner. Even more curious, the failed policy of containment 
enjoys a wide spread bipartisan consensus, as governments as different as the Clinton and 
Bush administrations have largely adhered to its parameters. Although at times the Bush 
White House has indulged in calls of regime change, its essential policy still reflects the 
containment consensus. In Washington policy circles evidently nothing succeeds like 
failure.” (Takeyh [2006]: p. 220.) 
 
 Empirical evidence tends to show that containment has either produced strategic 
blowback effects or it has simply been ineffective.  
 
2.3.1. Explaining Outcomes – Strategic Blowback and Containment 
 
The US policy of containment qualifies as aggressive foreign policy behavior 
according to the definition applied by the dissertation. Thus, what remains to be 
examined is whether this caused any strategic setbacks by hindering or altogether 
preventing the realization of US national interests.186 Again, the dissertation argues that 
factors on at least two levels affected the experienced outcomes: 
Systemic factors: 
 global distribution of power; and the 
 regional distribution of power. 
 
Sub-systemic factors: 
 government policies of the US and Iran; 
 perceptions; and 
 domestic constituencies and political forces.  
 
As far as the systemic level is concerned, containment was partly a result of the 
recognition by the Bush administration that the US pool of resources is not infinite. 
Military action against Iran would have cost the US dearly, but the administration also 
                                                 
186 Recall that US national interests under the Bush administration were defined by the dissertation as 
follows: defeating Islamic militancy and terrorism; rolling back the appeal of Islamic extremism by 
spreading US values and institutions; securing the free flow of energy from the Middle East, fostering 
stability in Iraq and Afghanistan and, finally, fostering stability in the Middle East partly by reaching a 
solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. (See the beginning of this chapter.)  
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rejected most Iranian initiatives regarding a possible dialogue or rapprochement. Thus, 
the only viable action was containment. Thus, it is the limits of US global and regional 
power that led to the pursuit of containment. This explanation corresponds with Iran’s 
power position at the time. Although the relative position of the two powers did not 
change significantly since the beginning of the Bush administration, still, Iran’s latent 
leverage grew significantly due to changed geopolitical realities. Iran’s regional reach 
made it a formidable challenge to US influence in the Middle East. Thus, applying the 
structural logic of Neoclassical Realism, it is the relative weakening of the US and the 
growth of Iran’s regional power that led to the implicit acknowledgment of limits to US 
power and US efforts to contain the Islamic Republic.  
The growth of Iran’s (structural) power, then, led to Iran’s ability to hinder the 
realization of US strategic interests in the region. By choosing to reject Iranian offers to 
cooperate and by containing Iran’s regional influence, Iran had an incentive to fight the 
US occupation of Iraq through supporting its own proxies. Structural and geopolitical 
realities explain why Iran was motivated to act as a spoiler in Iraq. Having been 
surrounded by US troops, Iran felt that its Iraqi presence was imperative for its own 
security. However, as the US aspired to roll back Iranian influence in the Middle East, 
Iran was even more motivated to make the US presence in Iran and Afghanistan as 
difficult as possible. (Parsi [2012]: pp. 5-6.) 
This led to sustained Iranian support for various groups in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Lebanon, Gaza and the Palestinian Territories, which in turn made the realization of US 
interests more difficult. It made defeating Islamic militancy and extremism, as well as 
the spreading US values and institutions almost impossible. It also cast a shadow over 
the free flow of energy supplies through the Strait of Hormuz, since Iran started 
threatening the closure of the strait in case it was attacked. It conducted military 
exercises during November 2006, which demonstrated preparations for blocking the 
strait – roughly a month after the first carrier was dispatched to the region in October. 
(See: McElroy [2007]) The strategic US national interest of stabilizing Iraq and 
Afghanistan was successfully jeopardized by Iran from 2006 to 2009.  Finally, by 
organizing the Annapolis conference on the Arab-Israeli conflict without inviting Iran, 
the US created a situation in which Tehran had a stake in undermining the success of 
the process. Furthermore, acquiring a nuclear deterrent would also be a logical response 
to Iran’s own geopolitical situation. The bottom line is that Iran had not given up on 
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developing its nuclear program.187 Thus, structural factors by themselves explain the 
outcomes.  
At the sub-systemic level, US government policies led to significant setbacks. 
The political element of containment proved to be the most counterproductive, thus, it 
caused the most significant strategic blowback effects. Containment efforts concentrated 
on creating an anti-Iran consensus in the region, which clearly did not exist at the time. 
These US efforts led to Iranian policies aimed “at breaking out of the artificial cage” the 
US was trying to create in the region. But the US never really succeeded in realizing 
this because Iran countered these efforts. These countermeasures manifested themselves 
in Iranian political support for its proxies in the region as mentioned above. Occasional 
military threats actually played into the hands of radicals in Tehran because they 
provided legitimacy for those who aimed to sustain the regime by mobilizing political 
forces based on anti-Americanism. Political containment was pursued parallel to 
engaging Iran in the P5+1 framework. However, these diplomatic initiatives on 
Washington’s behalf were not meaningful enough to produce a breakthrough with Iran 
and change the overall “aggressive” and confrontational nature of US policy.  
Economic containment did not reach its strategic objectives because sanctions 
did not change Iran’s policies. Enforcement did not really cause significant direct 
blowback effects; rather, they were simply ineffective. The volume of US-Iran trade even 
grew during this period and the US government maintained business relations with 
entities which kept dealing with Iran as well. Even US dual-use goods and military 
hardware made it to Iran due to flawed implementation of sanctions. Enforcement 
measures contributed to the weakening of companies, which were forced to leave the 
Iranian market only to leave an investment vacuum behind to be filled by European and 
other firms. (See: Katzman [2012b]: p. 42.) Sanctions had similar effects as the political 
segment of containment: they provided a platform for Ahmadinejad and those on the far 
right of the Iranian political spectrum to blame Iran’s economic hardships on sanctions. 
Thus, economic enforcement measures provided a “fig leaf” for hiding how inadept the 
government was at managing the economy. (Katzman [2012b]: p. 52.) 
Military containment (e.g. an additional US carrier task force in the Gulf) led to 
the escalation of tensions in the Gulf and, thus, destabilized the Gulf security situation. 
The other form of military containment concentrated on rallying Arab states in the Gulf 
                                                 
187 This does not imply that Iran’s nuclear program has military implications, but it does not close out the 
possibility either. 
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to counter Iran’s influence by improving their military capabilities. The bilateral and 
multilateral arrangements resembled the modernized version of John Foster Dulles’s 
“pactomania” as applied to the Gulf region of the 21st century.  It was based on a 
flawed assumption, since Gulf states had difficulties in agreeing on a unitary “anti-Iran” 
front in the region. The prospect of selling arms to Gulf states fueled distrust and 
tensions between Washington and Tehran and further contributed to negative Iranian 
perceptions of the US.  
These perceptions were further reinforced due to systematic rhetorical efforts 
signaling US willingness to apply force against Iran if necessary. All in all, this track of 
containment did not lead to direct strategic blowback, but it did contribute to a tense 
atmosphere in the region, which intensified Iranian efforts aiming to sabotage US efforts 
in the Middle East. This mutually reinforcing nature of perceptions and images of “self” 
and “other” have contributed to the stalemate between Iran and the US during the 
period examined. (See: Beeman [2008]) 
Domestic forces also contributed to containment – unilateral US sanctions such 
as the Iran Freedom Support Act renewed ILSA under the title “Iran Sanctions Act.” 
This formed the backbone of the US ban on investment in the Iranian energy sector. 
Domestic political forces in Congress were successful in extending ILSA and, thus, 
complemented other economic containment measures of the executive branch. Again, 
this was an incentive for Iranian radicals who thought their political platform had been 
justified by repeated US efforts to isolate Iran economically.  
All in all, the policy of containment closed out the option of cooperation 
between the US and Iran. It caused significant direct strategic blowback effects and led 
Iran to undermine US policies in the region through its regional network. In fact, the 
realization of all six key US national interests regarding the Middle East had been 
hindered or prevented altogether. 
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3. The Obama Administration (2009–2010)  
 
"The highest proof of virtue is to possess boundless 
power without abusing it." Lord Macaulay (Secretary 
at War 1839-1841) Quoted in: Daalder; Lindsay 
[2005], page unmarked. 
   
The Clinton administration’s approach to using US power was based on a 
balanced concept that recognized the many facets of modern power. President Clinton 
was willing to use force, but only in a limited manner. The Bush administration, on the 
other hand, was far more willing to rely on US force much more extensively and had a 
rather one dimensional (militarist) view of modern power. In this respect, Barack 
Hussein Obama’s presidency marked a return to a more nuanced view of US power that 
recognized the complexities of power in the 21st century. However, he seemed to show 
greater resolve when applying US military force than Clinton and he was also more 
willing to rely on the use of force in many respects than his democratic predecessor 
was. Thus, there is more continuity between the foreign policies of Obama and Bush 
than their political or ideological background may imply. (Balogh [2011c])  
It is interesting to note that Obama is often regarded as a “law professor” due to 
his background in teaching constitutional law at the University of Chicago Law School 
and his law degree from Harvard Law School. (See: Kantor [2009]) This, however, does 
not cover Obama’s entire experience and socialization because he also gained a degree 
in political science with an emphasis in international relations at Columbia University. 
His immigrant background and his international experience as a child provided him 
with a different perspective compared to that of the two previous Presidents. This 
obviously had an impact on how he thought of the world and foreign policy in 
general.188   
Obama’s nomination for democratic presidential candidate followed a fierce 
primary election fight with a prominent New York senator who had already spent eight 
years in the White House. Hillary Clinton was a formidable rival who enjoyed the 
                                                 
188 Certain authors reject the idea that Obama’s immigrant background and international experience as a 
child had a defining impact upon his thinking. (See: Mann [2012]: pp. 72-73.) The author doubts that that 
was the case. Of course these personal experiences are entirely subjective, still, it is reasonable to think 
that Obama’s earlier international experience influenced his views on the world. The author has lived 
abroad for almost two years altogether at the ages of 12 and 14 and can honestly say that he has been 
seeing the world completely differently ever since that experience.  
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support of the democratic establishment with connections to the “Clinton-clan”. Ending 
the Iraq war, defeating al Qaeda and nonproliferation were among Obama’s top national 
security priorities. (Washington Post, [date unknown]). Obama prevailed and beat John 
McCain in the national elections, becoming the first black president in the history of the 
US. His campaign focused on fixing the economy, reforming health care and social 
security, tax reform, fiscal balance, as well as withdrawing troops from Iraq.  
 The Obama administration took over the wheel of government amid the largest 
world economic crisis since the 1929-1933 great depression and a number of other 
international challenges were looming over the horizon. Osama bin Laden’s 
whereabouts and the threat of al Qaeda; instability in Iraq and Afghanistan; North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons program; Iran’s nuclear program; the Arab-Israeli peace 
process; the rise of China and an emboldened Russia are just some of the difficult issues 
Obama had to deal with. Upon entering office, he devised an ambitious plan promising 
to tackle these problems. He spoke of “a world free of nuclear weapons” in 2009; 
promised to pull out troops from Iraq; refocused US attention on Afghanistan and 
ordered the deployment of additional troops there and he also wanted to close the 
notorious prison in Guantanamo. (See respectively: Remarks by President Obama. 
Prague, April 5, [2009]; Cockburn [2008]; Remarks by the President in Address to the 
Nation… December 1. [2009]; Mazetti; Glaberson [2009]; Harding; Traynor [2009]]) A 
number of his initial measures proved to be highly controversial, such as backing away 
from missile defense plans in Central Eastern Europe. (Harding; Traynor [2009]; 
Magyarics [2010]) It is true that the initial expectations concerning the Obama 
administration’s policies were too high to begin with, and then President Obama 
received the Nobel Peace Prize, which further raised those expectations. Thus, 
expecting him to reach a breakthrough on so many fronts was unrealistic from the start.   
 It is difficult to define what approach the Obama administration represented 
during the first two years of its tenure of office, i.e. if Obama had a “grand strategy.” 
Many have tried to describe and label the overall approach of the administration to 
foreign affairs in order to find out if there was ‘an Obama doctrine’ or not. The 
intellectual disorder in this regard is quite obvious. One source describes the Obama 
doctrine as representing a middle way between the approaches of presidents Clinton and 
Bush. (Blake; Cillizza [2011]) Others point to Obama’s increased reliance on drone 
attacks as the core of his doctrine. (Rohde [2012]) Still others put forward that the 
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backbone of Obama’s foreign policy is the kind of “new interventionism” demonstrated 
in Libya, which marks a departure from traditional intervention. It is based on the 
application of air power and limited US involvement. (Kaplan [2011]; Daalder; 
Stavridis [2012]; The Economist [2011]) Another author contends that the Obama 
doctrine is about containing China. (White [2011]) Fareed Zakaria argues that one 
possible definition of the concept could be the strategy of “rebalancing”, which refers to 
the “pivot to Asia.” (Zakaria [2012]; Annual Report on Military Power of Iran [2012]: 
pp. 1-4.) 
 Another obvious source for defining Obama’s grand strategy is the May 2010 
National Security Strategy. The core of this document could be conveyed as follows: 
multilateral cooperation and cooperation with emerging powers; managing the rise of 
China; limited and careful promotion of democracy, as well as selective (humanitarian) 
interventionism. (NSS [2010]) This corresponds with Zakaria’s definition of the 
doctrine: ‘managing the rise of emerging powers’. (Zakaria [2012]: pp. 17-20) Only 
Zakaria’s latter definition qualifies as a viable summary of Obama’s approach to foreign 
affairs. Most of the other labels and definitions do not qualify for a “doctrine” because 
they are not broad enough to provide the administration with basic principles for 
engaging the world. Elliot Abrams of the Council on Foreign Relations points out that 
drone attacks, for example, cannot form the core of any foreign policy because it can 
only tackle certain challenges. (Abrams [2012]) Thus, this dissertation argues that the 
Obama doctrine could be defined as accepting the changing nature of the global 
balance of power and managing the rise of emerging powers. (Balogh [2012]: pp. 9-
11.)189 It is a careful approach designed to take note of the limits to US power. Thus, 
Obama was only willing to apply force if success was assured. This corresponds with 
the words of former British Secretary at War Lord Macaulay quoted at the beginning of 
this chapter. Paradoxically, power is most effective when there is no need for it to be 
applied to the fullest and Obama seemed to take a similar view on US power. 
 It is also important to note that while Clinton’s foreign policy marked the basic 
platform for Obama, he significantly changed the way democrats related to the 
application of military force. Clinton was not afraid of relying on force either, but he 
was more hesitant at times – perhaps due to the new strategic environment following the 
                                                 
189 This section of the dissertation has been taken from an earlier publication of the author. See: Balogh 
[2012]: pp. 8-16. 
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collapse of the Soviet Union. Clinton’s willingness to apply military force in certain 
situations marked a departure from the traditional view of democrats on the use of force 
following Vietnam. This view was based on ardent opposition of the use of force in 
order to avoid another Vietnam-like situation and was associated with Democratic 
presidential candidate George McGovern who lost the 1972 elections. From then on, 
Democrats looked weak on national security and this image stuck with them until 
Clinton. Clinton modified this picture with the Kosovo intervention. In fact, it was the 
Kosovo intervention that was the “archetype” of Obama’s intervention in Libya. 
Nonetheless, it was Obama who has completely dismantled the negative image of 
Democrats regarding national security. The liquidation of Osama bin Laden and the 
intervention in Libya led to the redefinition of how Democrats related to the use of 
military force. (Mann [2012] pp. 13-44.) 
The Obama presidency’s plans regarding the Middle East included setting a new 
tone in rhetoric and applying a softer and more balanced tone regarding US 
commitment to Israel and Arab political forces. (See: Remarks by the President on a 
New Beginning… June 4. [2009]). Regarding Iran, Obama promised high level and 
“direct diplomacy” in order to engage the regime in Tehran. (Barack Obama will 
pursue… [2008]) He sent a video message to the Iranian people on the occasion of the 
Persian New Year (‘Nowruz’). (Videotaped Remarks by the President in Celebration of 
Nowruz. March 20. [2009]) The White House was careful in its reactions to popular 
unrests in Iran following the 2009 presidential elections and Obama applied pressure on 
Israel in order to keep it from attacking Iran.  (Beale [2009]; Benn, Mozgovaya [2009]). 
Thus, Obama’s seemingly new approach and tone signaled a significant change.190 
 This chapter argues that even though Obama did change the course of US 
foreign policy regarding Iran, his efforts demonstrated more continuity with Bush than 
his initial measures implied. Still, he is the president who came closest to reaching a 
deal with Iran and that was due to a new approach based on more engagement and less 
confrontation, which corresponds with the logic of the strategic blowback theory. 
However, this engagement did not lead to a significant breakthrough with Iran, thus, 
Obama also returned to the old – and flawed – idea of containment. This hindered the 
realization of US national interests in the region, which are defined as follows: 
 
                                                 
190 This section has been taken from an earlier publication of the author. See: Balogh [2011c] pp. 1-2. 
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 defeating terrorism associated with Islamic extremism; 
 rolling back Islamic militancy and extremism; 
 stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan; 
 Arab-Israeli peace; and 
 preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. 
 
The following chapters analyze the initial efforts to engage Iran and then the return to 
containment. Events are examined up to December 18, 2010 – the first wave of protests 
in Tunisia – which marks the beginning of popular Arab uprisings in the Middle Eastern 
and North African regions. This was the date chosen in the introductory chapter as the 
end of the period examined in the dissertation. The chapter wishes to shed light on why 
engagement did not bring results and what are the implications of the strategic 
blowback theory as applied to the Obama administration’s Iran policy.    
 
3.1. Overtures of the Obama administration  
 
 Barack Obama wished to provide an alternative to two foreign policy 
approaches: that of Hillary Clinton in order to beat her in the primaries and the foreign 
policy of the Bush administration in order to distinguish himself from the previous 
Republican presidency. During a televised debate on July 24 2007, Obama put forth that 
he would be willing to meet the leaders of Iran, North Korea, Venezuela, Cuba and 
Syria. He argued that not talking to them is regarded as a “punishment” by the Bush 
administration but he contended that this is “ridiculous.” (See: Mann [2012]: pp. 83-85.) 
Overall, the only position regarding Iran that could distinguish Obama from both the 
incumbent administration and the other Democratic candidates, was to support direct 
talks with Iranian leaders. There was another rationale behind supporting direct 
diplomacy with Iran: the fact that no US administration has ever tried high level, direct, 
and one-on-one diplomacy with Tehran since 1979. Thus, it seemed to make sense to 
add this alternative to possible options when it came to dealing with the Islamic 
Republic. Thus, both domestic as well as foreign policy “pressures” made promoting 
diplomatic talks the logical path to pursue. 
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 As noted earlier, the Obama administration began engagement efforts by sending 
a direct message addressed to the Iranian people for Nowruz, the Persian New Year in 
March 2009. (The President’s Message to the Iranian People. March 19. [2009]) It was 
an unprecedented initiative and one that raised expectations regarding a significant shift 
in US policies towards Iran. Obama offered dialogue if Iran was willing to “unclench its 
fist.” (Fawaz [2012]: p. 180.) The first official encounter between the parties took place 
at a conference on Afghanistan on March 31, 2009. The mood of this event suggested a 
positive outlook for engagement. Shortly after taking office, Obama ordered the review 
of US policy on Iran. Once that was concluded, Washington sent two letters to Iranian 
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Khamenei responded by listing Iranian 
grievances but the letter did not close out the possibility of engagement. He expected a 
change not only in rhetoric, but also in US actions. However, the second letter was 
never answered probably due to the turmoil surrounding the Iranian presidential 
elections in June 2009. (Parsi [2012]: p. 56; pp. 100-101.)  
On a multilateral level, the P5+1 made renewed efforts to make the parties return 
to the negotiating table after Obama entered office. The group sent another invitation to 
Iran offering to pursue talks on pressing issues regarding the Iranian nuclear program. 
Iran only responded in September with a reply that did not include the issue of its 
nuclear program at all, thus, this track of the discussions did not lead to any results. In 
June 2009, Iran requested IAEA help in providing it with fuel for one of its research 
reactors in Tehran (Tehran Research Reactor, TRR). This reactor produced medical 
isotopes for medical purposes. The US put forth another offer: if Iran handed over 1200 
kg of its uranium enriched to 4% it could receive 120 kg of fuel for the TRR.  (ACA 
[2012]) The TRR specifically needed uranium enriched at the 20% level and the US and 
the P5+1 offered Iran to provide it with this type of fuel. 
Thus, on October 1, 2009 US representatives met Iran within the framework 
P5+1 format in Geneva, Switzerland. The novel element of the event was that the US 
and Iran were willing to meet each other one-on-one and so Under Secretary of State 
William Burns held talks with Iranian chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili. This had 
been the highest level discussion between the two countries since 1979. The plan that 
was agreed upon required Iran to provide Russia with its stocks of enriched uranium to 
be converted into reactor fuel by Moscow and then to be sent to France for further 
processing. Finally, enriched uranium would be returned to Iran for use in the TRR. 
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Talks continued in Vienna during October 2009. However, the deal had not worked out 
well as Iran rejected the idea of having to send all of its uranium stocks abroad. 
Furthermore, Khamenei also voiced harsh criticism concerning the talks and targeting 
the US. (Mann [2012]: pp. 203-204.; Borger [2009]) Obama gave Iran until December 
31 2009 in order to move ahead with finding a solution to the stalemate. (Crail [2010]) 
This did not happen, thus, the Geneva round did not produce the results previously 
hoped for. (See: Sanger et al. [2009]) The last efforts at diplomacy meant using Japan 
and later Turkey as intermediaries between the US and Iran in order to strike a deal 
based on the Geneva offer. However, none of those countries succeeded. (Parsi [2012]: 
pp. 143-146.)  
Diplomacy seemed to have failed and, furthermore, Iran announced in February 
2010 that it had started enriching uranium at 19.75% levels. (BBC [2010]; Mousavian 
[2012b]: pp. 365-367) Furthermore, Iran organized a “counter-conference” after it was 
not invited to a 2010 conference on nuclear issues organized by the Obama 
administration in Washington, D.C. 2010 was also the year of the NPT review 
conference and Iran obviously wanted to demonstrate its international influence in this 
field. Thus, around 60 countries were said to have accepted the invitation to the Iranian 
nuclear summit. (Mostafavi et al. [2010]) 
Obama reacted carefully to events following the 2009 Iranian presidential 
elections in order not to alienate Iran from engaging the US. (Parsi [2012]: pp. 94-95.)  
However, as a result of the Iranian rejection of the P5+1 proposal and narrowing 
international as well as domestic political space for engagement, the US stance on Iran 
hardened and Washington started reducing the distance it previously kept from the 
Green Movement. By 2011, the brief episode of engagement was entirely over. (Mann 
[2012]: pp. 204-206.) By late 2010, the Obama team had a tough containment policy in 
place in order to up the ante on Iran. Part of this obviously had to do with the fact that 
by the fall of 2009, the US, UK and French intelligence services discovered a uranium 
facility under construction in Fordow near Qom that had not been reported to the IAEA. 
(Mann [2012]: p. 203.; Barzashka [2009]) 
The policy of engagement was regarded by many prominent analysts and experts 
as the only solution to the US-Iran stalemate. (See: Takeyh [2009]: pp. 263-265.; 
Takeyh [2006]: p. 222-226.; Kaye-Wehrey [2009] p. 46.; Maloney-Takeyh [2007]; Nasr 
[2008]) Even former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates was a proponent of engaging 
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Iran before he joined the Obama administration and former National Security Adviser 
Zbigniew Brzezinski also supported the idea. (See: 2 U.S. ex officials … [2004]) Colin 
Powell, Madeleine Albright, Warren Christopher, James Baker, as well as Henry 
Kissinger all expressed support for engagement at some point. (AFP [2008]) John Kerry 
also argued for engagement. (Kerry [2009]) Others did not think that engagement by 
itself could lead to success or they were at least skeptical. (Pollack [2006]: pp. 395-400.; 
Berman [2009]; Parasiliti [2010];) Even if opinions were divided, there seemed to have 
been a consensus within the “mainstream” of experts and the US foreign policy 
establishment that engagement was the right path to take. Still, the above experience 
seems to prove otherwise.  
 Results of the first significant Iran related initiative of the Obama administration 
seems to be undermining the strategic blowback hypothesis. The US administration 
tried what seemed to correspond with H1b, namely, the strategy of seeking the least 
resistance by concentrating on diplomatic talks. Furthermore, it turned out that Iran was 
building a new underground nuclear facility. The US pursued nonaggressive policies 
and still experienced blowback effects, which occurred in the form of Iranian rejections 
of US and international initiatives to remedy problems between the parties. Absent a 
deal, Iran was motivated to sustain its policies, which were essentially designed to 
frustrate and sabotage US policies in the region. Thus, initial steps of the Obama 
administration seem to be providing evidence of the strongest rebuttal of the blowback 
hypothesis yet. It seems as if nonaggressive approaches led to equally harsh blowback 
effects. However, that is not the case as the next chapter explains.  
   
3.1.1. Explaining Outcomes – Strategic Blowback and the Diplomatic Opening 
Towards Iran 
  
 There are a number of issues to be examined regarding President Obama’s 
policy of engagement with Iran. First of all, one has to see if the policy of engagement 
can be regarded as a nonaggressive effort. In fact, engagement was complemented with 
other policies and the overall effect of those different tracks led to policies at least partly 
aggressive. The explanation for this is the following. 
All of the above implies that the Obama administration applied a genuinely 
different approach to what the Bush administration had been representing. That is true, 
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but a more nuanced understanding of how the US wished to engage Iran provides a 
more accurate picture. The Obama administration wished to demonstrate its willingness 
to talk. Nonetheless, the team around Obama was shrewd because it did not want to talk 
to Iran for the sake of talking but for demonstrating US willingness to exhaust all 
diplomatic solutions before something tougher could take their place. There is plenty of 
evidence to support this assumption.  
The point person in charge of Iran policy at the National Security Council at the 
time was Dennis B. Ross, President Clinton’s former Middle East peace negotiator with 
a distinguished career in government. (Scherer; Calabresi [2009]) Ross wrote a book 
with Middle East expert David Makovsky of the Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy (WINEP) in 2009. The intriguing book argues that: 
 
“Tougher policies - either military or meaningful containment - will be easier to sell 
internationally and domestically if we have diplomatically tried to resolve our differences 
with Iran in a serious and credible fashion” (Ross; Makovsky [2009]: p. 230.; Holland 
[2009]) 
 
 
In fact, the two authors devote an entire section of their book on how to engage and 
pressure Tehran at the same time. (Ross; Makovsky [2009]: pp. 225-233) 
Opening was only a prelude to tougher policies such as sanctions. It was aiming 
to demonstrate the difference between the Bush and Obama administrations. Even as the 
US was “courting” Iran, it was preparing for possible tougher sanctions against the 
Islamic Republic. Obama ordered Stuart Levey of the Office of Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence (OTFI) at the Treasury Department to work out possible scenarios for 
sanctioning Iran in case it was not willing to cooperate on the nuclear issue. In fact, 
engagement was never really “pure” in the sense that the US had always been 
contemplating other tracks in order to pressure Iran. (Mann [2012]: pp. 191-196; p. 
203,). James Mann notes: 
 
“From the outset, as Obama pressed forward his policy of engagement, his administration 
was also quietly exploring the possibilities for tightening sanctions. […] Thus, from the 
start an underlying purpose of Obama’s engagement policy was to help the United States 
win greater international support for tougher action, such as economic sanctions, than the 
Bush administration had been able to obtain. Indeed, Obama’s initial attempts at 
engagement with North Korea and Iran were generally a flop: Neither was willing to rein 
its nuclear weapons program. But these failed efforts helped to buttress the case for 
international sanctions by demonstrating that engagement by itself had failed, or that it 
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wouldn’t accomplish much. The Obama team was able to win greater European and other 
international support for sanctions than had ever been obtained by the Bush 
administration” (Mann [2012]: p. 196.) 
 
This is entirely in harmony with Patrick Clawson’s opinion: 
“What we’ve got to do is…show the world that we’re doing a heck of a lot to try and 
engage the Iranians.” “Our principal target with these offers [to Iran] is not Iran. Our 
principal target with these offers is, in fact, American public opinion [and] world public 
opinion.” (Dreyfuss [2009]: p. 7.) 
 
Moreover, Dreyfuss references a paper that Ross has worked on together with a 
number of other people. This work refers to “kinetic action” when describing possible 
contingencies the US may need to respond to in the Gulf. (Coats; Robb; Makovsky et. 
al. [2008]: p. xii. quoted in Dreyfuss [2009]: p. 7) Based on the Wikileaks documents, 
Mann’s account describes an event during which an official working within OTFI 
provided European officials with a presentation on US sanctions policies regarding Iran 
in London. The official noted that “‘engagement alone is not likely to succeed”, thus 
applying pressure has to be a potential option. (Sanger; Glanz Becker [2010]; quoted in 
Mann [2012]: p. 196.; Parsi [2012]: p. 104.)191 Diplomatic overtures were halfhearted in 
a sense, and that was enough for US initiatives to run astray. (Gerges [2012]: p. 181.) 
Former White House aide on Iran Gary Sick also noted that Iran would never have 
responded favorably to a “halfhearted” approach designed to engage as well as pressure 
Iran at the same time. (Peterson [2010]) An article of the Christian Science Monitor 
cites diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks, proving that the Obama administration 
was already preparing sanctions when engagement was underway. The article argues 
that the administration never believed sincerely that engagement would work. (Ibid. 
Leverett-Leverett [2010c]) Furthermore, the US position on the fuel swap deal became 
rather static – the US was not open to modifications suggested by Iran due to President 
Obama’s restricted domestic political space. Hence, the Geneva offer became a “take it 
or leave” it proposal. (Parsi [2012]: p. 141.; p. 219-220.)  
Thus, when examining the sub-systemic level of government policies, it is very 
important to know that “engagement” with Iran was never meant to be engagement 
alone. It was meant to provide Iran with carrots and sticks at the same time – thus, at 
least part of the policy was aggressive as defined by the dissertation. It is not entirely 
right to say that engagement was not meaningful on behalf of the US administration 
                                                 
191 This section was partly based on a section of one of the author’s earlier publications. See: Balogh 
[2011c] pp. 3-6. 
192 
 
since that would be equal to saying that Obama had not altered the approach applied by 
the Bush administration. This would not be true. Nonetheless, it is true that the moment 
engagement was started different ways were also being designed to put pressure on Iran. 
This dualism had always been part of US-Iran policies and it partly explains why the US 
had not been able to engage Iran successfully.  
 Besides engagement (i.e. the “first track”), the “second track” meant pressuring 
Iran by preparing tough sanctions but there was also a “third track” too. This meant 
covert operations designed under the Bush administration, which took the form of 
cyber-attacks against computers of Iranian nuclear installations and the Natanz uranium 
enrichment site in particular. (Sanger [2012]: p. 150) This initiative was a product of 
joint US-Israeli efforts to design a highly sophisticated virus, which caused centrifuges 
used for enrichment to blow up. The virus was later named “Stuxnet” in the media and 
took out approximately one fifth of Iran’s centrifuges in Natanz as a result of attacks, 
which began in 2010. (Sanger [2012]: pp. 188-206. Crist [2012]: p. 551.)192  
 Thus, with engagement having been pursued parallel to policies designed to 
pressure Iran, it is fair to say that at least a part of the overall US policy was aggressive, 
since sanctions and covert operations count as such policies according to the 
terminology applied by the dissertation. What remains to be explained is how this 
approach caused blowback effects. Again, factors on two different levels affected 
outcomes. 
Systemic factors: 
 global distribution of power; and 
 the regional distribution of power. 
 
Sub-systemic factors: 
 government policies of the US and Iran; 
 perceptions; and 
 domestic constituencies and political forces. 
 
Concerning the systemic level, it is necessary to note that the US was still the 
                                                 
192 It should alo be noted that a series of bomb attacks were carried out against Iranian nuclear scentists, 
most likely by Israel’s Mossad. These attacks  must have further strengthened Iranian perceptions that US 
efforts to engage Iran were not sincere as Israel was the ally of the US. (See: Crist [2012]: pp. 552-553.) 
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preeminent power in the international system, however, the development of China and 
other emerging economies started closing the gap between the United States and the 
rest. This was already the case under the Bush administration, but this tendency became 
even more prominent by the time Obama took office. During Obama’s first year in 
office, US population stood at roughly 307 million people and only the Chinese, Indian 
and EU populations were significantly larger.193 US GDP amounted to almost 14 trillion 
US dollars and this economic performance was only surpassed by the combined data of 
EU countries. Chinese output was roughly 30% –, and Japanese GDP was 
approximately 60 percent smaller than that of the US. Still, it should be noted that 
Chinese GDP more than doubled since 2003, while US economic growth began to slow 
significantly in the same period. However, US GDP was still more than four times 
larger than India’s economic output.194 (World Bank [2012])  
GDP per capita data prove that the US was still the leading economic power in 
the international system in 2008. As this indicator provides a better snapshot of the 
domestic distribution of wealth, it is somewhat more informative. However, it should be 
noted that the Chinese economy did extraordinarily well in redistributing wealth as it 
actually doubled its GDP per capita between 2003 and 2009.195 (World Bank [2012]) It 
is the annual growth rate of Chinese GDP that is even more astonishing. The world 
economic crisis was a fact by 2009 and a number of economic great powers began to 
experience negative growth rates, but not China. According to World Bank data, 
Chinese economic growth stood at 9.2% and only the Indian economy showed a similar 
performance. The US economy actually contracted in 2009 and the negative growth rate 
of US GDP was at -3,5%.196  (World Bank [2012]) The US economy was particularly 
weak when considering the total public debt, which stood at roughly 10 trillion US 
dollars in January 2009. This amounted to about 104% of that year’s economic output. 
                                                 
193 For population data for 2009 see: China: 1.331.380.000; India: 1.207.740.408; EU: 500.883.709; US: 
306.771.529; Indonesia: 237.414.495; Brazil: 193.246.610; Russian Federation: 141.910.000. (World 
Bank [2012]) 
194 For data on GDP at PPP (purchasing power parity) in current international dollars for the year 2009 
see: EU: 15.575.165.310.492; US: 13.863.600.000.000; China: 9.066.218.749.474; Japan: 
4.095.509.324.139; India: 3.727.114.702.654; Russian Federation: 2.680.824.551.723; Brazil: 
2.007.583.191.879. (Numbers have been rounded.) As in the previous chapter on the Bush administration, 
the author chose these countries as they are among the most relevant international economic powers, thus, 
their standing is a relatively good indicator of the international configuration of economic power. World 
Databank, World Bank [2012] 
195 For data on GDP per capita at PPP (purchasing power parity) in current international dollars for the 
year 2009 see: US: 45.192; Japan: 32.107; EU: 31.095; Russian Federation: 18.891; China: 6.809 
(Numbers have been rounded). World Databank, World Bank [2012] 
196 For data on annual GDP growth for the year 2009 see: China: 9.2%; India: 8.2%; Indonesia: 4.6 %; 
US: -3,5%; EU: -4.4%; Japan: -5.5%; Russian Federation: -7.8%. World Databank, World Bank [2012] 
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(TreasuryDirect [2009] p. 1.; Chantrill [Year unknown]) The share of exports in the US 
GDP amounted to 11.4%, which signaled some limited growth since 2003. However, 
the same data for China was 26.7 %, which even marks a slight reduction since 2003.197 
(World Bank [2012])  All in all, the tendency that became clearly visible by 2003198 was 
even more apparent in 2009: the US was still the strongest economy in the international 
system, but its advantage was eroding.   
China’s military development was dramatic – its military expenditures grew by 
more than 100%. Beijing spent 52 billion US dollars on its military in 2003 and this 
sum grew to 117 billion by 2009. (SIPRI [2012]) However, US military power was still 
unchallenged. According to 2010 data of the IISS Military Balance, the number of US 
active duty personnel in the US military stood 1,5 million people – 100,000 more than 
in 2003. The US national defense budget appropriation reached 694 billion US dollars 
in 2009. (IISS [2010]: p. 31.) Thus, US forces still outnumbered and US military power 
outweighed every other significant military power in the international system.199 (SIPRI 
[2012]) Furthermore, US force projection capabilities were still second to none in 2009-
2010, since the US had 11 CVN type aircraft carriers.200  
 As far as the regional configuration of power is concerned, Iran was still one of 
the most influential powers in the region, however, its economic position has 
significantly weakened.  Its population stood at 73 million, meaning that only the 
Egyptian population was significantly larger.201 The Iranian economy was still the 
second largest in the Middle East and Turkey was still number one in this respect.202 
                                                 
197 For 2009 data on exports of goods and services as percentage of GDP see: Russian Federation: 35%; 
EU: 34%; Indonesia: 30%; China: 29.5%; Brazil: 15%; India: 14.7%; Japan: 11.8%; US: 9.4%.   
(Numbers have been rounded) World Databank, World Bank [2012] 
198 This year was chosen for comparing data of countries under the Bush administration as this was the 
year which marked the invasion of Iraq. 
199 According to the 2010 edition of the IISS Military Balance the other three countries possessed the 
following capacities in terms of active personnel: China: 2,285,000; India: 1,325,000; Russia: 1,027,000.  
IISS [2010]: p. 399; p. 359; p. 222. respectively. According to the SIPRI database on military 
expenditures the four countries spent the following amounts on their armed forces in 2009. (All data are 
indicated in constant 2010 billion US dollars and all numbers have been rounded.) US: 680; China: 117; 
Russia: 60; India: 46. For military expenditures as percentage of GDP for the same four countries in 2009 
see: Russia: 4.3 %; US: 4.8; India: 2.9 %; China: 2.2%. SIPRI [2012].  
200The US had 11 aircraft carriers at the time, which was more than what any country possessed during 
this period. See: IISS [2010]: p. 33. 
201 For 2009 data on population of Middle Eastern states (million people) see: Egypt: 80; Iran: 73; 
Turkey: 72; Iraq: 31; Saudi Arabia: 27; Syria: 20; Israel: 7.5; Jordan: 6; Lebanon: 4.2. (Numbers have 
been rounded.) World Databank, World Bank [2012]  
202 For 2009 data on GDP at PPP (purchasing power parity) in current international dollars for Middle 
Eastern countries see: Turkey: 1.038.438.711.594; Iran: 839.571.868.205; Saudi Arabia: 
590.994.991.844; Egypt: 469.266.188.271; Israel: 190.674.499.369; Iraq: 111.345.975.174; Syria: 
103.060.367.600; Lebanon: 54.704.061.814; Jordan: 34.044.419.957. (Numbers have been rounded.) 
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Compared to the performance of other Middle Eastern states, Iran’s GDP per capita data 
was rather low and the performance of its export sector was quite weak too. The annual 
growth of the Iranian economy stood at only 1.8%, which was one of the lowest data in 
the region. Nonetheless, Iran’s external debt stocks as percentage of GNI were also the 
lowest in the region in 2009 (4.1%), but the net inflows of FDI were quite low.203 Thus, 
Iran’s economy was one of the most significant ones in terms of size, but its overall 
performance was relatively weak in 2009. One of the most significant changes in the 
regional configuration of economic power was that Iraq’s economic performance was 
improving and the Turkish economy was in recession. (World Databank, World Bank 
[2012]) 
 Concerning the regional balance of military power, it is important to note that 
Iran’s regional position has also been weakening. One reason behind this was the 
development of the Iraqi military, which was larger in size in 2009.204 (IISS [2010]: p. 
164; pp. 235-282.) The Iranian military expenditure was still the fourth largest in the 
region, but its military expenditure as percentage of GDP was relatively low (1.8%).205 
(SIPRI [2012]) Thus, a weakening economy implied a weakening military force in 
2009. Part of this was probably due to the world economic crisis, sanctions and the fact 
that the world price of oil was relatively low by 2009.206 (EIA [2012])  
                                                                                                                                               
World Databank, World Bank [2012] 
203 For 2009 data on GDP per capita at PPP (power purchasing parity) in current international dollars for 
various countries of the region see: Israel: 25.472; Saudi Arabia: 22.045; Turkey: 14.454; Lebanon: 
13.034; Iran: 11.479; Egypt: 5.887; Jordan: 5.756; Syria: 5.143; Iraq: 3.581. For 2009 data export of 
goods and services as percentage of GDP: Jordan: 46%; Israel: 35%; Syria: 30%; Egypt: 25%; Turkey: 
23%; Lebanon: 20%; Saudi Arabia: 5%. No data were available for Iran and Iraq. For 2009 data on the 
annual growth of GDP see: Lebanon: 8.5%; Syria: 6%; Jordan: 5.5%; Egypt: 4.7%; Iraq: 4.2%; Iran: 
1.8%; Israel: 0.8%; Saudi Arabia: 0.1%; Turkey: -4,8%; For 2009 data on external debt stocks as 
percentage of GNI see: Lebanon: 72%; Turkey: 48%; Jordan: 26%; Egypt: 18%; Syria: 9.7%; Iran: 
4,1%. No data were available for Iraq, Israel, and Saudi Arabia. For data on net inflows of FDI (balance 
of payments, current billion US dollars) for 2009 see: Saudi Arabia: 36458; Turkey: 8411; Egypt: 6712; 
Lebanon: 4804; Israel: 4438; Iran: 3048; Syria: 2570; Jordan: 2414; Iraq: 1598. (Numbers have been 
rounded.) World Databank, World Bank [2012-2013]  
204 For the number of active personnel in Middle Eastern armed forces for the year 2009 see: Iraq: 
578.000. Iran: 523.000; Turkey: 510.600; Egypt: 468.500; Syria: 325.500; Saudi Arabia: 233.500; Israel: 
176.500; Jordan: 100.500; Lebanon: 59.100. See “Middle East and North Africa” in: IISS [2010] p. 164; 
pp. 235-282. 
205 For data on military expenditures in 2010 billion US dollars for the year 2009 see: Saudi Arabia: 43.5; 
Turkey: 18; Israel: 14,7; Iran: 9.9 (IISS); Egypt: 4.4; Syria: 2.3; Iraq: 3; Lebanon: 1.5; Jordan: 1.5. (In 
case of Iran no data were available for 2009, thus, the author applied IISS data from the 2010 edition of 
the Military Balance.) Numbers have been rounded.  SIPRI [2012]; IISS [2010]: p. 251. For data on 
military expenditures as percentage of GDP for 2009 see: Israel: 7%; Saudi Arabia: 11%; Syria: 4%; 
Jordan: 6%; Lebanon: 4.1%; Turkey: 2.6 %; Egypt: 2.1%; Iran: 1.8% (2008); Iraq: 2.5%. (In case of Iran 
no data were available for 2009, thus, the author applied 2008 data.)  SIPRI [2012] 
206 According to the Energy Information Agency (EIA) the US average real “crude oil domestic first 
purchase prices” (1949-2011, dollars per Barell) one Barrell of oil cost 51.35 US dollar in 2009, a sharp 
decrease from 2008 when real prices peaked at 86.61 per Barell. See: EIA [2012]  
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Thus, Iran and the US were both relatively weaker than in 2003.  This probably 
explains at least a part of why they were both more willing to engage each other during 
Obama’s first months in office and even afterwards. Their relatively weak positions left 
them with fewer options besides engagement. Thus, structural factors and changes in the 
global and regional distribution of power partly explain why both powers were willing 
to come to the table. In and of themselves, they do not explain why diplomacy failed 
and, thus, caused strategic setbacks for Washington.  
The final factor on the structural level was to do with regional geopolitical 
realities. Israel and Saudi Arabia were particularly concerned about the Iranian nuclear 
program with the Saudis even calling on the US to “cut off the head of the sneak”, 
implying that the US should apply force to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear bomb. 
(See: Sanger [2012]: p. 159-160.; Crist [2012]: p. 563.; pp. Gerges [2012] pp. 181-182.) 
Israel and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu was particularly anxious about the new US 
policy on Iran. (Goldberg [2009]) Thus, those two countries and other Gulf Arab states 
have been pushing the US to take tougher measures against the Islamic Republic. This 
set a limit to US engagement efforts from the outset. (Parsi [2012]: pp. 211-213.) 
The author has already described the dynamic that took place on the sub-
systemic level of US government policies when examining whether policies of the 
Obama administration could be regarded as “aggressive” towards Iran. (See above.) 
One direct and immediate blowback effect of the static position the US took during the 
Geneva and Vienna negotiations and the constant preparation for sanctions was that Iran 
started further enriching uranium “at the 19.75% level” by February 2010. (Parsi 
[2012]: p. 163.) The problem with this is that it takes much less to go from 20% to 90% 
- weapons grade uranium, that is, than going from 4-5 to 20%. (Fitzpatrick [2011]: p. 
34.) Iran also took steps to demonstrate its international influence concerning nuclear 
issues by organizing a nuclear disarmament conference in Tehran in 2010. The event 
attracted considerable attendance, which was used by Iran for propaganda purposes. 
(McElroy [2010])  
Furthermore, another domestic US actor has to be added to the mix of factors 
listed so far. Congressional political forces pushed for sanctions supported by both 
parties. (The Economist [2010])  Congress and domestic lobby groups, and AIPAC in 
particular, have been very effective at pushing for sanctions in the US legislature. Thus, 
a number of representatives and senators sided with AIPAC in supporting tougher 
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measures and limiting the political space of the White House concerning engagement. 
(Parsi [2012]: pp. 103-105; pp. 132-133; Gerges [2012]: p. 157-158; p. 191.) In fact, the 
US House of Representatives passed a resolution on gasoline sanctions on December 
15, 2009. (Parsi [2012]: p. 157.) 
As far as Iranian government policies are concerned, the Iranian government’s 
harsh measures in order to crush opposition forces after the 2009 presidential elections 
meant that Obama had more difficulties selling the policy of engagement both at home, 
as well as in Europe. This caused a domestic debate, which led to a stalemate in foreign 
policy decision making. (Parsi [2012]: pp. 147-150.) As a result, Tehran kept delaying 
its response and then rejected the P5+1 offer. This meant a real strategic blowback for 
the US because it implied that Iranian policies designed to sabotage US policies in the 
Middle East would remain in place. The author contends that there are two main reasons 
for this rejection. 
 One was that Iranian political forces were themselves divided on what to 
respond. If “institutional resistance” played a part on the US side due to Congressional 
pressures, then the same factor was definitely at play in Iran too. (Gerges [2012]: p. 
191.) In fact, it may well be – as some analysts point out – that Ahmadinejad actually 
wanted a deal in order to stabilize his position domestically. This would have helped 
him regain some of the legitimacy he lost during the 2009 summer presidential 
elections. In fact, a number of sources draw attention to this and emphasize the apparent 
“paralysis” of Iranian decision making as a result of domestic political divisions in the 
wake of the 2009 post-election turmoil.  (Perthes [2010]: pp. 100-101.; also referenced 
in Balogh [2010a]: p. 373.; Sanger [2012]: p. 162.; Gerges [2012]: pp. 184-185; Crist 
[2012]: p. 549.; Parsi [2012]: pp. 147-150.)207 Thus, it may be right to conclude that it 
was not diplomacy per se that failed, it may have been that the Iranian domestic 
political system failed to produce a political compromise. (Balogh [2010a]: p. 373.) 
Those domestic divisions, however, were at least partly results of ambivalent US 
policies towards Tehran and, thus, responsible for lack of a genuine will to “reward” US 
overtures.  
Strategic blowback came not as a result of what had happened as a direct or 
indirect consequence of the above US policies, but rather as a result of what had not 
happened. Following an aggressive counter-offensive led by Gen. David Petraeus, then 
                                                 
207 Part of this section is based on one of the earlier studies by the author. See: Balogh [2010a]: p. 373. 
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commander of Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), Iran’s influence weakened over Iraq. 
However, in 2009, Iran sought to reinforce its presence and IRGC officers returned to 
Iraq. Knowing that the US was in the process of handing responsibility over to local 
authorities and forces, they could move around more freely than before. Commander of 
the IRGC’s Quds Force Gen. Qassem Suleimani wished to weaken the US while it was 
preparing to withdraw, assuming that it was more vulnerable while reducing its 
presence in the country.208 (Crist [2012]: p. 558.)  
Wikileaks cables further prove the reinforcement of Iran’s presence in its 
neighborhood. A cable dated February 21, 2010 from Baghdad provides insight into 
how local political forces perceive Iranian presence. Members of the local political 
forces in Ramadi, Anbar province, contended that Iran had been influencing Iraqi 
politics through dominating the Accountability and Justice Committee, the organization 
responsible for vetting candidates for the 2010 elections. (PRT Anbar: Anbaris 
perceive… [2010]) Another embassy cable reports of a discussion between US 
ambassador to Iraq Christopher Hill and the governor of Iraq’s Diyala province, which 
sheds light on the fact that Iran became an important factor in Iraqi politics not only 
because of its political power, but also due to its stake in the Iraqi infrastructure. The 
cable notes that Diyala province receives most of its electricity through power lines 
from the Iranian province of Khermansah. (PRT Diyala: Ambassador Hill… [2010]) 
Another cable provides evidence of Iranian influence by recounting a conversation in 
which a former Iraqi representative (Mashhadani) had this to say concerning the issue:  
 
“He stated that Iraqi candidates should criticize Iranian interference in Iraq, but claimed 
that they could not do so without American protection.” (Former Speaker on De-
ba’athification … [2010]) 
  
Thus, Iran exerted influence through a coercive policy by instilling fear in those who 
did not support its policies.  
Iran also tried to maintain influence in Afghanistan as well.  In another embassy 
cable, a US official reported of a discussion with President Karzai’s chief of staff, Omar 
                                                 
208 It was even reported that in 2008, Gen. Petraeus was handed a mobile that had a text message from 
Gen. Qassem Suleimani specifically addressed to him saying: "General Petraeus, you should know that I, 
Qassem Suleimani, control the policy for Iran with respect to Iraq, Lebanon, Gaza, and Afghanistan. And 
indeed, the ambassador in Baghdad is a Quds Force member. The individual who's going to replace him 
is a Quds Force member." See: Chulov [2011]. 
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Daudzai, who is also Afghanistan’s former ambassador to Iran. The cable states that: 
 
“He said that the Iranians no longer deny their support for the Taliban. While there is 
room for "indirect" U.S.-Afghan cooperation on Afghanistan, Daudzai cautioned that at 
best the Iranians would only "tolerate" our [the US – added by author, I.B.] presence in 
Afghanistan.” (Afghanistan’s Outlook on Iran … [2010]) 
 
Still other cables shed light on the growing influence of Iran in Afghanistan’s Bamyan 
province and Iran’s “subtle but significant” influence in the country’s higher education 
system. (Bamyan Governor Sarobi … [2009]; Iranian Influence in Afghanistan’s … 
[2009]) Iran’s economic, cultural and political influence in Afghanistan has also been 
growing since the US interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. (Bagherpour-Farhad 
[2010]) 
Even though these cables do not necessarily reflect an Iranian influence exerted 
through nefarious activities, they still attest to the fact that Iranian presence has become 
an integral part of the fabric of society, government and economy in both Iraq and 
Afghanistan. This is the presence that is used as a hedge against US influence in both 
countries. (See previous chapters on the Bush administration.) However, there is also 
evidence of more aggressive Iranian activities in Iraq. Wikileaks war logs shed light on 
the fact that Iran was still involved or at least complicit in smuggling “lethal aid” and 
anti-tank grenades from Iran to Iraq in 2009. There are also reports of occasional Iranian 
small arms fire on US supported Iraqi forces from Iranian bases along the Iraq-Iran 
border. (See respectively: MND-S: (Criminal Event)… [2009]; MND-S: (Friendly 
Action) … [2009]; MND-S: (Enemy Action)… [2009])209  
This suggests that even if Iran mostly applied only political tools, its presence 
was still partly built on aiding paramilitary outfits capable of countering US presence. 
Since the US and Iran could not agree on a deal regarding Iran’s nuclear program and 
other pressing regional issues, Iran did not change its previous policies because it still 
had a stake in undermining US presence in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the Arab-
Israeli peace process. Thus, policies aiming to cause strategic setbacks for the US 
remained in place.  
                                                 
209 The second war log referenced here does not specifically state that the anti-tank grenades came from 
Iran. However, every war log released by Wikileaks includes a Google maps satellite image of the exact 
place of the reported event and in this case the interception happened just a few kilometers from the Iraq-
Iran border, thus, there is sufficient evidence to assume that the supplies came from Iran.  See: MND-S: 
(Friendly Action) … [2009]  
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This is closely connected to the other reason why Iran rejected the offer of the 
P5+1 and this factor has to do with perceptions. Domestic Iranian disagreement was a 
result of the perceptions of certain political forces, which thought that the US is “setting 
a trap” and as long as its actions do not change, its rhetoric and initiatives cannot be 
trusted. To be sure and fair, part of this was just sheer populism, regime propaganda and 
paranoia. Still, the other part was fuelled by perceptions that the US was not really 
intent on a grand bargain, that changes in rhetoric had not been followed by changes in 
practice. (AP/The Guardian [2009]) Diplomatic overtures could not be trusted and taken 
for granted because they did not represent the sincere and real intentions of Washington. 
However, this was partly true. The author provided proof that détente was not 
necessarily pursued for the sake of a real opening, but for creating the strategic 
environment for tougher measures (sanctions). Thus, when Iran was criticizing the US 
for not being sincere when it signaled its willingness to negotiate with Iran, it was partly 
right. Of course, most of this had more to do with Iranian regime propaganda, but at 
least some of the outcome was a result of ambivalent US policies and signals elaborated 
upon above. Thus, old and reinforced perceptions still had a profound effect on the US-
Iran relationship. (See: Crist [2012]: p. 572; Gerges [2012]: p. 156.)  
The author also argues that Iran had obviously also done a lot to reinforce those 
negative perceptions. One such mistake was hiding the Fordow plant from the 
international community. This reinforced the Obama administration’s stance that 
engagement in and of itself cannot be effective. Thus, a fair share of the responsibility 
rests with Iran. Still, by applying pressure besides engagement, the Obama presidency 
fuelled Iran’s negative perceptions too.210 
US policies failed to succeed and indirectly led to strategic blowback to the 
extent they were aggressive. Blowback effects were not particularly harsh because the 
US approach was not entirely aggressive. Thus, the biggest setback for the US was that 
Iran rejected the Geneva offer due to the dual track approach. Furthermore, the Iraqi war 
effort was winding down and Iran was more willing to wait out the remaining period of 
US presence in Iraq without further escalating the situation there. Tehran also knew that 
the Afghanistan mission would also eventually come to an end. Thus, the very fact that 
                                                 
210 Hiding the Fordow plant could be interpreted as a strategic blowback resulting from earlier US threats 
to use force against Iran. These drove Iran to take some parts of its nuclear program underground in 
Fordow. However, proving this connection is really difficult, thus, the author will not elaborate on this 
possibility.  
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Obama planned to withdraw made Iran less interested in pursuing more aggressive 
policies in those countries. Even if Iran maintained its presence in countries it 
considered strategically important, it did not escalate the situation. It rather discredited 
the Obama administration’s engagement efforts by rejecting the P5+1 offer. This was the 
biggest blowback to the Obama administration, which had invested enormous political 
capital into engaging Iran both at home, as well as abroad. This hindered the 
realization of all US interests listed at the beginning of this chapter, particularly 
stopping Iran from acquiring a nuclear breakout capacity.211 
Thus, the multilevel analysis based on Neoclassical Realism leads one to believe 
that no opening is going to proceed if it is not a genuine opening. There is sufficient 
evidence to prove the linkage between “dual track” US policies and the Iranian 
rejection. Mixed signals will inevitably reinforce old mindsets and play into the hands 
of forces determined to stop the US and Iran from remedying their problems together. 
Of course, this may mean asking too much from an administration that has already gone 
a long way in investing domestic political capital into a much criticized policy of 
détente. This has to be acknowledged. It must be emphasized that Obama got closer to a 
compromise with Iran than any other president had before him. (Limbert [2010]: p. 
148.)  
This dissertation does not wish to be biased against the US – quite to the 
contrary, it seeks to find what caused setbacks to the US in order to find the solution for 
the stalemate that has been poisoning the relationship of the two actors for more than 
thirty years. Neither is it true that according to the theory of strategic blowback, the US 
“can do no good.” In fact the Obama administration started experimenting with the only 
solution that could work. Thus, it was on the right track initially. Still, it did not go all 
the way in exhausting diplomacy because of possible domestic political costs associated 
with pursuing negotiations without any preconditions. (See: Parsi [2012]: pp. ix-x.)  
However, the right conclusion from the failure of earlier overtures is not that diplomacy 
cannot work, and that tougher measures are needed. The right conclusion is that 
diplomacy should be given an extra chance because it was not pursued in the right 
manner and even this was enough to produce strategic blowback effects for the US. 
                                                 
211 The author listed the following US national interests at stake: defeating terrorism associated with 
Islamic extremism; rolling back Islamic militancy and extremism; stabilizing Iraq and Afghanistan; Arab-
Israeli peace; preventing an Iranian nuclear weapons capability. See the introductory chapter on the 
Obama administration.  
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3.2. The policy of containing Iran  
 
As the chances for successful engagement waned, the Obama presidency 
stepped up its efforts to isolate Iran. In doing so, it took a page from the playbook of 
every previous administration since President Carter – it returned to the traditional 
policy of containment. Similar to the Clinton and Bush administrations, the Obama 
presidency designed its policy of isolation to include a political, an economic as well as 
a military component.  
Political efforts included rallying the international community to support further 
sanctions within the framework of the UN Security Council. The idea was to secure 
international support for another round of UN sanctions in order to provide a legal basis 
for further enforcement measures by individual nations. These efforts had two different 
dimensions: one aimed to gain European support for such measures and the other 
focused on getting Russia and China on board. It was figured that China would be more 
willing to accept further sanctions if Russia had agreed to them too. Thus, in order to get 
Russian support, Washington persuaded Israel to have Moscow vote in favor of 
additional sanctions and the Saudis were asked to provide China with guarantees that 
Chinese energy supplies from Iran would be made up for by Riyadh in case the flow of 
Iranian oil stopped as a result of economic enforcement measures. By March 2010 both 
Saudi Arabia and the UAE had stepped up their oil sales to China. (Parsi [2012]: pp. 
153-154.; p. 164.) This diplomatic jockeying made another round of UN sanctions 
possible and UNSC 1929 was adopted on June 9 2010. (Limbert [2010]: p. 148.)  
A further sign of containment efforts and the end of the engagement policy was 
that the US was not sincerely interested in a direct and negotiated solution anymore. 
When Turkey and Brazil succeeded in striking a fuel swap deal based on the same terms 
as the Geneva offer on May 17, 2010, Washington dismissed the result despite signs that 
Brazil and Turkey struck a deal based on previous “instructions” by President Obama 
himself. The US was determined to pass another sanctions resolution by then. (Parsi 
[2012]: pp. 193-199, Starr [2010]: p. 121.; Joint Declaration by Iran, Turkey and Brazil. 
17 May [2010]) 
Parallel to these diplomatic efforts, Obama put pressure on Iran by applying 
tougher rhetoric. In his State of the Union Address on January 27, 2010, Obama noted: 
“That's why the international community is more united and the Islamic Republic of Iran 
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is more isolated. [Emphasis added by author – I.B.] And as Iran's leaders continue to 
ignore their obligations, there should be no doubt: They, too, will face growing 
consequences. That is a promise.” (State of the Union address by Barack Obama.  January 
27. [2010]) 
 
A year later he added that sanctions put in place by the US and its allies are results 
of diplomatic measures. This attests to the fact that Washington had given up 
engagement for containment. (State of the Union address by Barack Obama. 
January 25. [2011]) Obama’s rhetoric became tougher as the US distanced itself 
from a diplomatic solution. In his speech before the AIPAC Policy Conference – 
the annual conference of the most influential Israeli lobby group – Obama pointed 
out that he was determined to stop Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons: 
 
“You also see our commitment to our shared security in our determination to prevent Iran 
from acquiring nuclear weapons.  (Applause.)  Here in the United States, we’ve imposed 
the toughest sanctions ever on the Iranian regime.  (Applause.)  At the United Nations, 
under our leadership, we’ve secured the most comprehensive international sanctions on 
the regime, which have been joined by allies and partners around the world.  Today, Iran 
is virtually cut off from large parts of the international financial system, and we’re going 
to keep up the pressure.  So let me be absolutely clear –- we remain committed to 
preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons.  (Applause.)” (Transcript of Obama’s 
Remarks to AIPAC. May 22. [2011]) 
 
 Engagement morphed into rhetorical pressure and it was a prelude to pursuing 
tougher measures, such as international and national sanctions. This formed the 
economic dimension of containment. The first part of this initiative was to have the 
UNSC adopt another round of sanctions. The author already mentioned the efforts to 
rally international support for the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1929. This was the 
toughest of all sanctions passed against Iran so far.  The resolution focused on banning 
missile technology exports headed for Iran and it also prohibited the Islamic Republic 
from “acquiring commercial interest in uranium mining or producing nuclear materials 
in other countries.” (Starr [2010]: p. 121.) The provisions also extended already existing 
travel sanctions and required states to search ships heading towards or coming from Iran 
in case they suspected that such ships carried prohibited items.  Furthermore, the IRGC 
and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) were also further targeted and 
states were instructed not to provide these entities with financial or insurance services. 
No Iranian bank was allowed to operate within the territory of any other UN member 
state and no financial institution could engage in business within the Islamic Republic. 
(Ibid.; Resolution 1929… UNSC [2010]) 
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 Once international sanctions were passed at the UN, the US Congress moved to 
add its own enforcement measures to the existing list. Thus, on July 1 2010, President 
Obama signed into law the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and 
Divestment Act (CISADA). (Public Law 111-195-July 1. [2010]) Even before CISADA 
was adopted by Congress, at least two laws aimed at curbing gasoline sales to Iran.212 
This included the strictest US sanctions up until then. First, CISADA amended the 
“triggers” of the Iran Sanctions Act – it slightly modified the definition of “investment” 
in Iran’s energy sector to include the construction of pipelines to and through Iran, as 
well as contracts for developing energy projects. It banned the sale of hardware for use 
in Iran’s energy sector in case the deal was part of an investment project. All of these 
provisions were basically later included in CISADA itself. CISADA sanctions gasoline 
sales to Iran worth over a million US dollars or 5 million within a year. It also bans the 
sale of any equipment, which assists Iran in making or acquiring refined oil products. 
CISADA added three new possible forms of sanctions to the already existing six options 
under ISA.213 (See the previous chapters on ISA.) Instead of requiring the 
administration to apply at least two of the six options against a violator of ISA, 
CISADA requires that the government use three of altogether nine options. CISADA 
further amended ISA to require firms entering contracts with the US government to 
verify that they are not violating ISA. The law also changed the system of waivers and 
exemptions somewhat and put forth that sanctions on selling gasoline and hardware 
related to gasoline would only terminate if it could be established that Iran did not 
pursue WMDs anymore and was removed from the State Department’s list containing 
states sponsoring terrorism. CISADA also restored a strict ban on exports to and imports 
from Iran since a number of trade and investments bans had been relaxed between 1999 
and 2010. As far as banking sanctions are concerned, US banks are barred from 
handling accounts with entities deemed to be carrying out considerable financial 
                                                 
212 This included the “Energy and Water Development and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010”. 
(P.L. 111-85- Oct. 28, 2009) which banned the purchase of oil for the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve 
from firms, which sold Iran refined petroleum worth over one million US dollars. Furthermore, the 
“Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010” (P.L. 111-117-Dec. 16, 2009.) prohibited Ex-Im Bank credits to 
companies selling refined petroleum products to Iran. (Katzman [2012c]: p. 4.; P.L. 111-85- Oct. 28. 
[2009]; P.L. 111-117-Dec. 16. [2009])  
213 Those three are the following:  
 a ban on foreign exchange transactions by the violator;  
 a ban on payments or providing credits to the violator by US financial institutions; and 
 “prohibition of the sanctioned entity from acquiring, holding, using, or trading any U.S.-
based property which the sanctioned entity has a financial interest in.” (Katzman [2012c]: pp. 
7-8.) 
205 
 
transactions for specific Iranian entities and the IRGC in particular. Moreover, shares of 
entities investing in Iran’s energy sector may be subject to divestment. CISADA also 
contained provisions on the protection of human rights in Iran and included other efforts 
to increase Iranian access to internet and various means of communication.214 New 
sanctions also altered and made stricter the rules of investigation of violations under 
ISA (the earlier set of sanctions introduced by the US in August 1996, see previous 
chapters.)  According to provisions of the law, it is to remain in force until December 
31, 2016. (Katzman [2012c]: pp. 3-9.; p. 20.; pp. 26-27.; pp. 31-34.) 
 However, one of the most effective ways of harming Iranian economic interests 
was to informally deter banks from dealing with entities assumed to be directly or 
indirectly involved in aiding illicit conduct related to Iran’s nuclear program. The father 
of this approach was Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial 
Intelligence at the Department of the Treasury and a Republican holdover from the Bush 
administration. The idea behind his design was that large international banks could not 
afford to lose their good reputation on the global market, plus they did not want to be 
subject to US sanctions, thus, they would take measures to cut ties with Iran and its 
affiliates. In fact, this plan worked so well, that, much to Levey’s surprise, it caused a 
“snowball effect” by a growing number of financial institutions toeing the line.215 
(Mann [2012]: pp. 194-196.; Ross [2007]: pp. 316-317)  
 Political and economic isolation was complemented by the military dimension 
of containment. One of the most important military measures aimed at neutralizing the 
threat of Iranian ballistic missile capabilities. On January 21, 2010, head of CENTCOM 
General Petraeus announced that the US has deployed eight Patriot missile batteries in 
the Gulf region in Kuwait, the UAE, as well as Bahrain. Some Gulf states also started 
buying advanced missile and radar technology. Furthermore, the February 2010 
Pentagon report on ballistic missile defense placed an emphasis on defense against 
Iranian capabilities. The US aimed to establish a “layered land and sea system” for 
intercepting Iranian ballistic missiles. Washington had also placed additional Patriot 
missile batteries in the region and deployed Aegis type radar vessels. Furthermore, a 
                                                 
214 Other measures also aimed at expanding access to internet communication networks. Katzman 
[2012c]: pp. 32-33. 
215 These efforts have also been documented by embassy cables released by Wikileaks. One embassy 
cable from Kabul reports on the efforts of Assistant Secretary of State for Terrorism Financing David 
Cohen to persuade banks in Afghanistan to be careful when dealing with Iranian banks. (Corrected Copy: 
Treasury A/S Cohen… [2010])  
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new “Integrated Air Defense Center for Excellence” was established with US support in 
Abu Dhabi. The Center focused on training and exercising in preparation for a potential 
missile attack. Adding to the importance of the military dimension, confrontation 
between the US and Iranian navies in the Strait of Hormuz were regular. Furthermore, 
systematic planning was underway in order to devise a strategy against Iran’s 
unconventional military capabilities. Even though US military engagement in Iraq was 
nearing its end and the same was planned for Afghanistan, the US still intended to 
station forty thousand military personnel in the Gulf area “chiefly to contain Iran.” 
(Crist [2012]: pp. 557-561; p. 569.) Thus, the US kept pursuing the policy based on the 
Gulf Security Dialogue designed by the Bush administration. It offered to improve the 
military capabilities of Gulf allies by selling military hardware to them with planned 
deals worth 120 billion US dollars altogether. (Katzman [2010]: p. 53.) 
 Thus, by the end of 2010, a tough containment policy was in place with three 
different components. It was a shift in strategy that was already underway when Iran 
and the P5+1 gathered in Geneva in fall 2009, but its full implementation was yet to 
take place. Only the June 9 UNSC resolutions and the July enactment of CISADA 
signaled that diplomacy was over for good.  
The immediate response of Iran to the passing of new sanctions at the UN was to 
deny nuclear inspectors access to its nuclear sites in June 2010. (Sanger-Healy [2010]) 
Ahmadinejad threatened to retaliate in case Iranian ships were searched and signaled 
that Iran would not engage in talks with great powers over its nuclear program until 
August, 2010. Moreover, a commander of the IRGC said that Iran would retaliate by 
action in the Strait of Hormuz in case its ships were searched. (Erdbrink [2010]) 
Ahmadinejad further threatened to ban US and Western products in Iran as a response to 
sanctions. (LaFranchi [2010]) Then in April and May 2010, Iran conducted two large 
military exercises in the Strait of Hormuz. (Frayer [2010]) Even though most of these 
measures were mere threats, they also signaled that Iran is willing to escalate the 
situation, which ran contrary to US interests. Furthermore, in February 2010, the IAEA 
released a report on the Iranian nuclear file essentially saying that the Iranian nuclear 
program may have military implications. (See: Implementation of the NPT … 
Gov/2010/10 IAEA February 18. [2010]: pp. 8-10)  
As far as the political element of containment is concerned, a number of experts 
still supported the policy of containment. (Reardon [2012]; Fitzpatrick [2011]; Zakaria 
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[2009]) Zbigniew Brzezinski also talked favorably of the initiative but still others were 
skeptical, e.g. Brent Scowcroft. (Sanger [2010]) Certain well known analysts pointed 
out the inherent problem in trying to create a US-led alliance between Israel and Arab 
states in order to contain Iran. (Leverett, H.M. [2010]) Such criticism has also been 
emphasized by other experts as well. (Nasr-Taheyh [2008]; Nasr [2011]; Bromund-
Phillips [2011]) Still other authors argue that Iran’s influence kept growing despite 
sanctions and efforts to contain it. (Choksy [2010]) Robert Dreyfuss of The Nation 
contends that containing Iran is not only ineffective, it is also counterproductive: 
“The fact is that the resolution will make it harder, not easier to achieve a diplomatic 
breakthrough on Iran's nuclear program. That's because it will make it more difficult for 
Iran's fractious leadership to make any conciliatory move without appearing to be caving 
in to international pressure. […]Since military action has been ruled out, the choice are 
between diplomacy and containment of a post-nuclear Iran. In that choice, the sanctions 
are irrelevant. But they do make the diplomacy a lot harder.” (Dreyfuss [2010]) 
 
This is the most important reason why containment is counterproductive. The author 
acknowledges that containment has had significant effects. But when coupled with 
diplomacy, it is counterproductive because it prevents diplomacy from succeeding and 
that is exactly what happened under the first two years of the Obama administration’s 
tenure of office. This has discouraged Iran during its own domestic political turmoil and 
it provided an incentive to maintain policies designed to harass US presence in the 
region. “If the subsequent talks were successful and Iran agreed to the swap, it would 
be a major accomplishment that would set back Iran’s breakout capability while 
creating more space and promise for additional diplomacy, which in turn could lead to 
significant positive reverberations in Iraq and Afghanistan.”  (Parsi [2012]: pp. 131-
132.)  
A former member of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, Hossein 
Mousavian argues that there are essentially two domestic political forces in Iran. One 
believes that a negotiated settlement of the US-Iran conflict is possible while the other 
does not. By introducing new sanctions, the US has indirectly “proved the second 
school right.” (Mousavian [2012a]) 
The biggest problem with the ‘containment debate’ is that the possibility of 
containing a nuclear Iran has entered the discourse on the US-Iran stalemate inherently 
suggesting that this is the only future option. (See: Lindsay-Takeyh [2010b]; Lindsay-
Takeyh [2010a]; Edelman-Krepinevich-Montgomery [2011]; Adamsky et al. [2011]; 
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Posen et al. [2011]; Waltz [2012]) This is particularly counterproductive, as this 
discussion is not based on present realities and focuses the mainstream debate on one 
potential outcome without ignoring other possible options and the present situation. 
 The economic dimension of containment has equally been contentious. The 
reason is that the results of the sanctions policy have been mixed at best. Some argue 
that new sanctions introduced by Obama are effective indeed. (Askari [2010]; Levitt 
[2010]; Pletka [2009]) On the other hand, a Wall Street Journal op-ed points out that 
some of Iran’s most important trading partners get exemptions from sanctions making 
the arrangement ineffective. (The Wall Street Journal [2012]) Other prominent analysts 
have also pointed out that sanctions are not likely to work for various reasons. (Leverett 
[2009]; Wall [2010]; Joyner [2010]; Oxford Analytica [2010]; Salehi-Isfahani [2009] 
Thompson [2010]) The bottom line is that up to the end of the period examined in the 
dissertation (December 18, 2010) no significant change has been realized in Iran’s 
behavior and strategy. It is true that containment and sanctions have significantly 
limited Iran’s economy, military buildup and political influence, but Tehran had not 
changed its policies. (Pollack [2010]: p. 209.) This suggests that even if sanctions are 
debated, there seems to be a consensus among a number of experts that sanctions are 
not likely to change Iran’s policies.  
The military component is a logical way of hedging against an Iranian military 
threat, but it also has the potential to backfire. Robert Reardon of RAND Corporation 
puts forth that even though containment could be effective, it may also create setbacks: 
“Measures intended to deter a potentially nuclear-armed Iran could actually create greater 
incentives for Iran to weaponize in the first place. Specifically, efforts to improve the 
defensive capabilities of U.S. regional allies and deter Iranian aggression in the region 
may increase Iran’s perception of regional threats, and trigger a security dilemma. Even 
measures that may be intended as purely defensive, such as the deployment of missile 
defenses, could increase Iran’s perception of a threat. Iran could view efforts to improve 
the regional defenses of U.S. forces and U.S. allies as preparations for Iranian retaliation 
after an impending attack. Any negative shift in the regional balance of power risks 
providing Tehran with an incentive to weaponize.” (Reardon [2012]: p. 148.) 
 
 
US historian Toby C. Jones notes the “[US – added by author, I.B.] experiment in 
militarizing the region has made it more volatile, less free, and more costly to American 
interests and values” (Jones [2011]) This is yet another testament to the fact that the 
military component of containment hinders US national interests by creating 
circumstances conducive to instability and confrontation. Jonathan Rue’s Foreign 
Affairs article underscores Jones’s argument by shedding light on the rapid development 
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of the Iranian navy recently. (Rue [2011]) 
 Thus, even if every component of containment provides a platform for debate, 
still, a great number of prominent experts and voices point out that containment is either 
ineffective, or even worse, it is counterproductive.  
 
3.2.1. Explaining Outcomes – Strategic Blowback as a Result of Containment 
 
  According to the terminology of the dissertation, the Obama administration’s 
efforts at containment qualify for an aggressive US policy. The question is whether 
containment efforts have generated any strategic setbacks for the US. Again, the author 
applies the multilevel analysis suggested by Neoclassical Realism, meaning that the 
following factors influenced the outcomes of containment:  
Systemic factors: 
 global distribution of power; and 
 the regional distribution of power. 
 
Sub-systemic factors: 
 government policies of the US and Iran; 
 perceptions; and 
 domestic constituencies and political forces. 
 
As far as the global and regional balance of power is concerned, structural 
factors and regional geopolitical realities provided a mixed picture. The US was 
drawing down and had less direct influence over Iraqi events but it was also 
strengthening its position in Afghanistan. Still, Iran knew that both missions would 
eventually end in a couple of years’ time, thus, it was in a winning position overall. This 
confidence was coupled with the fact that US efforts to rally great powers and regional 
allies to confront Iran and support tough sanctions, as well as other measures convinced 
Iran that US overtures were never really sincere. Thus, international structural realities 
pushed Iran towards confrontation and away from reconciliation even if the regional 
configuration of power was favorable for Iran’s position.  
On the sub-systemic level, the Obama administration’s return to containment 
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either failed to produce any meaningful results or they led to strategic setbacks. 
Although China agreed to significantly cut back its oil imports from Iran, it began 
increasing its Iranian imports by 2011 causing a 30% increase compared to 2010. (Ma 
[2012])  Sanctions caused Iran to engage in saber rattling and escalate the political 
discourse by threatening to initiate actions in the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian military 
exercises also added to tensions in the region. However, Iranian threats were obviously 
not the most important sources of strategic blowback. Rather, the blowback came in the 
form of sustained Iranian policies aimed at undermining US influence in the Middle 
East and hedging against a potential military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities. The 
February 2010 IAEA report proves that Iran had not abandoned its policies. It is true 
that the report was released before the US actually returned to containment during the 
summer of 2010, but the last report released by the IAEA before the end of the period 
examined here (December 18, 2010) equally confirmed that Iran’s program may have 
had military implications. (Implementation of the NPT… Gov/2010/62 IAEA November 
23. [2010]: pp. 7-8.) Prominent Iran expert Shahram Chubin’s assessment of the 
effectiveness of sanctions is instructive here: 
 
“[Chubin] said the accumulation of sanctions is "exacting a price on the Iranians, but it is 
not going to change its policies." (Kessler [2010]) 
 
As the author argued in the previous chapter on engagement, blowback was a 
result of not what Iran had done, rather, what it had not changed. Iran maintained its 
regional initiatives and influence in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon and Palestine. (See: 
Addis et al. [2010]; Ross [2007]: p. 307) As former US National Security Council 
Officials Hillary and Mann Leverett note in their Foreign Policy article rejecting 
prominent Iran expert Karim Sajjadpour’s call for containment: 
“If the Obama administration had the kind of strategic seriousness toward Iran shown by 
those Nixon-era officials in their dealings with China, Washington would use a 
comprehensive realignment of U.S.-Iranian relations to channel the Islamic Republic's 
regional influence to support important U.S. interests in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Israel and 
Palestine.” (Leverett-Leverett [2010b]) 
 
The authors also go on to conclude that containment can actually provoke a war in the 
region. 
  A further sign of potential setback is the belated realization that despite 
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sanctions and pressure, some segments of Iran’s military capabilities have developed 
relatively unhindered, while the world was solely focused on the nuclear file in the past 
decade.   
 As far as perceptions are concerned, the return to containment is the best 
example of the phenomenon described by Dennis Ross and cited earlier by the author. 
Ross argued that cognitive dissonance has a special role in foreign policy, meaning that 
decision makers tend to look for patterns that fit their previous perceptions and 
constructions and ignore behavior that does not correspond with earlier experience. 
(Parsi [2007]: p. 152.) This is particularly true for the transition from engagement to 
containment. For a moment, both sides thought that they could deconstruct the 
atmosphere of distrust and negative image of the other. However, as Iran rejected the 
Geneva offer, the US felt that its old images of a hostile Iran were reinforced. As a 
result, Obama had to push for sanctions partly due to domestic and external pressures. 
This push reinforced earlier negative Iranian perceptions of the US and assumed that the 
real US is the one that tries to contain Iran, not the one that bets on negotiations.  
 Finally, domestic political constituencies played an important role again. The 
author has described how AIPAC and Congress pushed for sanctions and forced the US 
to return to the path of containment. Blowback was partly a result of US containment 
policies, which gave credit to Iranian hardliners who were against engagement anyway.  
 The period between the start of containment and the end of the examined period 
is too short for proving that setbacks occurred specifically because of containment. It is 
also true that there is not enough direct evidence to support the blowback hypothesis. 
Thus, there is only contextual and indirect evidence of the relationship suggested. This 
means that the hypothesis may work in this case too, but it is quite difficult to prove it. 
Containment probably hindered realization of all five strategic US interests in the region 
as defined by the author at the beginning of the chapter on the Obama administration. 
Sustained Iranian policies in the region made it harder to fight terrorism associated with 
Islamic extremism and to roll back Islamic militancy. It made stabilizing Iraq and 
Afghanistan more difficult, it assumed that Iran would continue to play the Islamic card 
in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and it made stopping Iran from going nuclear less 
likely. However, the linkages are difficult to prove.  
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III. CONCLUSION – A CASE FOR A STRATEGY OF 
SEEKING THE LEAST RESISTENCE 
 
 
 This dissertation has put forward that aggressive US policies towards Iran cause 
strategic blowbacks, which hinder the realization of US national interests in the Middle 
East and parts of Central Asia. The thesis tested the blowback hypothesis (H1) by 
applying the theory to the timespan between 1993 and 2010. It has reviewed virtually all 
major US initiatives related to Iran: The Oslo process, the policy of dual containment, 
détente under President Khatami, the Bush doctrine and the return to containment, and 
engagement and containment in the first two years of the Obama administration. The 
timespan embraces 17 years and seven policy initiatives – a sample sufficient for 
identifying any patterns.  
 The author has found that the relationship between aggressive US policies and 
blowback effects is particularly strong in case of the first six policies examined. Those 
policy initiatives cover the Clinton and Bush administrations and partly the Obama 
presidency. The Oslo process under the Clinton administration was partly designed for 
isolating Iran. This policy was augmented when Martin Indyk introduced the policy of 
dual containment. Both initiatives rested on the assumption that barring Iran from 
participation in regional arrangements would hinder its ability to meddle in regional 
conflicts. Since Iran was never given a seat at the table, it had incentives to act as a 
spoiler and so it did. Support for terrorism and hindering the Arab-Israeli process, which 
indirectly contributed to the emergence of circumstances conducive to the second 
intifada, came as results of trying to contain Iran.  The Khatami presidency’s détente 
could have led to reconciliation between Washington and Tehran, however, Israel, 
AIPAC and other domestic political forces in Congress pushed the administration 
towards keeping up the effort at containing Iran. The US only offered symbolic 
gestures, which were not enough to justify Khatami’s policies at home. Halfhearted 
responses and domestic as well as external pressures in the US tied President Clinton’s 
hands. This, in turn tied Khatami’s hands in his own domestic political arena.  
 The strongest evidence of the relationship suggested by the hypothesis is 
provided by blowback effects under the Bush administration. The Bush presidency 
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applied a relatively simplistic approach to international relations based on the extensive 
reliance on the use of force. Iran was encircled as a consequence of implementing the 
Bush doctrine and this provided Tehran with incentives to weaken the US in both Iraq 
and Afghanistan. When Iran offered a constructive proposal, the US rejected it 
punishing even the Swiss ambassador acting as an intermediary. Thus, Iran contributed 
to escalating the Iraqi situation from 2004 to at least 2006. The US administration 
realized it does not have enough resources needed for fully implementing the Bush 
doctrine, thus, it returned to a policy of containment introducing sanctions against Iran 
and countering its influence by improving military capabilities of Gulf allies. However, 
containment under President Bush was based on the same flawed assumption put 
forward by the Clinton presidency, namely, that it was possible to forge an anti-Iran 
consensus in the region instead of an anti-Israel one. Both presidencies were aiming to 
persuade Arab allies that Iran was the real problem in the region. Even if those states 
were afraid of Iran, they were not willing to confront it openly, but they all agreed on 
countering Israel. Iran was aware of this division and it used it to promote its own goals 
by supporting its regional proxies. It sustained its nuclear program and elected a 
hardliner to power in 2005.  
 Engagement under the Obama administration was coupled with an initiative 
deemed aggressive by the dissertation – containment. The combined pursuit of 
engagement and containment produced blowback effects, the two most important of 
which were the Iranian rejection of the Geneva fuel swap deal and the decision to enrich 
uranium at the 19.75%  level. The other important setback was the fact that Iran had not 
changed its policies. Absent a deal, Iran was motivated to further undermine US policies 
in the wider Middle East.  
 These six initiatives demonstrate a strong and (direct) relationship between US 
aggressive approaches and blowback effects. The final and seventh item of the set 
examined – the policy of containment under Obama – shows a weak linkage between 
aggressive US policies and blowback effects. These effects were identifiable, but they 
were not particularly harsh or as significant as in the case of previous policies examined 
and at the end of 2012 Iran even showed willingness to negotiate. (See: Cooper-Landler 
[2012]) The evidence presented is overwhelmingly circumstantial and indirect, thus, it 
is difficult to tell whether the relatively minimal blowback effect occurred because of 
containment per se. One possible reason is that the author examined only the short 
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period between the (re)introduction of containment in June 2010 and the start of the 
Tunisian demonstrations (December 18, 2010), since the latter date had been defined as 
the end of the time interval researched in the dissertation.  
 This means that in six out of seven cases the hypothesis provides a good 
explanation of why the realization of US national interests suffered difficulties. The final 
policy examined does not provide sufficient evidence of the relationship suggested by 
the dissertation.  Expressed in numbers, this is approximately an 86% accuracy. Thus, 
86% of the time it held that the tougher policies the US pursued toward Iran (Xa), the 
more likely it was to suffer unintended consequences (Yb).   
 Inverse logic leads one to believe that a Strategy of Seeking the Least Resistance 
(SSLR) could be the best possible strategy for finding a solution to the US-Iran 
stalemate (H1b). Since aggressive strategies have not worked out, a good case can be 
made that nonaggressive tools should be given priority. The one tool that this leaves 
the US with is diplomacy without any sort of pressure. In fact, the Obama 
administration started off right – engagement was the way to go forward. To the extent 
it was pursued, it did produce some limited results such as the negotiations themselves 
and an initial Iranian agreement to the Geneva offer. However, as pressure was also 
applied, Iran thought that it was falling for a trap set by the US and that US overtures 
were never really sincere. It has to be emphasized that it was not the Obama 
administration per se who made a mistake. The case was that domestic and foreign 
circumstances limited Obama’s maneuvering space. (See: Parsi [2012])   
Arguing for a SSLR does not mean that such an approach will inevitably and 
automatically lead to a solution. However, it does mean that it could create the 
circumstances conducive to a solution. The difference between the two is essential for 
understanding the limits of both H1a and H1b. 
 Obviously, a number of questions arise concerning the SSLR concept. First, 
doesn’t the concept of “pure diplomacy” or “diplomacy alone” go against the entire 
concept of strategic thought and grand strategic thought in particular, both of which 
focus on an ideal combination of a number of tools in order to reach certain goals? 
Doesn’t the US make itself (look) weak by denouncing other tools for pressuring 
Tehran? It is true that an ideal combination of tools is always the key to achieving 
specific foreign policy objectives. The US-Iran stalemate, however, is different. The 
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author argues that there are only three options on Iran: airstrikes, containment and 
engagement. Containment has been pursued by just about every US administration since 
1979 without causing a significant change in Iranian policies. It is interesting that 
whenever a given US administration failed at implementing its individual grand design 
on Iran or the Middle East in general, it always returned to the strategy of containment. 
This is particularly the case with the three presidencies examined in this thesis.  
 Airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities and other military installations is another 
theoretical option. However, as the author pointed out earlier, there is a strong 
consensus among mainstream experts that a military solution to the present stalemate 
would have disastrous regional consequences, thus, it is not a viable option. (See also: 
[Balogh [2010a]). 
 The only strategy that has not been tried yet is “diplomacy alone.” No one sat 
down to talk with Iran so far without applying some form of pressure. Containment is 
unable to produce real results apart from significantly weakening Iran and the military 
option is not a realistic one. Furthermore, a combination of different tools (e.g. pressure 
and engagement) has not yielded returns either. This leaves the US with only one viable 
strategy: the policy of pursuing “diplomacy alone.” This would also entail the lifting of 
some of the tougher sanctions as suggested by others. (Parsi-Marashi [2012]) This 
would deprive Iranian hardliners of their talking point regarding “real change for real 
change”, meaning that as long as real actions are not taken, rhetoric is not enough by 
itself.  
 SSLR is proven right indirectly due to the fact that aggressive strategies do not 
work and the fact that it has not been tried yet. Thus, H1b is proven right because H1a is 
proven right. By logically closing out other possibilities, theoretically only one possible 
path may work and that is the SSLR. Essentially, SSLR is not entirely different from H1a 
– H1b is the inverse of H1a. Of course, in reality, H1b may be difficult to prove right 
because there is no empirical evidence, since no one has ever tried easing the pressure 
on Iran while pursuing diplomacy at the same time. Additionally, the counterproductive 
nature of pursuing aggressive policies does not necessarily mean that pursuing 
nonaggressive policies will be effective and successful. But that is not what H1a and 
H1b are about – H1a and H1b only propose that nonaggressive policies produce 
circumstances conducive to realizing US national interests. Thus, in a logical and 
strictly theoretical sense, H1b is proven right.  
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 There is one more caveat to H1b as applied to the US and Iran. Neoclassical 
Realism suggests that domestic political constituencies have special relevance in 
influencing foreign policies. An SSLR can only work if the domestic political situation 
in both the US and Iran is permissive in that regard. Diplomatic engagement coupled 
with the easing of pressure on Iran can be suitable for accommodating certain US and 
Iranian constituencies, however, there will always be significant domestic political 
forces, which will not support such solutions. (Parsi [2012]) This defines the domestic 
political limits of applying the SSLR-approach. Furthermore, the assumption that only 
negotiations may resolve the two countries’ dispute also means that Neoclassical 
Realism has its limits. The inherent assumption behind the prospective success of talks 
is that direct contacts may help change the mindset of the players. Thus, the final steps 
toward full reconciliation may at least partly be explained by applying a constructive 
lens.  
 Finally, one also has to address the possibilities of the general application of 
H1a-b and the blowback hypothesis in general. Can H1 be applied in general, meaning 
that aggressive policies do not pay off and the SSLR has a universal applicability? The 
answer to this is that H1 can be applied universally, however, only with significant 
caveats. It is the philosophy behind H1 that has universal implications. This is to say 
that it is obviously desirable to follow a strategy which seeks to avoid resistance in 
general. Thus, the philosophy behind H1 could provide a general guidance for foreign 
policy makers.   
This, however, does not mean that relying on the use of force or other forms of 
aggressive behavior in international relations should not be part of national foreign 
policy tools – quite to the contrary. Indeed, in some cases the SSLR will imply applying 
force, provided that the costs and consequences are carefully calculated and considered 
durable. Thus, the blowback hypothesis is not a pacifist approach to international 
relations. There will be a great number of cases in which the application of force by a 
state against another will make sense because the attacker will not suffer long term 
blowback effects. However, the exact implications of applying the theory to other cases 
needs to be further researched. There could be a point of inflection, beyond which costs 
associated with aggressive policies and applying force could turn into payoffs – e.g. the 
application of force by a great power against a middle or a small power not possessing 
resources of strategic importance (e.g. oil, natural gas, minerals and other raw 
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materials). The difference with the US-Iran relationship is that Iran is still deeply 
embedded in the regional and global economy despite all the sanctions and containment. 
Thus, the first blowback effect of any military action against Iran would be steeply and 
rapidly increasing world oil prices. Furthermore, Iran is also an important part of the 
Middle Eastern social and political fabric; hence, in Iran’s case there is no inflection 
point beyond which the escalation of pressure and force could bring positive results. 
 
* 
 
Overall, the author found that the blowback hypothesis has a significant 
relevance in explaining why the US has not succeeded in remedying problems of the 
US-Iran relationship so far. The author has to emphasize that a fair share of the 
responsibility for lack of a solution to the stalemate belongs to Iran. The thesis 
highlighted how Iranian nefarious activities reduced the chances of resolving the 
conflict between the two entities. However, this dissertation examined the Iran policy of 
the US, thus, the US perspective prevailed throughout the research. The author applied a 
critical approach to US Iran policies in order to try and find the solution to one of the 
most vexing foreign and security policy dilemmas of contemporary international 
relations. The main driving force behind this dissertation was not to criticize the US. 
Rather, the objective was to provide an objective analysis and a possible explanation of 
what kept the two sides from resolving their conflicts so far. The author sincerely hopes 
that he succeeded in contributing to the present theoretical debate on the US-Iran 
stalemate and the discipline of strategic thought in general.  
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Appendix: Relevant Speeches of President George W. 
Bush Mentioning Iran 2001–2009 in Chronological 
Order 
 
Speeches from 2001 to the March 16, 2006 release of the 2006 US National Security 
Strategy 
 
 
Text of Bush’s address. September 11, 2001. CNN US. http://articles.cnn.com/2001-09-
11/us/bush.speech.text_1_attacks-deadly-terrorist-acts-despicable-
acts?_s=PM:US Accessed: 27-08-2012 
 
Transcript of President Bush’s address to a joint session of Congress on Thursday night, 
September 20, 2001. September 21, 2001. CNN US 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript/ Accessed: 27-
08-2012 
 
State of the Union address by George W. Bush. Washington, D.C., January 29, 2002. 
http://articles.cnn.com/2002-01-29/politics/bush.speech.txt_1_firefighter-
returns-terrorist-training-camps-interim-leader?_s=PM:ALLPOLITICS 
Accessed: 28-08-2012 
 
Text of Bush’s Speech at West Point. June 1, 2002, The New York Times. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/01/international/02PTEX-
WEB.html?pagewanted=all Accessed: 28-08-2012  
 
State of the Union Address by George W. Bush. Washington, DC, January 28, 2003. 
Speeches from George W. Bush's First Term, Presidential Rhetoric 
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/01.28.03.html Accessed: 
05-10-2012 
 
Freedom in Iraq and Middle East: Address at the 20th Anniversary of the National 
Endowment for Democracy by George W. Bush.Washington, D.C., 
November 6, 2003. Speeches from George W. Bush's First Term, 
Presidential Rhetoric 
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/11.06.03.html  Accessed: 
05-10-2012 
 
Address at Whitehall Palace by George W. Bush. 
London, England 
November 19, 2003.  Speeches from George W. Bush's First Term, 
Presidential Rhetoric. 
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/11.19.03.html Accessed: 
05-10-2012 
 
 
 
 
219 
 
State of the Union Address by George W. Bush. 
Washington, DC, January 20, 2004. Speeches from George W. Bush's 
First Term, Presidential Rhetoric 
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/01.20.04.html  Accessed: 
05-10-2012 
 
Speech to the Republican Governors Association by George W. Bush. 
Washington, DC, February 23, 2004. Speeches from George W. Bush's 
First Term, Presidential Rhetoric. 
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/02.23.04.html Accessed: 
05-10-2012  
 
Defending the War – Speech by George W. Bush. 
Kuztown, PA 
July 9, 2004.  Speeches from George W. Bush's First Term, Presidential 
Rhetoric. http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/07.09.04.html  
Accessed: 05-10-2012  
 
Defending the War – Speech by George W. Bush. 
Oak Ridge, TN 
July 12, 2004. Speeches from George W. Bush's First Term, Presidential 
Rhetoric. http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/07.12.04.html 
Accessed: 05-10-2012  
 
State of the Union Address by George W. Bush. 
Washington, DC, 
February 2, 2005 Speeches from George W. Bush's Second Term, 
Presidential Rhetoric. 
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/02.02.05.html Accessed: 
05-10-2012  
 
Speech at the National Defense University by George W. Bush. 
Fort Lesley J. McNair 
March 8, 2005. Speeches from George W. Bush's Second Term, 
Presidential Rhetoric. 
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/03.08.05.html Accessed: 
05-10-2012  
 
Speech at the National Endowment for Democracy by George W. Bush. 
Washington, DC, 
October 6, 2005. Speeches from George W. Bush's Second Term, 
Presidential Rhetoric. 
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/10.06.05.html Accessed: 
05-10-2012   
 
Veterans Day Address: Defending the War – Speech by George W. Bush. 
Tobyhanna, Pennsylvania, November 11, 2005. Speeches from George 
W. Bush's Second Term, Presidential Rhetoric. 
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/11.11.05.html Accessed: 
05-10-2012   
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The Struggle for Democracy in Iraq: Speech to the World Affairs Council of 
Philadelphia by George W. Bush. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, December 
12, 2005. Speeches from George W. Bush's Second Term, Presidential 
Rhetoric. http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/12.12.05.html 
Accessed: 05-10-2012    
 
State of the Union Address by George W. Bush. 
Washington, DC, January 31, 2006. Speeches from George W. Bush's 
Second Term, Presidential Rhetoric. 
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/01.31.06.html Accessed: 
05-10-2012  
 
The 2006 Agenda: Address at the Grand Ole Opry by George W. Bush. 
Nashville, Tennessee, February 1, 2006. Speeches from George W. 
Bush's Second Term, Presidential Rhetoric. 
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/02.01.06.html Accessed: 
05-10-2012   
 
Status of the War on Terror: Address to the National Guard – Speech by George W. 
Bush. 
Washington, DC, February 9, 2006. Speeches from George W. Bush's 
Second Term, Presidential Rhetoric. 
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/02.09.06.html Accessed: 
05-10-2012   
 
Violence in Iraq & The War on Terror: Address to the American Legion – Speech by 
George W. Bush.Washington, DC, 
February 24, 2006. Speeches from George W. Bush's Second Term, 
Presidential Rhetoric. 
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/02.24.06.html Accessed: 
05-10-2012    
 
The U.S., India, and Nuclear Technology: Address in New Delhi – Speech by George W. 
Bush. 
New Delhi, India 
March 3, 2006. Speeches from George W. Bush's Second Term, 
Presidential Rhetoric. 
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/03.03.06.html Accessed: 
05-10-2012 
 
Focus on Iraq: Address to the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies – Speech by 
George W. Bush. Washington, DC, 
March 13, 2006. Speeches from George W. Bush's Second Term, 
Presidential Rhetoric. 
http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/03.13.06.html Accessed: 
05-10-2012  
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Speeches from the March 16, 2006 release of the 2006 US National Security 
Strategy to 2009 
 
The United States, China, and the Global Economy: 
The Remarks of President Bush and President Hu of the People's 
Republic of China – Speech by George W. Bush. Washington, DC, April 
20, 2006. Speeches from George W. Bush's Second Term, Presidential 
Rhetoric. http://www.presidentialrhetoric.com/speeches/04.20.06.html 
Accessed:30-11-2012  
 
Conflict in the Middle East: News Conference with President Bush and Secretary of 
State Condoleezza Rice – Speech by George W. Bush. 
Crawford, Texas,  
August 7, 2006. Speeches from George W. Bush's Second Term, 
Presidential Rhetoric. 
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